other minds

The classical problem of why we believe that other people (and perhaps at least the higher animals) have sensations, thoughts, and so on, essentially similar to our own. It seems that we draw a widespread analogy from our own behaviour, and related internal affective states, to the internal states of other people (and sometimes animals), especially when their behaviour is similar to ours. Some clinical states, especially coma, are very difficult to interpret or 'read', as behaviour is no longer typical or at all like our own.

Given that computers are developing some abilities until recently thought specifically human, the question of whether computers can have minds is rapidly becoming a significant issue. As Alan Turing suggested, we may say that a computer is as 'intelligent' as a human if it answers questions as a human does; but would we say that the computer is conscious, or aware, as we are? Has it a mind? Such questions may give behaviourism its prima facie scientific validity — though behaviourism rejects what we take to be the most important fact of at least our minds: consciousness.

(Published 1987)

— Richard L. Gregory

Bibliography
• Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brain Storms.
• Wisdom, J. (1952). Other Minds.

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