In the philosophy of science, the pessimistic induction, also known as the pessimistic meta-induction, is an argument which seeks to rebut scientific realism, particularly the scientific realist's notion of epistemic optimism.
Scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our presently successful scientific theories are true or approximately true, where approximate truth means that the central terms of such theories genuinely refer. The pessimistic meta-induction undermines the realist's warrant for his epistemic optimism via historical counterexample. Larry Laudan argues that the history of science is a "graveyard" of once empirically successful theories whose central terms have been found not to refer. For example, 18th century optical aether theory and the humoral theory of medicine were incredibly successful, and yet we no longer believe in the existence of aether, nor would we want to label such theories as having been approximately true. Using meta-induction, Laudan then argues that if past scientific theories which were successful were found to be false, we have no reason to believe the realist's claim that our currently successful theories are approximately true. The pessimistic meta-induction argument was first fully postulated by Laudan in 1981 and survives to this day as one of the strongest arguments against scientific realism.
References
- Laudan, Larry. "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, (Mar. 1981): 19-49.
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