In December 1640 a palace coup in support of the duke of Bragança and his acclamation as King John IV restored the Portuguese monarchy and ended sixty years of rule by the Spanish Habsburgs. From 1641 to 1668 the two nations were at war, with Spain seeking to isolate Portugal militarily and diplomatically and Portugal hoping to find the resources to maintain its independence through political alliances and colonial income.
The military aspects of the war fall into three periods: an early stage when a few major engagements demonstrated that the Portuguese could not be easily returned to submission; a long second period (1646–1660) of military standoffs characterized by small-scale raiding, while Spain concentrated on its military commitments elsewhere in Europe; and a final period (1660–1668) during which the Spanish king Philip IV unsuccessfully sought a major engagement that would bring an end to hostilities.
Spain in early 1641 faced a war with France as well as rebellions in both Catalonia and Portugal. Hoping for a quick victory in Portugal, Spain immediately committed seven regiments to the Portuguese frontier, but delays by the count of Monterrey, a commander more interested in the comforts of camp than of the battlefield, lost any immediate advantage. A Portuguese counter-thrust in late 1641 failed, and the conflict soon settled into a stalemate, especially after a major column under the Neapolitan marquis of Torrecusa was stopped at Montijo in 1644 by the Portuguese under the Brazilian-trained Matias de Albuquerque, one of a number of experienced Portuguese colonial officers who rose to prominence during the war. Shortly thereafter, in November 1644, Torrecusa crossed from Badajoz in a rare winter campaign to attack Elvas, where he suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat back across the border.
The war now took on a peculiar character as a frontier confrontation, often between local forces that knew each other well, but whose familiarity did not diminish the destructive effects on either side. The bloody nature of the combat was often exacerbated by the use of foreign troops and mercenaries. Incidents of singular cruelty were reported on both sides as the Portuguese settled old animosities, while Spanish commanders often took the view that their opponents were disloyal and rebellious subjects, not an opposing army entitled to the rules of combat.
Three theaters were eventually opened, but most activity focused on the northern front and on the frontier between Portuguese Alemtejo and Spanish Extremadura. The southern front in Spanish Andalusia was a logical target for Portugal, but it never bore the full weight of Portuguese attack, probably because the Portuguese queen, Luisa de Gusmão (Guzmán), was the sister of the duke of Medina Sidonia, the leading noble of Andalusia. Spain at first made the war defensive. Portugal, for its part, felt no need to take Spanish territory in order to win, and it too was willing to make the war a defensive one. Campaigns typically consisted of correrias, or 'cavalry raids', burning fields, sacking towns, and appropriating large herds of enemy cattle and sheep. Soldiers and officers primarily interested in booty and prone to desertion were poor instruments for the conduct of serious war. For long periods, without men or money, neither side mounted formal campaigns, and when actions were taken, they were often driven as much by political considerations, such as Portugal's need to impress its potential allies, as by clear military objectives. Year by year, given the transportation problems of campaigning in winter and the heat and dry conditions of summer, most fighting was limited to the spring and fall.
The war settled into a pattern of mutual destruction. As early as December 1641 there were Spanish complaints that "our Extremadura is finished." Tax collectors, recruiting officers, the billeting of soldiers, and depredation by Spanish and foreign troops were feared as much by the Spanish population as the destructive raids of the enemy. In Extremadura, local militias bore the brunt of the fighting until 1659, and this was destructive to agriculture and local finances. Since there was often no money to pay or support the troops or to reward commanders, the crown turned a blind eye to the contraband, disorder, and destruction on the frontier. Similar conditions also existed among the Portuguese forces.
The war was also expensive. In the 1650s there were over 20,000 Spanish troops in Extremadura alone, compared to 27,000 in Flanders. Between 1649 and 1654 about 29 percent (over six million ducats) of Spanish defense spending went to Portugal, a figure that rose during the major campaigns of the 1660s. Portugal was able to finance the war because of its ability to tax the spice trade from Asia and the sugar trade from Brazil, and because of support from the European opponents of Spain, particularly Holland, France, and England.
The 1650s were indecisive militarily but important on the political and diplomatic fronts. The death of John IV, the former duke of Bragança, in 1656 brought the regency of his wife, followed by a succession crisis and a palace coup (1662). Despite these domestic problems, the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil (1654) and the signing of a treaty with England (1654) improved Portugal's diplomatic and financial position for a while and gave it needed protection against a naval attack on Lisbon. Nonetheless, the major goal of a formal pact with France continued to evade Portugal, whose weakness and isolation had been driven home by its virtual exclusion at the negotiations for the general European peace of Westphalia (1648). With that treaty and the end of hostilities in Catalonia in 1652, Spain was again ready to direct its attention against Portugal but faced a lack of men, resources, and especially good military commanders.
By 1662 Spain committed to a major effort to end the rebellion. Don Juan José de Austria, Philip IV's illegitimate son, led some 14,000 men into Alemtejo and in the following year succeeded in taking Évora, the major city of the region. The Portuguese under the marquis of Marialva and the German soldier of fortune Friedrich Hermann von Schönberg, the duke of Schomberg, who had been contracted along with other foreign officers to bolster the Portuguese forces, were able to turn the tide. They defeated the Spanish in a major engagement at Ameixial (8 June 1663), forcing Don Juan José to abandon Évora and retreat across the border.
The Portuguese now had some 30,000 troops in this theater, but they could not draw the Spanish into a major engagement until June 1665, when a new Spanish commander, the marquis of Caracena, took over Vilaviciosa with about 23,000 men, including recruits from Germany and Italy. The Portuguese relief column under Schomburg met them at Montes Claros (17 June 1665). The Portuguese infantry and gun emplacements broke the Spanish cavalry, and the Spanish force lost over 10,000 men as casualties and prisoners. This was the last major engagement of the war. Both sides returned to skirmishing campaigns. Portugal, with the intercession of its English ally, had sought a truce, but after the Portuguese victory at Montes Claros and with the signing of a Franco-Portuguese treaty in 1667, Spain finally agreed to recognize Portugal's independence (13 February 1668).
The war proved costly to both sides. Portugal won its independence at a high price in terms of concessions it made to forge the alliances needed for its political survival. Its economy was damaged by reduced access to Spanish-American silver and colonial losses. The effect on Spain was difficult to calculate. The economy of Spanish Galicia and especially Extremadura were devastated, and the reputation of Spanish arms suffered badly. The war drained resources and men for almost three decades. It may well be true, as the historian R. A. Stradling has said, that the war with Portugal, "ended contributing more than any other single factor to the final dissolution of Spanish hegemony."
Bibliography
Bouza Álvarez, Fernando. Portugal no tempo dos Felipes. Lisbon, 2000.
Livermore, H. V. A History of Portugal. Cambridge, U.K., 1947.
Magalhães Godinho, Vitorino. "1580 e a restauração." In Ensaios, 3 vols. Vol. 2, pp. 255–292. Lisbon, 1968.
Stradling, R. A. Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580–1720. London and Boston, 1981.
Valladares, Rafael. La rebellion de Portugal, 1640–1680. Valladolid, Spain, 1998.
White, Louise. "War and Government in a Castilian Province: Extremadura, 1640–1668." Ph. D. diss., University of East Anglia, 1985.
—STUART B. SCHWARTZ
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Acclamation of John IV as King of Portugal, painting by Veloso Salgado in the Military Museum, Lisbon. |
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| John IV of Portugal Afonso VI of Portugal Prince Regent Peter of Portugal António Luís de Meneses Sancho Manoel de Vilhena Duke of Schomberg Matias de Albuquerque |
Philip IV of Spain Queen Regent Marianna of Spain Luis de Haro John of Austria Duke of Osuna Marquis of Caracena |
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The Portuguese Restoration War (Portuguese: Guerra da Restauração) was the name given by nineteenth-century 'romantic' historians to the war between Portugal and Spain that began with the Portuguese revolution of 1640 and ended with the Treaty of Lisbon (1668). The revolution of 1640 ended the sixty-year period of dual monarchy in Portugal and Spain under the Spanish Habsburgs.[3][4] The period from 1640 to 1668 was marked by periodic skirmishes between Portugal and Spain, as well as short episodes of more serious warfare, much of it occasioned by Spanish and Portuguese entanglements with non-Iberian powers.
In the seventeenth century and afterwards, this period of sporadic conflict was simply known, in Portugal and elsewhere, as the Acclamation War. The war established the sovereignty of Portugal's new ruling dynasty, the House of Braganza, by deposing a foreign king, Philip IV of Spain, and acclaiming another one, João IV of Portugal, who was more legitimate and suitable to the Portuguese. This ended the so-called Iberian Union.
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When Philip II of Portugal (known as Philip III in Spain) died, he was succeeded by Philip III (Philip IV of Spain) who had a different approach to Portuguese issues. Taxes on the Portuguese merchants were raised, the Portuguese nobility began to lose its influence at the Spanish Cortes, and government posts in Portugal were increasingly occupied by Spaniards. Ultimately, Philip III tried to make Portugal a Spanish province, and Portuguese nobles stood to lose all of their power.
This situation culminated in a coup d'état organized by the nobility and bourgeoisie, executed on 1 December 1640, sixty years after the crowning of Philip I (Philip II of Spain), the first "dual monarch". The plot was planned by Antão Vaz de Almada, Miguel de Almeida, and João Pinto Ribeiro. They, together with several associates, killed the Secretary of State, Miguel de Vasconcelos, and imprisoned the king's cousin, Margaret of Savoy, who had been governing Portugal in his name. The moment was well chosen; Philip's troops were, at the time, fighting the Thirty Years' War and also facing a revolution in Catalonia which became known as the Reapers' War.
The support of the people became apparent almost immediately, and, within a matter of hours, John, 8th Duke of Braganza was acclaimed as King John IV of Portugal; the news spread like wildfire throughout the country. By 2 December 1640, the day following the coup, John IV, acting in his capacity as sovereign of the country, had already sent a letter to the Municipal Chamber of Évora.
The ensuing conflict with Spain brought Portugal into the Thirty Years War as, at least, a peripheral player. From 1641 to 1668, the period during which the two nations were at war, Spain sought to isolate Portugal militarily and diplomatically, and Portugal tried to find the resources to maintain its independence through savvy political alliances and maintenance of its colonial income.
Immediately after assuming the Portuguese throne, João IV took several steps to strengthen his position. On 11 December 1640, a 'Council of War' was created to organize all of the operations. Next, the king created the 'Junta of the Frontiers' to take care of the fortresses near the border, the hypothetical defense of Lisbon, and the garrisons and sea ports. A year later, in December 1641, he created a tenancy to assure that all of the country's fortresses would be upgraded and that the improvements would be financed with regional taxes. João IV also organized the army, re-established the 'Military Laws of King Sebastian', and undertook a diplomatic campaign focused on restoring good relations with England.
After gaining several small victories, João tried to make peace quickly. However, his demand that Philip recognize the new ruling dynasty in Portugal was not fulfilled until the reign of his son, Afonso VI, during the regency of Peter of Braganza (another of his sons who later became King Peter II of Portugal.) Difficulties with Spain lasted twenty-eight years.
In 1640, Cardinal Richelieu, then chief adviser to Louis XIII of France, was fully aware of the fact that France was operating under strained circumstances. She was at war with Castile at that time; she had to control rebellions within France that were supported and financed by Madrid; and she had to send French armies to fight the Spanish Habsburgs on three different fronts. In addition to their shared frontier at the Pyrenees, Philip IV of Spain, formerly Philip III of Portugal as well, reigned, under various titles, in Flanders and Franche-Comté, to the north and east of France. In addition, Philip IV controlled large territories in Italy, where he could, at will, impose a fourth front by attacking French-controlled Savoy. (In Savoy, Christine Marie of France was acting as regent on behalf of her young son, Charles Emmanuel II, Duke of Savoy.)
Spain had enjoyed a reputation as having the most formidable military force in Europe, a reputation they had gained with the introduction of the arquebus and the so called "Spanish School". This reputation and tactic had however diminished with The Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, the consummate statesman, Richelieu, decided to force Philip IV to look to his own internal problems. In order to divert the Spanish troops besieging France, Louis XIII, on the advice of Richelieu, supported the claim of João IV of Portugal during the Acclamation War. This was done on the reasoning that a Portuguese war would drain Spanish resources and manpower.
To fulfill the common foreign-policy interests of Portugal and France, a treaty of alliance between the two countries was concluded at Paris on 1 June 1641. It lasted eighteen years before Richelieu's successor as unofficial foreign minister, Cardinal Mazarin, broke the treaty and abandoned his Portuguese and Catalan allies to sign a separate peace with Madrid. The Treaty of the Pyrenees was signed in 1659, under the terms of which France received the portion of Catalonia north of the Pyrenees, known as the Roussillon, and part of the Cerdanya (French Cerdagne). Most important to the Portuguese, the French recognised Philip IV of Spain as the legitimate king of Portugal.
Seven years later, in the late stages of the Portuguese Restoration War, relations between the two countries thawed to the extent that the young (but sickly) Afonso VI of Portugal married a French princess, Marie Françoise of Nemours.
At the time of the coup in Lisbon (December 1640), the Portuguese had been at war with the Dutch for nearly forty years. A good deal of the conflict can be attributed to the fact that Spain and the Netherlands were concurrently engaged in the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), and, ever since hostilities between Portugal and the Netherlands erupted in 1602, Portugal had been ruled by a Spanish monarch.
The Dutch-Portuguese War was fought almost entirely overseas, with the Dutch mercantile surrogates, the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch West India Company, repeatedly attacking Portugal's colonial possessions in the Americas, in Africa, in India, and in the Far East. Portugal was in a defensive posture throughout, and it received very little military help from Spain.
After the acclamation of João IV, this pattern persisted all over the Portuguese Empire until the final expulsion of the Dutch from Angola (1648), São Tomé and Príncipe (1649), and Brazil (1654). The Dutch signed a European truce with Portugal, helping each other somewhat against their common enemy, Castile. The Dutch resumed buying salt in the Setúbal salt factories, restarting commerce between the two countries for the first time since 1580, when the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs, against whom the Dutch were in revolt, had assumed the Portuguese throne.
England was, at this time, embroiled in its own civil war. Portuguese problems in dealing with England arose from the fact that the English Parliament fought and won its anti-royalist war while, at the same time, Portugal's royal court continued to receive and recognize English princes and nobles. These strained relations persisted during the short-lived Commonwealth period in the British Isles, when the republican government that had deposed Charles I ruled the country.
After the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in England (as well as Scotland and Ireland), it became possible for Portugal to compensate for the loss of limited French support by renewing its traditional alliance with England. This took the form of a dynastic marriage between Charles II and Afonso VI's sister, Catherine of Braganza, which assured Portugal of outside support in its conflict with Castile. It was largely due to the English alliance that peace with Spain became possible at war's end; Spain had been drained by the Thirty Years' War, and it had no stomach for further warfare with other European powers, especially a resurgent England.
Militarily, the Portuguese Restoration War consisted mainly of border skirmishes and cavalry raids to sack border towns, combined with occasional invasions and counter-invasions, many of them half-hearted and under-financed. There were only five major set-piece battles during twenty-eight years of hostilities.
The war may be considered to have had three periods:
Hoping for a quick victory in Portugal, Spain immediately committed seven regiments to the Portuguese frontier, but delays by the count of Monterrey, a commander with more interest in the comforts of life at camp than the battlefield, squandered any immediate advantage. A Portuguese counter-thrust in late 1641 failed, and the conflict soon settled into a stalemate.
On 26 May 1644, a large column of Spanish troops and mercenaries, commanded by the Neapolitan marquis of Torrecusa, was stopped at the Battle of Montijo by the Portuguese, who were led by the Matias de Albuquerque, one of a number of experienced Portuguese colonial officers who rose to prominence during the war.
Shortly thereafter, in November 1644, Torrecusa crossed from Badajoz, in a rare winter campaign, to attack the Portuguese town of Elvas, which he besieged for nine days. He suffered heavy losses and was forced back across the border.
The war now took on a peculiar character. It became a frontier confrontation, often between local forces, neighbors who knew each other well, but this familiarity did not moderate the destructive and blood-thirsty impulses of either side. The wanton nature of the combat was often exacerbated by the use of mercenaries and foreign conscripts; incidents of singular cruelty were reported on both sides. The Portuguese settled old animosities that had festered during sixty years of Spanish domination, and the Spanish often took the view that their opponents were disloyal and rebellious subjects, not an opposing army entitled to respectful treatment under the rules of combat.
Three theaters of warfare were eventually opened, but most activity focused on the northern front, near Galicia, and on the central frontier between Portuguese Alentejo and Spanish Extremadura. The southern front, where the Portuguese Algarve abuts Spanish Andalusia, was a logical target for Portugal, but it was never the focus of a Portuguese attack, probably because the Portuguese queen, Luisa de Guzmán, was the sister of the duke of Medina Sidonia, the leading noble of Andalusia.
Spain, at first, made the war a defensive one. Portugal, for its part, felt no need to take Spanish territory in order to win, and it too was willing to make the war a defensive contest. Campaigns typically consisted of correrias (cavalry raids) to burn fields, sack towns, and steal large herds of enemy cattle and sheep. Soldiers and officers, many of them mercenaries, were primarily interested in booty and prone to desertion. For long periods, without men or money, neither side mounted formal campaigns, and when actions were taken, they were often driven as much by political considerations, such as Portugal's need to impress potential allies, as by clear military objectives. Year after year, given the problems of campaigning in the winter, and the heat and dry conditions of summer, most of the serious fighting was confined to two relatively-short "campaign seasons" in the spring and fall.
The war settled into a pattern of mutual destruction. As early as December 1641, it was common to hear Spaniards throughout the country lament that "Extremadura is finished." Tax collectors, recruiting officers, billeted soldiers, and depredations by Spanish and foreign troops were loathed and feared by the Spanish population as much as raids by the enemy. In Extremadura, local militias bore the brunt of the fighting until 1659, and the absence of these part-time soldiers was extremely harmful to agriculture and local finances. Since there was often no money to pay or support the troops (or to reward their commanders), the Spanish crown turned a blind eye to the smuggling, contraband, profiteering, disorder, and destruction that had become rampant on the frontier. Similar conditions also existed among the Portuguese.
The war was also expensive. In the 1650s, there were over 20,000 Spanish troops in Extremadura alone, compared to 27,000 in Flanders. Between 1649 and 1654, about 29 percent (over six million ducats) of Spanish defence spending was appropriated for fighting Portugal, a figure that rose during the major campaigns of the 1660s. Portugal was able to finance its war effort because of its ability to tax the spice trade with Asia and the sugar trade from Brazil, and it received some support from the European opponents of Spain, particularly Holland, France, and England.
The 1650s were indecisive militarily but important on the political and diplomatic fronts. The death of João IV in 1656 signalled the beginning of the regency of his wife, followed by a succession crisis and a palace coup (1662). Despite these domestic problems, the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil (1654) and the signing of a treaty with England (also in 1654) improved Portugal's diplomatic and financial position temporarily and gave it needed protection against a naval raid on Lisbon.
Nonetheless, the overriding goal, a formal pact with France continued to evade Portugal, whose weakness and isolation had been driven home by its virtual exclusion at the negotiations for the European settlement-of-settlements, the new realpolitik of the peace of Westphalia (1648).
With this treaty and the end of hostilities in Catalonia in 1652, Spain was again ready to direct its efforts against Portugal, but it faced a lack of men, resources, and, especially, good military commanders.
By 1662, Spain had committed itself to a major effort to end the rebellion. John of Austria the Younger, Philip IV's illegitimate son, led 14,000 men into Alentejo, and, the following year, they succeeded in taking Évora, the major city of the region. The Portuguese, under António Luís de Meneses, 1st Marquess of Marialva and the German soldier of fortune, Friedrich Hermann von Schönberg, the duke of Schomberg, who had been contracted, along with other foreign officers and over 2,000 English troops to bolster the leadership of Portuguese forces, were able to turn the tide. They defeated the Spanish in a major engagement at Ameixial on 8 June 1663, and this forced John of Austria to abandon Évora and retreat across the border.
The Portuguese now had some 30,000 troops in the Alentejo-Extremadura theater, but they could not draw the Spanish into a major engagement until June 1665, when a new Spanish commander, the marquis of Caracena, took over Vila Viçosa with about 23,000 men, including recruits from Germany and Italy. The Portuguese relief column under António Luís de Meneses and Schomberg met them at Montes Claros on 17 June 1665. The Portuguese infantry and gun emplacements broke the Spanish cavalry, and the Spanish force lost over 10,000 men, including casualties and prisoners. Shortly thereafter, the Portuguese retook Vila Viçosa. These were the last major engagements of the war.
Both sides returned to skirmishing campaigns. Portugal, with the intercession of its English ally, had sought a truce, but after the decisive Portuguese victory at Montes Claros and with the signing of a Franco-Portuguese treaty in 1667, Spain finally agreed to recognize Portugal's independence on 13 February 1668.
The five major battles of the war were:
The Portuguese were victorious in all of these engagements, and peace was concluded, with the help of English mediation, by the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668.
Happily for Portugal, its restoration of independence from Spain was clearly established, and it proved that it could fend for itself, albeit with difficulty. Its victories on the battlefield had re-awakened Portuguese nationalism.
Nonetheless, Portugal remained economically weak, agriculturally underdeveloped, dependent on English grain, and hungry for foreign trade goods in general, especially woven cloth. Luís de Meneses, the Count of Ericeira, economic adviser to the prince regent, advocated the development of a native textile industry based on a Flemish model. Factories were established at Covilhã, in an area of central Portugal where there was easy access to flocks of sheep and clean mountain water, but they were highly unpopular with both local consumers and traditional weavers. Meanwhile, Portuguese attempted to develop a silk industry, but this was undercut by the French, who wanted to monopolize that market.
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