San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 1 (1973), argued 12 Oct. 1972, decided 21 Mar. 1973 by vote of 5 to 4; Powell for the Court, Stewart concurring; Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall in dissent. In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez and other parents residing in Texas' property‐poor Edgewood school district filed a class‐action suit in federal district court contending that their state's school finance law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Texas law, the state appropriated funds to provide each child with a minimum education; local school districts then enriched that basic education with funds derived from locally levied ad valorem property taxes. Because the value of taxable property as well as the number of school‐age children differed greatly among the state's more than one thousand districts, significant interdistrict disparities existed in available enhancement revenues, per‐pupil expenditures, and tax rates.
In 1971, the district court found that the Texas statute operated for property‐poor school districts as a spend‐less, tax‐more system of school finance, and for rich ones as a spend‐more, tax‐less system. Education, the three‐judge panel held unanimously, was a fundamental constitutional right (see Fundamental Rights); wealth‐based classifications, as Texas had created here, were constitutionally suspect. Applying the test of strict scrutiny, the lower court held that the Texas method of school finance deprived plaintiffs of their equal protection guarantees. It ordered the state to finance its schools so that the amount spent on a child's education did not depend upon the wealth of the neighborhood in which the child resided.
In 1973, a divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision and sustained the school finance policy operating in Texas and, in effect, forty‐nine other states. Justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion held that education was not a fundamental right, since it was guaranteed neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Constitution. Texas did not, in any case, deprive any class or anyone of an education, but rather assured that each child in the state received a free minimum education. Moreover, no discrete, wealth‐based class existed against which the state discriminated, since, among other things, some school children from poor families resided in property‐rich school districts expending high per‐pupil amounts on their education. Acknowledging its traditional reluctance to meddle in local fiscal affairs, the Court applied the rational basis (or minimal scrutiny) test. It found that the state's method of school finance, incorporating local choice over tax rates and degree of educational enrichment, furthered the state's legitimate interest in fostering local participation in public education while simultaneously providing every child in the state with a free basic education.
Vigorous dissents registered a spectrum of interpretations and objections. Justice Byron White, also applying the minimal scrutiny test, argued that the statute bore no rational relationship to the state's purported goal of local control, since property‐poor districts had no meaningful enhancement options available to them. Justice William Brennan argued that a fundamental right to education did exist because of education's importance to the enjoyment of rights that are guaranteed explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. Hence, strict scrutiny should apply. Justice Thurgood Marshall argued for the adoption of a variable equal protection standard, one that assessed the characteristics of the class and the importance of the governmental benefits to that class, relative to the government's interest in retaining the classification.
During the decade following the Rodriguez decision, Texas and numerous other states enacted a series of “equalization” reforms but failed to reduce effectively the interdistrict inequities in access to resources, per‐pupil expenditures, and tax rates. In 1984, with federal court pathways foreclosed, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, on behalf of the Edgewood district, Rodriguez, and other plaintiffs, filed suit in a lower state court alleging that Texas school finance policy violated the Texas constitution.
In October 1989 the Texas Supreme Court held unanimously for the petitioners in Edgewood v. Kirby (1989). It declared that the legislature had failed “to establish and make suitable provision for … an efficient system of public free schools” throughout the state, as mandated by Article VII of the Texas constitution (p. 500). Existent inequality among the districts, the justices held, affronted the constitutional vision of efficiency. The court ordered the legislature to redesign its school finance system by 1 May 1990, so that districts would have access to relatively equal revenues per pupil when making equal tax efforts. With this decision, Texas became the tenth state to have its state supreme court declare a school finance law in violation of the state constitution. Since that 1989 decision, however, property‐poor and property‐rich school districts have perpetually challenged the fiscal adequacy and inequality associated with the state's school finance laws, with the Texas supreme court rendering no less than five major constitutional decisions in what seems to be a never‐ending struggle.
See also Education; Race and Racism.
— Richard A. Gambitta
