A term coined in 1915 in a coy attempt to conceal the true purpose of early ‘landships’, which has stuck. The concept dates back at least as far as Leonardo da Vinci, but in the modern era it was the Austrian Gunther Burstyn and the Australian Lancelot de Mole, in 1911 and 1912 respectively, who produced designs that were tanks in all but name, only to be ignored. British interest in landships was fostered by the Admiralty at the insistence of Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Most of the early designs were for vehicles that would transport infantry across no man's land although to begin with designers could not decide whether tracks or huge wheels represented the best means of propulsion. The adoption of the design as we know it was due largely to the engineers Walter Wilson and William Tritton, but nothing would have been achieved without the driving force of Albert Stern, secretary to the Landships Committee.
The earliest British tanks were little more than mechanical battering rams, designed to cross a few hundred yards of rough ground, crush wire, and suppress opposition, enabling the infantry to gain their objective. Slow speed and poor manoeuvrability rendered them unsuitable for more subtle tactics or wide-ranging operations, while their firepower was restricted by their side-mounted gun sponsons. Male tanks carried a pair of 57 mm guns, females only machine guns. There was parallel development in France, largely due to the efforts of Col Estienne of the artillery, but their early designs were more like self-propelled (SP) guns, with poor cross-country capability. Nonetheless the first tank worthy of the name, in the modern sense, was probably the two-man Renault FT-17. It was the first tank to see active service that carried a fully rotating turret and the first to feature the combination of rear mounted engine and final drive which is now almost universal. It was, of course, intended for a more mobile form of warfare, beyond the trenches, and designed to be used in quantity, in theory compensating for lack of protection by overwhelming the defence.
Tanks developed dramatically over the two years from their creation. By the end of WW I Great Britain had produced a dozen different models including SP artillery, an APC, and engineer tanks adaptable to clear mines, place demolition charges, or lay bridges under fire. The British answer to the Renault was the Medium A, or Whippet, which had a separate engine and gearbox for each track, making it notoriously difficult to drive. The Germans, by contrast, were slow to start tank development and the results were not impressive. Their A7V model, of which just twenty examples were built, had a poor cross-country performance and demanded a crew of eighteen. As the war ended they were constructing a monstrous machine, which would have weighed 148 tons had it been completed, a mistake they were to repeat.
The end of the war found Great Britain developing the Medium D, a high speed, amphibious tank of impossible complexity, intended to match the tactical theories of Fuller, while the French, now saddled with hundreds of the little Renaults, were building a 70 ton giant with turrets at each end. Italy, Japan, the USSR, and the USA, meanwhile, developed the Renault with minor variations. Britain took the lead again in 1923 with the so-called Vickers Medium, a turreted tank designed specifically to fight other tanks while on the move, in accordance with Royal Tank Corps doctrine. This was followed by a veritable land battleship with five turrets, known as the Independent, which never got beyond the prototype stage. However, it did create an international fashion for multi-turreted tanks which lasted far too long. The Experimental Armoured Force of 1927/8 placed Britain in the forefront of tactical thinking. It was the first step in the creation of the armoured division but it aroused considerable opposition among the traditional arms, which provided the British government with an excuse to scrap it. Economy also gave rise to tiny tracked vehicles such as the Carden-Loyd Carrier which was influential worldwide, despite being almost useless. The Carden-Loyd also spawned a vast range of two- and three-man light tanks of little practical value which, nevertheless, formed the basis of Vickers-Armstrong's success as a manufacturer and exporter of armoured fighting vehicles.
In the USA J. Walter Christie produced a range of high-speed tanks based on the revolutionary suspension system that bears his name. His work had considerable influence in Russia and Britain, but his abrasive personality caused rejection in his own country, and America developed more pedestrian types that reflected French thinking to some extent. They were mechanically well designed, but were overly wedded to the machine gun. France was producing a range of tanks for infantry and cavalry support which all suffered from a preoccupation with small, one-man turrets that rendered them almost unfightable. Even so the French made considerable strides in the development of cast armour and produced some interesting transmission systems. The Italians also favoured light tanks, which were mechanically sound but crudely constructed to save cost.
In the years leading up to WW II, Britain lost its lead. A new doctrine classified tanks by role: light tanks, little better than tracked armoured cars for reconnaissance; slow, heavily armoured tanks for direct infantry support; and thinly armoured ‘cruiser’ tanks for wide-ranging operations. With another European war in view the British army concentrated on the problems of trench warfare and gave priority to the production of infantry tanks. Along with the Americans, they continued to produce riveted tanks while the Germans and the Soviets were welding theirs, and in addition there was a fundamental difference of approach between the Americans, who made extensive use of machine tools and mass-production techniques, and the British, who tended to rely upon their traditional arms-manufacturing system.
German advocates of armoured warfare were obliged to develop their ideas in secret—during the 1920s in co-operation with their future adversaries, the Red Army. Yet their early work laid the foundations of an impressive striking force that combined tanks with SP artillery and APCs. Likewise in secret the Soviets created a massive tank force which relied extensively on American and British technology but promoted firepower and the employment of armour en masse.
The various national choices of tank technology and doctrine were put to the test in 1940-1, with disastrous early results for both the French and the British at the hands of the Germans, who had found an ideal combination of speed, protection, and hitting power in the Pkw III and IV, fundamentally good designs that proved capable of accepting additional armour and larger guns without suffering any great loss of performance. By contrast the British ‘cruisers’ were neither strong enough to carry additional armour nor designed with enough latitude to accept larger guns, even when these became available. German doctrine also stressed firing when stationary, giving them greater accuracy than the British, trained to fire on the move. In North Africa, Rommel was to demonstrate that, properly handled, even Italian armoured units (the bulk of his force) could be winners, while the absolute superiority of the Afrika Korps tanks became embarrassingly apparent. British tanks were deployed in larger numbers, but they were unreliable and unimaginatively handled, their difficulties compounded by the practice of stowing ammunition in unprotected racks.
A stopgap solution was provided by the American M3 Medium (its different versions known as Grant and Lee to the British), which combined a heavy, hull-mounted gun with a lighter one in a turret, at last giving the long-suffering British tank crews the ability to fire armour-piercing or high-explosive shells from the same gun. The silhouette was too high and the hull mounting was cumbersome, but at last they could confront German tanks from a sensible range, although no answers were found then or later to Rommel's most potent weapon, the dreaded 88 mm anti-tank gun.
Initially designed as an armoured bulldozer to overcome barbed wire and trenches, the tank quickly evolved into a system designed not only for breakthrough but also for exploitation and pursuit. Some variants, like the Soviet T-34, were simple, rugged and built in vast numbers: others, like the German Tiger, were highly engineered but produced in small numbers. Although the tank is often seen as the epitome of land warfare in the late 20th century, tanks have only ever been effective as part of combined-arms teams
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Arriving in Tunisia in 1942 the US army brought with it a doctrine which, in theory, allocated tanks to infantry support while enemy armour was dealt with by dedicated anti-armour vehicles, called tank destroyers. In practice it proved impossible to arrange matters in such a tidy way: tanks fought tanks while tank destroyers proved vulnerable on account of their thinner armour and open tops. The Tunisian campaign also saw the last of British tanks for a while. When the Allies invaded Sicily and in the subsequent Italian campaign, British and Commonwealth forces were equipped with the American Sherman tank and not before 1944 did the British Churchill appear, still inadequate but less inclined to burn than the Sherman.
In the summer of 1942 Germany introduced the 57 ton Tiger armed with the 88 mm anti-armour gun, and later the superb Panther, which outclassed every other tank on the battlefield. The Allies overwhelmed them with numbers, production of the Sherman coming close to 50, 000 against less than 9, 000 of all the heavier German machines. But the best all-round design both in terms of battlefield performance and ease of manufacture was unquestionably the Soviet T-34, produced in greater numbers even than the Sherman, backed up by heavier machines designed to counter the Tiger. The Soviets in WW II pioneered the commonality of parts among combat vehicles which has characterized their approach to armoured warfare to this day, while the West has moved towards the smaller numbers of unique and technologically ‘gold-plated’ designs after the frightful experiences of the hapless Sherman tank crews at the hands of the Germans. Britain developed a number of specialist armour applications based on the ponderous but dependable Churchill, but it was on the immensity of the eastern front that the Germans and Soviets pioneered the use of early APCs and even MICVs.
By 1945 the Soviet T-34 was carrying a larger gun (85 mm) and it was backed up by the sleek, futuristic, and well-armed Stalin. The USA was building larger machines with a respectable 90 mm gun and Britain was on the point of producing the excellent Centurion. In Germany tank production was crushed under the weight of Allied air power and pursued peculiar lines such as the 140 ton Maus. In a sense this increase in size and firepower appeared to vindicate pre-war British theories. Tank guns were, once again, dedicated anti-armour weapons while the adoption of weapon system stabilizers permitted an effective return to the practice of firing on the move.
Post-war, new projectiles such as discarding sabot (APDS) and high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) improved armour penetration and introduced new ways of destroying tanks, but it would be some time before these developments could be matched by improved means of surveillance and target acquisition. Yet the lessons of WW II did not result in immediate consensus. The Americans were developing larger tanks, with cast-armour hulls and turrets, better guns, and air-cooled diesel engines. In Britain policy centred upon a multi-purpose tank in the form of Centurion while the Soviets stuck to their wartime preference for mass production and simplicity in the shape of their T-54/55 and T-62 models. Since the USSR also continued to develop heavier tanks, Britain and America countered with the massive Conqueror and M103. Yet when West Germany revived its tank-building industry the emphasis was on mobility. France tended to follow German thinking and its AMX-30 was even lighter. Britain was now almost alone in staying with petrol engines and not employing torsion bar suspension but the Centurion was so well designed that it was twice up-gunned while in British service and became a major export success.
Other countries were expanding tank production to ensure survival in an ideologically divided world rendered more dangerous by the advent of nuclear weapons. Switzerland produced its own tanks and in Sweden the highly original S-Tank appeared—an almost flat turretless tank destroyer which elevated and depressed its gun by adjusting its suspension. Japan, which only built tanks for home defence, tended to follow American practice while the Chinese simply copied the Soviets. Post-war light tanks ranged from the innovative, air-portable French AMX-13, one of the first tanks to feature an automatic loader, to the technically advanced American M551 Sheridan which, like the simpler Soviet PT-76, was capable of amphibious operation. Britain preferred to rely on armoured cars at this stage but it did continue to develop its experience of specialized armour to a far greater extent than any other nation. APCs were now almost universal, among which the American M113 must be singled out as the most widely deployed.
The appearance of the British Chieftain in the sixties marks a key stage in the development of the tank. In many respects, in terms of multi-fuel power unit, weapon mountings, and reclining driver's position it was highly innovative and may be regarded as the first of the true main battle tanks. At the same time it was the last of a generation of tanks that relied on conventional armour to resist the effect of kinetic energy projectiles. It was the development of new projectiles, notably anti-armour guided missiles, that led to the invention of so-called Chobham armour in Britain and the adoption of reactive armour panels elsewhere. But such developments were not entirely passive. Solid state technology enhanced the effectiveness of surveillance and target acquisition and tanks were now designed to survive on a nuclear battlefield.
Another development of the sixties was the family of armoured fighting vehicles with commonality of parts. An excellent example is the British FV100 series, typified by Scorpion and Scimitar—in effect light tanks—which includes ambulance, recovery, personnel carrying, and anti-armour guided weapon vehicles. In theory the anti-armour guided missile sounded the death knell of the tank. Highly destructive, readily transported, and accurate, they were supposed to be the ultimate ground-based antidote to the tank. In fact the majority of these weapons demand certain conditions to be ideal before they can be used to full effect and have not yet supplanted the high-velocity tank gun.
If trends can be identified in post-war developments then it may be said that Britain and the USA favoured the big gun and thick armour which, in German hands, had caused such carnage during the war. The Germans, on the other hand, now promoted mobility to the point that Leopard 2 is probably the fastest main battle tank in the world while the Soviets simply confirmed their belief that quantity mattered a good deal more than quality. The results of the Arab-Israeli and Gulf wars seem to call this into question, but it seems undeniably right in principle.
Current trends, in addition to a wider adoption of Chobham-type armour, include the use of a gas turbine engine in the US M1A1 Abrams. It delivers 1, 500 hp (against 1, 200 hp for the Perkins diesel in Challenger) but consumes fuel in prodigious quantities and produces a considerable heat signature. Germany pioneered the use of a smooth-bore 120 mm gun in their Leopard 2, which fires fin-stabilized projectiles to compensate for the lack of rifling. Various nations have adopted automatic loading systems for their guns but the Russians have created a system that works in a conventional, rotating turret. The human loader is a tank designer's nightmare. Effectively he can only work standing up which inevitably affects the overall height of the tank. Thus the Russian T-72 has the lowest profile of all modern main battle tanks, but the loading equipment is temperamental at best and, like British tanks in WW II, the ammunition in the crew compartment increases its vulnerability to fire.
British engineers developed a hydro-pneumatic suspension system for Challenger, which works in conjunction with an automatically adjustable idler that maintains correct track tension without the normal hard labour associated with this task. But if one seeks a design worked out in the hard grind of bitterly won battlefield experience, the highly innovative Israeli Merkava takes the prize: it is the only main battle tank in the world with its engine ahead of the fighting compartment, a feature which not only enhances crew protection but enables them to escape through a back door in an emergency rather than clambering out the top, in full view of the enemy.
There remains the possibility that wheels could supersede tracks. The South African defence industry has produced an eight-wheeled vehicle known as the Rooikat which is virtually a wheeled tank. Progress in tyre technology, in conjunction with suspension developments, could soon produce a wheeled vehicle that would rival the versatility of tracks without the complications of transmission and power waste. Any vehicle that could equal the performance of a tank across country, yet travel rapidly by road without the need for a transporter, would have both tactical and strategic implications along with considerable economic advantage. Finally, when considering the future, one can only point to the rapid rise of the MICV, which combines firepower with the ability to transport its own infantry. If one can visualize a situation where major wars are a thing of the past, then existing tanks, suitably modernized, should be sufficient for battlefield superiority, while MICVs should prove more than adequate for international security duties.
Bibliography
- Macksey, Kenneth, Tank versus Tank (London, 1991).
- Ogorliewicz, Richard M., Technology of Tanks (1991).
- Simkin, Richard, Tank Warfare (London, 1979).
- Stern, Sir Albert, Tanks 1914-1918: The Logbook of a Pioneer (London, 1919)
— David Fletcher
