The United States has directly intervened militarily in Nicaragua three times, 1909–10, 1912–25, and 1926–33, and once indirectly, 1981–89. The direct interventions were extensions of the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, in which President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the right of U.S. intervention to preclude European intervention in the Caribbean.
Nicaragua first gained importance to the United States as a potential canal route through Central America. With the construction of the Panama Canal, that importance shifted to economic and security concerns. Instability or a government unfriendly to the United States were seen as threats to the Panama Canal. It was just such conditions that prompted the first intervention and led to the establishment of what was in effect an American protectorate over Nicaragua until 1933.
In 1909, President José Zelaya's government executed two Americans who had joined a revolutionary force opposing his rule. The United States broke relations with the government in Managua, and the U.S. Navy was used to aid the rebels in a decisive battle against Zelaya's forces. The victorious revolutionaries, under the leadership of Adolfo Díaz, negotiated a treaty establishing U.S. control over Nicaragua's customs—the exporting nation's main source of revenue. American forces were removed in 1910, but over 2,000 U.S. Marines were sent back in 1912 to help protect the Díaz government against a new uprising. After the defeat of the rebellion, most Marines were withdrawn, but 100 remained to ensure stability. This arrangement was ratified in the 1916 Bryan‐Chamorro Treaty, which extended American financial aid to Nicaragua and granted the United States sole rights for any future canal built there.
By 1925, the Coolidge administration concluded that Nicaragua was stable enough for U.S. forces to depart. The outbreak of civil war in late 1926, however, brought a third round of American intervention. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg justified military intervention because Communists were fighting the government. Actually, liberal forces were contesting Díaz's taking of the presidency from Gen. Emiliano Chamorro Vargas. Washington quickly recognized Díaz and sent lawyer‐diplomat Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua to supervise elections and establish a National Guard (Guardia Nacional) to be trained by the Marines. All the liberal forces agreed to the settlement imposed by Stimson except for Augusto Sandino, who vowed to fight until U.S. forces were withdrawn.
Stimson, appointed secretary of state by Herbert C. Hoover, concluded that the Guardia Nacional was ready to handle the problem of Sandino and maintain order in Nicaragua. The last of the Marines departed in 1933, and the Guardia Nacional under Anastasio Somoza became the most powerful military force in Nicaragua. Sandino ended his fighting as promised, but was killed in 1934 by the Guardia Nacional. In 1936, Somoza formally took over all power in Nicaragua. He and his two sons would rule with American support until 1979, when the Somoza dictatorship was overthrown by the Sandinista National Liberation Front.
In the 1980s, tensions developed quickly between the leftist Sandinistas and the U.S. government. When promised U.S. economic aid was delayed by Congress, the new revolutionary government turned to other nations, particularly Cuba, for advisers and technicians, and produced scathing criticisms of American foreign policy in Latin America. As it left office, the Carter administration suspended the belated economic assistance on the grounds that the Sandinistas were aiding leftist rebels in neighboring El Salvador. In 1981, the Reagan administration came to office determined to oust the Sandinistas. To do so, the United States applied a wide range of political and economic pressure to undermine the Nicaraguan government. Most important, Reagan provided $19 million to the Central Intelligence Agency in November 1981 to begin training a counterrevolutionary army known as the Contras. Led by former Guardia Nacional officers, the Contras by 1986 consisted of over 15,000 soldiers supported by the United States. During the period when a Democratic majority in Congress banned aid to the rebels, the administration used a variety of means to funnel funds to them illegally. In what became known as the Iran‐Contra Affair (1986), one scheme diverted money from secret arms sales to Iran to the Contras. Even with U.S. aid and bases in Honduras, the Contras were unable to unseat the Sandinistas. The war ended after a negotiated settlement sponsored by other Latin American nations led to free elections in 1989 and the victory of the anti‐Sandinista coalition.
[See also Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. Military Involvement in the; Marine Corps, U.S.: 1865–1914; Marine Corps, U.S.: 1914–1945.]
Bibliography
- Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, 1967.
- William Kammen, A Search for Stability: United States Diplomacy Toward Nicaragua, 1925–1933, 1968.
- Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S.‐Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family, 1977.
- Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, 1987.
- Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993, 1993.
- Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: America Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990, 1995.
- Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America,
2nd rev. ed. 1993
