United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

299 U.S. 304 (1936), argued 19–20 Nov. 1936, decided 21 Dec. 1936 by vote of 7 to 1; Sutherland for the Court, McReynolds in dissent, Stone not participating. The powers of the federal government in foreign affairs are derived principally from inferences based on the history and structure of the Constitution, rather than from specific constitutional language. In Curtiss‐Wright, the Supreme Court relied on just such inferences to conclude not only that the foreign affairs power vested in the national government as a whole, but that the president of the United States had “plenary” powers in the foreign affairs field not dependent upon congressional delegation.

Congress, acting by joint resolution, had authorized the president to place an embargo on arms shipments to countries at war in the Chaco region of South America. Acting pursuant to the resolution, President Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed such an embargo. When Curtiss‐Wright Export Corp. was indicted for violating the embargo, it defended itself on the grounds that the embargo and the proclamation were void because Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to the executive branch by leaving what was essentially a legislative determination to the president's “unfettered discretion.”

The Court ruled that the joint resolution and the president's actions were not based on unconstitutional delegation of nonenumerated powers because of “fundamental differences” in national power with respect to internal and to external affairs. Key language from the Court's dictum explaining this conclusion has become a basis for broad executive branch claims to inherent presidential power in foreign affairs (see Inherent Powers).

Justice George Sutherland argued that the powers of sovereignty in foreign affairs did not depend upon express grants in the Constitution. The foreign affairs power had been transmitted immediately from Great Britain to the united colonies as an essential element of nationhood upon the success of the Revolution. Although many scholars have refuted Justice Sutherland's “springing sovereignty” analysis on historical grounds, there is general agreement that the foreign affairs power resides exclusively in the national government.

A more controversial question is raised by the presumptive identity between national power and executive power over foreign affairs that the Court's language and holding suggest. The opinion concluded that if sovereign power resided in the federal government, the power to deal with foreign nations must reside in the executive branch. Consequently, no allocation of specific powers, other than the general conferral of executive power in Article II of the Constitution, was necessary to empower the president to act in foreign affairs matters.

Despite the controversy surrounding it, the Curtiss‐Wright decision is one of the Supreme Court's most influential. Most cases involving executive branch–legislative branch conflicts involve political questions that the courts refuse to adjudicate. Therefore, the sweeping language of Curtiss‐Wright is regularly cited to support executive branch claims of power to act without congressional authorization in foreign affairs, especially when there is no judicial intervention to interpret the meaning of that text.

The Court's characterization of the president's power as “plenary” has been cited as legal sanction for executive branch initiatives in foreign affairs that often result in Congress being faced with a fait accompli. The Curtiss‐Wright opinion has been cited to support the president's power to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations, claims of executive privilege in national security and other matters, as well as much of the executive branch activity during the Vietnam War. Curtiss‐Wright was also cited to attack the constitutionality of the 1973 War Powers Act, requiring the president under certain conditions to withdraw combat troops committed abroad if not authorized by Congress.

The Court has not recognized the full scope of executive power suggested by Justice Sutherland's sweeping language. Congressional authorization may be necessary to legitimize many executive acts. In Regan v. Wald (1984), for example, the Supreme Court cited Curtiss‐Wright in upholding the constitutionality of the president's regulations restricting travel to Cuba expressly on the ground that they had been authorized by Congress. On the other hand, in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. (1976), the Court validated presidential restrictions on oil imports based on very broad congressional language delegating apparently unlimited regulatory authority to the executive branch.

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See also Delegation of Powers; Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy

— Harold G. Maier

• 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
• Vote: 7–1
• For the Court: Sutherland
• Dissenting: McReynolds
• Not participating: Stone

In 1934, Bolivia and Paraguay were at war with each other. Both countries needed military weapons from abroad, and American weapons makers were eager to sell to them. At the same time, the American public and Great Britain wanted the United States to help end the war by stopping all arms sales to the two nations.

On May 28, 1934, Congress passed a joint resolution giving President Franklin Delano Roosevelt authority to place an embargo, or ban, on selling weapons to Bolivia and Paraguay. Four days later, Roosevelt declared the embargo in effect because he believed it would help restore peace. The federal government later indicted the Curtiss-Wright Corporation for violating the embargo by selling armed aircraft to Bolivia. Curtiss -Wright claimed that the Constitution did not allow Congress to give the President power to declare an embargo.

The Issue

Did Congress's joint resolution unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the executive branch? Or did Congress have the authority to delegate broad discretionary powers in foreign affairs to the President?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court ruled to uphold the President's embargo. The Court distinguished between the powers exercised by Congress and the President in “external” (foreign) affairs and “internal” (domestic) affairs. The Court said that the national government could take action in conducting foreign affairs that might exceed its authority to direct domestic policy.

Writing for the majority, Justice George Sutherland reasoned that since the United States had existed as a sovereign nation before the adoption of the Constitution, it retained powers to influence international affairs that were neither implied nor listed in the Constitution. These powers stemmed from the simple unspoken reality that the United States existed in a world of nations and must have powers to meet its international responsibilities just as other sovereign nations did. This idea established a new precedent, the doctrine of inherent powers.

Further, the Court ruled that Congress could delegate broad discretionary powers to the President to cope with foreign affairs issues. This verdict contrasted with the Court's ruling on domestic affairs, which limited Congress to delegating legislative powers to the President only if it also set clear guidelines for using those delegated powers.

Dissent

Although Justice James Mc-Reynolds dissented in this case, he filed no opinion.

Significance

The Curtiss-Wright decision recognized the broad responsibility of the executive branch of the national government for foreign affairs, giving the President great freedom in directing the nation's foreign policy. Justice Sutherland wrote: “[T]he President alone has the power to speak as a representative of the nation.” He described the President's power in foreign affairs as “plenary [full] and exclusive.” The President is “the sole organ of the federal government in…international relations.” This decision thereby provided the foundations for strong and decisive Presidential leadership in world affairs.

Sources

• Robert A. Divine, “The Case of the Smuggled Bombers,” in Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, edited by John A. Garraty (New York: Harper & Row, 1987)

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 19–20, 1936 Decided December 21, 1936
Full case name	United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation et al.
Citations	299 U.S. 304 (more) 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255
Prior history	Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment, 14 F.Supp. 230 (D. D.C. 1932)
Holding
Found in favor of the government, reasoning that while the Constitution may not explicitly say that all ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation is vested in the President, it is nonetheless given implicitly and by the fact that the Executive, by its very nature, is empowered to conduct foreign affairs in a way which Congress cannot and should not.
Court membership
Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes Associate Justices Willis Van Devanter · James C. McReynolds Louis Brandeis · George Sutherland Pierce Butler · Harlan F. Stone Owen J. Roberts · Benjamin N. Cardozo
Case opinions
Plurality	Sutherland
Dissent	McReynolds
Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)^[1], was a United States Supreme Court case involving principles of both governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of the executive branch of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs.

Contents 1 Facts 2 Issue 3 Decision of the Court 4 See also 5 References 6 Further reading 7 External links

Facts

In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court relied on just such inferences to conclude not only that the foreign affairs power vested in the national government as a whole, but that the President of the United States had “plenary” powers in the foreign affairs field not dependent upon congressional delegation.

Congress, acting by joint resolution, had authorized the President to place an embargo on arms shipments to countries at war in the Chaco region of South America. Acting pursuant to the resolution, President Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed such an embargo. When Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. was indicted for violating the embargo through the sale of bombers disguised as passenger planes to Bolivia, it defended itself on the grounds that the embargo and the proclamation were void because Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to the executive branch by leaving what was essentially a legislative determination to the President's “unfettered discretion.”

In 1936 the defendant Curtiss-Wright Corporation was charged with illegally sending arms of war to Bolivia prior to the revocation of the first proclamation.^[1] Despite the controversy surrounding it, the Curtiss-Wright decision is one of the Supreme Court's most influential. Most cases involving executive branch–legislative branch conflicts involve political questions that the courts refuse to adjudicate. Therefore, the sweeping language of Curtiss-Wright is regularly cited to support executive branch claims of power to act without congressional authorization in foreign affairs, especially when there is no judicial intervention to interpret the meaning of that text.

Issue

The defendant raised several issues for consideration by the Court:

1. Did the Joint Resolution passed by Congress grant too much authority (and legislative power) to the President, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine?
2. Was the President required by due process considerations to make findings of fact in support of the proclamation?
3. Did the revocation of the May 1934 proclamation operate to eliminate the penalty for its violation?

Decision of the Court

The Court has not recognized the full scope of executive power suggested by Justice Sutherland's sweeping language. Congressional authorization may be necessary to legitimize many executive acts. In Regan v. Wald (1984), for example, the Supreme Court cited Curtiss-Wright in upholding the constitutionality of the president's regulations restricting travel to Cuba expressly on the ground that they had been authorized by Congress. On the other hand, in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. (1976), the Court validated presidential restrictions on oil imports based on very broad congressional language delegating apparently unlimited regulatory authority to the executive branch. In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments and found in favor of the government. The Court reasoned that, while the Constitution may not explicitly say that all ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation is vested in the President, such power is nonetheless granted implicitly. Moreover, said the Court, the Executive, by its very nature, is empowered to conduct foreign affairs in a way which Congress cannot and should not. The Court stated that "there is sufficient warrant for the broad discretion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace in the affected countries."^[1]

The upshot of this ruling not only upheld export limitations on the grounds of national security (similar ones still exist today) but also established the broader principle of executive supremacy in national security and foreign affairs – one of the reasons advanced in the 1950s in favor of the almost-successful attempt to add the Bricker Amendment to the Constitution.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 299

References

1. ^ ^{a b} United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

Further reading

• Robert A. Divine, “The Case of the Smuggled Bombers,” in Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, edited by John A. Garraty (New York: Harper & Row, 1987)

External links

• ^ 299 U.S. 304 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
• Summary of case from OYEZ

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