Results for United States v. Darby Lumber Co.
On this page:
 
US Supreme Court:

United States v. Darby Lumber Co.

312 U.S. 100 (1941), argued 19–20 Dec. 1940, decided 3 Feb. 1941 by vote of 9 to 0; Stone for the Court. The Fair Labor Standards Act (often called the Wages and Hours Act), adopted in 1938, was the last major piece of New Deal legislation. The statute provided for the setting of minimum wages and maximum hours for all employees in industries whose products were shipped in interstate commerce and made violation of the wages and hours standards unlawful. The act applied to all employees “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”

The Constitution authorizes Congress “to regulate commerce … among the several states.” In the classic case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) the Supreme Court gave a broad reading to the federal commerce power, and regulation of commerce has been a major congressional concern. Around the beginning of the twentieth century Congress began to explore use of the Commerce Clause as a kind of national police power. An act forbidding the interstate transportation of lottery tickets was upheld in Champion v. Ames (1903). The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 prohibited the introduction of impure food and drugs into the states by interstate commerce. The Mann Act (1910), forbidding the transportation of women in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution and debauchery, was upheld in Hoke v. United States (1913).

This technique of closing the channels of commerce to achieve social welfare purposes was then utilized by Congress in the federal Child Labor Act of 1916. The statute prohibited transportation in interstate commerce for products of commercial operations where children under fourteen years of age had been employed and where certain dangerous conditions had prevailed. The Supreme Court called a halt to such use of the commerce power in the famous case of Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), where a bare majority held the Child Labor Act unconstitutional as an infringement on powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. The Court's argument was based on the concept of dual federalism—that powers delegated to the national government by the Constitution are nevertheless limited by the reserved powers of the states. In a noteworthy dissent to the Hammer decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected this view, arguing that use of a power specifically conferred on Congress by the Constitution “is not made any less constitutional because of the indirect effects that it may have” (p. 277).

When the Fair Labor Standards Act came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby, it was upheld unanimously. Because Congress in adopting the act had exercised its undoubted power over the movement of goods across state lines, there would have been little need for discussion of the constitutional issue except for the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Justice Harlan F. Stone, writing for the Court, had to dispose of that roadblock. Invoking “the powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes,” Stone wrote, “The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled” (pp. 115–116).

While the constitutionality of the Wages and Hours Act was ratified by Darby, problems with respect to the coverage of the act remained, for the statute had failed to invoke the total power of Congress over commerce. Rather, it was made applicable to employees engaged “in commerce” or “in the production of goods for commerce.” Consequently there was much confusion as to whether specific employees were covered by the act. A noteworthy controversy arose over the applicability of the federal statute to state employees. In Maryland v. Wirtz (1968) the Court rejected a contention that enforcing the act's standards against state employees violated state sovereignty. But eight years later the Court accepted that contention. In National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) the Court by vote of 5 to 4 overruled Wirtz, rehabilitated Hammer v. Dagenhart, and held that federal wage and hour standards for state and municipal employees were unconstitutional. In turn, Usery was reversed nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985).

See also Labor.

— C. Herman Pritchett

 
 
US Government Guide: United States v. Darby Lumber Co

312 U.S. 100 (1941)
Vote: 9–0
For the Court: Stone

In 1938, the U.S. Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay regulations for workers in businesses involved in interstate commerce—that is, in shipping their products across state lines. Enactment of this federal law was based on Congress's power “to regulate Commerce … among the several States” (Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution).

The Darby Lumber Company claimed that the Fair Labor Standards Act was unconstitutional, so it filed suit to prevent enforcement of this federal law.

The Issue

The Darby Lumber Company argued that Congress exceeded its powers under the commerce clause of the Constitution when it passed the Fair Labor Standards Act. It claimed that, according to the 10th Amendment to the Constitution, the power to regulate wages, hours of work, working conditions, and so forth belongs to the states. (The amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’) This claim was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918). Was enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act a constitutional exercise of the commerce power, or did this federal law violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution? Further, did the Fair Labor Standards Act violate the due process clause of the 5th Amendment by taking away the right of employers and workers to bargain freely about wages and working conditions?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan F. Stone based his opinion on the dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918). Agreeing with Holmes, Stone argued that the federal government's power to regulate commerce among the states should be interpreted broadly. Thus, the power to regulate wages and working conditions can, said Justice Stone, be tied to the power to regulate interstate commerce. Stone wrote, “The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart … should be and now is overruled.”

Significance

This decision expanded the federal government's power to regulate national economic affairs. Further, this opinion rejected the argument, advanced in Hammer v. Dagenhart, that the 10th Amendment strictly limits the enumerated, or specifically listed, powers of Congress. Instead, it established a broad interpretation of the Congress's commerce power.

See also Commerce power; Federalism; Hammer v. Dagenhart

 
Wikipedia: United States v. Darby Lumber Co.
This case is about the Commerce Clause. For the 1931 case about taxation of reduction of debt, see United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.
United States v. Darby Lumber Co.
Seal_of_the_United_States_Supreme_Court.png
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 19 – 20, 1940
Decided February 3, 1941
Full case name: United States v. Darby Lumber Company
Citations: 312 U.S. 100; 61 S. Ct. 451; 85 L. Ed. 609; 1941 U.S. LEXIS 1222; 3 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P51,108; 132 A.L.R. 1430
Prior history: Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia. Appeal, under the Criminal Appeals Act, from a judgment quashing an indictment
Holding
The Fair Labor Standards Act was a constitutional exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Charles Evans Hughes
Associate Justices: James Clark McReynolds, Harlan Fiske Stone, Owen Josephus Roberts, Hugo Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy
Case opinions
Majority by: Stone
Joined by: unanimous
Laws applied
U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8; Fair Labor Standards Act

United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941)[1], was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, holding that the U.S. Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions. The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned several longstanding precedents, notably Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

The issue

At issue was whether the Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority in creating the Fair Labor Standards Act. A lumber company in Georgia that did not meet these standards was charged with violating the law, but had won an appeal, where the appellate judge followed the precedent of Hammer v. Dagenhart finding that the federal government is barred by the 10th Amendment from interfering in matters that are strictly local, that is, within intrastate boundaries. The Act also required the keeping of records to verify compliance; the appellee argued that this violated his 5th Amendment right protecting him from self-incrimination.

The decision

The Court reversed the appellate court decision. It affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which power "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." FindLaw. The Court argued that the purpose of the Act was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage through interstate commerce. In the Dagenhart case, the Court had made the distinction between manufacturing and interstate commerce, so that a business could argue it was engaging in the former, but had not intended the latter. Twenty-two years later, the Court found that earlier argument facile, explaining that Congress was well aware that businesses produce their goods without thought to where it will go; product is pulled and shipped to meet the orders of the day. The Court went so far as to allow that Congress can control intrastate commerce when it must reasonably do so to effect its regulatory power over interstate commerce. The Court also found that the requirement of record keeping was entirely appropriate as a matter of enforcing the Act.

There were no dissenting opinions in this case.

External link


 
 

Join the WikiAnswers Q&A community. Post a question or answer questions about "United States v. Darby Lumber Co." at WikiAnswers.

 

Copyrights:

US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
US Government Guide. The Oxford Guide to the United States Government. Copyright © 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2002 by John J. Patrick, Richard M. Pious, Donald M. Ritchie. All rights reserved.  Read more
Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "United States v. Darby Lumber Co." Read more

Search for answers directly from your browser with the FREE Answers.com Toolbar!  
Click here to download now. 

Get Answers your way! Check out all our free tools and products.

On this page:   E-mail   print Print  Link  

 

Keep Reading

Mentioned In:

Related Topics