Violent non-state actor (VNSA), refers to any organization that uses illegal violence (i.e. force not officially approved of by the state) to reach its goals, thereby contesting the monopoly on violence of the state. The term has been used in several papers published by the United States military.[1][2][3]
Examples of VNSA's are: warlords, insurgents, para-militaries, liberation armies, freedom fighters, terrorists, militias, guerrillas, youth gangs, pirates, and criminal organizations like the Mafia or Yakuza.[citation needed]
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Relation to terrorism
Whether some or all VNSAs are terrorist organizations depends on the applied definition of terrorism. ("One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"). And vice versa, not all forms of terrorism are conducted by VNSAs (i.e. state terrorism).[citation needed]
Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those acts which:[citation needed]
- are intended to create fear (terror) among a broader public, and
- are a policy and perpetrated for an ideological goal (as opposed to a materialistic goal or a lone attack), and
- deliberately target (or disregard the safety of) non-combatants.
Most VNSAs do not meet all three of these criteria, and therefore should not automatically be identified or associated with terrorism.[citation needed]
For instance, criminal organizations (like the Mafia, Yakuza, or Mara Salvatrucha) do not legitimize their strategies by referring to an ideological goal, and insurgents or liberation armies do not necessarily target non-combatants.[citation needed]
Origin and motives
Some VNSAs (being non-state actors) are in one way or another sponsored by the state, or by local authorities (see also state-sponsored terrorism or para-militaries).[citation needed]
Most VNSAs however emerge in response to deficiencies, inadequacies, or shortcomings; i.e. when the state does not provide safety, security, (economic) stability and the basic public services for its citizens, or certain groups of citizens (minorities). When the state lacks legitimacy and/or capacity, others will fill the gap, take advantage, or directly confront the state. (see also Relative deprivation, Failed state and Fragile state).[citation needed]
Motives of VNSA's can be either mainly materialistic (like the Mafia), or mainly political, ideological (like the EZLN), or religious (like Al-Qaeda), or a mix of some or all of the four. In reality these distinctions are often not clear. Hamas for instance might be viewed by some as freedom fighters, but by others as terrorists.[citation needed]
Diagnostic dimensions
Instead of labelling an organization (for instance as terrorist or freedom fighters), a clearer picture of the nature of a VNSA can be provided by diagnosing an organisation by dimensions; for example by asking the following questions:[citation needed]
- How do they legitimize themselves? (by political ideology, ethnicity, nationality, religion, functionality)
- Which societal gaps does a VNSA fill? (safety/security, (economic) stability, social participation, public services)
- To what extent do they have support from outside? (local, regional, national, international)
- What is the scope of influence? (local, regional, national, international)
- Among which population groups or what indicators they recrute on? (age, religious, political, class, ethnicity)
- Where do they recruit? (local, regional, national, international)
- How do they recruit? (ideological i.e. empowerment, bribery, intimidation and violence, kidnapping)
- To what extent are they infiltrated in (local or national) government and business (corruption)?
- Are they involved in organized crime? (weapons trade, drug trade, trade in humans, money-laundering)
- How is the organisation structured? (hierarchical or democratic, central or diffused network)
- How has their focus and strategy changed over time (generations)? (more violent or more diplomatic, more international)
See also
Notes
- ^ Maj William Casebeer, USAF, USAF Academy, and Maj Troy Thomas, USAF, 1st Fighter Wing IN., Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in the New Millenium, Strategic Insights, Volume I, Issue 10 (December 2002)
- ^ Captain Jason Bartolomei (USAF); Major William Casebeer (USAF); Major Troy Thomas (USAF). Modeling Violent Non-State Actors: A Summary of Concepts and Methods, November 2004, IITA Research Publication 4, Information Series, Institute for Information Technology Applications, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.
- ^ Violent Non-State Actors, Small Wars Council "Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security ISN, 25 Nov 08: ... The paper draws on the pioneering work been done by Troy Thomas and various collaborators as well as an important study by Shultz, Farah and Lockard that argues very persuasively that armed groups have become a “tier-one” security threat...... "
- The "pioneering work": Maj. Troy S. Thomas, USAF and Maj. William D. Casebeer, USAF Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems, Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 3 (March 2004)
- The "important study": Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, Itamara V. Lochard. Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority, INSS Occasional Paper 57, September 2004, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado
References
- Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-state Actors, Lexington Books, August 2005.
- Phil Williams: Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security, ISN (International relations and Security Network), 2008.
- Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups Database
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