Washington v. Davis

426 U.S. 229 (1976), argued 1 Mar. 1976, decided 7 June 1976 by vote of 7 to 2; White for the Court, Brennan and Marshall in dissent. This case involved the standard required to show unconstitutional racial discrimination, specifically the distinction between laws having a racially disproportionate impact and laws adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose or intent.

The case originated in 1970 as a suit by African‐American police officers and unsuccessful applicants against the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department. The suit alleged that the department's promotion and hiring policies were racially discriminatory. The rejected applicants contended that the department's use of a written personnel test (Test 21), which a disproportionately high number of African‐American applicants failed, violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as several federal and District of Columbia statutes.

The district court held for the police department. On appeal, the decision was reversed. The court of appeals, in examining whether Test 21 unconstitutionally discriminated against African‐Americans, relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971). Under Griggs, which developed standards for interpreting the prohibition on employment discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a showing of disproportionate impact was sufficient to make out a rebuttable case of unconstitutional race discrimination. Applying the Griggs standard, the court of appeals held that because four times as many blacks as whites failed Test 21 and because the test had not been shown to be an adequate measure of job performance, the Constitution had been violated. It found that Test 21 had a racially discriminatory impact with no adequate justification for its use (see Disparate Impact).

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, finding that it had erroneously applied standards developed for Title VII to the Constitution. It flatly rejected the disproportionate impact claim as sufficient to make out a case of unconstitutional racial discrimination. Rather, the Court held that an intent or purpose to discriminate had to be present for there to be a constitutional violation. The Court cited numerous opinions in jury discrimination, legislative apportionment, and school desegregation cases to show that its decisions had always required a showing of racially discriminatory intent or purpose for a holding of unconstitutional discrimination. Thus, the Title VII requirement for a showing of unlawful race discrimination differed from the showing required to make such a case under the Constitution.

The Court also addressed the question of what might count as proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent. It held that a racially discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including disproportionate impact. This relatively weak test was considerably strengthened, to the disadvantage of civil rights litigants, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979).

Focusing on Test 21, the Court argued that the fact that many more blacks failed the test than whites did not demonstrate that the original plaintiffs were being denied equal protection. It found the test neutral on its face and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, the modest upgrading of the communicative skills of government employees. The Court took note of the efforts of the department to recruit black officers and the changing racial composition of the recruit classes. Putting the totality of the circumstances together, no constitutional violation was found.

In their dissenting opinion, Justices William J. *Brennan and Thurgood Marshall argued that the department failed to show that Test 21 was sufficiently related to the job of a police officer.

While the case remains good law, it has been criticized on several grounds. First, the Court gave little indication of how discriminatory purpose or intent is to be shown. Aside from the very few cases where statutes or policies discriminate on their face or are administered in a racially discriminatory fashion, what serves as proof? Second, as Justice John Paul Stevens suggested in his concurring opinion, the distinction between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not always clear. Indeed, if racially discriminatory impact is evidence of racially discriminatory intent, as the Court states, the two standards collapse toward each other. Third, as is often argued, the decision ignores the fact that a statute or policy lacking discriminatory intent or purpose can build on the present effects of past discrimination to produce identical results. For example, if Test 21 was intended to discriminate, and four times as many blacks failed it as whites, it would be unconstitutional; but if there were no such intent, and the result were identical because of a history of school segregation that was still being felt, no constitutional violation would occur.

See also Due Process, Substantive; Employment Discrimination; Race and Racism.

— Gerald N. Rosenberg

Washington v. Davis
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 1, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976
Full case name	Washington, Mayor of Washington, D.C., et al. v. Davis, et al.
Citations	426 U.S. 229 (more) 96 S. Ct. 2040; 48 L. Ed. 2d 597; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 154; 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1415; 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P10,958
Prior history	Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Subsequent history	168 U.S. App. D.C. 42, 512 F.2d 956, reversed.
Holding
Racial discrimination by the state must contain two elements: a racially disproportionate impact and discriminatory motivation on the part of the state actor.
Court membership
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Associate Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. · Potter Stewart Byron White · Thurgood Marshall Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
Majority	White, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens; Stewart (parts I and II only)
Concurrence	Stevens
Dissent	Brennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V; Civil Rights Act of 1964

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)^[1], was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the application of the Due Process Clause. Two African Americans had applied for positions in the Washington, DC police department, and sued after being turned down. They claimed that the department used racially discriminatory hiring procedures, by implementing a test of verbal skills (Test 21), which was failed disproportionately by African Americans. The Court ruled against them, finding that use of the test did not violate the Due Process Clause. Since the respondents were filing action in Washington, DC, they sued using the Fifth Amendment and not the Fourteenth Amendment since the Equal Protection Clause applied to the states.

The important general rule created by Washington v. Davis is that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[an] official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact." Instead, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive on the state actor's part. The court noted that "disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution". The purpose-based standard elucidated in the Court's 1976 opinion has made it much more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in discrimination suits.

Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, while Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall dissented.

Contents 1 Rationale of The Court 2 Projected Scope of Authority 3 See also 4 External links

Rationale of The Court

The court reversed the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals on grounds that while it may have been true that Test 21 had the effect of removing a greater number of black than white applicants, the test did not have a discriminatory purpose. The Court found that the Court of Appeals had erroneously assumed that the stricter, effect-based standard of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also applied to the constitutional Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today. - J. White, 426 U.S. 229 at 238.

To further its argument that Test 21 did not have a discriminatory purpose, the Court discussed evidence that the Washington D.C. police department had gone to significant lengths to recruit black officers. Moreover, the Court noted that in the years since the case was brought before the trial court, the ratio of blacks on the police force to blacks in the community had nearly evened out.

Nor on the facts of the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion that it is a purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional rights of respondents as well as other black applicants. As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that "a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability. - J. White, 426 U.S. 229 at 246.

Projected Scope of Authority

The underlying rule in Washington v. Davis was seemingly affirmed 11 years later in McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McClesky applied the requirement that more than mere discriminatory effect be shown in order to invalidate criminal statutes which are challenged under the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution. Likewise, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), decided only 3 years after Washington, stated explicitly in its holding that legislation obnoxious to the Equal Protection clause is that which is passed "because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."

The Equal Protection clause applies here because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts agencies of the District of Columbia (as well as the Federal Government and Indian tribes). Employment practices by other employers which have a disparate impact on racial groups may be unlawful under Title VII even when the employer is acting without discriminatory motive (Griggs v. Duke Power Co.).

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 426

External links

• ^  Text of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) is available from:  · Enfacto · Findlaw

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