Zorach v. Clauson

343 U.S. 306 (1952), argued 31 Jan.–1 Feb. 1952, decided 28 Apr. 1952 by vote of 6 to 3; Douglas for the Court, black, Frankfurter, and Jackson in dissent. Zorach v. Clauson was the Supreme Court's second decision on “released time” plans that allow religious instruction for public school students during the school week. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), a plan, including instruction within school buildings, had been held to violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In Zorach, the Court, stressing the desirability of accommodation to religious needs, approved New York City's program for religious instruction taking place outside the public schools.

According to Justice William O. Douglas's opinion for the Court, the result in McCollum was to be explained by the use of school buildings for religious instruction. New York, by contrast, had not violated separation of church and state. In language often quoted by those who oppose strict separationist approaches to the Establishment Clause, Justice Douglas wrote, “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” (p. 313).

The three justices who had written in favor of the result in McCollum dissented in Zorach. Justice Hugo Black protested that his opinion for the Court in McCollum had not emphasized the location of the religious instruction. He contended, as did Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson, that New York, like Illinois, had impermissibly placed the coercive apparatus of the public school laws behind religious instruction, receiving attendance reports for those released and treating as truants students who failed to go to religious instruction.

The Court's language in Zorach does not comport comfortably with its language in McCollum. Some justices who did not write in McCollum may have thought the school location of the religious instruction mattered more than the opinions reflected, or they may have come to that view on further reflection, perhaps partly in response to criticism of the Court's “hostility” to religion. In subsequent cases, Zorach has been used to advocate permissible accommodation to religion; ironically, Douglas later adopted strictly separationist positions and disavowed the result his language eloquently justifies.

See also Education.

— Kent Greenawalt

• 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
• Vote: 6–3
• For the Court: Douglas
• Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson

In 1948 the New York City public schools introduced a “released time” program for religious education, under which students could leave the public schools before the end of the regular school day to attend religious classes of their choosing. During the 1940s and 1950s these programs were widespread. Tessim Zorach, a resident of New York City, complained that the city school system's “released time” program violated the establishment clause of the 1st Amendment.

The Issue

The 1st Amendment of the Constitution prohibits government from enacting laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” Does this mean that there must be complete separation of church and state? Or does this establishment clause permit certain kinds of governmental association with religion, as long as the government does not discriminate in its treatment of different religions?

Opinion of the Court

Justice William O. Douglas upheld the New York City “released time” program because the religious instruction was not carried out in public school buildings. Rather, public school students could choose to participate, during the official school day, in religious instruction outside the public schools. Douglas emphasized that a “released time” program in Champaign, Illinois, had been declared unconstitutional only because religious instruction was provided in the public school buildings during the school day (Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 1948).

Justice Douglas wrote these often-quoted words in support of permissible governmental accommodation of religion:

We are a religious people whose institutions suppose a Supreme Being. … When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.

Dissent

Justice Hugo Black emphasized that the location of religious instruction involved in “released time” programs was not relevant. It was the connection between government-supported public schools and the content of the religious instruction that, according to Black and the other dissenters, was not permitted by the 1st Amendment as applied to the states through the 14th Amendment. Black wrote that the reSources and authority of the public schools had been unconstitutionally put at the service of private religious groups.

Significance

“Released time” programs expanded in the wake of the Zorach decision. However, they declined in use and importance in the 1970s and 1980s. The enduring importance of the Zorach case is the argument for a constitutional accommodation of government and religion provided by Justice Douglas. In line with this opinion, the Court ruled in Zobrest v. Catalina School District (1993) that local government funds could be used to pay for a sign-language interpreter to assist a deaf student at a private school operated by the Catholic church.

See also Establishment clause; Religious issues under the Constitution

Sources

• Robert S. Alley, The Supreme Court on Church and State (New York: Oxford, 1988)

Zorach v. Clauson
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 31 – February 1, 1952 Decided April 28, 1952
Full case name: Zorach, et al. v. Clauson, et al., constituting the Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. Citations: 343 U.S. 306; 72 S. Ct. 679; 96 L. Ed. 954; 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2773 Prior history: Appeal from the Court of Appeals of New York
Holding
Court membership
Chief Justice: Fred M. Vinson Associate Justices: Hugo Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Robert H. Jackson, Harold Hitz Burton, Tom C. Clark, Sherman Minton
Case opinions
Majority by: Douglas Joined by: Vinson, Reed, Burton, Clark, Minton Dissent by: Black Dissent by: Frankfurter Dissent by: Jackson

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), was a case at the Supreme Court of the United States.

Under 3210 of the New York Education Law and the regulations thereunder, New York City permits its public schools to release students during school hours, on written requests of their parents, so that they may leave the school buildings and grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises. The same section makes school attendance compulsory; students not released stay in the classrooms; and the churches report to the schools the names of children released from public schools who fail to report for religious instruction. The program involves neither religious instruction in public schools nor the expenditure of public funds. Held: This program does not violate the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) , distinguished. Pp. 308-315.

(a) By this system, New York has neither prohibited the "free exercise" of religion nor made a law "respecting an establishment of religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment. Pp. 310-315.

(b) There is no evidence in the record in this case to support a conclusion that the system involves the use of coercion to get public school students into religious classrooms. Pp. 311-312.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 343

References

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