Chamberlain thought that by appeasing Germany and Hitler, he could prevent war. Chamberlain, and many in Britan, thought that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh and by giving back the land taken from Germany (and more) they would make Germany/Hitler happy and war would never come.
i dont know the answer
Winston Churchill opposed Neville Chamberlains policy of appeasement because he saw and knew what Hitler was doing and new that he was getting stronger, he stood up and said this but was the only one who did so.
Hitler did not have a policy of appeasement. Great Brittain appeased hitler when he took land.
The policy of appeasement was not successful at all. The Axis powers had no interest in brokering peace but wanted war.
No, it was a terrible and cowardly policy.
i dont know the answer
Winston Churchill opposed Neville Chamberlains policy of appeasement because he saw and knew what Hitler was doing and new that he was getting stronger, he stood up and said this but was the only one who did so.
Neville Chamberlains policy of Appeasement, as he did not wish for there to be another world war so he believed that if Hitler had any true grievances with the Treaty of Versailles that would "discuss" them. Though after Hitler had actually taken the whole of Czechoslovakia the British stopped the policy of appeasement and started conscription.
Not really. The Appeasement policy only prolonged the inevitable.
why did France and britiain choose the policy of appeasement
Hitler did not have a policy of appeasement. Great Brittain appeased hitler when he took land.
Appeasement is the policy of giving in to the demands of an aggressor to keep the peace.
Appeasement never works. See answer to this question.What_is_wrong_with_the_policy_of_appeasement
The policy of appeasement.
The Munich Agreement is generally seen as the height of appeasement, but the policy of appeasement was older.
The policy of appeasement was not successful at all. The Axis powers had no interest in brokering peace but wanted war.
at the begining of WWII