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the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, in the United States, and the associated events and impact of those attacks.

The attacks, which were carried out by agents of Al Qaeda (a militant Islamic terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden) used three hijacked commercial jet aircraft to destroy the World Trade Center in New York City and severely damage the Pentagon in Arlington, Va. A fourth hijacked plane crashed in Shanksville, Pa., when its passengers attempted to seize the plane from the hijackers. Some 3,000 persons died or were missing as a result of the most devastating terrorist episode in U.S. history.

9/11 was a turning point in the presidency of George W. Bush and U.S. foreign policy, leading directly to U.S. support for the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda was based. The attacks were also used to justify in part the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (see also Persian Gulf Wars) despite the lack of any clear evidence linking the Iraqi government to Al Qaeda, but the impact of 9/11 contributed to strong American public support for the invasion. The Bush administration, which had already insisted on strong presidential powers, asserted that the United States was at war (a response not echoed by the Spanish and British government in the wake of subsequent significant terror attacks in Madrid and London) and that legal restrictions did not exist on the president's powers to defend the country, a position subsequently questioned in part by the Supreme Court.

As a result of the attacks and of the subsequent reports issued by a joint Congressional investigation and by the 9/11 Commission (see below), a number of significant changes to the federal government were made, including the establishment of the Dept. of Homeland Security, which consolidated 22 nonmilitary government security agencies and assumed responsiblity for U.S. air travel security through its Transportation Security Administration, and the establishment of the cabinet-level post of director of national intelligence, who became responsible for overseeing and coordinating all U.S. intelligence agencies. Other far-reaching effects include the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and building-code changes proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2005.

The 9/11 Commission, officially known as the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
was established by law in 2002 to prepare a full account of the attacks and make recommendations on how to guard against future attacks. Headed by Thomas H. Kean, the former Republican governor of New Jersey, and consisting of a panel of a five Democrats and five Republicans, it first convened in 2003, interviewed more than 1,000 persons in 10 countries, and issued its report the following year. The commission faced resistance from the White House and the House Intelligence Committee over access to documents and individuals (including the president and vice president), but access to those improved mainly through public pressure brought by the families of the victims of the attacks; the group was not permitted, however, to question directly the detainees at Guantánamo.

The commission held both public and private hearings and issued a report with both public and classified sections. With the benefit of insights dependent on hindsight, it detailed the terror plot's origins, which dated to 1996, and its development, and also identified failures of various U.S. agencies that might have alerted officials to the impending attack or could have led to actions that might have prevented it. Its work revealed problems with U.S. intelligence gathering and interpretation and with law enforcement concerning terrorist threats against the United States, especially with regard to the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to cooperation between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency. (It also found no evidence of collaboration between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government.) Many of its recommendations, which focused on preventing another similar attack against the United States, were subsequently adopted, but thoughtful critics have pointed out that its proposals are limited both by its focus on the hijackings and by an emphasis on centralization of responsibility and control as a solution to overcoming the failures of 9/11.

Bibliography

See the 9/11 Commission's report (2004), the commission staff reports and other materials, ed. by S. Strasser (2004), and the account of the commission's work by T. H. Kean and L. H. Hamilton (2006); study of the events of 9/11 by L. Wright (2006).


 
 
Wikipedia: 9/11 Commission
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9/11 Commission Report

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was set up on November 27, 2002 "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.

The Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. Given its significant importance in investigating one of the most important events in American history and providing recommendations to defend the U.S. against future terrorist attacks, some have compared the Commission to that of the Warren Commission of 19631964 in its mammoth global and national significance.

Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the Commission comprised five Democrats and five Republicans. The Commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.

The Commission's final report was a lengthy book, based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.

After the publication of its final report, the Commission closed on August 21, 2004.

History

After pressure from the relatives of victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was set up on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and U.S. Congress. The 9/11 Commission was in session for more than a year and a half and released its final report on July 22, 2004.

Members

The members of the Commission were:

The members of the Commission's staff included:

  • Philip D. Zelikow, The Commission's Executive Director; Christopher Kojm, the Commission's Deputy Executive Director; Daniel Marcus, the General Counsel; Janice Kephart, of counsel.
  • Al Felzenberg, the commission's spokesman.[1]

President Bush had initially appointed former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to head the commission, but he withdrew shortly afterward because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[2]

Officials called to testify

Then government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:

Past government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:

President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony without oaths. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate.

Report

The cover of the final 9/11 report, which can be purchased in bookstores across the United States and around the world
Enlarge
The cover of the final 9/11 report, which can be purchased in bookstores across the United States and around the world

The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been "not well served" by the FBI and CIA [3]. The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely-guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.

Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists' financing, travel, and other matters.

Criticisms

Because the investigation was controversial and politically sensitive, many participants have been criticised during the process. Leading critics include members of the 9/11 Family Steering Committee and the Jersey Girls, who were instrumental in overcoming government resistance to establishing the 9/11 Commission in the first place, according to the documentary, "9/11: Press for Truth".

Claims of bias within the commission

The 9/11 commission members were appointed by George W. Bush as well as Congress, which led to the criticism that it was not a truly independent commission. The commission stated in its report that "[their] aim has not been to assign individual blame," a judgement which some critics believed would obscure the facts of the matter in a nod to consensus politics. Some members of victims' families have claimed that the commission has numerous conflicts of interest. 9/11 CitizensWatch, in particular, called for the resignation of Philip D. Zelikow, the executive staff director. Zelikow is a Bush-appointee who served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He spent three years on the President George H. W. Bush's National Security Council. Zelikow worked closely with Bush NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice and even co-wrote a book with her. Some worry that Zelikow may be using his power to deflect blame from himself and to protect Rice. Both the Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demanded his resignation, without success.

In addition, many members had ties which could be viewed as conflicts of interest.

Members of the 9/11 commission. Top row: Ben-Veniste, Lehman, Roemer, Thompson, Kerrey, Gorton. Bottom row:  Fielding,  Hamilton (Vice-Chairman),  Kean (Chairman), Gorelick.
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Members of the 9/11 commission. Top row: Ben-Veniste, Lehman, Roemer, Thompson, Kerrey, Gorton. Bottom row: Fielding, Hamilton (Vice-Chairman), Kean (Chairman), Gorelick.
  • Jamie Gorelick, while serving in the Department of Justice under the Clinton administration, developed the policy that prevented communication between various government law enforcement and intelligence agencies, specifically the FBI and CIA. (the "wall memo").[4] She also is on the board of United Technologies. Gorelick's firm has agreed to represent Prince Mohammed al Faisal in the suit by the 9/11 families. The families contend that al Faisal has legal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.
  • Thomas Kean has a history of investments that link him to Saudi Arabian investors who have financially supported both George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden in the past. One example is his former business connections to Khalid bin Mahfouz, an alleged terrorist financier. He was also at one point or still is on the board of Pepsi Bottling, Amerada Hess, UnitedHealth Group, CIT Group and Aramark.
  • Fred F. Fielding has done legal work for two of Bush's leading "Pioneer" fund-raisers. Fielding also works for a law firm lobbying for Spirit Airlines and United Airlines.
  • Slade Gorton has close ties to Boeing, which built all the planes destroyed on 9/11, and his law firm represents several major airlines, including Delta Air Lines.
  • James Thompson is the head of a law firm that lobbies for American Airlines, and he has previously represented United Airlines.
  • Richard Ben-Veniste has represented Democratic National Chairman Terry McAuliffe, and continues to represent Boeing and United Airlines.
  • Max Cleland, former U.S. Senator, has received $300,000 from the airline industry. He publicly complained about the White House's refusal to cooperate, then was appointed head of the U.S. Export/Import Bank by the president and resigned from the Commission.
  • Lee Hamilton sits on many advisory boards, including those to the CIA, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, The United States Commission on National Security, and the US Army.
  • Tim Roemer represents Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

The commission's defenders claim that these do not represent significant conflicts of interest, and that the commission maintained its neutrality.

Claims of lack of cooperation from the White House

In April 2002, Bush said that the investigation into 9/11 should be confined to Congress because it deals with sensitive information that could reveal sources and methods of intelligence.[5] But by September, the White House came under intense fire concerning the commission from many victims' families,[6] and thus President Bush finally agreed to the creation of an independent 9/11 commission. But many 9/11 victims' families believed that the scope of the investigation by the Commission did not go far enough in investigating the U.S. government's failures because the Commission was not to investigate intelligence failures.[7]

However, the White House insisted that it was to appoint the commission's chair, leading some to question the commission's independence. The initial person appointed to head the commission, Henry Kissinger, has been accused by many of having been involved in past government coverups in South America (specifically, the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile), and of having on-going business relationships with members of the Bin Laden family in Saudi Arabia.

Even after Kissinger resigned, the White House was often cited as having attempted to block the release of information to the commission[8] and for refusing to give interviews without tight conditions attached leading to threats to subpoena.[9] The Bush Administration has further been accused of attempting to derail the commission by giving it one of the smallest independent commission funding levels in recent history ($3 million),[10] and by giving the commission a very short deadline. The White House insists that they have given the commission "unprecedented cooperation".

While President Bush and Vice President Cheney did ultimately agree to testify, they did so only under several conditions:

  • They would be allowed to testify jointly;
  • They would not be required to take an oath before testifying;
  • The testimony would not be recorded electronically or transcribed, and that the only record would be notes taken by one of the commission staffers;
  • These notes would not be made public.

The commission agreed to these conditions, and the President and Vice President gave their testimony on April 29.

Commissioners suspected the Pentagon was deceiving the Commission

For more than two years after the attacks, officials with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided inaccurate information about the response to the hijackings in testimony and media appearances. Authorities suggested that U.S. air defenses had reacted quickly, that jets had been scrambled in response to the last two hijackings and that fighters were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if it threatened Washington, D.C..

The Commission reported a year later that audiotapes from NORAD's Northeast headquarters and other evidence showed clearly that the military never had any of the hijacked airliners in its sights and at one point chased a phantom aircraft—American Airlines Flight 11—long after it had crashed into the World Trade Center.[11] For example, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold and Col. Alan Scott told the commission that NORAD had begun tracking United 93 at 9:16 a.m., but the commission determined that the airliner was not even hijacked until 12 minutes later. According to later testimony, the military was not aware of the flight until after it had crashed in Pennsylvania.

The Commission was forced to use subpoenas to obtain the cooperation of the FAA and NORAD to release evidence such as audiotapes. The agencies' reluctance to release the tapes—along with e-mails, erroneous public statements and other evidence—led some of the panel's staff members and commissioners to believe that authorities sought to mislead the commission and the public about what happened on September 11. "I was shocked at how different the truth was from the way it was described," John Farmer, a former New Jersey attorney general who led the staff inquiry into events on September 11, said in an August 2006 interview.[12]

Commissioners believe the Commission was set up to fail

In their book "Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission" on their experience serving as co-chairs of the Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton devoted the first chapter on how they believed the Commission was set up for failure. Hamilton listed a number of reasons why they thought this, including the late start of the Commission and the very short deadline imposed; the insufficient funds, 3 million dollars, initially allocated for conducting such an extensive investigation (later the Commission requested and received additional funds, but the chairs still felt hamstrung); the many politicians who did not want the Commission formed; the continuing resistance and opposition to the work of the Commission by many politicians, particularly those who did not wish to be blamed for any of what happened; and the denial of access by various agencies to documents and witnesses. "So there were all kinds of reasons we thought we were set up to fail." [13]

Claims that the investigation lacked adequate funds

". . .Whereas the investigation of the Challenger disaster received $50 million, Bush promised only $3 million for the investigation of the much more deadly and complex disaster of 9/11. He then initially resisted when the commission asked for an additional $8 million."

from David Ray Griffin's The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. p.284

Claims the commission was used for partisan purposes

Some conservatives believe that the Democratic Party used the commission for partisan advantage during the 2004 election campaign. Rather than focusing equally on all factors, critics predicted that Congressional Democrats would ignore any policy errors made by Bill Clinton while emphasizing the mistakes of President Bush.[14]

In contrast, many opponents of the Bush administration believe that the commission was set up to perform a superficial examination of the background of the attacks, thereby meeting public demands for an investigation while still preventing any substantive examination. Also they argue that Republicans on the commission and in Congress ignored mistakes of the Bush administration while exaggerating those made by former President Clinton.

Four books that critique the official Commission are Crossing the Rubicon by Michael Ruppert, The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute, by Paul Thompson, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, A Critique of the Kean-Zelikow Report by David Ray Griffin, and Cover Up: What the Government is Still Hiding About the War on Terror, by Peter Lance. All describe conflicts of interest that the Commissioners had and point out problems in the official narrative that suggest the attacks were allowed to happen, or rather made to happen, in order to achieve long-sought policy changes (the Iraq war and "Homeland Security").

Newsweek, in late February, 2006, reported that a draft of the 9/11 Commission Report expressed skepticism about Dick Cheney's claim to have spoken with President Bush before giving an order to shoot down United Flight 93. According to Newsweek, White House officials successfully fought to have those parts of the report toned down.[15]

Claims the commission ignored or censored key government evidence

Former FBI, NSA and other federal intelligence experts claim the 9/11 Commission report was fundamentally flawed because the 9/11 Commission refused to hear, ignored, or censored testimony about the many pre-September 11 warnings given to the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies. These federal whistleblowers claim that in an effort to avoid having to hold any individual accountable, the 9/11 Commission turned a blind eye on FBI agent-provided evidence before September 11 regarding the 9/11 plot.[16]

Claims the commission ignored information regarding Able Danger

The reputation and credibility of the commission has recently been damaged by evidence of a lack of thoroughness or possibly a coverup. In August 2005, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claimed he had informed 9/11 Commission Executive Director Dr. Philip D. Zelikow about a highly classified data-mining project called Able Danger that had identified two of the three terrorist cells responsible for 9/11. Shaffer said Dr. Zelikow was initially very interested and gave Shaffer his card to contact him again. However, Shaffer claims when he contacted Dr. Zelikow, he was no longer interested in information about Able Danger.[17] The commission later issued a response saying they found Shaffer "not sufficiently reliable" and the information was "lacking historical significance" and did not warrant further investigation. [1] Subsequently, four additional "credible witnesses" have come forward to support Shaffer's account of Able Danger. [18]

Former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the Commission, said: "Bluntly, it just didn't happen and that's the conclusion of all 10 of us." A search for documents on Able Danger has not been very productive, leading U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) to speculate that a coverup may have occurred. The Pentagon investigated the matter and has not been able to find any documentary evidence confirming the allegations.[19] Pentagon spokesman Army Maj. Paul Swiergosz said: "We've interviewed 80 people involved with Able Danger, combed through hundreds of thousands of documents and millions of e-mails and have still found no documentation of Mohamed Atta." But Weldon claims that the Pentagon ordered the destruction of a large volume of documents related to Able Danger.[20]

FBI director's critique regarding Able Danger

Former FBI director Louis Freeh criticized the 9/11 Commission for ignoring key evidence from Able Danger, which, he alleged, resulted in false statements being made in the final 9/11 Commission report. For example, the 9/11 Commission concluded that "American intelligence agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the attacks," which, Mr. Freeh stated, appears to be false, given that Able Danger had identified Mohammed Atta, the alleged ring-leader of the 19 hijackers, as an Al Qaida man active in the United States, and was tracking him for many months.

Further, Director Freeh criticized the Commission for allowing the Pentagon to withhold key evidence about the facts found by Able Danger, and concluded that these inadequacies raised serious questions about the credibility of the 9/11 Commission (Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559 last visited 2007/5/28).

Sandy Berger convicted of stealing and destroying copies of classified terror documents

Commission recommendations

  • The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries.
  • The United States should make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan.
  • The United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan.
  • The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly.
  • The U.S. government must define what the message is, that for which it stands.

Work of commissioners after the Commission ceased its functions

Months after the 9/11 Commission had officially issued its report and ceased its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw attention to the recommendations of the Commission for reducing the terror risk, claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission.

Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, by Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, is a book about the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 9/11 Commission that investigated them.

The book was released on August 15, 2006 and chronicles the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission, which some consider one of the most important independent government commissions in American political history.

In the book, Kean and Hamilton write that the 9/11 Commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by officials from The Pentagon and the Federal Aviation Administration during the investigation that it considered a separate investigation into possible obstruction of justice by Pentagon and FAA officials. [21]

The book is published by Alfred A. Knopf.

References

  1. ^ Jehl, Douglas. "Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00", New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr., 8 August 2005, corrected 9 August. Retrieved on 2006-08-07. 
  2. ^ Cable News Network. "Kissinger resigns as head of 9/11 commission", CNN Inside Politics, Time Warner, 13 December 2002. Retrieved on 2006-08-07. 
  3. ^ Shovelan, John. "9/11 Commission finds 'deep institutional failings'", Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 23 July 2004. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  4. ^ Memo from Jamie Gorelick to Mary Jo White, Louis Freeh, Richard Scrugge, and Jo Ann Harris. "Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations". Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  5. ^ "Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel", CBS Worldwide, Inc, 23 May 2002. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  6. ^ "9-11 Relatives Grill Bush Administration", CBS Worldwide, Inc, 19 September 2002. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  7. ^ "Bush Backs Independent 9-11 Probe", CBS Worldwide, Inc, 20 September 2002. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  8. ^ "Bush: Documents sought by 9/11 commission 'very sensitive'", CNN, 28 October 2003. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  9. ^ Waterman, Shaun. "9/11 commission eyes subpoena of White House data", United Press International, 26 October 2003. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  10. ^ Burger, Timothy. "9-11 Commission Funding Woes", Time, Inc, 26 March 2003. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  11. ^ Eggen, Dan. "9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon", Washington Post, 2 August 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  12. ^ Eggen, Dan. "9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon", Washington Post, 2 August 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  13. ^ CBC News, August 21, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/911hamilton.html
  14. ^ Thomas, helen. "Administration Drags Feet Cooperating With 9/11 Probes", KCRA, 10 November 2003. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  15. ^ Thomas, Evan. "The Shot Heard Round the World", Newsweek, 27 February 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  16. ^ Edmonds, Sibel and Weaver, Bill. "The 9/11 Commission: A Play on Nothing in Three Acts", National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, 5 September 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  17. ^ Goodwin, Jacob. "Inside Able Danger – The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Untimely Death of a U.S. Military Intelligence Program", Government Security News, 23 August 2005. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  18. ^ "Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER", Public Discourse Project, 23 August 2005. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 
  19. ^ {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
  20. ^ {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
  21. ^ "Book: Sept. 11 Panel Doubted Officials", Associated Press, 4 August 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 

See also

External links

Critical Essays, Books and Films

External Sources

Hawala: An Informal Payment System and Its Use to Finance Terrorism, by Sebastian R. Müller (Broschiert - Dec. 2006), ISBN: ISBN-10: 3865506569, ISBN-13: 978-3865506566


 
 

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