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Abington School District v. Schempp

374 U.S. 203 (1963), argued 27–28 Feb. 1963, decided 17 June 1963 by vote of 8 to 1, Clark for the Court, Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg concurring, Stewart in dissent. Schempp was essentially a rerun of the Court's decision the previous term in Engel v. Vitale (1962). In the earlier case, the Court identified a constitutional violation and struck the offending legislation; in Schempp, it reasserted its logic and result as if to say, “We meant what we said.” Schempp repeats both the Engel holding—the Establishment Clause forbids public schools from sponsoring religious practices akin to prayer—and its coalition of justices. This time, however, Justice Tom C. Clark (Presbyterian) wrote for the majority, and the Court's religious diversity—Arthur Goldberg (Jewish) and William Brennan (Catholic)—was made manifest in separate concurring opinions.

Schempp came in the wake of a hostile response to Engel, which raged throughout the summer of 1962 and into the Court's next term. Representative L. Mendell Rivers accused the Court of “legislating—they never adjudicate—with one eye on the Kremlin and the other on the NAACP.” Cardinal Spellman said it had struck “at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for so long been raised.” Representative Frank Becker called Engel “the most tragic [ruling] in the history of the United States,” and offered an amendment to reverse this (and, later, the Schempp) decision (see Constitutional Amending Process). According to the Gallup Poll, 76 percent of Americans supported this approach. All told, 150 such amendments were offered by 111 members of Congress, with Becker's coming to a vote but losing in the House of Representatives.

The Schempp decision actually decided two cases: itself and Murray v. Curlett (1963). The former was brought by the Schempps—a non‐Jewish family sought out by the ACLU, which argued the case—who objected to a Pennsylvania law requiring that ten verses of the Bible be read at the opening of each public school day. The latter was brought by Madalyn Murray and her son William, professed atheists, who attacked a Baltimore statute providing for the “reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer” in opening exercises in city schools. Both of these cases saw the same type of amicus curiae group participation as in Engel, with separationists opposing the prayers and accommodationists supporting them.

Justice Clark's majority opinion was light on history and long on the importance of religion in American life. Its conclusion, however, was the same as that tendered the year before: the Constitution forbids state establishment of religion, prayer is religion, and thus prayer in public schools is constitutionally impermissible. For the first time, a “test” for Establishment Clause questions was formally articulated by the Court. To pass constitutional muster, legislation must have “a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion” (p. 222). The fact that the religious material here was not, like that in Engel, composed by the state, was constitutionally inconsequential; the “wall of separation” was real and was to be kept high.

The concurring opinions were unexceptional, save for the religious affiliations of the justices who wrote them and their somewhat self‐consciously apologetic tone; it was as if they sought to reassure the nation that the Court's posture was not antireligious. Most noteworthy was Brennan's seventy‐four page opus reviewing the history of the First Amendment—and judicial and legislative glosses on it—which concluded that government may neither foster nor promote religion.

Justice Potter Stewart's dissent reasserted themes he initially voiced in Engel. Charging the majority with hostility (not neutrality) to religion, he would have upheld the practices as a legitimate accommodation. In addition, Stewart noted that the separationist doctrine enunciated by the Court in the two prayer cases posed a difficult interpretive conundrum: if states sought to protect free exercise rights (say, by paying military chaplains to minister to the needs of troops in battle zones) they could run afoul of the Establishment Clause by pursuing policies that were primarily (if not solely) religious in purpose. He contended that his approach, stressing the preeminence of free exercise values, would avoid this dilemma.

See also Religion.

— Joseph Kobylka

 
 
US Government Guide: Abington School District v. Schempp

374 U.S. 203 (1963)
Vote: 8–1
For the Court: Clark
Concurring: Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg
Dissenting: Stewart

A Pennsylvania law required that each public school day must be started with the reading of at least 10 verses from the Bible, without comment. A student could be excused from this requirement by presenting to school authorities a written request from a parent or guardian. The Schempp family challenged the state law. They refused to request an exception for their child, a student at Abington High School, from the Bible-reading exercise. And they refused to allow their child to attend this exercise. The Schempps brought suit against the Abington School District to block enforcement of the Bible-reading statute.

The Issue

Did the Pennsylvania law on Bible reading in public schools violate the 1st Amendment provision against laws “respecting an establishment of religion”?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court decided in favor of the Schempp family and struck down the state law on Bible reading in public schools. Writing for the Court, Justice Tom Clark concluded that the government may not promote religion in public schools. For the first time, the Court specified a test for determining whether a law violates the establishment clause of the 1st Amendment. Justice Clark wrote:

The test may be stated as follows: What are the purposes and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution….

[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
According to the Court, the Pennsylvania law on daily Bible reading in public schools failed to pass this establishment clause test. The state law failed because it advances religion. The Pennsylvania Bible-reading statute was therefore ruled unconstitutional.

Dissent

Justice Potter Stewart claimed that the Court had incorrectly applied the 1st Amendment's establishment clause in this case. He emphasized that by striking down the state law, the Court was denying free exercise of religion to the majority of citizens. According to Justice Stewart, this Pennsylvania law was constitutional because it did not force students to participate in a religious exercise. Justice Stewart wrote:

We err in the first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as a matter of imperatives of our free society, that religion and government must necessarily interact in countless ways….

[T]he central value embodied in the First Amendment… is the safeguarding of an individual's right to free exercise of his religion….

[T]here is involved in these cases a substantial free exercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of passages from the Bible.

Significance

This case clearly stated the Court's position that the government cannot foster or promote religious doctrine in public schools through state-legislated religious exercises. By reinforcing the Engel v. Vitale (1962) decision, the Court in this case seemed to settle the question of state-sponsored religious exercises in public schools. However, public opinion polls from the 1960s to the 1990s have shown that more than 60 percent of Americans disagree with the Court's decisions on the prohibition of prayer in public school-sanctioned programs. Vigorous debate about the separation of church and state continues.

See also Engel v. Vitale; Establishment clause; Religious issues under the Constitution

 
Law Encyclopedia: Abington School District v. Schempp
This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

In 1963, the Supreme Court banned the Lord's Prayer and Bible reading in public schools in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844. The decision came one year after the Court had struck down, in Engel v. Vitale, a state-authored prayer that was recited by public school students each morning (370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601 [1962]). Engel had opened the floodgates; Schempp ensured that a steady flow of anti-prayer rulings would continue into the 1990s. Schempp was in many ways a repeat of Engel: the religious practices it concerned were nominally different, but the logic used to find them unconstitutional was the same. This time, the majority went one step further. Demolishing the arguments used to defend school prayer, it issued the first concrete test for determining violations of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

The Schempp ruling involved two cases: its namesake and Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962). The Schempp case concerned a 1949 Pennsylvania law that forced public schools to start each day with a reading of ten Bible verses (24 Pa. Stat. § 15-1516). The law did not specify which version of the Bible should be used—for instance, it could be the Catholic Douay text or the Jewish version of the Old Testament. But local school officials only bought the Protestant King James Version. Teachers ordered students to rise and recite the verses reverently and in unison, or, as in Abington School District, students in a broadcasting class read the verses over a public-address system. Teachers could be fired for refusing to participate, and pupils occasionally were segregated from others if they did not join in the daily reading.

The Pennsylvania law brought a challenge from the Schempps, whose three children also attended Unitarian Sunday school. In 1958, a special three-judge federal court heard the case. The father, Edward L. Schempp, testified that he objected to parts of the Bible. Leviticus, in particular, upset him, "where they mention all sorts of blood sacrifices, uncleanness and leprosy. … I do not want my children believing that God is a lesser person than a human father." Although hardly the first lawsuit on this issue—Bible reading cases in state courts had yielded contradictory rulings since 1910— Schempp was the first to reach a federal court. The three-judge panel ruled that the Bible reading statute violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion …") and interfered with its Free Exercise Clause ("or prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]"). Local and state officials immediately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear Schempp along with Murray as a consolidated case. Madalyn Murray and her fourteen-year-old son, William Murray, were atheists. They had challenged a 1905 Baltimore school board rule requiring each school day to start with Bible reading or the Lord's Prayer ("Our father, who art in heaven …"), or both. An attorney herself, Murray brought the suit only after protesting to officials, stirring up media attention, and encouraging her son to protest in a controversial strike that kept him out of school for eighteen days. The suit said the rule transgressed the Establishment Clause by requiring compulsory religious education and violated the Free Exercise Clause by discriminating against atheists. The Murrays originally lost in state courts and on appeal.

When the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the consolidated cases on February 27 and 28, the nation was still smarting from the previous year's ruling in Engel. An uproar over the Engel decision had produced 150 proposals in Congress to amend the Constitution and had hardly diminished. Schempp gave advocates of school prayer a chance to argue that the Court had been wrong in Engel, and this they did. Attorneys representing Pennsylvania and Baltimore officials denied that Bible reading or prayer had a religious nature, and claimed that it therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause—which, in any event, they maintained, was only designed to prevent an official state religion. Their true purpose, argued attorneys, was to keep order and provide a proper moral climate for students.

The Court stood by the Engel decision. In an 8-1 decision, it ruled that both Bible reading and the Lord's Prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Tom C. Clark's majority opinion differed in a few respects from the previous year's ruling: it admonished prayer advocates for ignoring the law, spelled out in some detail the precedents involved, and laid out the Court's first explicit test for Establishment Clause questions. Founded on the idea of state neutrality, this test had a vital standard: any law hoping to survive the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause must have "a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."

The test clearly spelled out the limits. Study of the Bible or religion was acceptable, but only so long as "presented objectively as part of a secular program of education." Religious practices in public school were indefensible under the First Amendment. "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone," Justice Clark observed, "it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."

Schempp produced three concurring opinions, notably a seventy-four-page epic by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. As in Engel, the sole dissent came from Justice Stewart. Again he disagreed with the majority's emphasis on the Establishment Clause's taking precedence over the Free Exercise Clause. For Stewart, the key factor was whether the states in the case had actually coerced students into praying or Bible reading. He did not think so.

Schempp concluded the initial round of the Supreme Court's prayer ban. However, the issue did not fade from public, political, and religious concern, and it came before the Supreme Court two decades later in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985) (a one-minute period of silence for meditation or prayer had no secular purpose and was created with religious purpose).

See: Constitutional Amendment; Engel v. Vitale; Establishment Clause; First Amendment; Free Exercise Clause; School Prayer.

 
Wikipedia: Abington School District v. Schempp
Abington Township School District v. Schempp
Seal_of_the_United_States_Supreme_Court.png
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 27 – 28, 1963
Decided June 17, 1963
Full case name: School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania, et al. v. Schempp et al.
Citations: 374 U.S. 203; 83 S. Ct. 1560; 10 L. Ed. 2d 844; 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2611
Prior history: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Holding
The Court decided 8-1 in favor of the respondent, Edward Schempp, and declared sanctioned organized Bible reading in public schools in the United States to be unconstitutional.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Earl Warren
Associate Justices: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Arthur Joseph Goldberg
Case opinions
Majority by: Clark
Joined by: Warren, Black, White, Douglas, Goldberg, Harlan, Brennan
Concurrence by: Douglas
Concurrence by: Brennan
Concurrence by: Goldberg
Joined by: Harlan
Dissent by: Stewart
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV

Abington Township School District v. Schempp (consolidated with Murray v. Curlett), 374 U.S. 203 (1963),[1] was a United States Supreme Court case argued on February 2728, 1963 and decided on June 17, 1963. In the case, the Court decided 8-1 in favor of the respondent, Edward Schempp, and declared school sponsored Bible reading in public schools in the United States to be unconstitutional. The case was part of a string of Supreme Court cases ruling on the place of religion in public schools, and was both condemned by religious conservatives and celebrated by those who supported constitutional separation of church and state.

Background

Origin of case

The Abington case began when Edward Schempp, a Unitarian and a resident of Abington Township, Pennsylvania, filed suit against the Abington Township School District in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to prohibit the enforcement of a Pennsylvania state law that required his children, specifically Ellery Schempp, to hear and sometimes read portions of the Bible as part of their public school education. That law (24 Pa. Stat. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928) required that "[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible [be] read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day." Schempp specifically contended that the statute violated his and his family's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.[2]

When it was brought, this case illustrated for Americans the metamorphosis their society was undergoing. Although many must have disagreed with local school districts conducting organized prayers and Bible readings, only a small minority vocally expressed objection to the statutes mandating those activities. Most U.S. citizens believed that the United States was a nation founded on Christian principles. Yet, in spite of their widely held beliefs, as early as 1890, many states were rolling back mandates of state sponsored devotional exercises in the classroom (Boston, 1993, p. 105).

Like four other states, Pennsylvania law included a statute compelling school districts to perform Bible readings in the mornings before class. Twenty-five states had laws allowing "optional" Bible reading, with the remainder having no laws supporting or rejecting Bible reading. In eleven of those states with laws supportive of Bible reading or state-sponsored prayer, courts had declared them unconstitutional (Boston, 1993, p. 101).

More famous than Schempp was the plaintiff in Murray v. Curlett, the son of Madalyn Murray O'Hair, who founded the group American Atheists in 1963.

The district court arguments

During the first District Court trial, Edward Schempp and his children testified as to specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible "which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching" (177 F. Supp. 398, 400). The children testified that all of the doctrines to which they referred were read to them at various times as part of the exercises. Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having his children excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several reasons, including his belief that the children's relationships with their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected.

The district court ruling

The district court ruled in Schempp's favor, and struck down the Pennsylvania statute. The school district appealed the ruling, and while that appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the statute to allow children to be excused from the exercises upon the written request of their parents. This change did not satisfy Schempp, however, and he continued his action against the school district, charging that the amendment of the law did not change its nature as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. (Due to the change in the law, the Supreme Court had responded to the school district's appeal by vacating the first ruling and remanding the case back to the district court.) The district court again found for Schempp. The school district appealed to the Supreme Court again, and, on appeal, the case was consolidated with a similar Maryland case launched by Madalyn Murray (Boston, 1993, p. 106).

The district court ruling in the second trial, in striking down the practices and the statute requiring them, made specific findings of fact that the children's attendance at Abington Senior High School was compulsory and that the practice of reading 10 verses from the Bible was also compelled by law. It also found that:

The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance. The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immediately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord's Prayer. The fact that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from attendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony for . . . Section 1516 . . . unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the statute requires the reading of the 'Holy Bible,' a Christian document, the practice . . . prefers the Christian religion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of . . . the Commonwealth . . . to introduce a religious ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth. (201 F. Supp., at 819; quoted in 374 U.S. 203 (1963))

Precedents for case

SCKITANOR explicitly upheld Engel v. Vitale, in which the Court ruled that the sanctioning of a prayer by the school amounted to a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion". The Abington court held that in organizing a reading of the Bible, the school was conducting "a religious exercise", and "that cannot be done without violating the 'neutrality' required of the State by the balance of power between individual, church and state that has been struck by the First Amendment" (374 U.S. 203 (1963)). Over the previous two decades, the Supreme Court, by incorporating specific rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, had steadily increased the extent to which rights contained in United States Bill of Rights were applied against the states.[3] Abington was a continuation of this trend with regard to the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, and specifically built upon Supreme Court precedents in Cantwell v. Connecticut (310 U.S. 296 (1940)), Everson v. Board of Education (330 U.S. 1 (1947)), and McCollum v. Board of Education (333 U.S. 203 (1948)).

Opinions

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to settle the persistent and vigorous protests resulting from its previous decision in Engel v. Vitale regarding religion in schools (White & Zimmerman, p. 70).

The decision

Clark continued that the Court was of the feeling that no matter the religious nature of the citizenry, the government at all levels, as required by the Constitution, must remain neutral in matters of religion "while protecting all, prefer[ring] none, and disparag[ing] none". The Court had clearly rejected the contention by many that the Establishment Clause forbade only governmental preference of one faith over another (Eastland, 1993, p. 59).

Citing Justice Hugo Black in Torcaso v. Watkins, Justice Clark added, "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion'". Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs". Such prohibited behavior was that self-evident in the Pennsylvania law requiring Bible reading (and allowing recitation of the Lord's Prayer) in its public schools. The Court recognized the value of such ideal neutrality from lessons of history when government and religion were either fully fused or cooperative with one another and religious liberty was nonexistent or seriously curtailed.

William J. Brennan's concurrence

Justice Brennan filed the only lengthy and truly historically significant concurrence in this case. The Justice took seventy-three pages to elaborate his ideas about what the Framers intended in the formation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, gauging the value of religion in our culture, reviewing past precedents, and suggesting a course for future church-state cases. Brennan felt the need to focus on the history of the Establishment Clause to counter numerous critics of the Court's Engel decision, who pointed out that prayer in public schools, as well as in many other areas of public life, was a longstanding practice going back to the framing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. He professed to be aware of the "ambiguities in the historical record" and felt a modern-day interpretation of the First Amendment was warranted (Davis, 1991, p. 77). In defense of that approach, Brennan stated:

Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's Prayer in ... public schools ..., our use of the history ... must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices. ... [T]he Baltimore and Abington schools offend the First Amendment because they sufficiently threaten in our day those substantive evils the fear of which called forth the Establishment Clause. ... [O]ur interpretation of the First Amendment must necessarily be responsive to the much more highly charged nature of religious questions in contemporary society. A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected

In answer to critics of a broad interpretation of the prohibitions against government in the realm of religion, Brennan said, "nothing in the text of the Establishment Clause supports the view that the prevention of the setting up of an official church was meant to be the full extent of the prohibitions against official involvements in religion".

In the third section of his exhaustive concurrence, Justice Brennan charted the course that led to the incorporation of the First Amendment's religion clauses by way of answering the charge of Abington Township's counsel that Pennsylvania's Bible reading statute was a state issue, outside the purview of the federal court system, including that of the Supreme Court. He labeled the daily recitals of the Lord's Prayer and reading of the Bible as "quite [clear] breaches of the command of the Establishment Clause". He noted the long history of such practices, even before the "founding of our Republic". Additionally, he did not neglect to mention that most of those who demanded reading of the Bible and prayer in schools were hoping to serve "broader goals than compelling formal worship of God or fostering church attendance". He cited the 1858 words of the Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction, who saw the Bible as aptly suited to "teaching the noblest principles of virtue, morality, patriotism, and good order".

Justice Brennan took great pains to also show that many states, such as South Dakota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Ohio and Massachusetts, had already enacted and revoked laws similar to Pennsylvania's by the first half of the twentieth century. In addition, many political leaders including attorneys general and presidents like Ulysses S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt insisted that "matters of religion be left to family altars, churches and private schools" and "[It] is not our business to have the Protestant Bible or the Catholic Vulgate or the Talmud read in [public] schools" (though such statements on the part of Grant must be viewed on the backdrop of Grant's virulent anti-Catholicism, a spirit which drove many of the anti-Catholic 19th century Republican Party to champion laws sharply curbing public financing of religious practices out of fear of state financing of Catholic schools).

Brennan's concurrence also recognized the plurality of religious thought in the nation as basis enough for restriction of church and state relations. He cited this lack of appreciation of that pluralism as the "basic flaw" of Pennsylvania's Bible reading statute and Abington Township's defense of it:

There are persons in every community—often deeply devout—to whom any version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is offensive. There are others whose reverence for the Holy Scriptures demands private study or reflection and to whom public reading or recitation is sacrilegious.... To such persons it is not the fact of using the Bible in the public schools, nor the content of any particular version, that is offensive, but the manner in which it is used.

Potter Stewart's dissent

Justice Potter Stewart filed the only dissent in the case. In it, he was critical of both the lower court opinions and the decision the Supreme Court had reached regarding them. He wished to remand the case to lower courts for further proceedings.

Stewart had dissented in Engel v. Vitale and viewed the doctrine relied on in that case as implausible, given the long history of government religious practice in the United States, including the fact that the Supreme Court opens its own sessions with the declaration, "God Save this Honorable Court" and that Congress opens its sessions with prayers, among many other examples. Stewart believed that such practice fit with the nation's long history of permitting free exercise of religious practices, even in the public sphere.

He declared the cases consolidated with Schempp as "so fundamentally deficient as to make impossible an informed or responsible determination of the constitutional issues presented"—specifically, of whether the Establishment Clause was violated. As to the intent and scope of the religion clauses of the First Amendment:

It is, I think, a fallacious oversimplification to regard the [religion clauses] as establishing a single constitutional standard of "separation of church and state", which can be applied in every case to delineate the required boundaries between government and religion.... As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation upon the newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly suggest that the Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments. ... So matters stood until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or more accurately, until this Court's decision in Cantwell....

He stated his agreement with the doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment's embrace and application of the Bill of Rights, but pointed out the irony of such an amendment "designed to leave the States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their autonomy" (Eastland, 1993, pp. 165).

Other critics of the Court's findings in Abington v. Schempp often quote the following excerpt from Justice Stewart's opinion:

If religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed in an artificial and state-created disadvantage.... And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism, or at least, as governmental support of the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private (Eastland, 1993, pp. 165).

Backlash

The public was divided in reaction to the Court's decision; the decision has sparked persistent and ongoing criticism from proponents of prayer in school. In 1964, Life magazine declared Madalyn Murray O'Hair, the mother of the plaintiff in one of the cases, "the most hated woman in America." [1]

Newspapers were no exception. The Washington Evening Star, for example, criticized the decision, declaring that "God and religion have all but been driven from the public schools. What remains? Will the baccalaureate service and Christmas carols be the next to go? Don't bet against it." (Eastland, 1993, pp. 165). In contrast, the New York Times was more accepting of the Court's ruling. The paper printed significant portions of the opinions with no significant comments, either supportive or critical (Lewis, 1963, p. 16).

The views of various religious entities on the decision split between mainline Protestants and Jews, who in general strongly supported the decision, and evangelical Protestants and conservative Catholics, who strongly opposed the decision. Speaking from the conservative Protestant perspective, the Reverend Dr. Billy Graham said, "[i]n my opinion ... the Supreme Court ... is wrong. ... Eighty percent of the American people want Bible reading and prayer in the schools. Why should a majority be so severely penalized ...?" (New York Times, 1963, p. 17). The mainline denominations, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, registered less critical opinions of the verdict, in fact seeing it as a boon to religious freedom by its very limiting of governmental authority in the sphere of public schools (Dugan, 1963, p. 18). However, a majority of fundamentalist Christians today regard this decision as the one which "kicked God and prayer out of the schools" (McWilliams, 1993, p. 170)....

Subsequent history

The United States Congress reacted swiftly; by April 1964, over 150 resolutions to overturn the decision by amending the Constitution had been proposed (O'Hair, 1974, p. 55). Calls continue today, mostly from conservative Republican and Religious Right activists, for an amendment to the Constitution to allow students to pray or read the Bible. This springs from the belief, on the part of school districts, parents, and concerned religious groups, that Abington v. Schempp prohibited such activity, when it actually restrained the government from interfering either to promote or prohibit such activity (Boston, 1993, p. 227).

Abington v. Schempp was used as precedent for similar cases like Board of Education v. Allen and Lemon v. Kurtzman in the decades that followed. The three part Lemon test had its basis in the jurisprudence of Abington v. Schempp. Under the test, a given church-state law is subjected to three criteria: sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the government in religious activity. Failure in any one of those realms allow the measure to be declared unconstitutional.

See also

References

  1. ^ 374 U.S. 203 (Full text of the decision courtesy of Findlaw.com)
  2. ^ Abington School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
  3. ^ The process of incorporation, or nationalization as it is also known, of the United States Bill of Rights began with cases (164 U.S. 403 (1896) and 166 U.S. 226 (1897)) pitting the railroads against the government over just compensation for the taking of private property, due all persons (and corporations) under the Fifth Amendment. Next was First Amendment Freedom of Speech, in Fiske v. Kansas 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Freedom of Religion was first incorporated (albeit in dictum) in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California 293 U.S. 245 (1934), and made official in Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Finally in Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the court ruled that a state could not write or sanction an official prayer to be read by students at school. For a more detailed history of Incorporation, see Incorporation (Bill of Rights).
  • Billy Graham voices shock over decision. (18 June 1963). New York Times. p. 17.
  • Boston, Robert. (1993). Why the religious right is wrong: About separation of church and state. (1st ed.). Buffalo: Prometheus Books. ISBN 0-87975-834-1
  • Davis, Derek. (1991). Original Intent: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Course of American Church-State Relations. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
  • Dugan, George. (18 June 1963). Churches divided, with most in favor. New York Times, p. 18.
  • Eastland, Terry, ed. (1993). Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center.
  • O'Hair, Madalyn Murray. (1974). Freedom Under Siege. Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, Inc.
  • Lewis, Anthony. (18 June 1963). Government must be neutral in religion, majority asserts. New York Times. p. 16.
  • Licciardello, Carman. (1994). Raising the Standard: Reclaiming Our World for God. Nashville: Sparrow Press.
  • McWilliams, Peter. (1993). Ain't Nobody's Business If You Do: The Absurdity of Consensual Crimes in a Free Society. (1st ed.). Los Angeles: Prelude Press. ISBN 0-931580-53-6
  • White, Ronald C. & Zimmerman, Albright G. (Eds.). (1990). An Unsettled Arena: Religion and the Bill of Rights. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. ISBN 0-8028-0465-9

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Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Abington School District v. Schempp" Read more

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