academic freedom

American professors had fought for academic freedom since the nineteenth century, but the term did not appear in a United States Supreme Court decision until 1952. Justice William O. Douglas invoked it then, dissenting in Adler v. Board of Education. The majority, laboring in the shadow of the Cold War and McCarthyism (see Communism and Cold War) had upheld a New York law that prohibited employment of teachers in public schools if they belonged to “subversive organizations.”

Constitutional recognition of academic freedom was foreshadowed by Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925). In Meyer, the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited teaching foreign languages to students before the ninth grade. In Pierce, the Court struck down an Oregon statute that required parents to send their children aged eight through sixteen to public schools. Both cases rested upon the substantive due process rights of private schools, as well as upon parents' right to control the sort of education their children receive.

Since Adler, the Court has invoked academic freedom in two distinct ways. As Justice David Souter said, concurring in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth (2000), “Our understanding of academic freedom has included not merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that universities and schools should have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to teach” (p. 237). These two principles may at times be inconsistent, as when a university regulates the conduct of professors or students and argues that the institutional independence aspect of academic freedom prevents a court from interfering in its decisions.

Academic Freedom for Professors and Students

The premise of Adler has now been rejected. Public employees, including teachers, have at least the same rights of expression as others (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 1967). The Court said that “[A]cademic freedom … is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” (p. 603).

In Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), the Court upheld a Marxist professor's refusal to answer questions about his teaching and political views. Chief Justice Warren identified freedom of thought and expression as essential to an academic institution. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, spoke both of the need to protect the “ardor and fearlessness of scholars” and of the even more venerable tradition of universities' institutional independence (pp. 262–263). The Warren and Frankfurter views have dominated the Court's academic freedom discussions ever since.

In Barenblatt v. United States, the Court by a 5–4 margin refused to insulate academics from congressional inquiry into their political beliefs and associations. But in later cases invalidating teacher loyalty oaths, it decried the chilling effect of coerced political conformity on teachers. In the oath cases, the Court clearly united free expression and procedural fairness values in creating a zone of autonomy for scholars and their activities.

Teachers were the first beneficiaries of the Court's expanding conception of academic freedom. In Epperson v. Arkansas (1968), the Court struck down a criminal statute that forbade teachers from teaching the theory of evolution, holding that the state's undoubted power to shape the curriculum is nevertheless controlled by the First Amendment.

The scope of protected speech may, however, be narrower when the teacher criticizes school officials. In Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited firing a teacher who had publicly questioned school board policies. Although the Court invoked academic freedom, it made clear that a teacher is also an employee, and that disruptive speech, even on a matter of public concern, could be the basis for termination. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle (1977) reaffirmed school authorities' power by permitting termination of a teacher whose speech dealt with public issues, if the employer could show independent grounds for discharge.

In Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a university to state reasons and provide a hearing when it does not renew a nontenured teacher's contract. The teacher can claim a hearing only if she makes a credible showing that nonrenewal would stigmatize her in searching for new employment.

The Court has been more hesitant to recognize student claims to academic freedom. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District (1969), the Court invalidated a school district's suspension of high school students who had worn black armbands in protest against the Vietnam War. However, in Healy v. James (1972), the Court held that a public university may enforce reasonable rules governing the time, place, and manner of public expression. It may deny campus access to provably disruptive groups. But it may not base its actions on the content of the views students wish to express, even if those views are “abhorrent” (p. 188).

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Court upheld a high school principal's censorship of the student newspaper. It found that because students in a journalism class wrote the paper, it was not a public forum and therefore not entitled to full First Amendment protection.

Academic Freedom As Institutional Autonomy

Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sweezy, had stressed the independence of universities from governmental control. The Court has followed Justice Frankfurter's lead in more recent cases. There is an obvious tension here, for judicial reluctance to intervene in school or university decisions can mean judicial abdication in the face of student or teacher demands for fairness and self‐expression. In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984), the Court rejected any first amendment basis for professors' participation in academic governance.

The tension between professor rights and university autonomy was clear in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1990). The commission sought peer review records relating to the university's decision to deny tenure to a faculty member who claimed that the denial was motivated by racial and sexual discrimination. The Court rejected the university's claim that such records were protected by an “academic freedom” privilege.

In Board of Education v. Pico (1982), the Court recognized a school board's discretionary power over curriculum and book selection, but held that the board could not bow to community pressure to remove “objectionable” books from school library shelves. Pico reaffirmed institutional autonomy, but only if the institution functions free from improper pressure to censor.

Institutional autonomy has been a central theme in the Court's decisions on affirmative action in university admissions. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Court invoked institutional academic freedom to permit a state medical school to take race into account in its admissions policy. In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), a 5–4 decision, the Court upheld a state law school's race‐conscious admissions policy, again relying on the institution's academic freedom to foster diversity in its student body.

The Court's opinions will no doubt continue to waver between individual‐oriented and institutional‐oriented theories of academic freedom. The Court seems destined to confront the Bakke/Grutter issues in a variety of contexts, and to revisit the issue of professor and student freedom of expression.

See also Education; First Amendment.

Bibliography

• Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, Journal of College & University Law 29 (2002): 35.
• Academic Freedom, symposium in Texas Law Review 66 (1988): 1247–1659

— Michael E. Tigar

Academic Freedom describes a group of rights claimed by teachers—the right to study, to communicate ideas, and to publish the results of reflection and research without external restraints—in short, to assert the truth as they perceive it. Academic freedom developed in the universities of western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It emerged in a period of growing tolerance nurtured by the spread of scientific inquiry, reaction to the fiercely destructive religious conflicts that had for so long plagued Europe, the growth of commerce, and the evolution of the liberal state with its general bias toward liberty. Academic freedom is now recognized in most countries.

The principal justification of academic freedom is that through the unhampered interplay of ideas, the world's stock of usable knowledge is enlarged. Thus, while academic freedom directly benefits the teacher or institution, in a larger and much more significant sense, it serves vital public interests. American professors have fought for academic freedom since the nineteenth century, but the U.S. Supreme Court did not endorse the concept until the mid-twentieth century. The first case in which a majority of the Court's justices ruled that academic freedom is protected by the Constitution was Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957). Today, the concept of academic freedom is well established in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In most countries, academic freedom refers to the autonomy of the institution and its independence from external restraints; in the United States, in accordance with the individualistic bent of its constitutional law, the claim to academic freedom is usually associated with an individual teacher's freedom from interference with the free play of the intellect.

Academic freedom is invariably tied to the concept of tenure (status granted after a trial period, protecting a teacher from summary dismissal), since without security of employment, teachers cannot safely exercise their intellectual freedom. Tenure does not mean, however, that teachers can never be dismissed. Rather, it means they can be dismissed only for adequate cause, established according to the exacting requirements of due process, and including at some stage a judgment by professional peers. Academic freedom does not protect teachers from dismissal for causes not related to the exercise of their intellectual rights.

There are many associations throughout the world that are concerned with the defense of academic freedom and tenure; one of the most vigorous defenders in the United States is the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Such defense is needed because academic freedom is often under great pressure from a wide variety of sources: political parties, politicians, economic interests, religious and racial groups, alumni, donors, and members of governing boards. When the Supreme Court decided Sweezy, professors were under attack by politicians trying to ferret out communists. Today, critics of academia accuse professors of politically indoctrinating students, of presenting only a single point of view, of irrelevant discussions, and occasionally of deliberately misrepresenting course content in course catalog descriptions. The increased involvement of professors in off-campus business and government affairs has also generated scrutiny of academic research. Topics of concern include limits on research as a result of industrial-academic collaboration; influence by companies that employ researchers as consultants, thereby creating a conflict of interest; money rather than scientific inquiry being the propellant for research; and limits of academic disclosure dictated by corporate sponsors.

Bibliography

De George, Richard T. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Ethical Issues. Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.

Hofstadter, Richard, and Walter P. Metzger. The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Kahn, Sharon E., and Dennis Pavlich. Academic Freedom and the Inclusive University. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000.

Sowell, Thomas. Inside American Education: The Decline, the Deception, the Dogmas. New York: Free Press, 1993.

—David Fellman

The right to teach as one sees fit, but not necessarily the right to teach evil. The term encompasses much more than teaching-related speech rights of teachers.

Educational institutions are communities unto themselves with rules of their own, and when conflicts arise, the most common and compelling arguments involve freedom. As a result, the academic community is famous for blazing new trails of freedom in society, and it is often forced to confront its own concepts of freedom in the process.

Academic freedom was first introduced as a judicial term of art (a term with a specific legal meaning) by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld a New York law (N.Y. Civ. Service Law § 12-a) that prohibited employment of teachers in public institutions if they were members of "subversive organizations." In a scathing dissent joined by Justice Hugo L. Black, Douglas argued that such legislation created a police state and ran contrary to the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.

Justice Douglas equated academic freedom with the pursuit of truth. If academic freedom is the pursuit of truth and is protected by the First Amendment, reasoned Douglas, then the New York law should be struck down because it produced standardized thought. According to Douglas's dissent, the New York law created an academic atmosphere concerned not with intellectual stimulation but with such questions as "Why was the history teacher so openly hostile to Franco's Spain? Who heard overtones of revolution in the English teacher's discussion of The Grapes of Wrath? and What was behind the praise of Soviet progress in metallurgy in the chemistry class?" Douglas conceded that the public school systems need not become "cells for Communist activities," but he reminded the court that the Framers of the Constitution "knew the strength that comes when the mind is free."

Shortly after the Adler decision, a similar case began to take shape in New Hampshire that would receive very different treatment by the Supreme Court. On January 5, 1954, Paul M. Sweezy was summoned to appear before New Hampshire attorney general Louis C. Wyman for inquiries into Sweezy's political associations. Under a 1951 New Hampshire statute, the state attorney general was authorized to investigate "subversive activities" and determine whether "subversive persons" were located within the state (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 [1957]). Wyman was especially interested in information on members of the Progressive party, an organization many politicians suspected of nurturing Communism in the United States.

Sweezy said he was unaware of any violations of the statute. He further stated that he would not answer any questions impertinent to the inquiry under the legislation, and he would not answer questions that seemed to infringe on his freedom of speech. Sweezy did answer numerous questions about himself, his views, and his activities, but he refused to answer questions about other people. In a later inquiry by the attorney general, Sweezy refused to comment about an article he had written and about a lecture he had delivered to a humanities class.

When Sweezy persisted in his refusal to talk about others and about his lecture, he was held in contempt of court and sent to the Merrimack County jail. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction, and Sweezy appealed.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The basis for the reversal was the New Hampshire statute's improper grant of broad interrogation powers to the attorney general and its failure to afford sufficient criminal protections to an accused. The Court commented strongly upon the threat such a statute posed to academic freedom.

The principal opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, questioned the wisdom of Wyman's legislative inquiry. With regard to the questions on Sweezy's lecture to the humanities class, the Chief Justice stated that "[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation."

Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion. To Frankfurter, the call of the Court was to decide the case by balancing the right of the state to self-protection against the right of a citizen to academic freedom and political privacy. Frankfurter concluded that Wyman's reasons for questioning Sweezy on academics were "grossly inadequate" given "the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university."

Neither of the plurality opinions in Sweezy would have found all congressional inquiries into academia to be unconstitutional. However, both opinions helped free educators in later cases by recognizing and emphasizing the danger of restricting academic thought. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 629 (1967), the Supreme Court finally awarded to teachers and professors the full complement of free speech and political privacy rights afforded other citizens. Political "loyalty oaths" required of New York State employees (including educators) under state civil service laws were declared void, and New York education laws against "treasonable or seditious speech" were found to violate the First Amendment right to free speech. According to the Keyishian decision, "[A]cademic freedom … is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."

The tension between academic oversight and academic freedom did not end with the Keyishian case. The Supreme Court later decided several cases that identified more precisely how much control school authorities may exercise over education. The Court held in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 73 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1982), that a school board can control curriculum and book selection, but it may not remove "objectionable" books from public school libraries solely in response to community pressure. Among the books that the Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 in New York had banned in the mid-1970s were Slaughterhouse Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Black Boy, by Richard Wright, Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris, and The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud.

School boards and state legislatures generally control public school curriculums, but their control is not complete. A state statute will be struck down if it requires public schools to teach creationism when they present evolution, and vice versa. According to the Court in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 96 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1987), such a law undermines a comprehensive scientific education and impermissibly endorses religion by advancing the religious belief that a supernatural power created human beings. The Supreme Court has also held that if school authorities can show additional independent grounds for discharge, they may terminate a teacher for disruptive speech even if a substantial motivation for the termination was speech on issues of public concern (Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 [1968]; Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 [1977]). This precedent seemed to give school authorities ample means to elude liability for unconstitutional terminations. However, neither of the principles helped City University of New York (CUNY) when it was sued by the chair of its black studies department.

Professor Leonard Jeffries specialized in black studies and the history of Africa, and his teaching style at CUNY was controversial. Some students felt that Jeffries discouraged classroom debate, whereas others applauded him for verbalizing the frustrations of many African Americans. Jeffries referred to Europeans as "ice people" and as "egotistic, individualistic, and exploitative." Africans, on the other hand, were "sun people" who had "humanistic, spiritualistic value system[s]."

On July 20, 1991, Jeffries spoke at the Empire State Black Arts and Cultural Festival, in Albany, New York. In his speech, he assailed perceived Jewish power, asserting that Jews controlled CUNY and Hollywood and had financed the American slave trade. The speech attracted national attention and placed CUNY on the horns of a dilemma: it could punish Jeffries and risk running afoul of the First Amendment and of academic freedom principles, or it could do nothing and risk losing expected income from offended school benefactors. For several months, the university wrestled with the problem. Then, in October, the board of trustees voted, without explanation, to limit Jeffries's current appointment as chair to one year instead of the customary three.

At the end of October, Jeffries wrote to Jeffrey Rosen, dean of social sciences, that he was declaring "war" on the faculty. In November, Jeffries scolded President Bernard Harleston as Harleston was leaving the administration building. By December, continuing performance reviews of Jeffries had become increasingly negative. On March 23, 1992, the CUNY Board of Trustees appointed Professor Edmund Gordon to the position of black studies chair. Jeffries filed suit in federal court against the CUNY trustees, Harleston, and Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds, on June 5, 1992.

Jeffries argued that the defendants violated his First Amendment free speech rights and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they denied him a full three-year term as chair of black studies. The jury agreed with Jeffries that a substantial motivating factor in his dismissal was his speech in Albany. The jury also found that CUNY had not shown that Jeffries would have lost the chair had Jeffries not delivered the Albany speech. The jury further found that Jeffries had not disrupted the operation of the black studies department, the college, or the university. The jury did find, however, that CUNY had reasonably expected the speech to have a detrimental effect on the school. Despite this seemingly justifiable excuse for the school's action, the jury finally found that CUNY had deprived Jeffries of property (the position of chair) without due process of law.

The district court judge held that Jeffries's First Amendment rights had been violated. On the issue of liability, the jury awarded Jeffries $400,000 in punitive damages: $30,000 against President Harleston, $50,000 against Chancellor Reynolds, and $80,000 against each of CUNY's four trustees. After the verdict, Harleston, Reynolds, and each of the trustees moved to overturn the award. They argued that the verdict was inconsistent with the jury's findings and not supported by the evidence. The defendants also maintained that they were immune from individual liability as state officials acting in their official capacity. Jeffries filed a motion requesting a court order reinstating him as chair of CUNY's black studies department.

On August 4, 1993, the district court judge reduced Jeffries's recovery in damages by $40,000, but awarded him the black studies chair. According to the judge, it was reasonable for the jury to find that CUNY had terminated Jeffries solely because of the views he expressed in the Albany speech, without constitutional grounds. The school apparently had ample opportunity to gather and present evidence that Jeffries's speech had disrupted the efficient and effective operation of the university, but instead chose to argue that Jeffries had been terminated for tardiness, sending grades to the school by mail, and brutish behavior. The lack of evidence to buttress CUNY's defenses supported Jeffries's arguments that his free speech rights had been violated and that he deserved to be reinstated to the position of black studies chair.

Though the concept of academic freedom has traditionally been applied only to teachers, it has begun to creep into lower-court opinions involving the rights of students. Several Supreme Court cases are cited as creating a basis for such rights. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a public university may deny campus access to provably disruptive groups, but it may not deny access based on the views the students wish to express. The Supreme Court ruled in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988), that a public school may censor the content of a student newspaper if the newspaper is not an entirely public forum and the reason for censure is related to a legitimate educational concern. In Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990), the Court approved the establishment of a Christian student group in a public school. The Court also held in Mergens that a school's refusal to permit a religious student group to meet at school and use its facilities violates the federal Equal Access Act (Education for Economic Security Act § 802, 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071 et seq. [1984]) if the school provides such access to other noncurriculum student groups.

See: Censorship; Colleges and Universities; First Amendment; Freedom of Speech; Religion; Schools and School Districts.

by William Rainey Harper, 1902

The University of Chicago opened its doors in October 1892. Its young president, William Rainey Harper, who was backed by the unlimited financial resources of John D. Rockefeller, had raided the faculties of the leading Eastern universities and brought to the new institution a distinguished group of young professors and intellectuals. Philosophers John Dewey and George Herbert Mead and economist Thorstein Veblen were but three of the many men who quickly established the university as the leading one in the Midwest. In 1902 the university published a report of its first ten years. Volume One included a report, which is reprinted here in part, that commented on the freedom of speech accorded to the faculty.

There are two points in connection with the work of the members of the staff mention of which I cannot omit. The charge of sensationalism has been made by some unthinking persons against certain instructors in the university. This has had its origin in the misrepresentations of professorial utterances which have appeared in the public press, having come from the pens of irresponsible reporters. An effort has been made in most of these cases to discover the basis of the newspaper statements, and it has generally been found that a remark, entirely innocent, has been twisted either by the reporter or by the editor to subserve a humorous purpose.

I take the liberty of repeating here a statement made at a recent Convocation:

"I am moved to make a statement of fact and opinion concerning two related subjects which quite recently have attracted some attention in the public mind. The first of these is the freedom of opinion enjoyed in these days by members of the university. The second is the use and abuse of this right by professors of the university faculty. Concerning the first, I may be permitted to present a statement adopted unanimously by the members of the Congregation of the university on June 30, 1899:

Resolved:

• That the principle of complete freedom of speech on all subjects has from the beginning been regarded as fundamental in the University of Chicago, as has been shown both by the attitude of the president and the Board of Trustees and by the actual practice of the president and the professors.
  
  
• That this principle can neither now nor at any future time be called in question.
  
  
• That it is desirable to have it clearly understood that the university, as such, does not appear as a disputant on either side upon any public question; and that the utterances which any professor may make in public are to be regarded as representing his opinions only.
  
  

"To this statement of the Congregation I wish to add, first, that whatever may or may not have happened in other universities, in the University of Chicago neither the trustees, nor the president, nor anyone in official position has at any time called an instructor to account for any public utterances which he may have made. Still further, in no single case has a donor to the university called the attention of the trustees to the teaching of any officer of the university as being distasteful or objectionable. Still further, it is my opinion that no donor of money to a university, whether that donor be an individual or the state, has any right, before God or man, to interfere with the teaching of officers appointed to give instruction in a university.

"When, for any reason, in a university on private foundation, or in a university supported by public money, the administration of the institution or the instruction in any of its departments is changed by an influence from without; when an effort is made to dislodge an officer or a professor because the political sentiment or the religious sentiment of the majority has undergone a change, at that moment the institution has ceased to be a university; and it cannot again take its place in the rank of universities so long as there continues to exist to any appreciable extent the factor of coercion. Neither an individual, nor the state, nor the church has the right to interfere with the search for truth or with its promulgation when found. Individuals, or the state, or the church may found schools for propagating certain special kinds of instruction, but such schools are not universities and may not be so denominated.

"A donor has the privilege of ceasing to make his gifts to an institution if, in his opinion, for any reason, the work of the institution is not satisfactory; but as donor he has no right to interfere with the administration or the instruction of the university. The trustees in an institution in which such interference has taken place may not maintain their self-respect and remain trustees. They owe it to themselves and to the cause of liberty of thought to resign their places rather than to yield a principle the significance of which rises above all else in comparison.

"In order to be specific, and in order not to be misunderstood, I wish to say again that no donor of funds to the university - and I include in the number of donors the founder of the university, Mr. Rockefeller - has ever by a single word or act indicated his dissatisfaction with the instruction given to the students in the university, or with the public expression of opinion made by an officer of the university. I vouch for the truth of this statement, and I trust that it may have the largest possible publicity.

"Concerning the second subject, the use and abuse of the right of free expression by officers of the university staff: As I have said, an instructor in the university has an absolute right to express his opinion. If such an instructor is on an appointment for two or three or four years, and if during these years he exercises this right in such a way as to do himself and the institution serious injury, it is of course the privilege of the university to allow his appointment to lapse at the end of the term for which it was originally made. If an officer on permanent appointment abuses his privilege as a professor, the university must suffer and it is proper that it should suffer. This is only the direct and inevitable consequence of the lack of foresight and wisdom involved in the original appointment.

"The injury thus accruing to the university is, moreover, far less serious than would follow if, for an expression of opinion differing from that of the majority of the faculty, or from that of the Board of Trustees, or from that of the president of the university, a permanent officer were asked to present his resignation. The greatest single element necessary for the cultivation of the academic spirit is the feeling of security from interference. It is only those who have this feeling that are able to do work which in the highest sense will be beneficial to humanity. Freedom of expression must be given the members of a university faculty, even though it be abused; for, as has been said, the abuse of it is not so great an evil as the restriction of such liberty.

"But it may be asked: In what way may the professor abuse his privilege of freedom of expression? Or, to put the question more largely: In what way does a professor bring reproach and injury to himself and to his institution? I answer: A professor is guilty of an abuse of his privilege who promulgates as truth ideas or opinions which have not been tested scientifically by his colleagues in the same department of research or investigation. A professor has no right to proclaim to the public a truth discovered which is yet unsettled and uncertain. A professor abuses his privilege who takes advantage of a classroom exercise to propagate the partisan views of one or another of the political parties. The university is no place for partisanship. From the teacher's desk should emanate the discussion of principles, the judicial statement of arguments from various points of view, and not the one-sided representations of a partisan character.

"A professor abuses his privilege who in any way seeks to influence his pupils or the public by sensational methods. A professor abuses his privilege of expression of opinion when, although a student and perhaps an authority in one department or group of departments, he undertakes to speak authoritatively on subjects which have no relationship to the department in which he was appointed to give instruction. A professor abuses his privilege in many cases when, although shut off in large measure from the world and engaged within a narrow field of investigation, he undertakes to instruct his colleagues or the public concerning matters in the world at large in connection with which he has had little or no experience.

"A professor abuses his privilege of freedom of expression when he fails to exercise that quality ordinarily called common sense, which, it must be confessed, in some cases the professor lacks. A professor ought not to make such an exhibition of his weakness, or to make an exhibition of his weakness so many times, that the attention of the public at large is called to the fact. In this respect he has no larger liberty than other men.

"But may a professor do all of these things and yet remain an officer in the university? Yes. The professor in most cases is only an ordinary man. Perfection is not to be expected of him. Like men in other professions, professors have their weaknesses. But will a professor under any circumstances be asked to withdraw from the university? Yes. His resignation will be demanded, and will be accepted, when, in the opinion of those in authority, he has been guilty of immorality, or when for any reason he has proved himself to be incompetent to perform the service called for.

"The public should be on its guard in two particulars: The utterance of a professor, however wise or foolish, is not the utterance of the university. No individual, no group of individuals, can speak for the university. A statement, by whomsoever made, is the statement of an individual.

"And further, in passing judgment, care should be taken that the facts are known. It is a habit of modern journalists, and especially of the average student reporter for the newspapers, so to supply facts, so to dress up the real facts, so to magnify and exaggerate, so to belittle and ridicule universities and university men that serious injury is wrought, where perhaps no such injury was intended. It is the fashion to do this sort of thing, and it is done regardless of the consequences. Real regard for the interests of higher education would lead to the adoption of a different policy; but, as matters stand, the professor is often charged with acts and utterances implying an imbecility which is not characteristic of him, and to him there are frequently ascribed startling and revolutionary sentiments and statements of which he is wholly innocent.

"I may sum up the point in three sentences: (1) college and university professors do make mistakes, and sometimes serious ones; but (2) these are to be attributed to the professor and not to the university; and (3) in a large majority of instances the mistake, as published to the world, is misrepresented, exaggerated, or, at least, presented in such a form as to do the professor, the university, and the cause of truth itself gross injustice."

The right of teachers and students to express their ideas in the classroom or in writing, free from political, religious, or institutional restrictions, even if these ideas are unpopular.

The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page.

Academic freedom is the belief that the freedom of inquiry by students and faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy, and that scholars should have freedom to teach or communicate ideas or facts (including those that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities) without being targeted for repression, job loss, or imprisonment.

Still, academic freedom has limits. In the United States, for example, according to the widely recognized "1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure"^[1], teachers should be careful to avoid controversial matter that is unrelated to the subject. When they speak or write in public, they are free to express their opinions without fear from institutional censorship or discipline, but they should show restraint and clearly indicate that they are not speaking for their institution. Academic tenure protects academic freedom by ensuring that teachers can be fired only for causes such as gross professional incompetence or behavior that evokes condemnation from the academic community itself.

Contents 1 The rationale for academic freedom 2 Academic freedom for professors 2.1 In Germany 2.2 In the United States 2.3 In France 3 Academic freedom for colleges and universities 4 Relationship to freedom of speech 5 Controversies 5.1 Evolution debate 5.2 The "Academic bill of rights" 5.3 Local events 6 See also 7 References 8 Further reading 9 External links

The rationale for academic freedom

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Proponents of academic freedom believe that the freedom of inquiry by students and faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy. They argue that academic communities are repeatedly targeted for repression due to their ability to shape and control the flow of information. When scholars attempt to teach or communicate ideas or facts that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities, they may find themselves targeted for public vilification, job loss, imprisonment, or even death. For example, in North Africa, a professor of public health discovered that his country's infant mortality rate was higher than government figures indicated. He lost his job and was imprisoned.^[2]

The fate of biology in the Soviet Union is also cited as a reason why society has an interest in protecting academic freedom. A Soviet biologist named Trofim Lysenko rejected Western science—then focused primarily on making advances in theoretical genetics, based on research with the fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster) -- and proposed a more socially relevant approach to farming that was based on the collectivist principles of dialectical materialism. (Lysenko called this "Michurinism," but it is more popularly known today as Lysenkoism.) Lysenko's ideas proved appealing to the Soviet leadership, in part because of their value as propaganda, and he was ultimately made director of the Soviet Academy of Agricultural Sciences; subsequently, Lysenko directed a purge of scientists who professed "harmful ideas," resulting in the expulsion, imprisonment, or death of hundreds of Soviet scientists. Lysenko's ideas were then implemented on collectivised farms in the Soviet Union and China. Famines that resulted partly from Lysenko's influence are believed to have killed 30 million people in China alone.^[3]

AFAF (Academics For Academic Freedom)of the United Kingdom^[4] is a campaign for lecturers, academic staff and researchers who want to make a public statement in favour of free enquiry and free expression. Their statement of Academic Freedom has two main principles:

1. that academics, both inside and outside the classroom, have unrestricted liberty to question and test received wisdom and to put forward controversial and unpopular opinions, whether or not these are deemed offensive, and
2. that academic institutions have no right to curb the exercise of this freedom by members of their staff, or to use it as grounds for disciplinary action or dismissal.'

AFAF and those who are part of the campaign believe that it is important for academics to be able to express their opinions - not just full stop, but to put them to scrutiny and to open further debate. They are against the idea of telling the public Platonic 'noble lies' and believe that people should not be protected from radical views.

Academic freedom for professors

The concept of academic freedom as a right of faculty members is an established part of most legal systems. Different from the United States, where academic freedom is derived from the guarantee of free speech under the First Amendment, constitutions of other countries (and particularly of civil law jurisdictions) typically grant a separate right to free learning, teaching, and research.

In Germany

The German Constitution (Grundgesetz) specifically grants academic freedom: "Art and science, research and teaching are free. Freedom of teaching does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution" (Art. 5, para. 3). In a tradition reaching back to the nineteenth century, jurisdiction has understood this right as one to teach (Lehrfreiheit), study (Lernfreiheit), and conduct research (Freiheit der Wissenschaft) freely, although the last concept has sometimes been taken as a cover term for the first two. Lehrfreiheit embraces the right of professors to determine the content of their lectures and to publish the results of their research without prior approval.

Since professors through their Habilitation receive the right to teach (venia docendi) in a particular academic field, academic freedom is deemed to cover at least the entirety of this field. Lernfreiheit means a student's right to determine an individual course of study. Finally, Freiheit der Wissenschaft permits academic self-governance and grants the university control of its internal affairs. Through the introduction of disciplinary curricula, Lernfreiheit has become a rather empty concept.^{[citation needed]}

In the United States

In the United States, academic freedom is generally taken as the notion of academic freedom defined by the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure," jointly authored by the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and the Association of American Colleges (AAC) (now the Association of American Colleges and Universities).^[5] These principles state that "Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject."^[5] The statement also permits institutions to impose "limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims," so long as they are "clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment."^[5] The Principles have only the character of private pronouncements, not that of binding law.

The six regional accreditors work with American colleges and universities, including private and religious institutions, to implement this standard. Additionally, the AAUP, which is not an accrediting body, works with this same institutions. The AAUP does not always agree with the regional accrediting bodies on the standards of protection of academic freedom and tenure.^[6] The AAUP lists those colleges and universities which it has found to violate these principles.^[7] There is some case law in the United States that teachers are limited in their academic freedoms.

In France

A professor at a public French university, or a researcher in a public research laboratory, is expected, as are all civil servants, to behave in a neutral manner and to not favor any particular political or religious point of view during the course of his duties. However, the academic freedom of university professors is a fundamental principle recognized by the laws of the Republic, as defined by the Constitutional Council; furthermore, statute law declares about higher education that "teachers-researchers (university professors and assistant professors), researchers and teachers are fully independent and enjoy full freedom of speech in the course of their research and teaching activities, provided they respect, following university traditions and the dispositions of this code, principles of tolerance and objectivity."^[8] The nomination and promotion of professors is largely done through a process of peer review rather than through normal administrative procedures.

Academic freedom for colleges and universities

A prominent feature of the English university concept is the freedom to appoint faculty, set standards and admit students. This ideal may be better described as institutional autonomy and is distinct from whatever freedom is granted to students and faculty by the institution.^[9]

The Supreme Court of the United States said that academic freedom means a university can "determine for itself on academic grounds:

1. who may teach,
2. what may be taught,
3. how it should be taught, and
4. who may be admitted to study."^[10][11][12]

In a 2008 case, a Federal court in Virginia ruled that professors have no academic freedom; all academic freedom resides with the university or college.^[12] In that case, Stronach v. Virginia State University, a district court judge held "that no constitutional right to academic freedom exists that would prohibit senior (university) officials from changing a grade given by (a professor) to one of his students."^[12] The court relied on mandatory precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire^[11] and a case from the fourth circuit court of appeals.^[12][13] The Stronach court also relied on persuasive cases from several circuits of the courts of appeals, including the first,^[14] third,^[15][16] and seventh ^[17] circuits. That court distinguished the situation when a university attempts to coerce a professor into changing a grade, which is clearly in violation of the First Amendment, from when university officials may, in their discretionary authority, change the grade upon appeal by a student.^[12][18] The Stronach case has gotten significant attention in the academic community as an important precedent.^[19]

Relationship to freedom of speech

Academic freedom and free speech rights are not coextensive. Academic freedom involves more than speech rights; for example, it includes the right to determine what is taught in the classroom. In practice, academic freedom is protected by institutional rules and regulations, letters of appointment, faculty handbooks, collective bargaining agreements, and academic custom.^[20]

In the U.S., the freedom of speech is guaranteed by the First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." By extension, the First Amendment applies to all governmental institutions, including public universities. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that academic freedom is a First Amendment right.^[21] The United States' First Amendment does not apply to private institutions, including religious institutions. These private institutions may honor freedom of speech and academic freedom at their discretion.

Controversies

Censorship

By media

Banned books · Banned films Re-edited film · Internet · Music Press · Radio  · Thought Speech and expression Video games

Methods

Book burning · Book challenging Bleeping · Broadcast delay Chilling effect Conspiracy of silence Content-control software Euphemism · Expurgation Gag order · Heckling · Memory hole Pixelization · Postal Prior restraint · Revisionism Self-censorship · Speech code Whitewashing · Verbal offence Strategic lawsuit

Contexts

Corporate · Political · Religious Ideological · Criminal speech Hate speech · Media bias Suppression of dissent

By country

Censorship · Freedom of speech

v • d • e

Evolution debate

Main article: Academic Freedom bills

The "academic freedom bills" are anti-evolution bills that were introduced in state legislatures in the United States between 2004 and 2008. Supporters say that both students and faculty face intimidation and retaliation when discussing scientific criticisms of evolution, and therefore require legal protection.^[22] Critics of the bills say that there are no credible scientific critiques of the overall concept of evolution.^[23] Investigation of the allegations showed no evidence that intimidation and retaliation occurs.^[24]

The bills were based largely upon language drafted by the Discovery Institute,^[25] the hub of the intelligent design movement, and derive from language originally drafted for the Santorum Amendment in the United States Senate. As of June 2008, only the Louisiana bill has been successfully been passed into law.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the common goal of these bills is to expose more students to articles and videos that undercut evolution, most of which are produced by advocates of intelligent design or Biblical creationism.^[23] The main organization defending academic freedom, the American Association of University Professors, recently reaffirmed its opposition to academic freedom bills, including any portrayal of creationism as a scientifically credible alternative and any misrepresentation of evolution as scientifically controversial.^[26][27]

The "Academic bill of rights"

Students for Academic Freedom (SAF) was founded in 2001 by David Horowitz to protect students from a perceived liberal bias in U.S. colleges and universities. The organization collected many statements from college students complaining that some of their professors were disregarding their responsibility to keep unrelated controversial material out of their classes and were instead teaching their subjects from an ideological point of view.^[28] In response, the organization drafted model legislation, called the Academic Bill of Rights, which has been introduced in several state legislatures and the U.S. House of Representatives. The Academic Bill of Rights is based on the Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure as published by the American Association of University Professors in 1915, and modified in 1940 and 1970. According to Students for Academic Freedom, academic freedom is "the freedom to teach and to learn." They contend in "The Academic Bill of Rights" that academic freedom promotes "intellectual diversity" and helps achieve a university's primary goals, i.e., "the pursuit of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the study and reasoned criticism of intellectual and cultural traditions, the teaching and general development of students to help them become creative individuals and productive citizens of a pluralistic democracy, and the transmission of knowledge and learning to a society at large." They feel that, in the past forty years, the principles as defined in the AAUP Declaration have become something of a dead letter, and that an entrenched class of tenured radical leftists is blocking all efforts to restore those principles.^[29] In an attempt to override such opposition, the Academic Bill of Rights calls for state and judicial regulation of colleges. Such regulation would ensure that:

• students and faculty will not be favored or disfavored because of their political views or religious beliefs;
• the humanities and social sciences, in particular, will expose their students to a variety of sources and viewpoints, and not present one viewpoint as certain and settled truth;
• campus publications and invited speakers will not be harassed, abused, or otherwise obstructed;
• academic institutions and professional societies will adopt a neutral attitude in matters of politics, ideology or religion.

Opponents claim that such a bill would actually restrict academic freedom, by granting politically-motivated legislators and judges the right to shape the nature and focus of scholarly concerns. According to the American Association of University Professors, the Academic Bill of Rights is, despite its title, an attack on the very concept of academic freedom itself: "A fundamental premise of academic freedom is that decisions concerning the quality of scholarship and teaching are to be made by reference to the standards of the academic profession, as interpreted and applied by the community of scholars who are qualified by expertise and training to establish such standards." The Academic Bill of Rights directs universities to implement the principle of neutrality by requiring the appointment of faculty "with a view toward fostering a plurality of methodologies and perspectives," an approach they claim is problematic because "It invites diversity to be measured by political standards that diverge from the academic criteria of the scholarly profession." For example,"no department of political theory ought to be obligated to establish 'a plurality of methodologies and perspectives' by appointing a professor of Nazi political philosophy."^{[citation needed]} Concurring, the president of Appalachian Bible College in West Virginia fears that the Academic Bill of Rights "would inhibit his college's efforts to provide a faith-based education and would put pressure on the college to hire professors... who espouse views contrary to those of the institution."^[30]

It should also be noted that there has been much controversy over the validity of the student’s statements used by Horowitz to support his organisations claims. This is due to the revelation that one of the cases he referred to regularly was not factually accurate. Horowitz claims that this student had to write an essay on ‘why George Bush was a war criminal.’ Instead, the student chose to focus her answer on why Saddam Hussein was a war criminal and consequently received a grade ‘F’(Fail). In reality, this question asking students to state whether or not Bush was a war criminal was never set, and the student in question did not receive a grade ‘F’ for this particular exam.^[31] Horowitz acknowledges the flaws in this case but asks the public to believe that there are many other legitimate cases.^[32]

Local events

While some controversies of academic freedom are reflected in proposed laws that would affect large numbers of students through entire regions, more cases involve individual academicians that express unpopular opinions or share politically unfavorable information. These individual cases may receive widespread attention and periodically test the limits of, and support for, academic freedom.

• The Bassett Affair at Duke University in North Carolina in the early 20th century was an important event in the history of academic freedom.^[33] In October 1903, Professor John Bassett publicly praised Booker T. Washington and drew attention to the racism and white supremacist behavior of the Democrat party, to the disgust of powerful white Southerners. Many media reports castigated Bassett, and many major newspapers published opinion pieces attacking him and demanding his termination. On December 1, 1903, the entire faculty of the college threatened to resign en masse if the board gave into political pressures and asked Bassett to resign.^[34] President Teddy Roosevelt later praised Bassett for his willingness to express the truth as he saw it.
• At the beginning of the 21st century, Lawrence Summers, while president of Harvard University, led a discussion that was intended to identify the reasons why fewer women chose to study science and mathematics at advanced levels. He suggested that the possibility of intrinsic gender differences in terms of talent for science and mathematics should be explored. He became the target of considerable public backlash.^[35] His critics were, in turn, accused of attempting to suppress academic freedom.^[36]
• J. Michael Bailey wrote a popular science-style book, The Man Who Would Be Queen, which says that transwomen are motivated by sexuality, and dismisses the popular "woman trapped in a man's body" concept of transsexuality in favor of the classification scheme currently dominant among researchers, which divides transwomen into two groups (autogynephilics and homosexual transsexuals) according to their sexual orientation. In an effort to discredit his book, some trans activists filed formal complaints with Northwestern University, accused Bailey of conducting regulated human research (by talking to people) without informed consent, attempted to have him convicted of "practicing psychology without a license", and publicly humiliated his young children, ex-wife, and other friends and colleagues.^[37][38] Supporters have expressed concerns that "informed consent" can be used to stifle free speech and that the behavior "over-the-top" behavior of some trans activists will convince qualified researchers not to research transsexuality. Steven Pinker of Harvard University said, ‘‘The intimidation directed at Bailey will ensure that graduate students, post-docs, and other young researchers will not touch this topic with a ten-foot pole, starving the field of new talent."'^[39]
• In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, some public statements made by some university faculty were criticized as being insufficiently patriotic. Most prominent among these were these comments made in January 2005 by University of Colorado professor Ward Churchill. He published an essay in which he asserted that the attack on the United States was justified because of American foreign policy. On news and talk programs, he was criticized for describing the World Trade Center victims as "little Eichmanns," a reference to Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem. Many called for Churchill to be fired for saying that the workers in the World Trade Center were legitimate military targets whose deaths were the inevitable result of American financial dominance and foreign policy positions. Others, even if they disagreed with his opinions, defended him on the principle of academic freedom.
• William Shockley was concerned about relatively high reproductive rates among people of African descent, because he believed that genetics doomed black people to be intellectually inferior to white people.^[40] He was strongly criticized for this stand, which raised some concerns about whether criticism of unpopular views of racial differences suppressed academic freedom.^[41]
• The 2006 scandal in which several members of the Duke Lacrosse team were falsely accused of rape raised serious criticisms against exploitation of academic freedom by the university and its faculty to press judgement and deny due process to the three players accused.^{[citation needed]}
• Thio Li-ann withdrew from an appointment at New York University School of Law after controversy erupted about some anti-gay remarks she had made, prompting a discussion of academic freedom within the law school.^[42][43]

See also

• Politicization of science
• Scientific freedom

References

1. ^ 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.
2. ^ Robert Quinn (2004). "Defending 'Dangerous Minds.'"
3. ^ Jasper Becker (1996). Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. New York: Free Press.
4. ^ http://www.afaf.org.uk
5. ^ ^{a b c} 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AAUP [1], accessed March 23, 2007
6. ^ For example, the Northwest Association of Schools and of Colleges and Universities reviewed Brigham Young University's academic freedom statement and found it in compliance with the 1940 statement, while AAUP has found Brigham Young University to be in violation
7. ^ Censured Institutions
8. ^ French Education Code, L952-2.
9. ^ (Kemp, p. 7)
10. ^ Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
11. ^ ^{a b} Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-263 (1957) (Felix Frankfurter, Justice).
12. ^ ^{a b c d e} Stronach v. Virginia State University, civil action 3:07-CV-646-HEH (E. D. Va. Jan. 15, 2008).
13. ^ See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414, 415 (4th Cir. 2000). (Noting that "cases that have referred to a First Amendment right of academic freedom have done so generally in terms of the institution, not the individual ...." and "Significantly, the court has never recognized that professors possess a First Amendment right of academic freedom to determine for themselves the content of their courses and scholarship, despite opportunities to do so".
14. ^ Lovelace v. S.E. Mass. University, 793 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1986) ("To accept plaintiff's contention that an untenured teacher's grading policy is constitutionally protected . . . would be to constrict the university in defining and performing its educational mission".)
15. ^ Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania, 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., The court held that the First Amendment does not allow a university professor to decide what is taught in the classroom but rather protects the university's right to select the curriculum," as cited in Stronach.)
16. ^ Brown v. Amenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001). (Holding "a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to expression via the school's grade assignment procedures".)
17. ^ Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001). (Holding that "No person has a fundamental right to teach undergraduate engineering classes without following the university's grading rules ...." and that "it is the [u]niversity's name, not [the professor]'s, that appears on the diploma; the [u]niversity, not [the professor], certifies to employers and graduate schools a student's successful completion of a course of study. Universities are entitled to assure themselves that their evaluation systems have been followed; otherwise their credentials are meaningless".)
18. ^ See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827-28 (6th Cir. 1989). (Holding that "a university professor may claim that his assignment of an examination grade or a final grade is communication protected by the First Amendment . . . [t]hus, the individual professor may not be compelled, by university officials, to change a grade that the professor previously assigned to her student".
19. ^ White, Lawrence, "CASE IN POINT: STRONACH V. VIRGINIA STATE U. (2008): Does Academic Freedom Give a Professor the Final Say on Grades?", Chronicle of Higher Education, found at Chronicle web site and Chronicle Review commentary and blog. Accessed May 20, 2008.
20. ^ Donna Euben, Political And Religious Belief Discrimination On Campus: Faculty and Student Academic Freedom and The First Amendment.
21. ^ Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
22. ^ Academic Freedom Act
23. ^ ^{a b} Evolution's Critics Shift Tactics With Schools, Stephanie Simon, Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2008
24. ^ Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, The Professional Staff of the Education Pre-K - 12 Committee, Florida Senate, March 26 2008
25. ^ "Academic Freedom" Bill in South Carolina Now Ed Brayton, Dispatches From the Culture Wars, May 18, 2008.
26. ^ Academic Freedom and Teaching Evolution Resolutions of the 94th Annual Meeting, American Association of University Professors. 2008
27. ^ The Latest Face of Creationism in the Classroom Glenn Branch and Eugenie C. Scott. Scientific American, December 2008.
28. ^ Academic Freedom Abuse Center
29. ^ Indoctrination U: the Left's war against academic freedom / David Horowitz, 2007 ISBN 1594031908
30. ^ Alyson Klein (2004). "Worried on the Left and Right." Chronicle of Higher Education (July 9, 2004).
31. ^ Media Matters
32. ^ FrontPage Magazine
33. ^ The Bassett Affair
34. ^ http://library.duke.edu/uarchives/exhibits/academic-freedom/publicreaction.html
35. ^ Summer's Remarks on Women Draw Fire
36. ^ Stephan Thernstrom. "In Defense of Academic Freedom at Harvard". History News Network, George Mason University. http://hnn.us/articles/10963.html. 
37. ^ Carey, Benedict. (21 August 2007) "Criticism of a Gender Theory, and a Scientist Under Siege." The New York Times.
38. ^ Dreger AD (June 2008). "The controversy surrounding "The man who would be queen": a case history of the politics of science, identity, and sex in the Internet age" (PDF). Arch Sex Behav 37 (3): 366–421. doi:10.1007/s10508-007-9301-1. PMID 18431641. http://www.bioethics.northwestern.edu/faculty/work/dreger/controversy_tmwwbq.pdf. 
39. ^ Dreger, 2008. page 413.
40. ^ William B. Shockley, 79, Creator Of Transistor and Theory on Race
41. ^ Kilgore, William J.; Sullivan, Barbara (1975). "Academic Values and the Jensen-Shockley Controversy". Journal of General Education. 
42. ^ Rights for some people, Inside Higher Ed, 8 June 2009, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/07/08/nyu, retrieved 11 June 2009 
43. ^ Tay Shi'an (22 July 2009), "She's not against gay people, just against gay agenda", The New Paper, http://www.asiaone.com/News/Education/Story/A1Story20090720-155956.html, retrieved 24 July 2009 

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• "Academic freedom". The Dictionary of the History of Ideas. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhiana.cgi?id=dv1-02. 
• Fish, Stanley (2006-07-23). "Conspiracy Theories 101". New York Times Op-Ed. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/opinion/23fish.html?ex=1311307200&en=eb67d7b666d8ae71&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss. 
• Cross, Tom. "Academic Freedom and the Hacker Ethic", Communications of the ACM, June 2006.
• Ekstrand, Lasse and Wallmon, Monika "Dancing with the Devil? Notes on a Free University". The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations, (2008), Volume 8, Issue 3, 171-174.
• Hofstadter, Richard, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College, Columbia University Press, 1955, 1961.
• Karran, Terence. "Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis". Higher Education Policy (2007) 20, 289–313.
• Karran, Terence. "Academic Freedom: A Research Bibliography" (2009) has over 1000 entries and is freely downloadable as a pdf from: http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/1763/.

External links

• Academic Freedom Watch, Australia
• Network for Education and Academic Rights
• American Association of University Professors

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