Admiralty and Maritime Law

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution empowers the federal judiciary to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” This jurisdiction is nowhere defined in the Constitution or in any act of Congress. The federal courts have therefore been required to determine the territorial scope and the types of cases that are included within it, as well as the kinds of relief that can be granted. Congress has on occasion broadened the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and so far the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of these efforts.

The framers of the Constitution conferred admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the federal courts because of the vital importance that international and interstate shipping had to the new nation. Both in times of war and in times of peace the national interest in an orderly resolution of disputes involving shipping transcended any local interest. Prior to 1875, when federal courts were granted full federal question jurisdiction, the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was the only basis that federal trial courts had for hearing cases that arose between citizens of the same state.

Before the Civil War, the Supreme Court was often severely divided about the proper scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Opponents pointed to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England, which was limited to disputes arising solely on the seas, such as collisions, salvage, and seamen's claims for wages. The English Admiralty Court had virtually no jurisdiction over maritime contracts. Those who sought to limit the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction were concerned about federal encroachment on the power of the states. But most of the Court's decisions gradually expanded the jurisdiction to include cases over marine insurance contracts, bills of lading, and charter parties—matters vital to the shipping industry.

Justice Joseph Story was a leading nineteenth century proponent of expansive federal admiralty jurisdiction. His circuit court decision in De Lovio v. Boit (1815) rejected the applicability of the English precedents and broadly asserted that the admiralty jurisdiction extended to all contracts “which relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea.” This position was consistent with Story's views in the famous Supreme Court case of Swift v. Tyson (1842) that federal courts are not bound by state court determinations of common law in commercial law cases. If a federal court was to be an effective commercial court, Story and others believed that it had to have the power to declare the law in commercial cases and in admiralty cases, which were intimately tied to commercial dealings. A majority of the Court generally adopted Story's broad view.

In England, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty was limited geographically to cases arising on the sea or within the ebb and flow of the tide. Initially the Supreme Court adopted this rule in The Thomas Jefferson (1825). The rule became unsatisfactory as steamboat traffic on the rivers and Great Lakes substantially increased. In Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (1852), the Court overruled The Thomas Jefferson. The Court held that the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction extended to cases arising on internal rivers and lakes, provided only that those waterways be navigable, that is, capable of carrying interstate or international commercial traffic.

When a case is solely within the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction there is no right to a trial by jury. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction as to most admiralty matters. Most admiralty claims are not within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction because of the famous “Saving to Suitors” clause in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In its current formulation, this clause saves to suitors “in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” The clause embodies the intention of the framers of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, it was generally understood that the state courts would apply state law to admiralty cases, that federal courts having admiralty jurisdiction would apply general admiralty law, and that federal courts having diversity jurisdiction in admiralty cases would apply federal common law. But following the decision of the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917), state and federal courts must apply the same law to an admiralty case. That law is usually admiralty law, although state law may be applied to some matters, such as environmental pollution and the regulation of local pilots, where the states are thought to have a strong interest.

There are some admiralty cases in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive, however. Foremost among these is the admiralty in rem suit, which rests on the fiction that the ship is the defendant. To exercise in rem jurisdiction, a plaintiff may actually have a United States marshal seize a vessel. Although rarely tried in this century, prize cases, those brought to condemn an enemy ship or cargo, can also be heard only in federal court. Though it has been traditionally thought that salvage cases are similarly not triable in state court, a few state courts have heard such cases in recent years, and a number of scholars have argued that the “Saving to Suitors” clause empowers state courts to hear salvage cases when the plaintiff sues in personam.

There are also some powers seemingly necessary to an admiralty court that have been traditionally thought to be outside admiralty jurisdiction. Chief among these is the power to grant equitable relief (see Injunctions and Equitable Remedies). The early approach of the Court, summarized in an 1890 case, The Eclipse, was that a court of admiralty jurisdiction had no power to grant equitable relief. The origins of this doctrine are unclear. It may have been grounded in the notion that courts of equity act in personam, that is, they order individuals to do something or to refrain from doing something, whereas courts of admiralty traditionally acted in rem. Or the doctrine may have developed out of a concern for state powers in the federal system and a desire to limit the power of the federal courts. In any event, lower federal courts made exceptions to it in cases where equitable relief was incidental to other relief that the federal court was empowered to grant. And in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A. (1950), the Supreme Court expanded these exceptions to allow a federal court to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the owner of a vessel that had been attached as security for a maritime claim. More recently, some lower courts have jettisoned entirely the earlier doctrine and will now grant equitable relief in any admiralty case where such relief is appropriate.

Although the general lines of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction have been worked out satisfactorily, there remain a number of anomalies. Contracts to repair a vessel are maritime, while contracts to build a vessel are not, owing to the Court's 1858 decision in People's Ferry Co v. Beers, which rested on the now‐discredited notion that all contracts made on land and that were to be performed on land must be considered nonmaritime. Lower courts have held that contracts to sell a vessel are nonmaritime even though contracts to charter a vessel are maritime. Most surprisingly, courts have held, following the Supreme Court's 1854 decision in Minturn v. Maynard, that a general agency contract to manage all aspects of a vessel's business is treated as being nonmaritime. In 1991 the Supreme Court overturned Minturn v. Maynard and reiterated that federal courts have admiralty jurisdiction to protect maritime commerce (Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.).

These limited views of the Court's admiralty jurisdiction with respect to contracts are in sharp contrast to its traditional approach to maritime tort cases, where the Court has asserted jurisdiction over any wrong done on the water regardless of its importance to commercial shipping. Lower courts exercised jurisdiction when swimmers were struck by surfboards, when airplanes crashed in territorial waters, and in similar matters. But in 1972 the Court adopted a more restrictive approach for tort cases, requiring that to be within the admiralty jurisdiction a tort must “bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity” (Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, p. 268). But in a subsequent 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that collisions between pleasure craft on navigable waters were within the admiralty jurisdiction (Foremost v. Richardson, 1982). Lower federal courts have struggled to apply these decisions to other types of cases. Although there was initially some disagreement, all appellate courts that have decided the issue now hold that claims by shipyard workers against manufacturers of asbestos for injuries caused by exposure to that product are nonmaritime. On the other hand lower courts are receptive to hearing injury claims by seamen and passengers even when there is nothing uniquely maritime about the tort.

The Supreme Court has largely defined the meaning of the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction. In addition, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have played a significant role in developing the law relating to commercial shipping in this country. As a result, the federal courts have fulfilled their mission of advancing the federal interest in the uniform resolution of disputes involving maritime commerce.

See also Judicial Power and Jurisdiction; Lower Federal Courts.

Bibliography

• Steven F. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty, 7th rev. ed. (1988).
• Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty, 2d ed. (1975).
• Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (1987)

— Steven F. Friedell

Article 3, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution says, “The judicial Power shall extend … to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” Admiralty or maritime law pertains to ships on the sea, including civil and criminal actions. In 1815 Justice Joseph Story, writing for the Supreme Court in De Lovio v. Boit, defined the scope of the Court's admiralty jurisdiction by stating that it extended to all transactions “which relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea.”

A field of law relating to, and arising from, the practice of the admiralty courts (tribunals that exercise jurisdiction over all contracts, torts, offenses, or injuries within maritime law) that regulates and settles special problems associated with sea navigation and commerce.

History of Admiralty and Maritime Law

The life of the mariner, spent far away from the stability of land, has long been considered an exotic one of travel, romance, and danger. Stories of pirates, mutinies, lashings, and hasty trials — many of them true — illustrate the peculiar, isolated nature of the maritime existence. In modern times, the practice of shipping goods by sea has become more civil, but the law still gives maritime activities special treatment by acknowledging the unique conflicts and difficulties involved in high-seas navigation and commerce.

The roots of maritime law are traced as far back as 900 b.c., which is when the Rhodian Customary Law is believed to have been shaped by the people of the island of Rhodes. The only concept in the Rhodian Laws that still exists is the law of jettison, which holds that if goods must be thrown overboard (jettisoned) for the safety of the ship or the safety of another's property, the owner of the goods is entitled to compensation from the beneficiaries of the jettison.

Codes enacted by medieval port cities and states have formed the current U.S. maritime law. The eleventh-century Amalphitan Code, of the Mediterranean countries; the fourteenth-century Consolato del Mare, of France, Spain, and Italy; the twelfth-century Roll of Oleron, from England; and the thirteenth-century Law of Visby all drew on the customs of mariners and merchants to create the unique substantive law of admiralty that still exists today. Procedural differences existed between maritime cases and other civil proceedings until 1966, when the U.S. Supreme Court approved amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that brought admiralty and maritime procedural rules into accord with those used in other civil suits. The substantive maritime law, however, has remained intact.

Current Admiralty and Maritime Law

The terms admiralty and maritime law are sometimes used interchangeably, but admiralty originally referred to a specific court in England and the American colonies that had jurisdiction over torts and contracts on the high seas, whereas substantive maritime law developed through the expansion of admiralty court jurisdiction to include all activities on the high seas and similar activities on navigable waters.

Because water commerce and navigation often involve foreign nations, much of the U.S. maritime law has evolved in concert with the maritime laws of other countries. The federal statutes that address maritime issues are often customized U.S. versions of the convention resolutions or treaties of international maritime law. The United Nations organizes and prepares these conventions and treaties through branches such as the International Maritime Organization, and the International Labor Organization, which prepares conventions on the health, safety, and well-being of maritime workers.

The substance of maritime law considers the dangerous conditions and unique conflicts involved in navigation and water commerce. Sailors are especially vulnerable to injury and sickness owing to a variety of conditions, such as drastic changes in climate, constant peril, hard labor, and loneliness. Under the Shipowners' Liability Convention (54 Stat. 1693 [1939]), a shipowner may be liable not only for the maintenance and cure of sailors injured on ship, but also for injuries occurring on land. Courts have construed accidents occurring during leave as being the responsibility of the shipowner because sailors need land visits in order to endure the long hours of water transportation.

Assigning responsibility for onboard negligence was a long-standing problem, but the Jones Act of 1920 (46 U.S.C.A. § 688 et seq.) solidifies the right of sailors to recover from an employer for injuries resulting from the negligence of the employer, a master, or another crew member. The 1920 Death on High Seas Act (46 App. U.S.C.A. § 761 et seq.) allows recovery by the decedents of a sailor's estate when the sailor dies by negligence, default, or wrongful act on the high seas "beyond a marine league from the shore of any state [territory or dependency]." A marine league is one-twentieth of a degree of latitude, or three miles.

Accidents suffered by nonmaritime persons on docks, piers, wharfs, or bridges do not qualify for the application of maritime law principles. However, personal injuries suffered while aboard a ship or as a result of an air-to-water airplane crash will be considered within the jurisdiction of admiralty law.

The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. [1927]) sets up a federal system to compensate injured maritime workers who do not sail. Through the Federal Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, employees such as stevedores (workers who load and unload ships) and ship service operators can receive compensation for injuries suffered in the course of their employment. U.S. sailors benefit from title 46 of the United States Code, which sets a schedule for sailors' earnings and the conditions of their contracts. Title 46 also lists the qualifications for sailor employment (§§ 7301 et seq.), the hours and conditions of the employment (§§ 8104 et seq.), and the living conditions that must be provided (§§ 11101 et seq.).

Federal laws also address the problems that beset ships and the life-or-death decisions made by carriers. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-1315 [1936]) regulates the rights, responsibilities, liabilities, and immunities regarding the relationship between shippers and carriers of goods. The Salvage Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 727-731 [1912]) provides for compensation to persons who help save a ship or cargo from danger, or help recover a ship or cargo from actual loss. To qualify for salvage remuneration, a person must not be acting in service of the ship or in performance of a contract, and the help given must have contributed at least in part to a wholly or partially successful salvage of the ship or goods.

The case law of the United States is rich in the areas of sailors' rights respecting the unseaworthiness of vessels, compensation for vessel suppliers and servicers, and the liabilities arising from collisions, towage, pilotage, and groundings. The Maritime Lien Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 31341-31343 [1920]) gives a lien to any person who, upon the order of the shipowner, furnishes repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries to any vessel, without allegation or proof that credit was given. The Ship Mortgage Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 31301-31330 [1920]) regulates the mortgages on ships registered in the United States, and also provides for enforcement of the maritime liens obtained through the Maritime Lien Act.

In case of collision or other damage to a vessel, an in rem proceeding is often used to recover damages. An in rem action is a lawsuit brought against an offending thing (in admiralty, usually the ship), whereas an in personam action is a suit brought against a person. Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (1985) provides necessary details for the seizure of an offending owner's vessel or property if a defendant vessel owner does not live in the state in which a suit is brought. The practical effect of Supplemental Rules B to E is to make it easier for a plaintiff to bring actions against out-of-state and foreign vessel owners, and to provide for the attachment and garnishment of the offending vessel.

An important consideration in any lawsuit is venue. Under Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts have the power to try "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" (art. III, sec. 2). However, state courts can also hear admiralty and maritime cases by virtue of the "saving-to-suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1). This clause allows a plaintiff to sue in state court through an ordinary civil action when the court's common law is competent to give a remedy. In such actions, the state court must apply the federal law of admiralty to the admiralty claims. Nevertheless, if a plaintiff believes he or she will fare better before a local tribunal, the option is available.

Where no applicable federal statute exists, the governing law of a maritime case will be the uniform laws as expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court and applicable to all torts and contracts, whether the case is tried in federal or state court. Maritime case law — not the general common law — will govern a contract dispute only if the subject matter of the contract pertained to water commerce. Maritime precedents will govern a tort claim only if the negligent or reckless actions involved commercial activity on navigable waters.

Charter parties are often a topic of concern in maritime law. A charter party, or charter, is an agreement between a shipowner, a crew (the charterer), and the owner of the goods to be transported. Charter parties come in three types: time, voyage, and demise. A time charter is the lease of a ship to a charterer for a specified period of time. A voyage charter is the lease of a ship for a specific number of voyages. A demise charter (so called because the shipowner effectively relinquishes ownership for a certain period, causing a "demise" in ownership interest) is usually a bareboat charter, which means that the charterer supplies the master and crew for the ship. Other demise charters provide that the shipowner's master and crew take charge of the vessel.

In contrast to the usual contract practice of providing risk-of-loss insurance for one party, charters utilize what is called a general average. General average is the traditional, primitive form of maritime risk allocation whereby all participants in a charter agree to share any damages resulting from an unsuccessful voyage. Most parties to a charter obtain insurance to cover their portion of risk. However, because a charter involves multiple parties, and because insurance policies are subject to interpretation, insurance coverage does not always prevent disputes over damages.

Risk of loss is sometimes decided according to a bill of lading. This document confirms a carrier's receipt of goods from the owner (consignor), verifies the voyage contract, and shows rightful ownership of the goods. In Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1962), the SS Ioannis P. Goulandris had chartered to carry olive oil, cheese, and tobacco from the western Greek port of Piraiévs to the United States via the Strait of Gibraltar. On October 28, 1940, with the Ioannis docked in Piraiévs, Italy attacked Greece, and the Ioannis was requisitioned by the Greek government for a military mission.

On November 10, 1940, the Ioannis finally set sail with its cargo for the United States via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and around Cape Horn. After an arduous journey that included two crossings of the equator, hull damage, and lengthy repairs, the Ioannis limped into port at Norfolk, Virginia, on May 3, 1941. En route, the tobacco had been damaged, much of the olive oil had leaked from its drums, and the cheese was " ‘[m]elted with a terrible stench, and worthless.' "

Despite the Ioannis's brave participation in wartime activities, the intended recipients (consignees) of the tobacco and olive oil sued the Ioannis and were able to recover for the losses suffered as a result of the damage. However, on the subject of the cheese, the court refused to allow recovery by Lekas and Drivas, which had consigned the cheese to itself.

Lekas argued that the crew of the Ioannis was negligent in storing the cheese in the structure at the stern above the main deck, known as the poop. According to Lekas, it was inappropriate for the cheese to be in the poop. The poop lacked ventilation, and it was not refrigerated. However, according to the bill of lading between Lekas and the Ioannis, special cooling was not necessary and had not been contracted for. The cheese was also stored on lighters (large, flat-bottomed barges used for loading and unloading ships) during the thirty-five days needed for repairs of the Ioannis, and Lekas claimed that this storage was improper. But, because wartime conditions were responsible for the length of repairs and the lack of proper storage space for the cheese, the court ultimately held that the Ioannis was not negligent in its handling of the cheese.

In addition to the state and federal governments, municipalities can affect the private enjoyment of maritime activity. In Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1991), appellants Richard Beveridge, Peter Murray, Gregory Davis, and Peter Eastman challenged a Santa Barbara city ordinance (Santa Barbara Municipal Code § 17.13.020) that prohibited the anchoring or mooring of boats within three hundred feet of Stearns Wharf from December to March. Santa Barbara had acquired ownership of Stearns Wharf in 1983, passed the ordinance in 1984, and started issuing citations for noncompliance shortly thereafter. Beveridge, Murray, Davis, and Eastman all owned boats moored or anchored within three hundred feet of Stearns Wharf, and the four, represented by Eastman, brought suit against the city in 1989, seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance.

At trial, Eastman argued that the Santa Barbara ordinance conflicted with the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221 et seq.), a federal act designed to reduce the loss of vessels and cargo, protect marine environment, prevent damage to structures on or adjacent to navigable waters, and ensure compliance with vessel operation and safety standards. The trial court dismissed the case, reasoning that the ordinance was neither preempted by, nor in conflict with, the federal statute.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the Santa Barbara ordinance was not in conflict with the PWSA, because the federal act was not intended to limit a municipality's control over its local shores. The appeals court also rejected the proposition that the enactment of the PWSA implicitly foreclosed the enactment of similar ordinances by municipalities, and Santa Barbara's control over the Stearns Wharf was complete.

Admiralty and maritime matters will always deserve laws carefully crafted to suit the complexity and urgency of maritime endeavors. The international nature of high-seas navigation and its attendant perils demand no less. Federal, state, and local control of navigable waters can affect everyone from the largest charter party to a private boat owner.

See: Carriers; Environmental Law; Piracy; Salvage; Shipping Law; Territorial Waters.