Trans-Alaska Pipeline System

Trans-Alaska Pipeline
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Map of Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Country/Province	Alaska, USA
Coordinates	70°15′26″N 148°37′8″W / 70.25722°N 148.61889°W / 70.25722; -148.61889
Length	800 miles (1,300 km)
Maximum discharge	2.1 million barrels per day (330,000 m³/d)
General direction	North-South
From	Prudhoe Bay, Alaska
Passes through	Deadhorse, Delta Junction, Fairbanks, Fox, Glennallen, North Pole
To	Valdez, Alaska
Established	1973
Runs Alongside	Dalton Highway, Richardson Highway, Elliott Highway

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), usually called the Alyeska Pipeline in Alaska or the Alaska Pipeline elsewhere, is a major U.S. oil pipeline connecting oil fields in Alaska's North Slope to a North Pacific seaport where the oil can be shipped to the Lower 48 states for refining.

The main Trans-Alaska Pipeline runs north to south, almost 800 miles (1,300 km), from the Arctic Ocean at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska to the Gulf of Alaska at Valdez, Alaska, passing near several Alaskan villages and towns, including Wiseman (pop. 21), Bettles (pop.39), Livengood (pop.29), Fox (pop.300), Fairbanks (pop. 34,540), and Glennallen (pop.554) [see map].

Construction of the pipeline through the sparsely-populated region presented significant challenges due to the difficult terrain and the harsh environment along the route. Between the North Slope and Valdez, there were three mountain ranges, active fault lines, miles of unstable, boggy ground underlain with frost, hundreds of streams and rivers, and migration paths of caribou and moose. Deer and elk are also affected by the construction. Geological activity has damaged the pipeline on several occasions.^{[citation needed]}

Since its completion in 1977, the pipeline has transported over 15 billion barrels (2.4 TL) of oil.

Origins

In 1909, geologist Alfred Hulse Brooks discovered oil seepages at Cape Simpson in the far north of Alaska, east of the village of Barrow.^[1] Similar seepages were found at the Canning River in 1919 by Ernest de Koven Leffingwell.^[2] Following the First World War, as the United States Navy converted its ships from coal to oil, the importance of securing a stable supply of oil became important to the U.S. government. Accordingly, President Warren G. Harding established a series of naval petroleum reserves across the United States. These reserves were areas thought to be rich in oil and set aside for future drilling by the U.S. government. Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 was sited in Alaska's far north, just south of Barrow, and encompassed 23,000,000 acres (93,078 km²).^[3]

The petroleum reserve lay dormant until the Second World War provided an impetus to explore new oil prospects. Starting in 1944, the U.S. Navy funded oil exploration near Unimat Mountain, on the Colville River in the Brooks Range. Surveyors from the U.S. Geological Survey spread across the petroleum reserve and worked to determine its extent until 1953, when the Navy suspended funding for the project. The USGS found several small oil fields, most notably the Unimat Oil Field, but none were deemed particularly feasible to develop.

Four years after the Navy suspended its survey, Richfield Oil Corporation (later Atlantic Richfield and ARCO) drilled an enormously successful oil well near the Swanson River in southern Alaska, near Kenai. The resulting Swanson River Oil Field was Alaska's first commercially producing oil field, and it spurred the exploration and development of many others. By 1965, five oil and 11 natural gas fields had been developed. This success and the previous Navy exploration of its petroleum reserve led petroleum engineers to the conclusion that the area of Alaska north of the Brooks Range surely held large amounts of oil and gas. The problems came from the area's remoteness and harsh climate. It was estimated that between 200 million and 500 million barrels of oil would have to be recovered to make a North Slope oil field commercially viable.

In 1967, Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) began detailed survey work in the Prudhoe Bay area. By January 1968, reports began circulating that natural gas had been discovered by a discovery well. On March 12, 1968, an Atlantic Richfield drilling crew finally hit paydirt. A discovery well began flowing at the rate of 1,152 barrels of oil per day. On June 25, ARCO announced that a second discovery well likewise was producing oil at a similar rate. Together, the two wells confirmed the existence of the Prudhoe Bay Oil Field. The new field contained more than 25 billion barrels of oil, making it the largest in North America and the 18th largest in the world.

The problem soon became how to develop the oil field and ship product to U.S. and global markets. Several solutions were offered. Boeing proposed a series of 12-engine tanker aircraft to transport oil from the field.^[4] General Dynamics proposed a line of tanker submarines for travel beneath the Arctic ice cap, and another group proposed extending the Alaska Railroad to Prudhoe Bay.^[5] But the most notable alternative to pipeline transport was the idea that oil tankers could be used to transport the oil directly from Prudhoe Bay.

In 1969, Humble Oil and Refining Company sent a specially fitted oil tanker, the SS Manhattan, to test the feasibility of transporting oil via ice-breaking tankers to market.^[6] The SS Manhattan was fitted with a massive ice-breaking bow, powerful engines, and hardened propellers before successfully traveling the Northwest Passage from the Atlantic Ocean to the Beaufort Sea. During the voyage, the ship suffered damage to several of its cargo holds, which flooded with seawater. Wind-blown ice forced the Manhattan to change its intended route from the McLure Strait to the smaller Prince of Wales Strait. Although the Manhattan successfully transited the Northwest Passage again in the summer of 1970, the concept was considered too risky.^[7] A pipeline was thus the only viable system for transporting the oil to the nearest port free of pack-ice, almost 800 miles (1,300 km) away at Valdez.

Before Alyeska

In February 1969, before the SS Manhattan had even sailed from its East Coast starting point, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), an unincorporated joint group created by ARCO, British Petroleum, and Humble Oil, asked for permission from the United States Department of the Interior to begin geological and engineering studies of a proposed oil pipeline route from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, across Alaska. Even before the first feasibility studies were begun, the oil companies chose determined the approximate route the pipeline would take.^[8] Permission was given, and teams of engineers began drilling core samples and surveying in Alaska.

Because TAPS hoped to begin laying pipe by September 1969, orders were placed for large amounts of 48-inch diameter steel pipeline. No American company manufactured pipe of that size, so three Japanese companies—Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd., Nippon Steel Corporation, and Nippon Kokan Kabushiki Kaisha—received a $100 million contract for more than 800 miles of pipeline. At the same time, TAPS placed a $30 million order for the first of the enormous pumps that would be needed to push the oil through the pipeline.^[9]

In June 1969, as the SS Manhattan traveled through the Northwest Passage, TAPS formally applied to the Interior Department for a permit to build an oil pipeline across 800 miles of public land—from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez.^[10] The application was for a 100-foot (30.5-meter) wide right of way to build a subterranean 48-inch (122-centimeter) pipeline including 11 pumping stations. Another right of way was requested to build a construction and maintenance highway paralleling the pipeline. A brief 20-page document outlined all the information TAPS had collected about the route to that point in its surveying.^[11]

The Interior Department responded by sending personnel to analyze the proposed route and plan. Max Brewer, an arctic expert in charge of the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory at Barrow, concluded that the plan to bury most of the pipeline was completely unfeasible because of the abundance of permafrost along the route. In a report, Brewer said the hot oil conveyed by the pipeline would melt the underlying permafrost, causing the pipeline to fail as its support turned to mud. This report was passed along to the appropriate committees of the U.S. House and Senate, which had to approve the right-of-way proposal because it asked for more land than authorized in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and because it would break a development freeze imposed in 1966 by former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall.^[12]

Udall imposed the freeze on any projects involving land claimed by Alaska Natives in hopes that an overarching Native claims settlement would result. In the fall of 1969, the Department of the Interior and TAPS set about bypassing the land freeze by obtaining waivers from the various native villages that had claims to a portion of the proposed right of way. By the end of September, all the relevant villages had waived their right-of-way claims, and Secretary of the Interior Wally Hickel asked Congress to lift the land freeze for the entire TAPS project. After several months of questioning by the House and Senate committees with oversight of the project, Hickel was given the authority to lift the land freeze and give the go-ahead to TAPS.

TAPS began issuing letters of intent to contractors for construction of the "haul road", a highway running the length of the pipeline route to be used for construction. Heavy equipment was prepared, and crews prepared to go to work after Hickel gave permission and the snow melted. Before Hickel could act, however, several Alaska Native and conservation groups asked a judge in Washington, D.C. to issue an injunction against the project continuing. Several of the native villages that had waived claims on the right of way reneged because TAPS had not chosen any Native contractors for the project, and the contractors chosen were not likely to hire Native workers.

On April 1, 1970, Judge George Luzerne Hart, Jr., of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, ordered the Interior Department to not issue a construction permit for a section of the project that crossed one of the claims. Less than two weeks later, Hart heard arguments from conservation groups that the TAPS project violated the Mineral Leasing Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, which had gone into effect at the start of the year. Hart issued an injunction against the project, preventing the Interior Department from issuing a construction permit and halting the project in its tracks.^[13]

After the Department of the Interior was stopped from issuing a construction permit, the unincorporated TAPS consortium was reorganized into the new incorporated Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. Former Humble Oil manager Edward L. Patton was put in charge of the new company and began to lobby strongly in favor of an Alaska Native claims settlement to resolve the disputes over the pipeline right of way.^[14]

Opposition

Opposition to construction of the pipeline came from two primary sources: Alaska Native groups and conservationists. Alaska Natives were upset that the pipeline would cross land traditionally claimed by a variety of groups but would not contribute economically to those groups. Conservationists were angry at what they saw as an incursion into America's last wilderness.^[15] Both opposition movements launched legal campaigns to halt the pipeline and were successful in preventing construction from 1970 to 1973.

Conservation objections

A caribou walks next to a section of the pipeline north of the Brooks Range. Opponents of the pipeline asserted the presence of the pipeline would interfere with the caribou.

Although conservation groups and environmental organizations voiced opposition to the pipeline project before 1970, the introduction of the National Environmental Policy Act allowed them legal grounds to halt the project. Arctic engineers had raised concerns about the way plans for a subterranean pipeline showed ignorance of Arctic engineering and permafrost in particular.^[16] A clause in NEPA requiring a study of alternatives and another clause requiring an environmental impact statement turned those concerns into tools used by the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Defense Fund in their spring 1970 lawsuit to stop the project.^[17]

Due to the injunction against the project, Alyeska was forced to do further research throughout the summer of 1970. The collected material was turned over to the Interior Department in October 1970,^[18] and a draft environmental impact statement was published in January 1971.^[19] The statement met with massive criticism from almost the moment it was released. The statement amounted to 294 pages but generated more than 12,000 pages of testimony and evidence in Congressional debates by the end of March.^[20] Criticisms of the project included its effect on the Alaska tundra, possible pollution, harm to animals, geographic features, and the lack of much engineering information from Alyeska. One element of opposition the report quelled was the discussion of alternatives. All the proposed alternatives—extension of the Alaska Railroad, an alternative route through Canada, establishing a port at Prudhoe Bay, and more—were deemed to pose more environmental risks than construction of a pipeline directly across Alaska.^[19]

Opposition also was directed at the building of the construction and maintenance highway parallel to the pipeline. Although a clause in Alyeska's pipeline proposal called for removal of the pipeline at a certain point, no such provision was made for removal of the road. Sydney Howe, president of the Conservation Foundation, warned: "The oil might last for fifty years. A road would remain forever."^[21] This argument relied upon the slow growth of plants and animals in far northern Alaska due to the harsh conditions and short growing season. In testimony, an environmentalist argued that arctic trees, though only a few feet tall, had been seedlings "when George Washington was inaugurated".^[22]

The portion of the environmental debate with the biggest symbolic impact took place when discussing the pipeline's impact on caribou herds.^[23] Environmentalists proposed that the pipeline would have an effect on caribou similar to the effect of the U.S. transcontinental railroad on the American Bison population of North America.^[23] Pipeline critics said the pipeline would block traditional migration routes, making caribou populations smaller and making them easier to hunt. This idea was exploited in anti-pipeline advertising, most notably when a picture of a forklift carrying several legally shot caribou was emblazoned with the slogan, "There is more than one way to get caribou across the Alaska Pipeline".^[24] The use of caribou as an example of the pipeline's environmental effects reached a peak in the spring of 1971, when the draft environmental statement was being debated.^[24]

Native objections

In 1902, the United States Department of Agriculture set aside 16,000,000 acres (64,750 km²) of Southeast Alaska as the Tongass National Forest.^[25] Tlingit natives who lived in the area protested that the land was theirs and had been unfairly taken. In 1935, Congress passed a law allowing the Tlingits to sue for recompense, and the resulting case dragged on until 1968, when a $7.5 million settlement was reached.^[26] Following the Native lawsuit to halt work on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, this precedent was frequently mentioned in debate, causing pressure to resolve the situation more quickly than the 33 years it had taken for the Tlingits to be satisfied.^[27] Between 1968 and 1971, a succession of bills were introduced into the U.S. Congress to compensate statewide Native claims.^[28] The earliest bill offered $7 million, but this was flatly rejected.^[29]

The Alaska Federation of Natives, which had been created in 1966, hired former United States Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg, who suggested that a settlement should include 40 million acres of land and a payment of $500 million.^[29] The issue remained at a standstill until Alyeska began lobbying in favor of a Native claims act in Congress in order to lift the legal injunction against pipeline construction.^[29] In October 1971, President Richard Nixon signed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Under the act, Native groups would renounce their land claims in exchange for $962.5 million and 148,500,000 acres (601,000 km²) in federal land.^[30] The money and land were split up among village and regional corporations, which then distributed shares of stock to Natives in the region or village. The shares paid dividends based on both the settlement and corporation profits.^[31] To pipeline developers, the most important aspect of ANCSA was the clause dictating that no Native allotments could be selected in the path of the pipeline.^[32]

Legal issues and politics

Alyeska and the oil companies fought objections to the pipeline's construction in both the courts and in Congress, where debates about the pipeline's environmental impact statement continued through 1971. Objections about the caribou herds were countered by observations of Davidson Ditch, a water pipeline with the same diameter of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which caribou were able to jump over.^[33] To those who argued that the pipeline would irrevocably alter Alaska wilderness, proponents pointed to the overgrown remnants of the Fairbanks Gold Rush, most of which had been erased 70 years later.^[34] Some pipeline opponents were satisfied by Alyeska's preliminary design, which incorporated underground and raised crossings for caribou and other big game; gravel and styrofoam insulation to prevent permafrost melting; automatic leak detection and shutoff; and other techniques.^[35] Other opponents, including fishermen who feared tanker leaks south of Valdez, maintained their disagreement with the plan.^[36]

All the arguments both for and against the pipeline were incorporated into the 3,500-page, 9-volume final environmental impact statement, which was released on March 20, 1972.^[32] Although Alaska Sen. Ted Stevens felt the statement "was not written by a proponent," it maintained the general approval for pipeline construction that was demonstrated in the draft statement.^[37] U.S. Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton allowed 45–days of comment after the release, and conservationists created a 1,300-page document opposing the impact statement.^[38] This document failed to sway Judge Hart, who lifted the injunction on the project on August 15, 1972.^[39]

The environmental groups that had filed the injunction appealed the decision, and on October 6, 1972, the U.S. District Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. partially reversed Hart's decision. The appeals court said that although the impact statement followed the guidelines set by the National Environmental Policy Act, it did not follow the Minerals Leasing Act, which allowed for a smaller pipeline right of way than was required for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.^[39] The oil companies and Alyeska appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but in April 1973, the court declined to hear the case.^[40]

Congressional issues

With the appeals court having decided that the Minerals Leasing Act did not cover the pipeline's requirements, Alyeska and the oil companies began lobbying Congress to either amend the act or create a new law that would permit a larger right-of-way. The Senate Interior Committee began the first hearings on a series of bills to that effect on March 9, 1973.^[41] Environmental opposition switched from contesting the pipeline on NEPA grounds to fighting an amendment to the leasing act or a new bill.^[42] By the spring and summer of 1973, these opposition groups attempted to persuade Congress to endorse a Trans-Canada oil pipeline or a railroad. They believed the "leave it in the ground" argument was doomed to fail, and the best way to oppose the pipeline would be to propose an ineffective alternative which could be easily defeated.^[43] The problem with this approach was that any such alternative would cover more ground and be more damaging environmentally than the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.^[44]

Hearings in both the U.S. Senate and the House continued through the summer of 1973 on both new bills and amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act. On July 13, an amendment calling for more study of the project—the Mondale-Bayh Amendment—was defeated.^[45] This was followed by another victory for pipeline proponents when an amendment by Alaska Sen. Mike Gravel was passed by the Senate. The amendment declared that the pipeline project fulfilled all aspects of NEPA and modified the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the larger right-of-way for the Alaska pipeline.^[46] Upon reconsideration, the vote was tied at 49–49 and required the vote of vice president Spiro Agnew, who supported the amendment.^[47] A similar amendment was passed in the House on August 2.^[48]

Oil crisis and authorization act

On October 17, 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced an oil embargo against the United States in retaliation for its support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Because the United States imported approximately 35 percent of its oil from foreign sources,^[49] the embargo had a major effect. The price of gasoline shot upward, gasoline shortages were common, and rationing was considered. Most Americans began demanding a solution to the problem, and President Richard Nixon began lobbying for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline as at least a part of the answer.

Nixon had supported the pipeline even before the oil crisis. On September 10, 1973, he released a message stating that the pipeline was his priority for the remainder of the Congressional session that year.^[50] On November 8, after the embargo had been in place for three weeks, he reaffirmed that statement. Members of Congress, under pressure from their constituents, created the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, which removed all legal barriers from construction of the pipeline, provided financial incentives, and granted a right-of-way for its construction. The act was drafted, rushed through committee, and approved by the House on November 12, 1973, by a vote of 361–14–60. The next day, the Senate passed it, 80–5–15.^[51] Nixon signed it into law on November 16, and a federal right-of-way for the pipeline and transportation highway was granted on January 3, 1974.^[52] The deal was signed by the oil companies on January 23, allowing work to start.^[53]

Construction

Although the legal right-of-way was cleared by January 1975, cold weather, the need to hire workers, and build a supply road meant work on the pipeline itself did not begin until much later. As early as 1969, the TAPS group (later, Alyeska) organized construction equipment and supplies in Fairbanks. Alyeska paid rent on storage lots and paid for maintenance on this equipment until 1975, when it was finally put to use.^[54] Between 1969 and 1975, as the legal and political debates went on in Washington, survey and planning work took place that ultimately paved the way for work to start in the summer of 1975. The final engineering drawings were not signed until May 1975, and the exact route of the pipeline often changed up until the moment the pipe went into the ground.^[55]

Survey and design

Intensive geological sampling and survey work started in spring 1970. Aerial photographs were taken, examined, and a preliminary route was detailed.^[56] Small survey parties physically visited the route and hammered stakes into the ground. The work was difficult; animal dangers forced the crews to be armed, and they also had to cope with the remote area and limited infrastructure. In places, the foliage was so dense that trees had to be cut down and progress was limited to 20,000 feet (6.1 km) per day.^[57] The surveyed route passed through several mountain passes: Atigun Pass, Isabel Pass, Thompson Pass, and Keystone Canyon.^[58] In the latter location, surveyors had to rappel down cliffs in order to perform their work.^[57]

Surveyors and planners also had to deal with the Denali Fault, a major cause of earthquakes, and with large amounts of permafrost.^[59] In 1969, the TAPS group drilled a series of core samples north of the Brooks Range that demonstrated the how ubiquitous the permafrost was along the route. This forced the design of an elevated pipeline, which was tested in a 1,000 feet (300 m) loop built near Barrow.^[60] This elevation required the pipeline to be insulated, since extreme cold temperatures caused the metal to become brittle, even when hot oil was being pumped through the pipeline.^[61]

After ecological objections forced subterranean pipeline crossings (in order to allow caribou to cross), engineers developed a system by which the ground near the pipeline would be refrigerated by chilled brine. These refrigerated sections also would be placed in Styrofoam-lined trenches and covered with gravel for their insulation value. Altogether, 3.5 miles (5.6 km) of the pipeline was designed to be built underground in this way. In other places, a lack of permafrost meant it could simply be placed underground without a special refrigeration plant.^[62] Large amounts of gravel were needed for all sections of the pipeline as insulation to keep the heat of above-ground structures from melting the permafrost. Gravel also was needed to build the construction and maintenance road, and surveyors located 470 sites across Alaska where the needed 65,000,000 cubic yards (50,000,000 m³) of gravel could be located.^[63]

The Pipeline Authorization Act required the pipeline to be able to withstand the maximum earthquake ever recorded in the area it was built. When crossing the Denali Fault, Teflon-coated sliders were designed to allow the pipeline to move side-to-side in an earthquake. To protect against forward-and-backward shocks and to allow for thermal expansion, the pipeline wasn't designed as a straight line. Instead, it was intended to be laid in an S-shape, and the bends would allow for expansion and movement without breaking.^[64]

Because most of the pipeline was built above permafrost, each of the pipes holding up the raised sections of pipeline contained a sealed tube of ammonia. As the permafrost below the pipeline warms, the ammonia absorbs the heat and rises to a radiator on top of each stanchion. The ammonia is cooled by the outside air, condenses, and falls back to the bottom of the tube, where the process repeats.^[65]

The surveyed route crossed hundreds of streams and rivers. To cross these with the pipeline, engineers designed concrete "jackets" to surround the pipe and weight it down so it would sink to the bottom of the stream or river. Because oil is lighter than water, the pipeline would float without the concrete jackets. Dredging rivers and burying the pipeline in the streambed was not allowed due to environmental concerns. In several places—either out of fear of disturbing the river or because of the river's characteristics—pipeline bridges were constructed. The most notable of these are over the Yukon River and the Tanana River.^[66] To protect against corrosion in these wet environments, the pipeline was designed with cathodic protection.^[67]

In terms of spill prevention, the pipeline was designed with one-way valves (so oil moving ahead could not leak out of a hole behind a certain point), computer-aided leak detection, and other features. The pipeline was designed to be pressurized, so any leak would be instantly detected by a loss of pressure at one of the pump stations, which could sound an alarm and halt the flow of oil quickly.^[68]

When it was proposed, the pipeline was scheduled to start at a capacity of 0.6 million barrels per day (95,000 m³/d), with capacity to be expanded to 1.2 million barrels per day (190,000 m³/d) in two years, and to 2 million barrels per day (320,000 m³/d) at an indeterminate time. The oil embargo scrapped these plans, and it was intended that the pipeline be built with an initial capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day (190,000 m³/d). This required eight pumping stations (instead of five) to be ready at startup, greatly increasing the manpower required.^[69]

Valdez Marine Terminal

The Valdez Marine Terminal, the southern end of the pipeline, was planned for a site across the Port Valdez fjord from Valdez proper. Initial studies predicted bedrock would be six feet below the surface of the ground, but when excavation began, it was discovered that bedrock actually was sixty feet down, requiring the removal of 15,000,000 cubic yards (11,000,000 m³) of overburden. The terminal itself was designed to be built with four tanker berths and space for a fifth, should it become necessary. Holding tanks were planned that had a capacity equal to that of the pipeline, allowing the whole pipeline to be emptied if required.^[70] As required by the Pipeline Authorization Act, a ballast-water filtration system had to be designed as well. This system removes oil from tankers' ballast water so it is not released into Prince William Sound—something fishermen feared when the pipeline was proposed.^[71]

Preparations

Shortly after the permit was signed, convoys of equipment on snow tractors began heading north, using hardened snow roads and an ice bridge over the Yukon River to reach the seven construction camps that had been dormant since 1970. In the 83 days from mid-January to the time the snow and ice melted in mid-April, 680 workers moved 34,000 short tons (31,000,000 kg) to the seven camps, and built five more camps and five temporary airstrips.^[72]

In February, as the ice bridge and snow road were carrying tracked vehicles north, Alyeska awarded a contract to design the construction and maintenance road. Michael Baker, Jr., Inc., a firm in Pennsylvania, was awarded the contract.^[73] To cross the Yukon River, the state of Alaska designed a bridge and paid two-thirds of its cost. The remaining third was paid by Alyeska, and the bridge was built by Manson-Osberg-Ghemm.^[74] On April 5, the contracts to build the road were picked. In total, the new Dalton Highway cost $185 million to build,^[73] and four companies shared that cost. Construction of the Dalton Highway started on April 29, and at the peak of the effort, Alyeska and the four subcontractors had more than 3,400 workers deployed from the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay.^[74] A massive airlift was created to supply the road construction effort; more than 700 flights per day—170,000 in total—were required before the road was finished on September 29.^[74] In just 154 days, a 360-mile gravel road had been built. Final grading had to be done and more than 20 small permanent bridges had to be built, but by November, the road was open to traffic crossing the Yukon River on another ice bridge.^[75]

Management

To supervise the construction of the pipeline, Alyeska appointed two construction management contractors to oversee all the other subcontractors in the project. Bechtel Corporation, from San Francisco, was named the management contractor for the pipeline itself.^[73] Fluor Alaska Inc., a division of Fluor Corp., was named the management contractor for the pumping stations and Valdez Marine Terminal, which was the most complex single section of the pipeline, since it involved the transfer of oil from the pipeline to seagoing oil tankers.^[76]

Neither of those two companies actually did the construction work. That job was handed off to a series of subcontractors, each of whom had responsibility on one (or two) of six sections of the pipeline (seven, if the marine terminal is included). Bidding on the subcontracting jobs opened at the end of March, and the contracts were announced on June 12, 1974.^[73]

On Section One, which ran 153 miles (246 km) from Valdez to the Sourdough pipeline camp, River Construction Corporation, a division of Morrison-Knudsen, was given the contract.^[76] For Section Two, which covered 149 miles (240 km) from Sourdough to north of Delta Junction, Perini Arctic Associates, a joint venture of Perini Corporation, Majestic Construction, Wiley Oilfield Hauling Ltd., and McKinney Drilling Company.^[76] Section Three covered 144 miles (232 km) from Delta Junction, past Fairbanks, and almost to the Yukon. The contract for this section was given to H.C. Price, a group formed by H.C. Price Company (usually known as PPCO), R.B. Potashnick, Codell Construction Company, and Oman Construction Company.^[76]

Section Four was 143 miles (230 km) from south of the Yukon to Coldfoot. It was contracted to Associated-Green, a group formed by Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc. and Green Construction Company. The group also was one of the main contractors for construction of the Dalton Highway.^[77] Section Five covered the distance from Coldfoot to Toolik pipeline camp, and Section Six went from Toolik to Prudhoe Bay. Together, the two sections covered 210 miles (340 km), and they both were under the supervision of Arctic Constructors, a venture of Brown & Root Inc., Ingram Corporation, Peter Kiewit Sons Inc., Williams Brothers Alaska, Inc., and H.B. Zachry Company.^[77]

In Valdez, where Fluor had supervision, the work also was divided among several contractors. Site preparation work was done by Morrison-Knudsen. Chicago Bridge & Iron Company built the tank farms, the tanker berts were built by Kiewest (a venture of Peter Kiewit Sons and Willamette-Western Corporation), and General Electric insulated the pipes.^[78] Fluor also had supervision of the construction of the pumping stations, which were generally built by the contractors working on a specific section of the pipeline.^[77]

Pipeline camps

When the contracts were announced, Alyeska already had 12 pipeline construction camps either built or under construction.^[72] These camps were all north of the Yukon, however, and camps had to be built along the entire length of the project. Aleyska planned for 29 construction camps,^[77] but 31 were created.^[79] Seven were built along the pipeline south of the Yukon, and one was built at each of the 12 pump stations along the length of the route.^[77]

The camps were built on thick beds of gravel laid down to insulate the underlying permafrost and to prevent pollution. At the conclusion of the construction project, the gravel was removed, theoretically removing oil leaks and other pollution with it.^[80] Atop the gravel were prefabricated modular buildings either flown to the site or trucked across the Dalton Highway. The standardized structures could house 28 people, and two typically were bolted together to create two "wings". All were one-story, except at Valdez and at the pump station camps, where modules were laid atop one another because of space concerns.^[81] In addition to the gravel insulation, both buildings and utility conduits were raised above the ground to avoid heating permafrost.^[82]

The camps housed from 250 people (at each pump station) to 3,500 people (at Valdez).^[81] A typical pump station camp cost $6 million to build, while the typical mainline camps cost about $10 million to build.^[81] The camps had beds for 16,500 workers and were collectively referred to as "Skinny City" by workers. The name came from the fact that the "city" was 800 miles (1,300 km) long, but only a few hundred feet wide.^[80]

Overall construction headquarters was at Fort Wainwright near Fairbanks, where Alyeska leased land and buildings from the U.S. Army. Vacant barracks were converted into housing, and vacant offices were given to oil workers. As air traffic increased, Alyeska arranged for the use of Fort Wainwright's airfield to relieve the burden on Fairbanks International Airport.^[77] The camp at Wainwright was the only one that did not use prefabricated buildings.^[81]

Workers

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System was built entirely with unionized labor. Because construction was slumping in the United States at large, the pipeline drew workers from across the country. These workers had to follow a strict hiring process based on union seniority and the labor that was needed. Priority was given to hiring Alaska residents and Alaska Natives, and no strikes were permitted by a labor agreement between Alyeska and the unions.^[83] In exchange for abiding by these restrictions, workers were paid extremely well and received fringe benefits.^[84] Because the subcontractors had cost-plus contracts with Alyeska for staffing,^[73] there was no incentive to keep staffing levels low. This often led to more people being assigned to a job than there was work to do.^[85] At the peak of construction in fall 1975, more than 28,000 people were working on the pipeline. Because of the high turnover on the project, more than 70,000 people worked on at least a part of the pipeline.^[86]

Welders

The welders who worked on the pipeline itself came from Pipeliners Local 798 out of Tulsa, Oklahoma, which specialized in providing welders for large-scale pipeline projects.^[87] Members of the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union performed all welding that was not a part of the pipeline itself. This included the pump stations, feeder pipelines, and work at the Valdez Marine Terminal.^[88] The welders were the highest-paid of all the workers on the pipeline and earned $18.25 per hour as their normal rate.^[89] To be hired on the pipeline project, welders had to go through an intensive certification process that involved a series of test welds. If a welder failed any of the test welds, he was not hired and was not allowed to try again for several weeks.^[90]

Most 798ers were characterized by a Southern accent, cowboy boots, and unique welders hats.^[89][91] They were the only people to weld the 48 inches (120 cm) pipe of the main pipeline, and outside observers characterized them as arrogant and "redneck". As a fellow welder stated at the time, "Take your typical 798 pipeline welder and feed him a few drinks, and he'll probably tell you that he's God's greatest gift to welding."^[92] This attitude generated resentment from other pipeline workers, and the conflict caused large-scale brawls. In some instances, Alaska State Troopers had to be flown to pipeline camps in order to break up small riots.^[93] Toward the end of the pipeline project, a series of bumper stickers was produced with the slogan "Happiness is 10,000 Okies going south with a Texan under each arm."^[89]

Teamsters

The Teamsters Union was by far the largest and most notable contributor of workers to the pipeline project. Teamsters worked in the transportation and supply aspects of the project. All trucks were driven by Teamsters, supply warehouses were run by Teamsters, and the buses that transported workers from camps to job sites were run by Teamsters.^[94] Teamsters Local 959, with more than 23,000 employees at its peak,^[95] was by far the most dominant labor force on the pipeline project.^[96] There were frequent allegations of corruption by Teamsters on the project, and the [[Anchorage Daily News]] won a Pulitzer Prize for a 15-part series on the rise of Local 959 and its influence on state politics.^[95] Repeated allegations of links to organized crime were never found, but two Teamsters leaders were murdered in 1976 while investigating drug activity on the pipeline project.^[97] Teamsters workers strongly denied any involvement with organized crime, and pointed to the fact that 80 percent of the Teamsters in the project had college degrees or professional and management experience.^[98]

The Teamsters' control of tools and equipment in warehouses they ran led to conflicts with other workers. In a few instances, Teamsters were assaulted by workers from other unions.^{[99][100][93]} In other instances, the Teamsters used their position to extract concessions from Alyeska and the subcontractors. Although they were forbidden from striking, they were allowed to halt work for safety meetings, and this excuse was used on a handful of occasions.^[101] The most notable of these was in February 1975, after a series of serious truck accidents on the Elliott Highway, which connected to the newly built Dalton. The Elliott had not been upgraded, and it was a treacherous drive for trucks hauling Template:Convert/feet of pipe. After his attempts to get Alyeska to upgrade the road were rebuffed, Teamster leader Jesse Carr stopped all truck traffic in the state for four days of safety meetings. Alyeska and the state promised upgrades to the road, and the traffic resumed.^[102]

Operators

The International Union of Operating Engineers (called Operators for short) represented the men and women who sat at the controls of the heavy equipment used on the construction of the pipeline.^[96] This equipment included bulldozers, cranes, drilling rigs, and sidebooms—a cross between a bulldozer and a crane that could lay a section of pipe in a trench parallel to its tracks. Because most of the heavy equipment was unheated, six operators were typically assigned to each piece of equipment, allowing for frequent breaks. A popular joke on the pipeline was that the sole qualification to be an Operator was, "Must be able to sit on a sideboom at 40 below and not freeze up."^[103] More seriously, one laborer wrote, was that there was no more terrifying thing than to be in a trench and have a drunken or unskilled Operator handling the pipe that was being laid in the trench.^[104]

Laborers

The Laborers International Union represented the bulk of the less-skilled labor on the project. Laborers, as they were commonly known, did most of the odd jobs on the project: digging trenches in areas inaccessable by heavy equipment, drilling holes for the pipeline's Vertical Support Members, spreading gravel, crushing rock, and moving supplies by hand.^[105] Laborers Local 942 out of Fairbanks was the most prominent Laborers group on the project, and because no special skills were required for the jobs it filled, the Laborers Union attracted most of the people who came to Alaska specifically for the pipeline project.^[106] As one Laborer put it, they were people "simply looking for the easiest way possible of getting through the day."^[107]

Because the Laborers had more applicants than jobs available, the process for getting a job on the pipeline through Laborers Local 942 was a multi-tiered process. There were multiple levels of eligibility, based on the amount of seniority a person had. A-level members had the first pick of jobs, but they had to have worked at least 800 hours with the union in the previous year. B-level members had to have worked between 100 and 800 hours with the union. C-level members had to have at least two years of experience outside of Alaska or be an Alaska resident for at least one year. D-level was for everyone else, and D-level people rarely got jobs.^[108] That didn't stop people from trying, however. At 11 a.m. on January 1, 1974, shortly before the pipeline right-of-way was signed, more than 100 people spent the night outside the Fairbanks office of the Laborers Union, waiting for the first choice of jobs when the office opened.^[109]

Pipeline life

Life during the pipeline construction project was characterized by long hours, poor conditions, and limited entertainment compensated by excellent benefits and pay. Each worker was handed a small booklet of 23 camp rules,^[110] but the rules (including no alcohol or smoking) were frequently broken^[111] and became the target of ribald humor.

Within the living quarters, the atmosphere resembled that of a college dormitory.^[112] Housekeeping and laundry services were provided, but the quarters were small and little entertainment was available. Television broadcasts were delayed two days because of the need to fly tapes from California,^[113] and most workers had to develop their own forms of entertainment. In the winter, some took to skiing or sightseeing; in the summer, some went hiking.^[114] In general, however, little time was available for recreation because of the long hours worked by most people.

In the first years of the project, workers were regularly treated to prime rib, steak dinners, and other exotic fare due to a cost-plus contract between the food preparers and the subcontractors.^[115] In later years, these cost-plus contracts were replaced, and institutional cooking and box lunches became common, but the food on the project was prized by many workers.^[116][117]

In 1976, workers' pay averaged between $11 and $18 per hour, depending on the position. With workweeks averaging between 70 and 84 hours per week, the problem for many workers became what to do with so much extra money.^[118] Teamster Jerry Thornhill, a typical worker, wrote to Money magazine, asking for advice. Thornhill detailed a pay rate of $57,000 per year at a time when members of Congress earned $42,500 annually, professional football players averaged $40,000, and U.S. vice president Nelson Rockefeller earned $62,500.^[119] The large amounts of money in the pipeline camps and a lack of entertainment caused frequent gambling games that sometimes involved tens of thousands of dollars.^[111][120] Instead of gambling, other workers saved their money for monthlong vacations to Hawaii or other warm climates, then returned to work with no money remaining.^[121]

Laying pipe

The pipeline crossing the Tanana River

The single 48 inch (1.22 m) diameter pipeline was built between 27 March 1975 to 31 May 1977 at a cost of about $8 billion.^[122] The pipeline was constructed in six sections by five different contractors employing 21,000 people at the peak of work; 31 workers died in construction accidents.

The 800-mile (1,286 km) route presented special challenges. As well as the harsh environment, the need to cross three mountain ranges and many rivers and streams, the permafrost of Alaska meant that more than half of the pipeline's length had to be elevated rather than buried as normal to prevent the ground melting and shifting. There were five years of surveying and geological sampling before construction began. During construction archaeological teams were repeatedly called in to investigate previously unknown sites which were disturbed by excavation.

Cost

When the TAPS group initially proposed the pipeline in 1969, the proposed cost was $900 million, and the pipeline would be completed by 1972.^[123] By January 1970, the projected cost had risen from $900 million to $2 billion.^[124] In October 1973, Alyeska further refined its figures and anticipated a cost of between $3.1 billion and $3.5 billion, with the potential for a billion more.^[125] One year later, Alyeska released its most detailed cost estimate to that point: $5.982 billion.^[126]

Technical details

Along the pipeline there are eleven pump stations, each with four pumps. Each electric pump is powered by diesel or natural gas generators. Twelve pump stations were planned but Pump Station 11 was never built, though the southward numbering system for the pump stations retains a place for this nonexistent station. Usually only around seven stations are active at one time, and plans to replace the existing pumps with newer high-efficiency pumps may reduce the number of active stations even further.

The pipeline was built above ground in areas where thaw-sensitive permafrost exists. Where the line must be buried, such as highway crossings or avalanche-prone areas, the pipe is encased in an insulated, refrigerated ditch. Nearby refrigeration plants pump cold brine through 6 inch (15 cm) pipes which absorb heat and keep the soil cooled. Other areas of burial are either conventional covered ditches or unrefrigerated but insulated ditches, depending on the sensitivity of the surrounding soil.

View of the pipeline's underside, heat pipes, and heat exchangers

Oil emerges from the ground at up to 180 °F (80 °C), and travels through the pipeline at temperatures above 120 °F (50 °C). In some elevated portions, heat conduction from the oil through the Vertical Support Members (VSMs) would melt the permafrost in which the VSMs are embedded. This would cause the pipeline to sink and possibly sustain damage. To prevent this, these portions of the pipeline include heat exchangers atop each VSM, passively cooled by convection to the air. Each heat exchanger is thermally coupled by a heat pipe to the base of the VSM. Running through the VSM, the heat pipe transports heat from the base to the heat exchanger. Since ammonia, the working fluid in the heat pipes, has a freezing point lower than the permafrost, the heat pipe works throughout the year, even during the coldest winter nights. This convection cooling system is thought by TAPS engineers to be the greatest innovation associated with the pipeline.

Another innovation associated with the pipeline is the zig-zag configuration above ground. Since pipe shifts around far more easily aboveground than when buried, the zig-zag path of the pipeline allows the pipe to move from side to side and lengthwise. This movement may be caused by earthquakes or by thermal expansion and contraction. The VSMs also include "shoes" to allow for horizontal or lateral movement, and crushable blocks to absorb shocks from earthquakes, avalanches, or vehicles.

Oil began flowing on 20 June 1977. Since then over 15 billion barrels (2.4×10⁹ m³) of oil have been pumped, peaking at 2.1 million barrels per day (330,000 m³/d) in 1988 and currently down to 720,000 barrels per day (114,000 m³/d) (April 2008 average) ^[127]. Around 16,700 tankers had been loaded at the Marine Terminal at Valdez by 2001. The terminal has berths for four tankers and cost almost US$1.4 billion to build. The first tanker to leave the terminal was the ARCO Juneau on 1 August 1977.

Maintenance

The pipeline is surveyed several times a day, mostly by air. Due to the placement of the surveillance bases, the pipeline can be surveyed in just two hours, but most surveys take longer to ensure thoroughness. Other methods of surveying include regular pipeline inspection gauges ("pigs"), sent through the line. Some pigs are used to remove the buildup of kerosene inside the pipe, while others have electronics which relay radar scans and fluid measurements as they travel.

Pipeline on slider supports where it crosses the Denali Fault.

The pipeline has been damaged several times. It was built with earthquakes in mind and has survived several, including the 7.9 magnitude quake of 3 November 2002. It is vulnerable to intentional attack and to forest fires. The highest losses from the pipeline were in February 1978, when a deliberate explosion led to more than 16,000 barrels (2,500 m³) leaking out at Steele Creek, near Fairbanks. From 1977 to 1994 there were 30 to 40 spills a year on average. The worst years in terms of number of incidents were 1991 to 1994, when there were 164 spills, although none were major. Since 1995 the number of spills has been sharply reduced, with total losses from 1997 to 2000 totalling only 6.89 barrels (1.10 m³).

The steel pipe is resistant to gunshots, but on 4 October 2001, a drunken gunman named Daniel Carson Lewis shot a hole into a weld near Livengood, causing a spill of about 6,000 barrels (950 m³). ^[128][129] Approximately 2 acres (8,100 m²) of tundra were soiled and were removed in the cleanup. The pipeline was repaired and was restarted on 7 October 2001. Lewis, known as a troublemaker in the community of fewer than 30 people, was apprehended four hours after the shooting. He was convicted on multiple state and federal felony charges, including a $10,000 fine and 10-year federal sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

In August 2006, after an inspection mandated by the United States Department of Transportation after a March spill, BP announced they had discovered corrosion severe enough to require replacement of 16 of 22 miles (35 km) of transit pipelines at their Prudhoe Bay oil field.^[130] No part of the main Trans-Alaska Pipeline was affected, although Alyeska said that lower crude oil volumes could slow pumping during the BP shutdown.^[131]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Trans-Alaska Pipeline System

See also

• Prudhoe Bay oil spill
• Alaska Gas Pipeline

Notes

References

• Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Alyeska: A 30-Year Journey. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 2007.
• Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. The Facts: Trans Alaska Pipeline System (PDF). Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 2007.
• Banet, Arthur C. "Oil and Gas Development on Alaska's North Slope: Past Results and Future Prospects" (PDF). Bureau of Land Management, March 1991.
• Berry, Mary Clay. Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims. Indiana University Press, 1975.
• Coates, Peter A. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy. University of Alaska Press, 1991.
• Cole, Dermot. Amazing Pipeline Stories. Kenmore, Washington; Epicenter Press, 1997.
• McGrath, Ed. Inside the Alaska Pipeline. Millbrae, California; Celestial Arts, 1977.
• Mead, Robert Douglas. Journeys Down the Line: Building the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Doubleday, 1978.
• Naske, Claus M. and Slotnick, Herman E. Alaska: A History of the 49th State. Norman, Oklahoma; University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. Second edition.
• Roscow, James P. 800 Miles to Valdez: The Building of the Alaska Pipeline. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977.
• Wickware, Potter. Crazy Money: Nine Months on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. New York; Random House, 1979.

External links

• Alyeska Pipeline website
• The Alaska Pipeline - Related American Experience episode
• Text of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline authorization Act

Additional reading

• Allen, Lawrence J. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Vol 1: The Beginning. Vol 2: South to Valdez. Seattle; Scribe Publishing Co. 1975 and 1976.
• Baring-Gould, Michael and Bennett, Marsha. Social Impact of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Construction in Valdez, Alaska 1974-1975. Anchorage; University of Alaska Anchorage, 1976.
• Brown, Tom. Oil on Ice: Alaskan Wilderness at the Crossroads. Edited by Richard Pollack. San Francisco; Sierra Club Battlebook, 1980.
• Dixon, Mim. What Happened to Fairbanks? The Effects of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline on the Community of Fairbanks, Alaska. Social Impact Assessment Series. Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1978.
• Dobler, Bruce. The Last Rush North. Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1976.
• Fineberg, Richard A. A Pipeline in Peril: A Status Report on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Ester, Alaska; Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility, 1996.
• Hanrahan, John and Gruenstein, Peter. Lost Frontier: The Marketing of Alaska. New York; W.W. Norton, 1977.
• Kruse, John A. Fairbanks Community Survey. Fairbanks; Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976.
• LaRocca, Joe. Alaska Agonistes: The Age of Petroleum: How Big Oil Bought Alaska. Rare Books, Inc. 2003.
• Lenzner, Terry F. The Management, Planning and Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Washington, D.C.; Report to the Alaska Pipeline Commission.
• Manning, Harvey. Cry Crisis! Rehersal in Alaska (A Case Study of What Government By Oil Did to Alaska and Does to the Earth). San Francisco; Friends of the Earth, 1974.
• McGinniss, Joe. Going to Extremes. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
• McPhee, John. Coming Into the Country. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1976.
• Romer, John and Elizabeth. The Seven Wonders of the World: A History of the Modern Imagination. New York; Henry Holt and Co., 1995.
• Simmons, DIane. Let the Bastards Freeze in the Dark. New York; Wyndham Books, 1980.
• Strohmeyer, John. Extreme Conditions: Big Oil and the Transformation of Alaska. New York; Simon & Schuster, 1993.
• Wolf, Donald E. Big Dams and Other Dreams: The Six Companies Story. Norman, Oklahoma. University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.
• Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York; Simon & Schuster, 1991.