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Early in John F. Kennedy's presidential term—but not sufficiently early for critics worried by the specter of communism in Latin America, Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution in Cuba, and the growing popularity among Brazil's landless of the Peasant Leagues movement headed by Francisco Julião—the president, at a White House reception for the Latin American diplomatic corps on 13 March 1961, proposed an alliance for progress in the Western Hemisphere. Based in principle on the successful Marshall Plan that rescued western Europe after World War II, Kennedy's proposal called for a concentrated joint effort to accelerate the economic and social development of Latin America within a democratic political framework. "Those who make democracy impossible," Kennedy said, "will make revolution inevitable."
The alliance speech was a powerful political statement marking a definite shift in U.S. policy that began in the late 1950s, at least partially in response to the growing revolutionary activity epitomized by Castro's overthrow of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. The speech, the Kennedy personality, and the positive response of popular Latin American leaders combined to produce a remarkable mass psychological impact throughout the hemisphere. Its immediate effect was to improve dramatically the political relations between the United States and Latin America, especially with the "democratic left." The speech electrified the masses and gave encouragement to progressive political and intellectual forces within Latin America, but it also engendered bitterness and obdurate opposition among those who, for selfish or ideological reasons, resisted strongly if not always publicly the fundamental changes called for.
Between 1961 and 1969, public economic assistance to the Latin American countries in the form of grants and loans from all external sources was about $18 billion, of which about $10 billion came directly from official U.S. sources. However, on a net basis, that is, after taking account of loan repayments and interest, official U.S. direct aid is estimated to have been about $4.8 billion in the same period. This relatively small net transfer of official capital is explained by the fact that public indebtedness in Latin America in 1960 was more than $10 billion, the servicing of which diverted resources away from new investment.
Although profound changes in the economic, social, and political structures in Latin America began to take place in 1961 under the impetus of the alliance, a variety of forces within Latin America and a major shift in U.S. energies and resources associated with the Vietnam War drained the alliance effort of its vitality. These factors, combined with the intrinsic difficulty of bringing about radical social change within a free and democratic framework, resulted in a failure to meet early expectations concerning performance. Depending on the site, some or most of the food supplies from the United States, for example, surplus powdered milk and eggs, cheese, tinned beef, and flour, found their way into private hands and were sold for profit.
Some Alliance for Progress projects were seen as arrogant, impractical, or both. Latin American educators, who traditionally preferred European models, resented being told by well-meaning American advisers that the U.S. system of middle and high schools should replace the more rigorous but less democratic Latin American school system. The Alliance for Progress spent millions of dollars to build communities of tract houses so working-class families could take out mortgages on the little houses and therefore become property owners. But the project overlooked the fact that these housing tracts were located so far from the city center, where the heads of families worked, that most residents abandoned the new housing as soon as they could to move closer to their work.
President Lyndon B. Johnson kept the Alliance for Progress alive, but President Richard M. Nixon ended it, substituting a new agency, Action for Progress. Like the dollar diplomacy advocates of the 1920s and 1930s, Nixon's approach argued that "prosperity makes contentment and contentment means repose." But all of these programs, including the Alliance for Progress, differed fundamentally from dollar diplomacy. Rather than relying on Wall Street bankers to bring repose to Latin America with loans, American taxpayers provided the money, most of it in concessional terms.
Bibliography
Berger, Mark T. Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
Schoultz, Lars. Beneath the United States: A History of U. S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
—Ralph A. Dungan
Bibliography
See A. F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (1991).
The Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso) initiated by U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1961 aimed to establish economic cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America.
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In March 1961, President Kennedy proposed a ten-year plan for Latin America:
| “ | ...we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress...Let us once again transform the American Continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men and women, an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand. Let us once again awaken our American revolution until it guides the struggles of people everywhere-not with an imperialism of force or fear but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.[1] | ” |
The program was signed at an inter-American conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961. The charter called for:
First, the plan called for Latin American countries to pledge a capital investment of $80 billion over 10 years. The United States agreed to supply or guarantee $20 billion within one decade.[3]
Second, Latin American delegates required the participating countries to draw up comprehensive plans for national development. These plans were then to be submitted for approval by an inter-American board of experts.
Third, tax codes had to be changed to demand "more from those who have most" and land reform was to be implemented.[2]
Because of the program, economic assistance to Latin America nearly tripled between fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1961. Between 1962 and 1967 the US supplied $1.4 billion per year to Latin America. If new investment was included, this amount rose to $3.3 billion per year.
But economic aid to Latin America dropped sharply in the late 1960s, especially when Richard Nixon entered the White House.[2]
Authors L. Ronald Scheman and Tony Smith state that the amount of aid totaled $22.3 billion.[4]
But this amount was not necessarily net transfers of resources and development. Latin American countries still had to pay off their debt to the US and other first world countries.
In addition, profits usually returned to the US, and profits frequently exceeded new investment. In March 1969, the US ambassador to the OAS, William T. Denzer, explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:
"When you look at net capital flows and their economic effect, and after all due credit is given to the U.S. effort to step up support to Latin America, one sees that not that much money has been put into Latin America after all."[2]
The alliance charter included a clause encouraged by US policy makers that committed the Latin American governments to the promotion "of conditions that will encourage the flow of foreign investments" to the region.
U.S. industries lobbied Congress to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to ensure that US aid would not be furnished to any foreign business that could compete with US business "unless the country concerned agrees to limit the export of the product to the US to 20 percent of output". In addition the industries lobbied Congress to limit all purchases of AID machinery and vehicles in the US. A 1967 study of AID showed that 90 percent of all AID commodity expenditures went to US corporations.[5]
To many experts, the foreign aid program was a sham since five times more dollars were leaving Brazil in the form of earnings, dividends and royalties paid to American companies than entering the country as direct investments. In his book Hidden Terrors (Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 66), A. J. Langguth describes the joking way Brazilians referred to the program as being one in which it was Brazil that was giving foreign aid to the United States after tax credits, assistance in locating and other privileges given to foreign firms were taken into account.[6] Ivan Illich advanced a "potent and highly influential critique" of the Alliance, seeing it as "bankrolled and organized by wealthy nations, foundations, and religious groups."[7]
During the Kennedy administration, between 1961 and 1963 the U.S. suspended economic and/or broke off diplomatic relations with several countries which had dictatorships, including Argentina, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru. But these suspensions were imposed only temporarily, for periods of only three weeks to six months.[8]
By 1964, under President Johnson, the program to discriminate against dictatoral regimes ceased. In March 1964 the US approved a military coup in Brazil, and was prepared to help if called upon under Operation Brother Sam.[8]
In 1965 the US dispatched 24,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to stop a possible left-wing take over under Operation Power Pack.
The Alliance for Progress included U.S. programs of military and police assistance to counter Communist subversion, including Plan LASO in Colombia.
Because the perception was that the Alliance for Progress was a failure, shortly after taking office, on February 17, 1969, President Richard Nixon commissioned a study to assess the state of Latin America. Nixon appointed his most powerful political rival, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller to direct the study. The poor relationship between the two politicians suggested that Nixon would not be that interested in the results of the study. There was a lack of interest for the region in the late 1960s to early 1970s.[9]
In early 1969, Rockefeller and his advisors took four trips to Latin America. Most of the trips turned out to be an embarrassment. Rockefeller wrote in his report preface that,
The major part of the Rockefeller report suggested a reduction of U.S. involvement, "we, in the United States, cannot determine the internal political structure of any other nation". Because there was little the United States should or could do toward changing the political atmosphere in other countries, there was no reason to attempt to use economic aid as a political tool. This was the justification to reduce economic aid in Latin America. The Rockefeller report called for some aid to continue, but the report recommended creating more effective aid programs.[9]
Growth in regional output per capita in Latin America in the 1960s was 2.6%, exceeding the Alliance for Progress goal of 2.5%. In contrast to 2.2% growth per capita in the 1950s, GDP growth rate per capita in the region reached 2.9% in the latter half of the 1960s and accelerated to 3.3% in the 1970s. Overall nine countries (including Brazil and Mexico) reached the target goal, ten nations did not reach the goal, and only Haiti had lower growth.[10]
Adult illiteracy was reduced but not wiped out. In some countries, the number of people attending universities doubled or even tripled. Access to secondary education also showed increases. One out of every four school-age children were provided with an extra food ration.[11] Many people were provided with new schools, textbooks, or housing.[11]
The Alliance for Progress saw the start of long-range reform, with some improvements in land use and distribution, slightly improved tax laws and administration, the submission of detailed development programmes to the OAS, the creation of central planning agencies, and greater local efforts to provide housing, education, and financial institutions.[11]
Health clinics were built across Latin America. However, success in improving health care was hindered by population growth.
Of the 15 million peasant families living in Latin America, only one million benefited from any kind of land reform. The traditional elites resisted any land reform.[2]
Minimum wage laws were created but the minimum wages offered to Nicaraguan workers, for example, were set so low as to have no appreciable effect on the wages received.[12] In other nations, such as El Salvador, minimum wage laws encouraged employers to use labor-saving machinery.[citation needed]
In Latin America during the 1960s thirteen constitutional governments were replaced by military dictatorships. According to some authors, such as Peter Smith, this was a failure of the Alliance for Progress. Peter Smith wrote, "The most striking failure of the Alliance of Progress occurred within the political realm. Instead of promoting and consolidating reformist civilian rule, the 1960s witnessed a rash of military coups throughout the region...By the end of 1968 dictators were holding sway in several countries."[2][13][14]
The Alliance for Progress achieved a short-lived public relations success. It also had real but limited economic advances.[8] But by the early 1970s the program was widely viewed as a failure.[15]
The program failed for three reasons:
The Organization of American States disbanded the permanent committee created to implement the alliance in 1973.[3]
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