Altruism is selfless concern for the welfare of others. It is a traditional
virtue in many cultures, and central to many religious traditions. In English, this idea was
often described as the Golden rule of ethics. Some newer philosophies such as
egoism have criticized the concept, with writers such as Nietzsche arguing that there is no moral obligation to help others.
Altruism can be distinguished from a feeling of loyalty and duty. Altruism focuses on a motivation to help others or a want to do good without reward, while duty focuses on a
moral obligation towards a specific individual (for example, God, a
king), a specific organization (for example, a government),
or an abstract concept (for example, patriotism etc). Some individuals may feel both altruism
and duty, while others may not. Pure altruism is giving without regard to reward or the benefits of recognition.
The concept has a long history in philosophical and ethical thought, and has more recently become a topic for psychologists,
sociologists, evolutionary
biologists, and ethologists. While ideas about altruism from one field can have an
impact on the other fields, the different methods and focuses of these fields lead to different perspectives on altruism.
Altruism in ethics
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The word "altruism" (derived from French autre "other", in its turn derived
from Latin alter "other") was coined by Auguste
Comte, the French founder of positivism, in order to describe the ethical doctrine he
supported. He believed that individuals had a moral obligation to serve the interest of others or the "greater good" of humanity.
Comte says, in his Catechisme Positiviste, that "[the] social point of view cannot tolerate the notion of rights, for such
notion rests on individualism. We are born under a load of obligations of every kind, to our predecessors, to our successors, to
our contemporaries. After our birth these obligations increase or accumulate, for it is some time before we can return any
service.... This ["to live for others"], the definitive formula of human morality, gives a direct sanction exclusively to our
instincts of benevolence, the common source of happiness and duty. [Man must serve] Humanity, who we are entirely." As the
name of the ethical doctrine is "altruism," doing what the ethical doctrine prescribes has also come to be referred to by the
term "altruism" — serving others through placing their interests above one's own.
Philosophers who support egoism have argued that altruism is demeaning to the
individual and that no moral obligation to help others actually exists. Nietzsche
asserts that altruism is predicated on the assumption that others are more important than one's self and that such a position is
degrading and demeaning. He also claims that it was very uncommon for people in Europe to consider the sacrifice of one's own
interests for others as virtuous until after the advent of Christianity.
Advocates of altruism as an ethical doctrine maintain that one ought to act, or refrain from acting, so that benefit or
good is bestowed on other people, if necessary to the exclusion of one's
own interests (Note that refraining from murdering someone, for example, is not altruism since he is not receiving a benefit or
being helped, as he already has his life; this would amount to the same thing as ignoring someone).
Altruism in ethology and evolutionary biology
In the science of ethology (the study of behavior), and more generally in the study of
social evolution, altruism refers to behavior by an individual that increases the
fitness of another individual while decreasing the fitness of the actor. Recent
developments in game theory (look into ultimatum
game) have provided some explanations for apparent altruism, as have traditional evolutionary analyses. Among the proposed
mechanisms are:
The study of altruism was the initial impetus behind George R. Price's development of
the Price equation which is a mathematical equation used to study genetic evolution. An
interesting example of altruism is found in the cellular slime moulds, such as
Dictyostelium mucoroides. These protists live as individual amoebae until starved, at which point they aggregate and form a multicellular fruiting body in which some cells
sacrifice themselves to promote the survival of other cells in the fruiting body. Social behavior and altruism share many
similarities to the interactions between the many parts (cells, genes) of an organism, but are distinguished by the ability of
each individual to reproduce indefinitely without an absolute requirement for its neighbors.
Jorge Moll and Jordan Grafman, neuroscientists at the National Institutes of Health and LABS-D'Or Hospital Network (J.M.)
provided the first evidence for the neural bases of altruistic giving in normal healthy volunteers, using functional magnetic
resonance imaging. In their research, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA in October, 2006
(Human fronto–mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation, PNAS 2006:103(42);15623-15628), they showed that
both pure monetary rewards and charitable donations activated the mesolimbic reward pathway, a primitive part of the brain that
usually lights up in response to food and sex. However, when volunteers generously placed their interests of others before their
own by making charitable donations, another brain circuit was selectively activated: the subgenual cortex / septal region. These
structures are intimately related to social attachment and bonding in other species. Altruism, the experiment suggested, was not
a superior moral faculty that suppresses basic selfish urges but rather was basic to the brain, hard-wired and
pleasurable.[1]
Norwegian Philosopher Arne Næss, has suggested that the narrow concept of egoic self implies that all acts of "doing good" are acts of altruism, whereas, through a larger
concept of the self-actualised "ecological self", in which it is the
interconnectedness within progressively larger wholes, ultimately incorporating the whole of life (see Gaia hypothesis), means that our self interest ultimately requires the flourishing and well-being of the
whole of life itself. This concept, similar in some respects to the land ethic of
Aldo Leopold, sets the concept of Altruism within the widest possible boundary of moral
concern [2].
Altruism in politics
With regard to their political convictions, altruists may be divided in two broad groups: Those who believe altruism is a
matter of personal choice (and therefore selfishness can and should be tolerated), and those who believe that altruism is a moral
ideal which should be embraced, if possible, by all human beings.
A prominent example of the former branch of altruist political thought is Lysander
Spooner, who, in Natural Law, writes: "Man, no doubt, owes many other moral duties to his fellow men; such as to
feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, care for the sick, protect the defenceless, assist the weak, and
enlighten the ignorant. But these are simply moral duties, of which each man must be his own judge, in each particular case, as
to whether, and how, and how far, he can, or will, perform them." Things such as a law that motorists pull over to let
emergency vehicles pass may also be justified by appealing to the altruism ethic. Finally, radical altruists of this branch may
take things further and advocate some form of collectivism or communalism.
On a somewhat related note, altruism is often held — even by non-altruists — to be the kind of ethic that should guide the
actions of politicians and other people in positions of power. Such people are usually expected to set their own interests aside
and serve the populace. When they do not, they may be criticized as defaulting on what is believed to be an ethical obligation to
place the interests of others above their own.
Altruism in psychology and sociology
If one performs an act beneficial to others with a view to gaining some personal benefit, then it isn't an altruistically
motivated act. There are several different perspectives on how "benefit" (or "interest") should be defined. A material gain (for
example, money, a physical reward, etc.) is clearly a form of benefit, while others identify and include both material and
immaterial gains (affection, respect, happiness, satisfaction etc.) as being philosophically identical benefits.
According to psychological egoism, while people can exhibit altruistic
behavior, they cannot have altruistic motivations. Psychological egoists would say that while they might very well
spend their lives benefitting others with no material benefit (or a material net loss) to themselves, their most basic motive for
doing so is always to further their own interests. For example, it would be alleged that the foundational motive behind a person
acting this way is to advance their own psychological well-being ("good feelings"). Critics of this theory often reject it on the
grounds that it's non-falsifiable; in other words, it is impossible to prove or disprove
because immaterial gains such as a "good feelings" cannot be measured or proven to exist in all people performing altruistic
acts. Psychological egoism has also been accused of using circular logic: "If a
person willingly performs an act, that means he derives personal enjoyment from it; therefore, people only perform acts that give
them personal enjoyment". This particular statement is circular because its conclusion is identical to its hypothesis (it assumes
that people only perform acts that give them personal enjoyment, and concludes that people only perform acts that give them
personal enjoyment).
In common parlance, altruism usually means helping another person without expecting material reward from that or other
persons, although it may well entail the "internal" benefit of a "good feeling," sense of satisfaction, self-esteem, fulfillment
of duty (whether imposed by a religion or ideology or simply one's conscience), or the like. In this way one need not speculate
on the motives of the altruist in question.
Humans are not exclusively altruistic towards family members, previous co-operators or potential future allies, but can be
altruistic towards people they don't know and will never meet. For example, some humans donate to international charities and volunteer their time to help society's less
fortunate. It can however be argued that an individual would contribute to a charity to gain respect or stature within his/her
own community.
It strains plausibility to claim that these altruistic deeds are done in the hope of a return favor. The game theory analysis
of this 'just in case' strategy, where the principle would be 'always help everyone in case you need to pull in a favor in
return', is a decidedly non-optimal strategy, where the net expenditure of effort is far greater than the net profit when
it occasionally pays off.
According to some, it is difficult to believe that these behaviors are solely explained as indirect selfish rationality, be it conscious or sub-conscious. Mathematical formulations of kin selection, along the lines of the prisoner's dilemma, are
helpful as far as they go; but what a game-theoretic explanation glosses over is the fact
that altruistic behavior can be attributed to that apparently mysterious phenomenon, the conscience. One recent suggestion, proposed by the philosopher Daniel
Dennett, was initially developed when considering the problem of so-called 'free riders' in the tragedy of the commons, a larger-scale version of the prisoner's dilemma.
In game theory terms, a free rider is an agent
who draws benefits from a co-operative society without contributing. In a one-to-one situation, free riding can easily be
discouraged by a tit-for-tat strategy. But in a larger-scale society, where contributions and benefits are pooled and shared,
they can be incredibly difficult to shake off.
Imagine an elementary society of co-operative organisms. Co-operative agents interact with each other, each contributing
resources and each drawing on the common good. Now imagine a rogue free rider, an agent who draws a favor ("you scratch my back") and later refuses to return it. The
problem is that free riding is always going to be beneficial to individuals at cost to society. How can well-behaved co-operative
agents avoid being cheated? Over many generations, one obvious solution is for co-operators to evolve the ability to spot
potential free riders in advance and refuse to enter into reciprocal
arrangements with them. Then, the canonical free rider response is to evolve a more convincing disguise, fooling co-operators into co-operating after all. This can lead to an evolutionary arms races, with ever-more-sophisticated disguises and ever-more-sophisticated detectors.
In this evolutionary arms race, how best might one convince comrades that one really is a genuine co-operator, not a
free rider in disguise? One answer is by actually making oneself a genuine co-operator, by erecting psychological barriers to breaking promises, and by advertising this fact to everyone else. In other words, a
good solution is for organisms to evolve things that everyone knows will force them to be co-operators - and to make it obvious
that they've evolved these things. So evolution will produce organisms who are sincerely moral and who wear their hearts on their
sleeves; in short, evolution will give rise to the phenomenon of conscience.
This theory, combined with ideas of kin selection and the one-to-one sharing of
benefits, may explain how a blind process can produce a genuinely non-cynical form of altruism that gives rise to the human
conscience.
Critics of such technical game theory analysis point out that it appears to forget that human beings are rational and
emotional. To presume an analysis of human behaviour without including human rationale or emotion is necessarily unrealistically
narrow, and treats human beings as if they are mere machines, sometimes called Homo
economicus. Another objection is that often people donate anonymously, so that it is impossible to determine if they
really did the altruistic act.
Beginning with an understanding that rational human beings benefit from living in a benign universe, logically it follows that
particular human beings may gain substantial emotional satisfaction from acts which they perceive to make the world a better
place.
Altruism and religion
Most, if not all, of the world's religions promote altruism as a very important moral value.
Christianity, Buddhism [citation needed] , and Sikhism place particular emphasis on altruistic morality, as noted above, but Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and many other
religions also promote altruistic behavior. Altruism was central to the teachings of Jesus found
in the Gospel especially in the Sermon on the Mount
and the Sermon on the Plain. From biblical to medieval Christian traditions, tensions between self-affirmation and other-regard were sometimes discussed
under the heading of "disinterested love," as in the Pauline phrase "love seeks not its own interests." In his book on
Indoctrination and Self-deception... Roderick Hindery tries to shed light on these tensions by contrasting them with impostors of
authentic self-affirmation and altruism, by analysis of other-regard within creative individuation of the self, and by
contrasting love for the few with love for the many. If love, which confirms others in their freedom, shuns propagandas and
masks, assurance of its presence is ultimately confirmed not by mere declarations from others, but by each person's experience
and practice from within. As in practical arts, the presence and meaning of love become validated and grasped not by words and
reflections alone, but in the doing.
Though it might seem obvious that altruism is central to the teachings of Jesus, one important and influential strand of
Christianity would qualify this. St Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologia, I:II Quaestion 26, Article 4 states that we should
love ourselves more than our neighbour. His interpretation of the Pauline phrase is that we should seek the common good more than
the private good but this is because the common good is a more desirable good for the individual. 'You should love your neighbour
as yourself' from Leviticus 19 and Matthew 22 is interpreted by St Thomas as meaning that love for ourself is the exemplar of
love for others. He does think though, that we should love God more than ourselves and our neighbour, taken as an entirety, more
than our bodily life, since the ultimate purpose of love of our neighbour is to share in eternal beatitude, a more desirable
thing than bodily well being. Comte was probably opposing this Thomistic doctrine, now part of mainstream Catholicism, in coining
the word Altruism, as stated above.
Altruism and love (the problem of love)
In philosophy, the problem of love questions whether the desire to do good for another is based solely on the outward
ability to love another person because the lover sees something (or someone) worth loving, or if a
little self-interest is always present in the desire to do good for another.
The problem arises from an analysis of the human will and is often debated among
Thomistic philosophers. The "problem" centers on Thomas
Aquinas's understanding that human expressions of love are always based partly on love of self and similitude of being:
“Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter
is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself.” See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), I-II, Q. 27, Art. 3, rep. obj. 2.)
The French philosopher Pierre Rousselot (1878-1915) locates the philosophical problem in terms of a pure "ecstatic" or totally
selfless love versus an egoistic, more self-interested love, beginning his examination from Aristotle's text (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 9): "Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum vererunt amicabilibus quae sunt ad
se ipsum" [The friendly feelings that we bear for another have arisen from the friendly feelings that we bear for ourselves].
See Pierre Rousselot, The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution. Trans. Alan Vincelette (Milwaukee:
Marquette Univ. Press, 2001).
See also
Notes
- ^ If It
Feels Good to Be Good, It Might Be Only Natural on Washingtonpost.com
- ^ Seed, John and Macy, Joanna (et al)(1987) "Thinking Like a Mountain:
Towards a Council of All Beings" (New Society Publications)
References
- Oord, Thomas Jay (2007). The Altruism Reader: Selections from Writings on Love, Religion, and Science (Philadelphia:
Templeton Foundation Press).
- Batson, C.D. (1991). The altruism question. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (23 October 2003). The
nature of human altruism. In Nature, 425, 785 – 791.
- August Comte, Catechisme positiviste (1852) or Catechism of Positivism,
tr. R. Congreve, (London: Kegan Paul, 1891)
- Thomas Jay Oord, Science of Love (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press,
2004).
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and
Evil
- Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Philosophy of Poverty (1847)
- Lysander Spooner, Natural Law
- Matt Ridley, The Origins of
Virtue
- Oliner, Samuel P. and Pearl M. Towards a Caring Society: Ideas into Action. West Port, CT: Praeger, 1995.
- The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod, Basic Books, ISBN 0-465-02121-2
- The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins
(1990), second edition -- includes two chapters about the evolution of cooperation, ISBN 0-19-286092-5
- Robert Wright, The moral animal, Vintage, 1995, ISBN
0-679-76399-6.
- Madsen, E.A., Tunney, R., Fieldman, G., Plotkin, H.C., Dunbar,
R.I.M., Richardson, J.M., & McFarland, D. (2006) Kinship and altruism: A cross-cultural experimental study. British
Journal of Psychology
- Wedekind, C. and Milinski, M. Human Cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus
Generous Tit-for-tat. Evolution, Vol. 93, pp. 2686-2689, April 1996.
External links
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