Amendment VII to the U.S. Constitution

View more Law & Legal Issues videos

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in most civil suits that are heard in federal court. However, before the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches, a lawsuit must satisfy four threshold requirements. First, it must assert a claim that would have triggered the right to a jury trial under the English common law of 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. If a lawsuit asserts a claim that is sufficiently analogous to an eighteenth-century English common-law claim, a litigant may still invoke the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial even though the claim was not expressly recognized in 1791 (Markman v. Westview Instruments, ___U.S.___, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 [1996]). Claims brought under a federal statute that confer a right to trial by jury also implicate the Seventh Amendment (Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 108 L. Ed. 2d 519 [1990]).

Second, a lawsuit must be brought in federal court before a litigant may invoke the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. This right is one of the few liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights that has not been made applicable to the states through the doctrine of selective incorporation (Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 36 S. Ct. 595, 60 L. Ed. 961 [1916]). The Seventh Amendment does not apply in state court even when a litigant is enforcing a right created by federal law. However, most state constitutions similarly afford the right to trial by jury in civil cases.

Third, a lawsuit must assert a claim for more than $20. Because nearly all lawsuits are filed to recover much larger sums, this provision of the Seventh Amendment is virtually always met.

Fourth, a lawsuit must assert a claim that is essentially legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment applies. There is no right to a jury trial in civil actions involving claims that are essentially equitable in nature (Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365 [1987]). Lawsuits that seek injunctions, specific performance, and other types of nonmonetary remedies are traditionally treated as equitable claims. Lawsuits that seek money damages, conversely, are traditionally treated as legal claims. However, these traditional categories of law and equity are not always neatly separated.

If the monetary relief sought is only "incidental" to an equitable claim for an injunction, the right to a jury trial will be denied (Stewart v. KHD Deutz of America, 75 F.3d 1522 [11th Cir. 1996]). Even if a lawsuit is couched in terms of a legal claim for monetary relief, a court will deny a litigant's request for a jury trial if an essentially equitable claim is being asserted. Lawsuits seeking restitution, though representing claims for monetary reimbursement, have been treated as equitable claims for the purposes of the Seventh Amendment (Provident Life and Accident Insurance v. Williams, 858 F. Supp. 907 [W.D. Ark. 1994]). On the other hand, an employee's action for back pay under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) represents a legal claim despite the fact that the statute characterizes the remedy as equitable (Local No. 391 v. Terry).

When a lawsuit involves mixed questions of law and equity, litigants may present the legal questions to a jury under the Seventh Amendment, while leaving the equitable questions for judicial resolution (Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555 [7th Cir. 1992]). For example, an action to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to a written agreement normally would be decided by a jury in accordance with the common law of contracts. However, in a subsequent proceeding to determine the amount of attorneys' fees owed, equitable principles of accounting would normally be applied by a judge alone (McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306 [2nd Cir. 1993]). Any factual determinations made by the jury in the first proceeding would be binding on the judge during the second proceeding (Lebow v. American Trans Air, 86 F.3d 661 [7th Cir. 1996]).

Some types of lawsuits present issues that are neither wholly legal nor entirely equitable. In many such cases, the Seventh Amendment offers no protection. For example, there is no right to trial by jury for lawsuits that involve issues of maritime law or admiralty rights (Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. [3 Pet.] 433, 7 L. Ed. 732 [1830]). Nor is the Seventh Amendment implicated in proceedings that relate to the naturalization (Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101 [1913]) or deportation (Gee Wah Lee v. United States, 25 F.2d 107 [5th Cir. 1928]), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608, 48 S. Ct. 603, 72 L. Ed. 1013 [1928]) of aliens. Litigants also have no Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in lawsuits brought against the federal government (Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 69 L. Ed. 2d 548 [1981]).

The underlying rationale of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the historic line separating the province of the jury from that of the judge in civil cases. Although the line separating questions of law from questions of fact is often blurred, the basic functions of judges and juries are clear. Judges are charged with the responsibility of resolving issues concerning the admissibility of evidence and instructing jurors regarding the pertinent laws governing the case. Judges are also permitted to comment on the evidence, highlight important issues, and otherwise express their opinions in open court as long as each factual question is ultimately submitted to the jury. However, a judge may not interject her personal opinions or observations to such an extent that they impair a litigant's right to a fair trial (Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802 [2nd Cir. 1996]).

Juries perform three main functions. First, jurors are charged with the responsibility of listening to the evidence, ascertaining the relevant facts, and drawing reasonable inferences that are necessary to reach a verdict. Second, jurors are required to heed the instructions read by the court and apply the governing legal principles to the facts of the case. Third, jurors are obliged to determine the legal consequences of the litigants' behavior through the process of group deliberation and then publicly announce their verdict.

The Seventh Amendment expressly forbids federal judges to "re-examin[e]" any "fact tried by a jury" except as allowed by the common law. This provision has been interpreted to mean that no court, trial or appellate, may overturn a jury verdict that is reasonably supported by the evidence (Taylor v. Curry, 17 F.3d 1434 [4th Cir. 1994]). A jury must be allowed to hear a lawsuit from start to finish unless it presents a legal claim that is completely lacking an evidentiary basis (Gregory v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 32 F.3d 160 [5th Cir. 1994]).

Together with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment guarantees civil litigants the right to an impartial jury (McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654 [6th Cir. 1981]). A juror's impartiality may be compromised by communications with sources outside the courtroom, such as friends, relatives, and members of the media. The presence of even one partial, biased, or prejudiced juror creates a presumption that the Seventh Amendment has been violated (Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532 [4th Cir. 1986]). A litigant seeking to overcome this presumption bears a heavy burden to establish the harmlessness of an unauthorized jury communication. In Haley, for example, the Supreme Court overturned a verdict against the defendant because jurors had communicated with an outside source who attempted to persuade them to side with the plaintiff.

Although every juror must be impartial, there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury of twelve persons. In Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 93 S. Ct. 2448, 37 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled that the quality of the deliberation process is not impaired when the size of a jury is reduced from twelve to six members. The Court cited one study suggesting that smaller juries promote more robust deliberations. Regardless of a jury's size, the Seventh Amendment requires unanimity among jurors who hear civil cases in federal court (Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445 [9th Cir. 1995]). By contrast, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not require juror unanimity in criminal trials, except in death penalty cases.

See: incorporation doctrine.

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

 More:

The Constitution
Bill of Rights (Amendments 1-10)
The Other Amendments (11-27)

"Seventh Amendment" redirects here. For the Irish constitutional amendment, see Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland.

United States of America
This article is part of the series: United States Constitution
Original text of the Constitution
Preamble Articles of the Constitution I II III IV V VI VII
Amendments to the Constitution
Bill of Rights I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Subsequent Amendments XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII Unratified Amendments I(1) XIII(1) XIII(2) XX(1) XXVII(1) XXVII(2)
Full text of the Constitution
Original Constitution Bill of Rights Subsequent Amendments Unsuccessful Amendments
Other countries ·  Law Portal view talk edit

The Seventh Amendment (Amendment VII) to the United States Constitution, which was ratified as part of the Bill of Rights, codifies the right to a jury trial in certain civil cases, and asserts that cases may not be re-examined by another court.

Contents 1 Text 2 History and development 3 Judicial interpretation 4 Re-examination of facts 5 Twenty Dollars Clause 6 Notes 7 External links

Text

The Bill of Rights in the National Archives

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

History and development

Prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, English judges were seen as "lions under the throne",^[1] servile creatures of the King. As English judges held their sinecures at the pleasure of the King, they were sometimes biased in favor of the King and did not always make their rulings in an impartial manner. As such, the jury was an essential countervailing force against tyranny, insofar as the jury had every right to ignore a judge's instructions, thwarting even the will of the King. William Blackstone wrote that it was "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals."^[2]

Whereas English judges won their independence from the Crown in the Act of Settlement 1701, American colonial judges still served at the pleasure of the King. King George III of Great Britain abolished trial by jury in the Colonies, one of the main grievances precipitating the American Revolution. As America's Founding Fathers shared a perfect horror at the concept of arbitrary courts of justice, such as those "of [King] Philip in the Netherlands, in which life and property were daily confiscated without a jury, and which occasioned as much misery and a more rapid depopulation of the province",^[3] they incorporated the right to trial by jury into the Bill of Rights, thereby restoring what soon-to-be United States Supreme Court Justice James Iredell described as that "noble palladium of liberty",^[4] and protecting it from the reach of future legislators.

"The right of trial by Jury is a fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot be legislated away."^[5] According to Senator Richard Henry Lee,^[6] the primary purpose of the trial by jury in America was to protect the public from corrupt or aristocratic judges:

The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted to the magistracy,--a select body of men, and those generally selected, by the prince, of such as enjoy the highest offices of the state,--these decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity. It is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always be attentive to the good of the many." The learned judge further says, that "every tribunal, selected for the decision of facts, is a step towards establishing aristocracy—the most oppressive of all governments."^[7]

Judicial interpretation

The Framers intended to preserve the trial by jury as it existed in England,^[8] as a check on potential abuse of power by the government.^[9] John Adams explains:

As the Constitution requires that the popular branch of the legislature should have an absolute check, so as to put a peremptory negative upon every act of the government, it requires that the common people, should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature.^[10]

Uncertainty in the law is a serious problem, insofar as the published precedent of courts in a common law system is supposed to constitute "a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise."^[11] But whereas a runaway jury poses a clear and present danger to that reliance interest, a runaway judge can pose an even greater peril. As Thomas Jefferson explained: that

[w]e all know that permanent judges acquire an esprit de corps; that, being known, they are liable to be tempted by bribery; that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the executive or legislative; that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross and pile than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of twelve honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right than cross and pile does. It is left therefore, to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any bias whatever in any cause, to take on themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. They never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality in the judges; and by the exercise of this power they have been the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.^[12]

Whereas colonial judges routinely instructed jurors that they were the ultimate arbiters of both fact and law,^[13] the modern judge asserts almost an plenary control over the evidence, law, and facts, instructing the jury as to what the law is,^[14] and may overturn decisions in favor of the defense.^[15]

Re-examination of facts

The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment states: "In suits at common law, ... no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." This clause forbids any court from reexamining or overturning any factual determinations made by a jury, unless the factual determinations are clearly erroneous. Determination of legal issues by a jury are subject to Appellate review.^[16] Justice Samuel Nelson wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. 9 Wall. 274 (1869), which applied the Re-Examination Clause to the states. In his opinion Nelson quoted Justice Joseph Story to explain the modes to reexamine facts tried by juries according to Common Law: “Mr. Justice Story […] referring to this part of the amendment, observed […] that it was 'a prohibition to the courts of the United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury in any other manner [than according to Common Law].' […] He further observed that 'the only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts was the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or the award of a venire facias de novo, by the appellate court, for some error of law that had intervened in the proceedings.'”

The Re-Examination Clause applies not only to federal courts, but also to "a case tried before a jury in a state court and brought to the Supreme Court on appeal."^[17]

As common law provided, the judge could set aside (or nullify) a jury verdict when the judge decided that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or the law. Common law precluded the judge from himself entering a verdict; a new trial, with a new jury, was the only course permissible. In Slocum v. New York Insurance Co. (1913), the Supreme Court upheld this rule. Later cases have undermined Slocum, but generally only when the evidence is overwhelming, or if a specific law provides narrow guidelines by which there can be no reasonable question as to the required outcome, may the court enter "judgment as a matter of law" or otherwise set aside the jury's findings.

Twenty Dollars Clause

While the amount mentioned in the amendment ($20) has not been indexed or adjusted for inflation, Congress has never extended federal diversity jurisdiction to amounts that small, and the amendment is one of the few portions of the Bill of Rights never to have been incorporated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C. §1332), the amount in dispute in diversity cases must exceed $75,000 USD in order for the case to be heard in federal court.^[18]

Notes

1. ^ Sir Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (ca. 1620)
2. ^ 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Lawes of England 379 (1765).
3. ^ 2 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 397 (1836) (remarks of Mr. Tredwell, of New York).
4. ^ 4 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 148 (1836) (remarks of Mr. Iredell, of North Carolina).
5. ^ Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (D.Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J, riding circuit).
6. ^ Though one of the more obscure Founding Fathers, he was among the most important. His resolution in the Second Continental Congress eventually became the Declaration of Independence; he was not only a signatory to the Declaration, but served as the fourth President of the Continental Congress.
7. ^ 1 Elliot, Debates at 504
8. ^ E.g., Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York, July 26, 1788, reprinted in 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 193 (United States Dept. of State, 1894) ("That the trial by Jury in the extent that it obtains by the Common Law of England is one of the greatest securities to the rights of a free People, and ought to remain inviolate [emphasis added].").
9. ^ Its intended purposes included the frustration of unwise legislation, vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government; and "protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges." Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 670-71 (1973) (examining history of the Seventh Amendment, and discussing the purposes behind it).
10. ^ 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States 253 (Charles F. Adams ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1850); accord, The Federalist No. 83, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987) ("The strongest argument in its favor is, that it is a security against corruption, [a]s there is always more time and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury summoned for the occasion.").
11. ^ Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
12. ^ Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to L’Abbe Arnoux), Jul. 19, 1789 at 2 (emphasis added). A substantially complete collection of Jefferson' writings, in manuscript, is available at [1]
13. ^ See e.g., "The Jury and Consensus Government in Mid-Eighteenth-Century America", William E. Nelson, article in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understanding (ed. E. W. Hickok, Jr., Univ. Press of Va. 1991), at [2] (then-Chief Justice John Jay informed a civil jury that while the court usually determined the law and the jury found the facts, the jury nevertheless had "a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.")
14. ^ E.g., 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § 1.01 (2008) ("You will then apply those facts to the law which I give you in these and in my other instructions, and in that way reach your verdict. You are the sole judges of the facts; but you must follow the law as stated in my instructions, whether you agree with it or not.") [3]
15. ^ Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 [4]; see generally, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, or j.n.o.v. for short.
16. ^ http://www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/first-ten-amendments.html
17. ^ http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/html/amdt7.html
18. ^ Baciker-McKee (2008) [1997], A Student's Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (eleventh ed.), United States: Thomson West, p. 1266, ISBN 978-0-314-19004-8 

External links

• Kilman, Johnny and George Costello (Eds). (2000). The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation.
• CRS Annotated Constitution: Seventh Amendment
• [5]

v t e United States Constitution Text Preamble and Articles Bill of Rights Subsequent Amendments Articles Preamble One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Amendments Bill of Rights 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Ratified Proposed Conventions to propose State ratifying conventions Formation History Articles of Confederation Mount Vernon Conference Annapolis Convention Philadelphia Convention Virginia Plan New Jersey Plan Connecticut Compromise Three-Fifths Compromise Signers Federalist Papers (list) Massachusetts Compromise Clauses Appointments Appropriations Assistance of Counsel Case or Controversy Citizenship Commerce Compact Compulsory Process Confrontation Contract Copyright and Patent Double Jeopardy Due Process Emolument Equal Protection Establishment Exceptions Excessive Bail Ex post facto Extradition Free Exercise Fugitive Slave Full Faith and Credit General Welfare Guarantee Impeachment Ineligibility Militia Natural–born citizen Necessary and Proper No Religious Test Origination Postal Presentment Privileges and Immunities Privileges or Immunities Self-Incrimination Speech or Debate Speedy Trial Supremacy Suspension Takings Taxing and Spending Territorial Title of Nobility Treaty Trial by Jury Vesting Vicinage War Powers Interpretation Concurrent powers Congressional enforcement Criminal procedure Criminal sentencing Dormant Commerce Clause Enumerated powers Executive privilege Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Judicial review Nondelegation doctrine Preemption Saxbe fix Separation of church and state Separation of powers Unitary executive theory

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)