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Battle of Antietam

 
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Battle of Antietam
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(Sept. 17, 1862) Decisive and bloody battle of the American Civil War that halted the Confederate advance on Maryland. Following victory in the Second Battle of Bull Run, Gen. Robert E. Lee moved his troops into Maryland with an eye to capturing Washington, D.C. They were stopped by Union troops under George B. McClellan at Antietam Creek, Md. Confederate casualties numbered some 13,700, and Union losses were about 12,400. McClellan was criticized for allowing Lee's forces to retreat to Virginia, but the victory encouraged Pres. Abraham Lincoln to issue a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

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Military History Companion: battle of Antietam
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Antietam, battle of (1862), bloodiest single day of the American civil war. Lee capitalized on his crushing victory at second Bull Run to take the war into enemy territory, hoping also to rally Maryland to the Confederate cause. Underestimating how quickly McClellan would revitalize the Army of the Potomac, he scattered his army in drives on the Federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry and towards Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. Despite possessing a windfall copy of Lee's disposition of forces, McClellan failed fully to exploit the opportunity, permitting the Confederates to beat a fighting retreat and regroup along a ridgeline around the town of Sharpsburg, with their backs to the Potomac river, faced by more than twice their number.

Through the early morning of 17 September first Hooker, then Mansfield's corps, and then Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps advanced against Jackson's corps on the Confederate left flank. There were 10, 000 combined casualties including Hooker and Mansfield, mostly incurred over a 20 acre (8 hectare) cornfield which changed hands fifteen times. This drew in troops from D. H. Hill's corps at the Confederate centre, where first French's and then Richardson's divisions of Sumner's corps struck at the aptly named Bloody Lane through late morning. Richardson died achieving a breakthrough, but McClellan refused to commit his reserve and Lee was able to restore the hinge of his position.

The most flagrant of all the wasted Union opportunities was the simultaneous failure of Burnside to cross Antietam Creek against the Confederate right, threatening Lee's line of retreat and the direction from which desperately awaited reinforcements had to advance from Harper's Ferry. With a brute obstinacy which prefigured the massacre into which he was to send his army at Fredericksburg three months later, he permitted a brigade of Georgia sharpshooters to hold up his 12, 000 men throughout the morning by persistently attacking across a narrow bridge, when the creek was easily fordable. After the opposite bank was gained, he paused for two hours before resuming an advance that drove the remains of the Confederate right under Longstreet back around Sharpsburg, but McClellan again held back his reserve of 20, 000 men. The last minute arrival of A. P. Hill with 3, 000 men after marching 17 miles (27 km) in eight hours from Harper's Ferry took Burnside in the flank and he fell back.

Stunned by the carnage, the two sides devoted the next day to dealing with their casualties: over 12, 000 Unionists and nearly 11, 000 Confederates, one out of every four men engaged. Despite the arrival of two fresh divisions, McClellan took no further offensive action and permitted Lee's army to retreat unhindered, an inaction which precipitated his dismissal as army commander by an exasperated Lincoln.

Missed opportunity though it was, the defeat aborted Confederate hopes for early British recognition and gave Lincoln the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. By introducing a moral element into a war which many believed unjustly waged against states as entitled to secede as the original 13 colonies, the proclamation made recognition by the premier abolitionist world power impossible.

— Hugh Bicheno

US Military History Companion: Battle of Antietam
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(1862)

The appointment of Gen. Robert E. Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia on 1 June 1862 helped reverse the momentum of the Civil War. Union armies and naval forces had won impressive victories along the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the river systems of Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas, overrunning some 50,000 square miles of the Confederacy. In Virginia, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's large and well‐equipped Army of the Potomac had advanced westward up the Virginia Peninsula to within six miles of Richmond. The Confederate States of America seemed doomed. But during Lee's first three months in command, he launched a series of counteroffensives. In the Seven Days' battles and the battles of Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas, Southern victories shifted the war in Virginia from the gates of Richmond to the environs of Washington. Hoping to strike a knockout blow that would force the Lincoln administration to sue for peace, Lee decided to invade Maryland.

Great possibilities rode with the Army of Northern Virginia as it began crossing the Potomac River northwest of Washington on 4 September 1862. The most powerful nations in the world, Britain and France, were considering diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy; one more military victory would win that crucial goal. A large faction in the Northern Democratic Party wanted peace negotiations; another Union defeat might enable them to capture the House of Representatives in the fall. President Abraham Lincoln had decided in July to issue a proclamation to free the slaves in Confederate states and was awaiting a Union military victory to announce it.

After the defeat at Second Manassas (Bull Run), Lincoln had merged the Union Army of Virginia into the Army of the Potomac and given McClellan command, ordering him to “destroy the rebel army.” Cautious as always, McClellan probed northward along the Potomac. On 13 September at Frederick, Maryland, he had extraordinary luck: two Union soldiers found a copy of Lee's invasion orders wrapped around some cigars lost by a Confederate staff officer. Lee had divided his army into five parts, sending three under “Stonewall” Jackson to capture the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, which lay athwart Lee's line of communications with the Shenandoah Valley. If he moved quickly, McClellan could destroy the separated units piecemeal. He did not move quickly. Union attacks did overrun Confederate defenders in the South Mountain gaps west of Frederick on 14 September, but failed to save the 12,000 Union troops at Harpers Ferry, which surrendered to Jackson on 15 September. McClellan's tardiness enabled Lee to reunite most of his army along high ground east of the village of Sharpsburg—his left flank on the Potomac and his right on Antietam Creek. Although he outnumbered Lee by about 80,000 troops to 45,000, McClellan assumed that the enemy outnumbered him.

After deliberate preparations that gave Lee time to unite his army, McClellan attacked at dawn on 17 September. His plan called for a one‐two punch against the Confederate left and right, followed by reserves to exploit whatever breakthrough might occur. The Union attacks were uncoordinated, enabling Lee to shift troops from quiet sectors to threatened points. During the early morning hours, assaults by six Union divisions on Jackson's corps were contained in vicious fighting in locales that became forever famous: the Cornfield, the West Woods, and the Dunkard Church. Meanwhile, the commander on the Union left flank, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, tried to force his troops across a bridge over the Antietam instead of fording that shallow stream. In the center at midday, two Union divisions broke through Confederate defenses along a sunken farm road known ever after as Bloody Lane, but McClellan failed to exploit this success because he feared Lee's nonexistent reserves. Burnside finally punched across the Antietam in early afternoon and advanced toward Sharpsburg, threatening Lee's rear and his retreat route across the Potomac. But at about 4:00 P.M. Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's Confederate division arrived after a forced march from Harpers Ferry and hit Burnside's flank, halting the Union advance.

The sun set on the deadliest single day in the Civil War—indeed, in all of American history. Some 6,000 men lay dead or dying, and another 16,000 were wounded. The fighting was not renewed next day, and that night Lee retreated to Virginia. McClellan failed to follow up, but nevertheless claimed a victory. Britain and France did not recognize the Confederacy. Republicans retained control of the House in November. And five days after the battle, Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

[See also Civil War: Military and Diplomatic Course.]

Bibliography

  • James V. Murfin, The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862, 1965.
  • Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, 1983.
  • Gary W. Gallagher, ed., Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign, 1989
US Military Dictionary: Battle of Antietam
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Also known as the Battle of Sharpsburg (September 17, 1862) the bloodiest one-day conflict in U.S. military history, with more than 3, 500 killed and more than 20, 000 total casualties. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who possessed a copy of Gen. Robert E. Lee's battle orders, attacked Lee's positions near Sharpsburg, Maryland, while many Confederate forces were still at Harpers Ferry. Union forces induced sufficient casualties to halt Lee's invasion of the North, but, erroneously believing Lee's forces four times their actual size, McClellan held back, allowing the Confederates to withdraw. Recognizing the missed opportunity to destroy Lee's army, President Abraham Lincoln later relieved McClellan of his command.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

US History Encyclopedia: Battle of Antietam
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The Battle of Antietam took place on 17 September 1862. With an estimated 23,100 total casualties, it was the bloodiest single-day battle of the American Civil War. As a result of the high number of casualties on each side, the battle was a tactical draw, although a strategic victory for the Union.

The battle was a result of the Confederate army's first attempt to wage war in the North. Early in September 1862 General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Maryland. He concentrated at Frederick, then sent T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps south to take Harpers Ferry and General James Long-street's corps westward across the South Mountain. On 14 September, Union general George Brinton McClellan's Army of the Potomac forced the mountain passes.

Lee began to concentrate toward the Potomac and took position at Sharpsburg, on Antietam Creek. While Longstreet was assembling, Lee heard that Jackson had captured Harpers Ferry and made the bold decision to stand and fight behind the creek, with the Potomac at his back. Longstreet took the right of the line, and Jackson's troops, as they arrived, took the left. McClellan planned to strike Lee's left with three corps (commanded by Generals Joseph Hooker, Joseph Mansfield, and Edwin Sumner). He would follow this blow with an attack by General Ambrose E. Burnside's corps on the Confederate right and hold Fitz-John Porter's and W. B. Franklin's corps, with Alfred Pleasonton's cavalry, in reserve in the center. But Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner attacked successively, not simultaneously, and each in turn was beaten. Burn-side's attack on the other flank came still later.

On the Confederate side, Longstreet's line had been weakened to reinforce Jackson, for Lee had no real reserve. As a result, although Burnside made some progress at first, when fully engaged he was struck in flank by A. P. Hill's division, the last of Jackson's troops returning from Harpers Ferry. Burnside was driven back to the bridge by which he had crossed the creek, and darkness ended the fighting.

On 18 September, Lee stood fast and McClellan did not renew his attack. The following day, Lee withdrew his army across the Potomac. The numbers engaged are uncertain; perhaps a fair estimate is 50,000 Union, 40,000 Confederate. But this represented Lee's entire strength, and McClellan had 20,000 troops in reserve, never used. Losses for the Union army numbered about 12,000 casualties, including 2,108 killed. The Army of Northern Virginia lost almost 25 percent of its forces, including at least 1,500 killed. News of the carnage spread throughout the country after newspapers published photographer Alexander Gardner's vivid and disturbing photographs of the battlefield. As a strategic Northern victory, Antietam provided the positive news President Abraham Lincoln thought a prerequisite for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. The victory also gave the impression that the North was doing better in the war, which may have helped elections for the Republican Party in 1862.

Antietam was designated a national battlefield by an act of Congress on 30 August 1890. Today the park is run by the National Park Service and receives approximately 280,000 visitors each year.

Bibliography

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Antietam Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000.

Johnson, Curt, and Richard C. Anderson Jr. Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.

—Honor Sachs

Wikipedia: Battle of Antietam
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"Antietam" redirects here. For other uses, see Antietam (disambiguation).
Battle of Antietam
Part of the American Civil War
Battle of Antietam by Thulstrup.jpg
The Battle of Antietam, by Thure de Thulstrup, depicting the charge of the Iron Brigade near the Dunker Church
Date September 17, 1862 (1862-09-17)
Location Near Sharpsburg, Maryland
Result Inconclusive; strategic Union victory[1]
Belligerents
United States United States (Union) Confederate States of America CSA (Confederacy)
Commanders
George B. McClellan Robert E. Lee
Strength
75,500 "present for duty"[2] 38,000 "engaged"[2]
Casualties and losses
12,401
(2,108 killed
 9,540 wounded
 753 captured/missing)[3]
 10,316
(1,546 killed
 7,752 wounded
 1,018 captured/missing)[3]
v • d • e

The Battle of Antietam (pronounced /ænˈtiːtəm/) (also known as the Battle of Sharpsburg, particularly in the South), fought on September 17, 1862, near Sharpsburg, Maryland, and Antietam Creek, as part of the Maryland Campaign, was the first major battle in the American Civil War to take place on Northern soil. It was the bloodiest single-day battle in American history, with about 23,000 casualties.[4]

After pursuing Confederate General Robert E. Lee into Maryland, Union Army Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan launched attacks against Lee's army, in defensive positions behind Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left flank. Attacks and counterattacks swept across Miller's cornfield and fighting swirled around the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not followed up. In the afternoon, Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's corps entered the action, capturing a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and advancing against the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and launched a surprise counterattack, driving back Burnside and ending the battle. Although outnumbered two-to-one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three-quarters of his army, enabling Lee to fight the Federals to a standstill. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties, Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while removing his battered army south of the river.[5]

Despite having superiority of numbers, McClellan's attacks failed to achieve concentration of mass, allowing Lee to counter by shifting forces along interior lines to meet each challenge. Despite ample reserve forces that could have been deployed to exploit localized successes, McClellan failed to destroy Lee's army. Nevertheless, Lee's invasion of Maryland was ended, and he was able to withdraw his army back to Virginia without interference from the cautious McClellan. Although the battle was tactically inconclusive, it had unique significance as enough of a victory to give President Abraham Lincoln the confidence to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, which discouraged the British and French governments from potential plans for recognition of the Confederacy.

Contents

Background and the Maryland Campaign

Further information: Maryland Campaign
Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to September 15, 1862.      Confederate      Union

Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia—about 55,000 men[6]—entered the state of Maryland on September 3, 1862, following their victory at Second Bull Run on August 29. Lee's strategy was to seek new supplies and recruits from the border state of Maryland, which had considerable pockets of Confederate sympathizers, and to affect public opinion prior to the upcoming elections in the North. (As it turned out, the social impact of Lee's actions was mixed; Marylanders were not as thoroughly won over by the sounds of Maryland, My Maryland from the bands of the Army of Northern Virginia as Lee had hoped, and the weak strategic victory of the Union's Army of the Potomac at Antietam diminished any successes Lee may have had in winning the hearts and minds of the people of Maryland.) Some Confederate politicians, including President Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition would increase if they won a military victory on Northern soil; such a victory might gain recognition and financial support from Great Britain and France, although there is no evidence that Lee thought the South should base its military plans on this possibility.[7]

While McClellan's 90,000-man Army of the Potomac was moving to intercept Lee, two Union soldiers (Corporal Barton W. Mitchell and First Sergeant John M. Bloss[8] of the 27th Indiana Volunteer Infantry) discovered a mislaid copy of Lee's detailed battle plans—Special Order 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically (to Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, and Hagerstown, Maryland), thus making each subject to isolation and defeat if McClellan could move quickly enough. McClellan waited about 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence and reposition his forces, thus squandering an opportunity to defeat Lee decisively.[9]

There were two significant engagements in the Maryland campaign prior to the major battle of Antietam: Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's capture of Harpers Ferry and McClellan's assault through the Blue Ridge Mountains in the Battle of South Mountain. The former was significant because a large portion of Lee's army was absent from the start of the battle of Antietam, attending to the surrender of the Union garrison; the latter because stout Confederate defenses at two passes through the mountains delayed McClellan's advance enough for Lee to concentrate the remainder of his army at Sharpsburg.[10]

Opposing forces

Confederate

Confederate corps commanders
Maj. Gen.
James Longstreet
Maj. Gen.
Stonewall Jackson
Maj. Gen.
J.E.B. Stuart
Further information: Antietam Confederate order of battle

General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two large infantry corps.[11]

The First Corps, under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, consisted of the divisions of:

The Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, consisted of the divisions of:

The remaining units were the Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, and the reserve artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton. The Second Corps was organized with artillery attached to each division, in contrast to the First Corps, which reserved its artillery at the corps level.

Union

Union corps commanders
Maj. Gen.
Joseph Hooker
Maj. Gen.
Edwin V. Sumner
Maj. Gen.
Fitz John Porter
Maj. Gen.
William B. Franklin
Maj. Gen.
Ambrose E. Burnside
Maj. Gen.
Joseph K. Mansfield
Further information: Antietam Union order of battle
Lincoln with McClellan and staff at the Grove Farm after the battle. Notable figures (from left) are 5. Alexander S. Webb, Chief of Staff, V Corps; 6. McClellan;. 8. Dr. Jonathan Letterman; 10. Lincoln; 11. Henry J. Hunt; 12. Fitz John Porter; 15. Andrew A. Humphreys; 16. Capt. George Armstrong Custer.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac, bolstered by units absorbed from John Pope's Army of Virginia, included six infantry corps.[12]

The I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, consisted of the divisions of:

The II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of the divisions of:

The V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of:

The VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the divisions of:

The IX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, consisted of the divisions of:

The XII Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, consisted of the divisions of:

Battle

Overview of the Battle of Antietam.

Near the town of Sharpsburg, Lee deployed his available forces behind Antietam Creek along a low ridge, starting on September 15. While it was an effective defensive position, it was not an impregnable one. The terrain provided excellent cover for infantrymen, with rail and stone fences, outcroppings of limestone, and little hollows and swales. The creek to their front was only a minor barrier, ranging from 60 to 100 feet (18-30 m) in width, and was fordable in places and crossed by three stone bridges each a mile (1.5 km) apart. It was also a precarious position because the Confederate rear was blocked by the Potomac River and only a single crossing point, Boteler's Ford at Shepherdstown, was nearby should retreat be necessary. (The ford at Williamsport, Maryland, was 10 miles (16 km) northwest from Sharpsburg and had been used by Jackson in his march to Harpers Ferry. The disposition of Union forces during the battle made it impractical to consider retreating in that direction.) And on September 15, the force under Lee's immediate command consisted of no more than 18,000 men, only a third the size of the Federal army.[13]

The first two Union divisions arrived on the afternoon of September 15 and the bulk of the remainder of the army late that evening. Although an immediate Union attack on the morning of September 16 would have had an overwhelming advantage in numbers, McClellan's trademark caution and his belief that Lee had over 100,000 men caused him to delay his attack for a day. This gave the Confederates more time to prepare defensive positions and allowed Longstreet's corps to arrive from Hagerstown and Jackson's corps, minus A.P. Hill's division, to arrive from Harpers Ferry. Jackson defended the left (northern) flank, anchored on the Potomac, Longstreet the right (southern) flank, anchored on the Antietam, a line that was about 4 miles (6 km) long. (As the battle progressed and Lee shifted units, these corps boundaries overlapped considerably.)

On the evening of September 16, McClellan ordered Hooker's I Corps to cross Antietam Creek and probe the enemy positions. Meade's division cautiously attacked the Confederates under Hood near the East Woods. After darkness, artillery fire continued as McClellan continued to position his troops. McClellan's plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank. He arrived at this decision because of the configuration of bridges over the Antietam. The lower bridge (which would soon be named Burnside Bridge) was dominated by Confederate positions on the bluffs overlooking it. The middle bridge, on the road from Boonsboro, was subject to artillery fire from the heights near Sharpsburg. But the upper bridge was 2 miles (3 km) east of the Confederate guns and could be crossed safely. McClellan planned to commit more than half his army to the assault, starting with two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. He intended to launch a simultaneous diversionary attack against the Confederate right with a fifth corps, and he was prepared to strike the center with his reserves if either attack succeeded.[14] The skirmish in the East Woods served to signal McClellan's intentions to Lee, who prepared his defenses accordingly. He shifted men to his left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with one division.

McClellan's plans were ill-coordinated and were executed poorly. He issued to each of his subordinate commanders only the orders for his own corps, not general orders describing the entire battle plan. The terrain of the battlefield made it difficult for those commanders to monitor events outside of their sectors, and McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in the rear (at the Philip Pry house, east of the creek), making it difficult for him to control the separate corps. Therefore, the battle progressed the next day as essentially three separate, mostly uncoordinated battles: morning in the northern end of the battlefield, mid-day in the center, and afternoon in the south. This lack of coordination and concentration of McClellan's forces almost completely nullified the two-to-one advantage the Union enjoyed and allowed Lee to shift his defensive forces to meet each offensive.

Morning

Assaults by the I Corps, 5:30 to 7:30 a.m.
The Dunker Church at Antietam
The Dunker Church after September 17, 1862. Here, both Union and Confederate dead lay together on the field.

The battle opened at dawn (about 5:30 a.m.) on September 17 with an attack down the Hagerstown Turnpike by the Union I Corps under Joseph Hooker. Hooker's objective was the plateau on which the Dunker Church sat, a modest whitewashed building belonging to a local sect of German Baptists. Hooker had approximately 8,600 men, little more than the 7,700 defenders under Stonewall Jackson, and this slight disparity was more than offset by the Confederates' strong defensive positions.[15] Abner Doubleday's division moved on Hooker's right, James Ricketts's moved on the left into the East Woods, and George Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves division deployed in the center and slightly to the rear. Jackson's defense consisted of the divisions under Alexander Lawton and John R. Jones in line from the West Woods, across the Turnpike, and along the southern end of the Miller Cornfield. Four brigades were held in reserve inside the West Woods.[16]

As the first Union men emerged from the North Woods and into the Cornfield, an artillery duel erupted. Confederate fire was from the horse artillery batteries under Jeb Stuart to the west and four batteries under Col. Stephen D. Lee on the high ground across the pike from the Dunker Church to the south. Union return fire was from nine batteries on the ridge behind the North Woods and four batteries of 20-pounder Parrott rifles, 2 miles (3 km) east of Antietam Creek. The conflagration caused heavy casualties on both sides and was described by Col. Lee as "artillery Hell."[17]

Seeing the glint of Confederate bayonets concealed in the Cornfield, Hooker halted his infantry and brought up four batteries of artillery, which fired shell and canister over the heads of the Federal infantry, covering the field. The artillery and rifle fire from both sides acted like a scythe, cutting down cornstalks and men alike.

Dead Confederate soldiers from Starke's Louisiana Brigade, on the Hagerstown Turnpike, north of the Dunker Church. Photograph by Gardner

Meade's 1st Brigade of Pennsylvanians, under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, began advancing through the East Woods and exchanged fire with Colonel James Walker's brigade of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina troops. As Walker's men forced Seymour's back, aided by Lee's artillery fire, Ricketts's division entered the Cornfield, also to be torn up by artillery. Brig. Gen. Abram Duryée's brigade marched directly into volleys from Colonel Marcellus Douglass's Georgia brigade. Enduring heavy fire from a range of 250 yards (230 m) and gaining no advantage because of a lack of reinforcements, Duryée ordered a withdrawal.[16]

The reinforcements that Duryée had expected—brigades under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christian—had difficulties reaching the scene. Hartsuff was wounded by a shell, and Christian dismounted and fled to the rear in terror. When the men were rallied and advanced into the Cornfield, they met the same artillery and infantry fire as their predecessors. As the superior Union numbers began to tell, the Louisiana "Tiger" Brigade under Harry Hays entered the fray and forced the Union men back to the East Woods. The casualties received by the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, 67%, were the highest of any unit that day.[18] The Tigers were beaten back eventually when the Federals brought up a battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles and rolled them directly into the Cornfield, point-blank fire that slaughtered the Tigers, who lost 323 of their 500 men.[19]

...the most deadly fire of the war. Rifles are shot to pieces in the hands of the soldiers, canteens and haversacks are riddled with bullets, the dead and wounded go down in scores.
—Captain Benjamin F. Cook of the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, on the attack by the Louisiana Tigers at the Cornfield[20]

While the Cornfield remained a bloody stalemate, Federal advances a few hundred yards to the west were more successful. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's 4th Brigade of Doubleday's division (recently named the Iron Brigade) began advancing down and astride the turnpike, into the cornfield, and in the West Woods, pushing aside Jackson's men.[21] They were halted by a charge of 1,150 men from Starke's brigade, leveling heavy fire from 30 yards (30 m) away. The Confederate brigade withdrew after being exposed to fierce return fire from the Iron Brigade, and Starke was mortally wounded.[22] The Union advance on the Dunker Church resumed and cut a large gap in Jackson's defensive line, which teetered near collapse. Although the cost was steep, Hooker's corps was making steady progress.

Confederate reinforcements arrived just after 7 a.m. The divisions under McLaws and Richard H. Anderson arrived following a night march from Harpers Ferry. Around 7:15, General Lee moved George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade from the right flank of the army to aid Jackson.

At 7 a.m., Hood's division of 2,300 men advanced through the West Woods and pushed the Union troops back through the Cornfield again. The Texans attacked with particular ferocity because as they were called from their reserve position they were forced to interrupt the first hot breakfast they had had in days. They were aided by three brigades of D.H. Hill's division arriving from the Mumma Farm, southeast of the Cornfield, and by Jubal Early's brigade, pushing through the West Woods from the Nicodemus Farm, where they had been supporting Jeb Stuart's horse artillery. Some officers of the Iron Brigade rallied men around the artillery pieces of Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery, and Gibbon himself saw to it that his previous unit did not lose a single caisson.[23] Hood's men bore the brunt of the fighting, however, and paid a heavy price—60% casualties—but they were able to prevent the defensive line from crumbling and held off the I Corps. When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood replied, "Dead on the field."[24]

Hooker's men had also paid heavily but without achieving their objectives. After two hours and 2,500 casualties, they were back where they started. The Cornfield, an area about 250 yards (230 m) deep and 400 yards (400 m) wide, was a scene of indescribable destruction. It was estimated that the Cornfield changed hands no fewer than 15 times in the course of the morning.[25] Major Rufus R. Dawes, who assumed command of Iron Brigade's 6th Wisconsin Regiment during the battle, later compared the fighting around the Hagerstown Turnpike with the stone wall at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania's "Bloody Angle", and the slaughter pen of Cold Harbor, insisting that "the Antietam Turnpike surpassed them all in manifest evidence of slaughter."[26] Hooker called for support from the 7,200 men of Mansfield's XII Corps.

... every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the [Confederates] slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before.
—Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker[27]
Assaults by the XII Corps, 7:30 to 9:00 a.m.

Half of Mansfield's men were raw recruits, and Mansfield was also inexperienced, having taken command only two days before. Although he was a veteran of 40 years' service, he had never led large numbers of soldiers in combat. Concerned that his men would bolt under fire, he marched them in a formation that was known as "column of companies, closed in mass," a bunched-up formation in which a regiment was arrayed ten ranks deep instead of the normal two. As his men entered the East Woods, they presented an excellent artillery target, "almost as good a target as a barn." Mansfield himself was felled by a sniper's bullet and died later in the day. Alpheus Williams assumed temporary command of the XII Corps.[28]

The new recruits of Mansfield's 1st Division made no progress against Hood's line, which was reinforced by D.H. Hill's divisions under Colquitt and McRae. The 2nd Division of the XII Corps, under George Sears Greene, however, broke through McRae's men, who fled under the mistaken belief that they were about to be trapped by a flanking attack. This breach of the line forced Hood and his men, outnumbered, to regroup in the West Woods, where they had started the day.[18] Greene was able to reach the Dunker Church, Hooker's original objective, and drove off Stephen Lee's batteries. Federal forces held most of the ground to the east of the turnpike.

Hooker attempted to gather the scattered remnants of his I Corps to continue the assault, but a Confederate sharpshooter spotted the general's conspicuous white horse and shot Hooker through the foot. Command of his I Corps fell to General Meade, since Hooker's senior subordinate, James B. Ricketts, had also been wounded. But with Hooker removed from the field, there was no general left with the authority to rally the men of the I and XII Corps. Greene's men came under heavy fire from the West Woods and withdrew from the Dunker Church.

In an effort to turn the Confederate left flank and relieve the pressure on Mansfield's men, Sumner's II Corps was ordered at 7:20 a.m. to send two divisions into battle. Sedgwick's division of 5,400 men was the first to ford the Antietam, and they entered the East Woods with the intention of turning left and forcing the Confederates south into the assault of Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps. But the plan went awry. They became separated from William H. French's division, and at 9 a.m. Sumner, who was accompanying the division, launched the attack with an unusual battle formation—the three brigades in three long lines, men side-by-side, with only 50 to 70 yards (60 m) separating the lines. They were assaulted first by Confederate artillery and then from three sides by the divisions of Early, Walker, and McLaws, and in less than half an hour Sedgwick's men were forced to retreat in great disorder to their starting point with over 2,200 casualties.[29] Sumner has been condemned by most historians for his "reckless" attack, his lack of coordination with the I and XII Corps headquarters, losing control of French's division when he accompanied Sedgwick's, failing to perform adequate reconnaissance prior to launching his attack, and selecting the unusual battle formation that was so effectively flanked by the Confederate counterattack. Historian M.V. Armstrong's recent scholarship, however, has determined that Sumner did perform appropriate reconnaissance and his decision to attack where he did was justified by the information available to him.[30]

The final actions in the morning phase of the battle were around 10 a.m., when two regiments of the XII Corps advanced, only to be confronted by the division of John G. Walker, newly arrived from the Confederate right. They fought in the area between the Cornfield in the West Woods, but soon Walker's men were forced back by two brigades of Greene's division, and the Federal troops seized some ground in the West Woods.

The morning phase ended with casualties on both sides of almost 13,000, including two Union corps commanders.[31]

Mid-day

Assaults by the XII and II Corps, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.

By mid-day, the action had shifted to the center of the Confederate line. Sumner had accompanied the morning attack of Sedgwick's division, but another of his divisions, under French, lost contact with Sumner and Sedgwick and inexplicably headed south. Eager for an opportunity to see combat, French found skirmishers in his path and ordered his men forward. By this time, Sumner's aide (and son) located French, described the terrible fighting in the West Woods and relayed an order for him to divert Confederate attention by attacking their center.[32]

French confronted D.H. Hill's division. Hill commanded about 2,500 men, less than half the number under French, and three of his five brigades had been torn up during the morning combat. This sector of Longstreet's line was theoretically the weakest. But Hill's men were in a strong defensive position, atop a gradual ridge, in a sunken road worn down by years of wagon traffic, which formed a natural trench.[33]

French launched a series of brigade-sized assaults against Hill's improvised breastworks at around 9:30 a.m. The first brigade to attack, mostly inexperienced troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Max Weber, was quickly cut down by heavy rifle fire; neither side deployed artillery at this point. The second attack, more raw recruits under Col. Dwight Morris, was also subjected to heavy fire but managed to beat back a counterattack by the Alabama Brigade of Robert Rodes. The third, under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, included three veteran regiments, but they also fell to fire from the sunken road. French's division suffered 1,750 casualties (of his 5,700 men) in under an hour.[34]

Reinforcements were arriving on both sides, and by 10:30 a.m. Robert E. Lee sent his final reserve division—some 3,400 men under Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson—to bolster Hill's line and extend it to the right, preparing an attack that would envelop French's left flank. But at the same time, the 4,000 men of Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division arrived on French's left. This was the last of Sumner's three divisions, which had been held up in the rear by McClellan as he organized his reserve forces.[35] Richardson's fresh troops struck the first blow.

Leading off the fourth attack of the day against the sunken road was the Irish Brigade of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. As they advanced with emerald green flags snapping in the breeze, a regimental chaplain, Father William Corby, rode back and forth across the front of the formation shouting words of conditional absolution prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church for those who were about to die. (Corby performed a similar service at Gettysburg in 1863.) The mostly Irish immigrants lost 540 men to heavy volleys before they were ordered to withdraw.[36]

Gen. Richardson personally dispatched the brigade of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell into battle around noon (after being told that Caldwell was in the rear, behind a haystack), and finally the tide turned. Anderson's Confederate division had been little help to the defenders after Gen. Anderson was wounded early in the fighting. Other key leaders were lost as well, including George B. Anderson (no relation; Anderson's successor, Col. Charles C. Tew of the 2nd North Carolina, was killed minutes after assuming command)[37] and Col. John B. Gordon of the 6th Alabama. (Gordon received four serious wounds in the fight. He lay unconscious, face down in his cap, and later told colleagues that he should have smothered in his own blood, except for the act of an unidentified Yankee, who had earlier shot a hole in his cap, which allowed the blood to drain.)[38] Rodes was wounded in the thigh but was still on the field. These losses contributed directly to the confusion of the following events.

We were shooting them like sheep in a pen. If a bullet missed the mark at first it was liable to strike the further bank, angle back, and take them secondarily.
—Sergeant of the 61st New York[39]

As Caldwell's brigade advanced around the right flank of the Confederates, Col. Francis C. Barlow and 350 men of the 61st and 64th New York saw a weak point in the line and seized a knoll commanding the sunken road. This allowed them to get enfilade fire into the Confederate line, turning it into a deadly trap. In attempting to wheel around to meet this threat, a command from Rodes was misunderstood by Lt. Col. James N. Lightfoot, who had succeeded the unconscious John Gordon. Lightfoot ordered his men to about-face and march away, an order that all five regiments of the brigade thought applied to them as well. Confederate troops streamed toward Sharpsburg, their line lost.

Richardson's men were in hot pursuit when massed artillery hastily assembled by Gen. Longstreet drove them back. A counterattack with 200 men led by D.H. Hill got around the Federal left flank near the sunken road, and although they were driven back by a fierce charge of the 5th New Hampshire, this stemmed the collapse of the center. Reluctantly, Richardson ordered his division to fall back to north of the ridge facing the sunken road. His division lost about 1,000 men. Col. Barlow was severely wounded, and Richardson mortally wounded.[40] Winfield S. Hancock assumed division command. Although Hancock would have an excellent future reputation as an aggressive division and corps commander, the unexpected change of command sapped the momentum of the Federal advance.[41]

The Bloody Lane in 2005.
Confederate dead lay in the "Bloody Lane" after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.

The carnage from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on the sunken road gave it the name Bloody Lane, leaving about 5,600 casualties (Union 3,000, Confederate 2,600) along the 800-yard (700 m) road. And yet a great opportunity presented itself. If this broken sector of the Confederate line were exploited, Lee's army would have been divided in half and possibly defeated. There were ample forces available to do so. There was a reserve of 3,500 cavalry and the 10,300 infantrymen of Gen. Porter's V Corps, waiting near the middle bridge, a mile away. The VI Corps had just arrived with 12,000 men. Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin of the VI Corps was ready to exploit this breakthrough, but Sumner, the senior corps commander, ordered him not to advance. Franklin appealed to McClellan, who left his headquarters in the rear to hear both arguments but backed Sumner's decision, ordering Franklin and Hancock to hold their positions.[42]

Later in the day, the commander of the other reserve unit near the center, the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, heard recommendations from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commanding his 2nd Division, that another attack be made in the center, an idea that intrigued McClellan. However, Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." McClellan demurred and another opportunity was lost.[43]

Afternoon

Assaults by the IX Corps, 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

The action moved to the southern end of the battlefield. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside and the IX Corps to conduct a diversionary attack in support of Hooker's I Corps, hoping to draw Confederate attention away from the intended main attack in the north. However, Burnside was instructed to wait for explicit orders before launching his attack, and those orders did not reach him until 10 a.m.[44] Burnside was strangely passive during preparations for the battle. He was disgruntled that McClellan had abandoned the previous arrangement of "wing" commanders reporting to him. Previously, Burnside had commanded a wing that included both the I and IX Corps and now he was responsible only for the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox of the Kanawha Division as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through him.

Burnside had four divisions (12,500 troops) and 50 guns east of Antietam Creek. Facing him was a force that had been greatly depleted by Lee's movement of units to bolster the Confederate left flank. At dawn, the divisions of Brig. Gens. David R. Jones and John G. Walker stood in defense, but by 10 a.m. all of Walker's men and Col. George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade had been removed. Jones had only about 3,000 men and 12 guns available to meet Burnside. Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near Sharpsburg, primarily a low plateau known as Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 men—the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments, under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, with two artillery batteries—defended Rohrbach's Bridge, a three-span, 125-foot (38 m) stone structure that was the southernmost crossing of the Antietam.[45] It would become known to history as Burnside's Bridge because of the notoriety of the coming battle. The bridge was a difficult objective. The road leading to it ran parallel to the creek and was exposed to enemy fire. The bridge was dominated by a 100-foot (30 m) high wooded bluff on the west bank, strewn with boulders from an old quarry, making infantry and sharpshooter fire from good covered positions a dangerous impediment to crossing.

Go and look at [Burnside's Bridge], and tell me if you don't think Burnside and his corps might have executed a hop, skip, and jump and landed on the other side. One thing is certain, they might have waded it that day without getting their waist belts wet in any place.
—Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas[46]

Antietam Creek in this sector was seldom more than 50 feet (15 m) wide, and several stretches were only waist deep and out of Confederate range. Burnside has been widely criticized for ignoring this fact, starting with derision from Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas.[46] However, the commanding terrain across the sometimes shallow creek made crossing the water a comparatively easy part of a difficult problem. Burnside concentrated his plan instead on storming the bridge while simultaneously crossing a ford McClellan's engineers had identified a half mile (1 km) downstream, but when Burnside's men reached it, they found the banks too high to negotiate. While Col. George Crook's Ohio brigade prepared to attack the bridge with the support of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis's division, the rest of the Kanawha Division and Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman's division struggled through thick brush trying to locate Snavely's Ford, 2 miles (3 km) downstream, intending to flank the Confederates.[47]

Burnside's Bridge.
Charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania across the Burnside's Bridge, by Edwin Forbes.
Battle of Antietam by Kurz and Allison.
Confederate guns on the hill above poured fire into the Union ranks at Burnside's bridge. Photo taken just after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.

Crook's assault on the bridge was led by skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut, who were ordered to clear the bridge for the Ohioans to cross and assault the bluff. After receiving punishing fire for 15 minutes, the Connecticut men withdrew with 139 casualties, one third of their strength, including their commander, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, who was fatally wounded.[48] Crook's main assault went awry when his unfamiliarity with the terrain caused his men to reach the creek a quarter mile (400 m) upstream from the bridge, where they exchanged volleys with Confederate skirmishers for the next few hours.[49]

While Rodman's division was out of touch, slogging toward Snavely's Ford, Burnside and Cox directed a second assault at the bridge by one of Sturgis's brigades, led by the 2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. They also fell prey to the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery, and their attack fell apart.[50] By this time it was noon, and McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general, Col. Delos B. Sackett, to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."[51]

The third attempt to take the bridge was at 12:30 p.m. by Sturgis's other brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero. It was led by the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, who, with adequate artillery support and a promise that a recently canceled whiskey ration would be restored if they were successful, charged downhill and took up positions on the east bank. Maneuvering a captured light howitzer into position, they fired double canister down the bridge and got within 25 yards (23 m) of the enemy. By 1 p.m., Confederate ammunition was running low, and word reached Toombs that Rodman's men were crossing Snavely's Ford on their flank. He ordered a withdrawal. His Georgians had cost the Federals more than 500 casualties, giving up fewer than 160 themselves. And they had stalled Burnside's assault on the southern flank for more than three hours.[52]

Burnside's assault stalled again on its own. His officers had neglected to transport ammunition across the bridge, which was itself becoming a bottleneck for soldiers, artillery, and wagons. This represented another two-hour delay. Gen. Lee used this time to bolster his right flank. He ordered up every available artillery unit, although he made no attempt to strengthen D.R. Jones's badly outnumbered force with infantry units from the left. Instead, he counted on the arrival of A.P. Hill's Light Division, currently embarked on an exhausting 17 mile (27 km) march from Harpers Ferry. By 2 p.m., Hill's men had reached Boteler's Ford, and Hill was able to confer with the relieved Lee at 2:30, who ordered him to bring up his men to the right of Jones.[53]

The Federals were completely unaware that 3,000 new men would be facing them. Burnside's plan was to move around the weakened Confederate right flank, converge on Sharpsburg, and cut Lee's army off from Boteler's Ford, their only escape route across the Potomac. At 3 p.m., Burnside left Sturgis's division in reserve on the west bank and moved west with over 8,000 troops (most of them fresh) and 22 guns for close support.[54]

An initial assault led by the 79th New York "Cameron Highlanders" succeeded against Jones's outnumbered division, which was pushed back past Cemetery Hill and to within 200 yards (200 m) of Sharpsburg. Farther to the left, Rodman's division advanced toward Harpers Ferry Road. Its lead brigade, under Col. Harrison Fairchild, containing several colorful Zouaves of the 9th New York, came under heavy shellfire from a dozen enemy guns mounted on a ridge to their front, but they kept pushing forward. There was panic in the streets of Sharpsburg, clogged with retreating Confederates. Of the five brigades in Jones's division, only Toombs's brigade was still intact, but he had only 700 men.[55]

The Lutheran Church just east of Sharpsburg marks the extent of the Union offensive during the Battle of Antietam, 1862. Union skirmishers moved to the cross street just beyond the church as a Confederate division commanded by A.P. Hill arrived on the Shepherdstown Road, surprising Burnside's troops and driving them back.

A. P. Hill's division arrived at 3:30 p.m. Hill divided his column, with two brigades moving southeast to guard his flank and the other three, about 2,000 men, moving to the right of Toombs's brigade and preparing for a counterattack. At 3:40 p.m., Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut on Rodman's left flank in the cornfield of farmer John Otto. The Connecticut men had been in service for only three weeks, and their line disintegrated with 185 casualties. The 4th Rhode Island came up on the right, but they had poor visibility amid the high stalks of corn, and they were disoriented because many of the Confederates were wearing Union uniforms captured at Harpers Ferry. They also broke and ran, leaving the 8th Connecticut far out in advance and isolated. They were enveloped and driven down the hills toward Antietam Creek. A counterattack by regiments from the Kanawha Division fell short.[56]

The IX Corps had suffered casualties of about 20% but still possessed twice the number of Confederates confronting them. Unnerved by the collapse of his flank, Burnside ordered his men all the way back to the west bank of the Antietam, where he urgently requested more men and guns. McClellan was able to provide just one battery. He said, "I can do nothing more. I have no infantry." In fact, however, McClellan had two fresh corps in reserve, Porter's V and Franklin's VI, but he was too cautious, concerned about an imminent massive counterstrike by Lee. Burnside's men spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge they had suffered so much to capture.[57]

Aftermath

Confederate dead gathered for burial after the battle. Photograph by Alexander Gardner

The battle was over by 5:30 p.m. Losses for the day were heavy on both sides. The Union had 12,401 casualties with 2,108 dead. Confederate casualties were 10,318 with 1,546 dead. This represented 25% of the Federal force and 31% of the Confederate.[3] More Americans died on September 17, 1862, than on any other day in the nation's military history.[58] Several generals died as a result of the battle, including Maj. Gens. Joseph K. Mansfield and Israel B. Richardson and Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman on the Union side (all mortally wounded), and Brig. Gens. Lawrence O. Branch and William E. Starke on the Confederate side (killed).[59]

On the morning of September 18, Lee's army prepared to defend against a Federal assault that never came. After an improvised truce for both sides to recover and exchange their wounded, Lee's forces began withdrawing across the Potomac that evening to return to Virginia.[60]

President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that McClellan's cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat. Historian Stephen Sears agrees.[61]

In making his battle against great odds to save the Republic, General McClellan had committed barely 50,000 infantry and artillerymen to the contest. A third of his army did not fire a shot. Even at that, his men repeatedly drove the Army of Northern Virginia to the brink of disaster, feats of valor entirely lost on a commander thinking of little beyond staving off his own defeat.

– Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red

The president was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president himself, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."[62] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, effectively ending the general's military career.

President Lincoln and General George B. McClellan in the general's tent near the Antietam battlefield, October 3, 1862. Photograph by Alexander Gardner

Some students of history question the designation of "strategic victory" for the Union. After all, McClellan performed poorly in the campaign and the battle itself, and Lee displayed great generalship in holding his own in battle against an army that greatly outnumbered him. Casualties were comparable on both sides, although Lee lost a higher percentage of his army. Lee withdrew from the battlefield first, the technical definition of the tactical loser in a Civil War battle. However, in a strategic sense, despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of the North) and it allowed President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, which took effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat. When the issue of emancipation was linked to the progress of the war, neither government had the political will to oppose the United States. Historian James M. McPherson summed up the importance of Antietam in his Crossroads of Freedom:[63]

No other campaign and battle in the war had such momentous, multiple consequences as Antietam. In July 1863 the dual Union triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg struck another blow that blunted a renewed Confederate offensive in the East and cut off the western third of the Confederacy from the rest. In September 1864 Sherman's capture of Atlanta reversed another decline in Northern morale and set the stage for the final drive to Union victory. These also were pivotal moments. But they would never have happened if the triple Confederate offensives in Mississippi, Kentucky, and most of all Maryland had not been defeated in the fall of 1862.

– James M. McPherson, Crossroads of Freedom

The battle is commemorated at Antietam National Battlefield.

See also

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Notes

  1. ^ NPS; see the discussion of "strategic victory" in the Aftermath section.
  2. ^ a b Eicher, p. 363. Sears, p. 173, cites 75,000 Union troops, with an effective strength of 71,500, with 300 guns; on p. 296, he states that the 12,401 Union casualties were 25% of those who went into action and that McClellan committed "barely 50,000 infantry and artillerymen to the contest"; p. 389, he cites Confederate total effective strength of "just over 38,000," including A.P. Hill's division, which arrived in the afternoon. Priest, p. 343, cites 87,164 men present in the Army of the Potomac, with 53,632 engaged, and 30,646 engaged in the Army of Northern Virginia. Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302, cite 87,100 Union engaged, 51,800 Confederate. Harsh, pp. 201-02, analyzes the historiography of the figures, and shows that Ezra A. Carman (a battlefield historian who influenced some of these sources) used "engaged" figures; the 38,000 excludes Pender's and Field's brigades, roughly half the artillery, and forces used to secure objectives behind the line.
  3. ^ a b c Sears, pp. 294-96; Cannan, p. 201. Confederate casualties are estimates because reported figures include undifferentiated casualties at South Mountain and Shepherdstown; Sears remarks that "there is no doubt that a good many of the 1,771 men listed as missing were in fact dead, buried uncounted in unmarked graves where they fell." McPherson, p. 129, gives ranges for the Confederate losses: 1,546–2,700 dead, 7,752–9,024 wounded. He states that more than 2,000 of the wounded on both sides died from their wounds. Priest, p. 343, reports 12,882 Union casualties (2,157 killed, 9,716 wounded, 1,009 missing or captured) and 11,530 Confederate (1,754 killed, 8,649 wounded, 1,127 missing or captured). Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302, cite Union casualties of 12,469 (2,010 killed, 9,416 wounded, 1,043 missing or captured) and 10,292 Confederate (1,567 killed, 8,725 wounded for September 14–20, plus approximately 2,000 missing or captured).
  4. ^ McPherson, p. 3.
  5. ^ NPS.
  6. ^ McPherson, p. 100; Eicher, p. 337; Sears, p. 69 "perhaps 50,000".
  7. ^ Sears, pp. 65-66; McPherson, pp. 88-95.
  8. ^ Sears, p. 112; McPherson, p. 108.
  9. ^ McPherson, p. 109.
  10. ^ McPherson, pp. 110-12.
  11. ^ Eicher, p. 337; O.R. Series 1, Vol. XIX part 2 (S# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294-300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, pp. 366-72. Although most histories, including the Official Records, refer to these organizations as Corps, that designation was not formally made until November 6, 1862, after the Maryland Campaign. Longstreet's unit was referred to as the Right Wing, Jackson's the Left Wing, for most of 1862. (Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for instance, Luvaas and Nelson, p. 4.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32-90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in command of a "Center Wing" with his own division (commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander.
  12. ^ Eicher, p. 338.
  13. ^ Bailey, p. 60.
  14. ^ Bailey, p. 63.
  15. ^ Sears, p. 181.
  16. ^ a b Wolff, p. 60.
  17. ^ Sears, p. 190.
  18. ^ a b Wolff, p. 61.
  19. ^ Bailey, pp. 71, 73.
  20. ^ Bailey, p. 71.
  21. ^ Dawes, pp. 88-91.
  22. ^ Bailey, p. 75.
  23. ^ Dawes, pp. 91-93.
  24. ^ Bailey, p. 79.
  25. ^ Bailey, p. 81.
  26. ^ Dawes, p. 95.
  27. ^ Bailey, p. 70.
  28. ^ Bailey, pp. 79-80.
  29. ^ Armstrong, pp. 3-27; Sears, pp. 221-30; Eicher, pp. 353-55; Wolff, pp. 61-62.
  30. ^ Armstrong, pp. 39-55.
  31. ^ Kennedy, p. 120.
  32. ^ Bailey, p. 93.
  33. ^ Bailey, p. 94.
  34. ^ Wolff, p. 63.
  35. ^ Bailey, p. 99.
  36. ^ Bailey, p. 100.
  37. ^ Bailey, pp. 101, 103.
  38. ^ Sears, p. 242.
  39. ^ Bailey, p. 102.
  40. ^ Sears, p. 254.
  41. ^ Bailey, p. 108.
  42. ^ Bailey, pp. 108-9.
  43. ^ Bailey, p. 141.
  44. ^ Jamieson, p. 94. McClellan issued the order at 9:10, after the repulse of Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults, having waited for the VI Corps to reach the battlefield and take up a reserve position.
  45. ^ Wolff, p. 64.
  46. ^ a b Douglas, p. 172.
  47. ^ Eicher, 359-60; Sears, p. 260; Wolff, p. 64.
  48. ^ Tucker, p. 87.
  49. ^ Sears, p. 263.
  50. ^ Bailey, p. 120.
  51. ^ Sears, pp. 264-65.
  52. ^ Sears, pp. 266-67; Bailey, pp. 125-26.
  53. ^ Sears, p. 276.
  54. ^ Bailey, p. 131.
  55. ^ Bailey, pp. 133-36.
  56. ^ Bailey, pp. 136-37.
  57. ^ Sears, pp. 291-92.
  58. ^ Antietam is sometimes cited as the bloodiest day in all of American history, but the deaths from the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 are significantly higher. The bloodiest battle in American history was Gettysburg, but its more than 46,000 casualties occurred over three days. Antietam ranks fifth in terms of total casualties in the Civil War, falling behind Chickamauga, Chancellorsville, and Spotsylvania Court House.
  59. ^ Sears, pp. 206, 254, 287, 290, 194.
  60. ^ Sears, pp. 297, 306-07.
  61. ^ Sears, p. 296.
  62. ^ Bailey, p. 67.
  63. ^ McPherson, p. 155.

References

  • Armstrong, Marion V., Disaster in the West Woods: General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam, Western Maryland Interpretive Association, 2002.
  • Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam, Time-Life Books, 1984, ISBN 0-8094-4740-1.
  • Cannan, John, The Antietam Campaign: August-September 1862, Combined Books, 1994, ISBN 0-93828-991-8.
  • Cole, J. R., History of Washington and Kent Counties, Rhode Island, W.W. Preston & Co., 1889.
  • Dawes, Rufus R., A Full Blown Yankee of the Iron Brigade: Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8032-6618-9.
  • Douglas, Henry Kyd, I Rode with Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson's Staff, University of North Carolina Press, 1940, ISBN 0-8078-0337-5.
  • Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
  • Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
  • Harsh, Joseph L., Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862, Kent State University Press, 2000, ISBN 0873386418.
  • Jamieson, Perry D., Death in September: The Antietam Campaign, McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999, ISBN 1-893114-07-4.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., Ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998, ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
  • Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds., The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam: The Maryland Campaign of 1862, University Press of Kansas, 1987, ISBN 0-7006-0784-6.
  • McPherson, James M., Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War, Oxford University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-19-513521-0.
  • Priest, John Michael, Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle, Oxford University Press, 1989, ISBN 0-19-508466-7.
  • Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, Houghton Mifflin, 1983, ISBN 0-89919-172-X.
  • Tucker, Phillip Thomas, Burnside's Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Stackpole Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8117-0199-9.
  • Wolff, Robert S., "The Antietam Campaign", Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, Heidler, David S., and Heidler, Jeanne T., eds., W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
  • National Park Service battle description

Further reading

  • Carman, Ezra A. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Account of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam, ed. Joseph Pierro. Routledge, 2008, ISBN 0-41595-628-5.
  • Frassanito, William A., Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day, Thomas Publications, 1978, ISBN 1-57747-005-2.
  • Gallagher, Gary W., Ed., Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign, Kent State University Press, 1989, ISBN 0-87338-400-8.
  • Jermann, Donald R., Antietam: The Lost Order, Pelican Publishing Company Inc., 2006, ISBN 1-58980-366-3.
  • Harsh, Joseph L., Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862, Kent State University Press, 1998, ISBN 0873385802.
  • Harsh, Joseph L., Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862, Kent State University Press, 1999, ISBN 0873386310.
  • Murfin, James V., The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862, Louisiana State University Press, 1965, ISBN 0-8071-0990-8.

External links

Coordinates: 39°28′24″N 77°44′41″W / 39.4732°N 77.7447°W / 39.4732; -77.7447

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