Antoine-Henri Jomini

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Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri de (1779-1869), Swiss-born French and Russian soldier and strategic theorist. Jomini was the most influential of many 19th-century military writers who believed they had found, in the campaigns of Napoleon, a basis for establishing the conduct of war on a scientific footing.

In the course of his long life, Jomini produced dozens of volumes on the history and theory of war, of which the best remembered is his Summary of the Art of War (1837-8). Everything he wrote was oriented toward a common theme: that the conduct of war was governed by a small number of fixed principles and that among these the most important were first, that one should seek a line of operations capable of threatening the communications of the enemy while protecting one's own; and second, that the key to victory lay in massing one's forces at what he famously called ‘the decisive point’.

Jomini's confidence that warfare answered to its own inherent logic did not save him from inconsistencies. He believed that Napoleon had demonstrated the superiority of the offensive, and the necessity of seizing the initiative and dominating the enemy. Yet Jomini's emphasis upon concentrated forces and secure communications also made him a proponent of fighting on ‘interior lines’, a relatively cautious approach by which one sought to place one's united forces between divided opponents, in order to defeat each in detail, almost as though Frederick ‘the Great’ had been his model. Although Napoleon might as easily have exemplified the advantages of an enveloping attack on ‘exterior’ lines, Jomini thought the dangers implicit in such methods could rarely be justified. He stressed the value of surprise, but also the importance of planning and methodical deployment. He regarded the destruction of the enemy army as the natural objective of a military campaign, yet he usually portrayed the results of victory in terms of expanded territorial control. Strategy, he said, was the art of making war upon a map. It was often the lay of the land or the distribution of rivers and roads, rather than the actions of the enemy, that determined for him where the ‘decisive point’ should be.

Jomini never grasped the spirit of fierce improvisation that animated Napoleon's most characteristic campaigns. As a theorist, he owed a great deal to pre-Revolutionary writers, especially the Englishman Henry Lloyd, whose history of the campaigns of Frederick ‘the Great’ Jomini admired as a young man. Like Lloyd, Jomini was disposed to conceive of warfare in terms of abstract spatial relationships, and to identify strategic excellence with carefully deliberated manoeuvre and the avoidance of defeat. Indeed, much of Jomini's appeal lay not in his having plumbed Napoleon's genius, but on the contrary in his assimilation of the Napoleonic experience to the conservative, risk-averse strategic traditions of the ancien régime.

The Europe in which Jomini came to be regarded as an authority was dominated by small, regular armies, tailored to the conduct of wars whose scale and violence were limited by the great powers' shared commitment to a stable international order. He was even more influential in the USA, where his teachings were at the core of the West Point syllabus. But when his ideas were put into practice in the American civil war, where mass armies of citizen soldiers grappled for the highest stakes, they had less reassuring implications: not swift decision on scientific principles, but grinding attrition. His views were further discredited by the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, in which victory had gone to the side that forsook the advantages of mass, security, and interior lines, in favour of energetic, independent manoeuvre by multiple detached forces.

Jomini's reputation would eventually be eclipsed by that of his contemporary Clausewitz. For Clausewitz war was not a scientific enterprise, but a violent clash of wills, driven by deep springs of political and social energy, in which the play of friction, chance, and genius must inevitably exceed the bounds of prescriptive theory. His was, without question, the more encompassing and intellectually demanding vision—though his interpretations of specific historical episodes were often closer to Jomini's than he was inclined to admit. It would be wrong, in any case, to imagine that Jomini's influence ceased to count once his personal fame began to fade. On the contrary, Jomini's faith that the chaos of war must somehow be subsumed by a few principled guides to action has been shared by generations of soldiers. All modern armies accept that there are principles of war, upon which they continue to base their most essential training and doctrine. If Jomini is no longer a name to conjure with among students and practitioners of war, it is in part because his point of view has been so widely adopted, even by those unaware of his work.

Bibliography

• Howard, Michael, ‘Jomini and the Classical Tradition’, in The Theory and Practice of War (London, 1965).
• Shy, John, ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986)

— Daniel Moran

A Swiss citizen in Napoleon's service, Jomini wrote profusely while becoming a general officer and chief of staff to Marshal Michel Ney and then had a long career in the Russian Army.

In his histories of the campaigns of Frederick the Great, the French Revolution, and Napoleon, Jomini expounded what he saw as the essence of the offensive strategy of Napoleonic warfare. In this, he assumed dispersed armies and advocated the use of interior lines of communication and supply, concentration against the center of a too‐dispersed adversary, and turning the flank of an opponent who was too concentrated. Napoleon's victories at Maren go, Ulm, and Jena illustrated this turning movement. Jomini summarized these ideas in his influential Précis de l’art de guerre (1837). Jomini had many expositors who helped educate English‐speaking soldiers in the British empire and the United States.

Beginning in the 1950s, some American military historians incorrectly attributed to Jomini an immense influence on the generals of the U.S. Civil War, who were, of course, influenced by Napoleon.

[See also Clausewitz, Carl von; Strategy: Fundamentals.]

Bibliography

• Richard E. Beringeret al., , Why the South Lost the Civil War, 1986.
• John Shy, Jomini, in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret, 1986

Jomini, Antoine-Henri (1779-1869) Swiss authority on the art of war who wrote histories of the campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, in whose service he fought. In his writings he concentrated on the offensive strategy of napoleonic warfare. He has been mistakenly credited with influencing the generals of the Civil War, who were influenced by Napoleon.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

Baron Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869) drew on his experience in the armies of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte to write the first systematic study of military strategy. The science of warfare as outlined in his Précis de l'art de la guerre (The Art of War) has been studied by military commanders in the years since Jomini's death, and it continues to influence the way modern warfare is waged, discussed, and studied.

Baron Antoine Henri Jomini rose in the ranks of the Swiss army, eventually serving under Marshall Michel Ney as chief of staff and becoming a baron in 1807. Loyal to French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, Jomini distinguished himself in 1806 at the battle of Jena as well as during France's takeover of Spain. His continued fame rests on his now-classic 1836 Précis de l'art de guerre, which advocates the use of large land forces, speed, maneuverability, and the capture of strategic points during battle. Jomini's work remained influential with military leaders throughout the 1800s, most notably during the U.S. Civil War.

Leaves Business for Battlefield

Jomini was born on March 6, 1779, in the town of Payerne, located in the Swiss canton of Vaud. His parents, of Italian descent, were of modest means and gave their son a good education. As a child he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend the Prince de Wurtemberg's military academy in Montbelliard, but his family's circumstances did not permit this. Unable to afford a commission in the Swiss Watteville regiment then under the command of the French, at age 14 he was sent to business school in Aarau with the intent that he train for a career. In April of 1795 he moved to Basle where he found a clerical position at the banking house of Monsieurs Preiswerk.

Moving to Paris in 1796, Jomini worked as a bank clerk for Monsieurs Mosselmann before leaving to become a stockbroker in partnership with another young man. Napoleon's successes in Italy at Lodi, Castiglione, and Lonato inspired Jomini to begin to write on military matters, and he began to study comparative warfare in earnest. His first published study of military operations were that of Frederick II. In 1798 he left his business career behind to reenlist in the Swiss army where he was appointed aide-de-camp to the minister of war of the Helvetic Republic.

Formulated Military Theory

In 1799 Jomini was appointed bureau chief within the Swiss war office, and in the following months, now with the rank of major, he reorganized the ministry for the Swiss War. He drew on his growing knowledge of military operations to standardize several procedures, taking advantage of his position to experiment with organizational systems and strategies. Leaving Switzerland in 1801, Jomini returned to Paris and worked for two years at a military equipment manufacturer before abandoning commerce for good and beginning the first of his books dealing with military theory and history, Traité des grandes opérations militaires. In this work, published in eight volumes between 1804 and 1810 and translated as Treatise on Grand Military Operations, Jomini presented an overview of the general principles of warfare. He included a critical history of the military actions of Frederick II, "the Great," during the Seven Years' War, contrasting them unfavorably with the battles waged by Napoleon Bonaparte. Not surprisingly, this work caught the attention of the French emperor, who eventually offered Jomini a position within his own ranks.

Jomini's Traité des grandes opérations militaires was the first of several works, including Principes de la strategie (1818), and the 15-volume, 1819-1824 work Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution, which addressed the wars of the French Revolution. The grossly inept early campaigns of the French Revolution had, in fact, inspired Jomini's search for scientific principles underlying successful warfare, but he waited to publish his Histoire critique until most of the generals he criticized were dead. In each of his writings he described actual battles and theorized why the actions taken either were successful or failed. A child of the Enlightenment, he sought to determine the laws of military strategy, inviolate scientific principles that could be followed to wage a successful war. Such laws would, Jomini believed, provide continuity among the diverse forces at work within an army and thus make war controlled and of minimal duration.

Ironically, Jomini was at first unable to gain entrance into either the French or Russian military on the basis of his Traité des grandes opérations militaries, the implication being that one so young had little to teach older and far more experienced generals. Finally his work came to the attention of Marshal Ney, who took Jomini into his staff in 1805 and provided the funds necessary for the young man to publish his book. Jomini fought with the Sixth Corps against Austria at Ulm in 1805 and served as senior-aide-de-camp against the Prussian Army at Jena and Bautzen the following year. Following the 1807 peace of Tilsit, he was created Baron of the Empire on July 27, 1808, in recognition of his service. During Napoleon's campaigns to take Spain in 1808, he fought bravely and was made brigade general in 1810. When the French army retreated from Russia Jomini also handled his role commendably and was appointed brigadier general in 1813.

Throughout his career in the army of Napoleon, Jomini exhibited complete confidence in his ability to discern "correct" and "incorrect" strategies in line with his theories. Such confidence was interpreted as arrogance by many officers, including Murat and Marshal Berthier, who likely also resented the preferential treatment given to the younger man by Napoleon. In August of 1813, as the result of efforts by Berthier to discredit him and sabotage a well-earned promotion to major general following Ney's victory at the battle of Bautzen, Jomini was forced from the French ranks. Angered and humiliated at his treatment, he traded allegiances, left France, and joined the Russian Army as lieutenant general and aide-de-camp to Alexander I. Aiding in Russia in ending Napoleon's efforts to conquer Eastern Europe, Jomini was allowed to abstain from all military action that took place on French soil. Advancing to general-in-chief in the service of Russia in 1826, he became the military tutor of the Tzarevich Nicholas. As one of his final duties in the Russian military, Jomini was put in charge of organizing the Russian staff college in 1830.

Under Bonaparte, the French had revolutionized warfare by decentralizing command, using a predominately conscripted force and vesting both political and military power in a single leader. Influenced by Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar, Napoleon had little concern for individual victories or defeats, and even placed the conquest of land secondary; he focused on the overall goal of destroying his enemy through a massed concentration of force. The observation of Napoleon's battle strategy strongly influenced Jomini's theory and became the foundation of his greatest work, 1836's Precis de l'art de la guerre, translated in 1862 as The Art of War, which was written to provide military instruction for the Grand Duke of Russia, the future Nicholas I. Jomini believed that after the age of Napoleon, war would no longer be considered the private affair of individual monarchs; instead it would be waged nation against nation. In his Precis he defined for the first time the three main categories of military activity - strategy, tactics, and logistics - and postulated his "Fundamental Principle of War."

Jomini's "Fundamental Principle of War" involved four maxims: 1) To maneuver the mass of the army, successively upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and attack the enemy's lines of communication as frequently as possible while still protecting ones own; 2) To quickly maneuver and engage fractions of the enemy's army with the majority of one's own; 3) To focus the attack on a "decisive point," such as weak or undefended areas in the enemy lines; 4) To economize one's own force on supporting attacks so that the focus of effort could attack - preferably by surprise - the decisive point at the proper time with sufficient force. He also advocated use of the turning movement, through which an adversary was overcome by moving beyond its position and attacking from the rear, and believed that adversaries in retreat should continue to be pursued as a means of beating them psychologically. He viewed leadership as a prime requirement for military success and appraised character as "above all other requisites in a commander in chief." However, he also recognized that a commander who possessed great character but lacked intellectual training would never be a great general; the necessary characteristic of a winning general would be the combination of intellect and natural leadership. Jomini strongly advocated simplicity and praised the Napoleonic strategy of a quick victory gained by quickly massing troops, as well as the French general's objective of capturing capital cities as a signal of defeat. He also provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation." Jomini cared little for the political niceties of war; in his view governments choose the best commander possible, then free that person to wage war as he deems appropriate.

Influence Spanned the Centuries

Jomini's writings, which constitute over 25 translated works, continued to influence military leaders in both Europe and North America for much of the nineteenth century. His systematization of Napoleon's modus operandi became accepted military doctrine during the U.S. Civil War and was used by generals at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. However, more recent scholars have viewed Jomini as a chronicler of pre-modern warfare. As a military strategist, he was often compared with Prussian contemporary Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), whose 1833 treatise Vom Kriege was considered by many scholars to be romanticized. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini was vague and contradicted himself on the importance of genius. Like Clausewitz, however, his focus remained on the Napoleonic "great battle" rather than the more modern war composed of multiple armed encounters. Among Jomini's other writings was a well-received 1864 Life of Napoleon and a political and military history of Napoleon's Waterloo campaign.

After publishing his Precis, Jomini retired from the Russian military. He moved to Brussels, but continued to be sought out for his expertise. In 1854 Jomini was called to advise the future Czar Nicholas I on the Crimean War and was consulted by French leader Napoleon III on the 1859 Italian campaign. Until 1888 he was considered by the English to be preeminent among military strategists, and his books were required reading in military academies. U.S. generals such as George B. McClellan and Robert E. Lee were said to have gone into battle armed with a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other. Reported to be of sound mind as late as his nineties, Jomini continued to insist that his principles would endure despite the changing face of modern warfare as a result of the development of technological advances such as railways and telegraphs. He died on March 24, 1869, at his home in Passy, France.

Books

Charters, David A., and others, editors, Military History and the Military Profession, Praeger, 1992.

Earle, Edward M., editor, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton University Press, 1944.

Handel, Michael I., Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini, Frank Cass, 1992.

Howard, Michael, editor, The Theory and Practice of War, Indiana University Press, 1975.

Jomini, Antoine Henri, The Art of War, translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, Lippincott, 1862, reprinted, Greenwood Press, 1971.

Periodicals

Galaxy, January-July 1869.

Marine Corps Gazette, December 1970; August 1988.

Military Affairs, Spring 1964; December 1974.

Military Review, February 1959.

Naval War College Review, autumn, 1990.

Online

Antoine-Henri Jomini,http://www.ostrogradsky.com (March 14, 2003).

Jomini

Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini (March 6, 1779–March 24, 1869) was a general in the French and later in the Russian service, and one of the most celebrated writers on the Napoleonic art of war. According to the historian John Shy, Jomini "deserves the dubious title of founder of modern strategy."^[1]

Contents 1 Early life and business career 2 Swiss Army 3 Service in the Napoleonic Wars 3.1 French Army 3.2 Russian Army 4 Post-war service and retirement 5 Works 6 See also 7 Notes 8 References 8.1 Works cited 8.2 Works by Jomini 8.3 Bibliography 9 External links

Early life and business career

Jomini was born in Payerne in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, where ^[2] his father served as mayor on March 6, 1779.^[3] The Jominis "were an old Swiss family"^[3] of Italian descent^[2] with a decidedly pro-French outlook.^[3] As a young boy, Jomini "was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war," and hoped to join the military, but his parents pushed him towards a career in business. As a result, Jomini entered a business school in Aarau at the age of 14.^[2]

In April 1795, Jomini left school and went to work at the banking house of Monsieurs Preiswerk in Basle. In 1796, he moved to Paris where he worked first at another banking house and then as a stock broker.^[2] After a short time in banking, however, "Jomini convinced himself that the tedious life of a banker was not to be compared with the the life afforded in French Army," and decided to become a military officer as soon as he found an opportunity.^[4]

Swiss Army

In 1798, after the establishment of the Helvetic Republic, Jomini became an "eager revolutionary", following the example of Frédéric-César de La Harpe and found a position in the new Swiss government as a secretary for the Minister of War with the rank of captain.^[3] In 1799, after being promoted to the rank of major, Jomini took responsibility for reorganizing the operations of the ministry. In that capacity, he standardized many procedures, and used his position "to experiment with organizational systems and strategies."^[2]

After the peace of Lunéville in 1801, Jomini returned to Paris, where he worked for a military equipment manufacturer. He found the job uninteresting, and spent most of his time preparing his first book on military theory: Traité des grandes operations militaires (Treatise on Grand Military Operations).^[2] Michel Ney, one of Napoleon's top generals, read the book in 1803 and subsidized its publication.^[5] The book appeared in several volumes from 1804 to 1810,^[2] and was "quickly translated and widely discussed" throughout Europe.^[6]

Service in the Napoleonic Wars

French Army

In 1805, Jomini served in the campaign of Austerlitz as a volunteer aide-de-camp on Ney's personal staff, and in December of that year, he was offered a commission as a colonel in the French Army. He joined without hesitation and served on Ney's staff. Jomini fought with Ney at the Battle of Ulm and served as his senior aide-de-camp at the Battle of Jena.^[2]

In 1806 Jomini published his views as to the conduct of the impending war with Prussia. This, along with his knowledge of Frederick the Great's campaigns, which Jomini had described in the Traité, led Napoleon to attach him to his own headquarters. Jomini was present with Napoleon at the Jena and at Eylau he won the cross of the Legion of Honour.

After the peace of Tilsit Jomini was made chief of the staff to Ney and created a Baron. In the Spanish campaign of 1808 his advice was often of the highest value to the marshal, but Jomini quarrelled with his chief, and was left almost at the mercy of his numerous enemies, especially Louis Alexandre Berthier, the emperor's chief of staff.

Russian Army

Portrait by George Dawe from the Military Gallery of the Winter Palace.

Overtures had been made to him, as early as 1807, to enter the Russian service, but Napoleon, hearing of his intention to leave the French army, compelled him to remain in the service with the rank of general of brigade.

For some years thereafter Jomini held both a French and a Russian commission, with the consent of both sovereigns. But when war between France and Russia broke out, he was in a difficult position, which he dealt with by taking a non-combat command on the line of communication.

Jomini was thus engaged when the retreat from Moscow and the uprising of Prussia transferred the seat of war to central Germany. He promptly rejoined Ney, took part in the battle of Lützen. As chief of the staff of Ney's group of corps, he rendered distinguished services before and at the battle of Bautzen, and was recommended for the rank of general of division. Berthier, however, not only erased Jomini's name from the list but put him under arrest and censured him in army orders for failing to supply certain staff reports that had been called for.

How far Jomini was responsible for certain misunderstandings which prevented the attainment of all the results hoped for from Ney's attack at Bautzen, we cannot be sure. But the pretext for censure was in Jomini's own view trivial and baseless, and during the armistice Jomini did as he had intended to do in 1809–10, and went into the Russian service. As things then were, this was tantamount to deserting to the enemy, and so it was regarded by many in the French army, and by not a few of his new comrades. It must be observed, in Jomini's defense, that he had for years held a dormant commission in the Russian army and that he had declined to take part in the invasion of Russia in 1812. More important—and a point that Napoleon commented upon—was the fact that he was a Swiss citizen, not a Frenchman.

His Swiss patriotism was indeed strong, and he withdrew from the Allied Army in 1814 when he found that he could not prevent the allies' violation of Swiss neutrality. Apart from love of his own country, the desire to study, to teach and to practise the art of war was his ruling motive. At the critical moment of the battle of Eylau he had exclaimed, "If I were the Russian commander for two hours!" On joining the allies he received the rank of lieutenant-general and the appointment of aide-de-camp from the tsar, and rendered important assistance during the German campaign: an accusation that he had betrayed the numbers, positions and intentions of the French to the enemy was later acknowledged by Napoleon to be without foundation. As a Swiss patriot and as a French officer, he declined to take part in the passage of the Rhine at Basel and the subsequent invasion of France.

In 1815 he was with Tsar Alexander in Paris, and attempted in vain to save the life of his old commander Ney. This defense of Ney almost cost Jomini his position in the Russian service. He succeeded, however, in overcoming the resistance of his enemies and took part in the Congress of Vienna.

Post-war service and retirement

After several years of retirement and literary work, Jomini resumed his post in the Russian army, and in about 1823 was made a full General. Thenceforward until his retirement in 1829 he was principally employed in the military education of the Tsarevich Nicholas (afterwards Emperor) and in the organization of the Russian staff college, which was opened in 1832 and bore its original name of the Nicholas Academy up to the October Revolution of 1917. In 1828 he was employed in the field in the Russo-Turkish War, and at the Siege of Varna he was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Alexander Order.

Commemoration plaque

This was his last active service. In 1829 he settled in Brussels which served as his main place of residence for the next thirty years. In 1853, after trying without success to bring about a political understanding between France and Russia, Jomini was called to St Petersburg to act as a military adviser to the Tsar during the Crimean War. He returned to Brussels upon the conclusion of peace in 1856. Later he settled at Passy near Paris. He was busily employed up to the end of his life in writing treatises, pamphlets and open letters on subjects of military art and history. In 1859 he was asked by Napoleon III to furnish a plan of campaign for the Italian War. One of his last essays dealt with the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the influence of the breech-loading rifle. He died at Passy only a year before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

Works

Jomini's military writings are frequently caricatured: he took a didactic, prescriptive approach, reflected in a detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases, strategic lines, and key points. His operational prescription was fundamentally simple: put superior combat power at the decisive point. In the famous theoretical Chapter 25 of the Traité de grande tactique, he stressed the exclusive superiority of interior lines.

As one writer rather partial to Carl von Clausewitz--Jomini's great competitor in the field of military theory—put it:

Jomini was no fool, however. His intelligence, facile pen, and actual experience of war made his writings a great deal more credible and useful than so brief a description can imply. Once he left Napoleon's service, he maintained himself and his reputation primarily through prose. His writing style--unlike Clausewitz's--reflected his constant search for an audience. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects (logistics, seapower) that Clausewitz had largely ignored. Elements of his discussion (his remarks on Great Britain and seapower, for instance, and his sycophantic treatment of Austria's Archduke Charles) are clearly aimed at protecting his political position or expanding his readership. And, one might add, at minimizing Clausewitz's, for he clearly perceived the Prussian writer as his chief competitor. For Jomini, Clausewitz's death thirty-eight years prior to his own came as a piece of rare good fortune.^[7]

See also

• Military strategy
• List of military theorists

Notes

1. ^ Shy, p. 144
2. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} "Antoine Henri Jomini"
3. ^ ^{a b c d} Shy, p. 146
4. ^ Hittle, p. 3
5. ^ Shy, p. 147
6. ^ Shy, p. 151
7. ^ Bassford, Christopher. "Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction." Paper presented to the 24th Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University, 26 February 1993. Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, XX (1992). Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University, 1994.

References

Works cited

• "Antoine Henri Jomini." Encyclopedia of World Biography Supplement, Vol. 23. Gale, 2003.

Reproduced in Biography Resource Center. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2009. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/BioRC

• Hittle, J.D. (1958). "Introduction". Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co.. 
• Shy, John. ""Jomini"". in Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

Works by Jomini

• Jomini, Henri. Traité de grande tactique, ou, Relation de la guerre de sept ans, extraite de Tempelhof, commentée at comparée aux principales opérations de la derniére guerre; avec un recueil des maximes les plus important de l'art militaire, justifiées par ces différents évenéments. Paris: Giguet et Michaud, 1805. In English translation as: Jomini, Antoine­-Henri, trans. Col. S.B. Holabird, U.S.A. Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System, 2 vols. New York: D. van Nostrand, 1865.
• Jomini, Le Baron de. Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire. Brussels: Meline, Cans et Copagnie, 1838. In English translation as: Jomini, Baron de, trans. Major O.F. Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean [USA]. The Art of War. New York: G.P. Putnam, 1854; Jomini, Baron de, trans. Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill [USA]. The Art of War. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1862; reprinted, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971; reprinted, with a new introduction by Charles Messenger, London: Greenhill Books, 1992.
• Jomini, Le Baron de. Histoire critique et militaire des campagnes de la Revolution (1806; new ed. 1819-1824), Paris and Brussels, 1806, 1824.
• Jomini, Le Baron de. Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon recontèe par lui-meme au Tribunal de Cèsar d'Alexandre et de Frederic, 4vol., Anselin, Paris, 1827

Bibliography

• Elting, John R. "Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?" Military Affairs, Spring 1964, 17-26.
• Lecomte, Ferdinand. Le Général Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits (1861; new ed. 1888).
• Pascal, A. Observations historiques sur la vie, &c., du général Jomini (1842).
• Sainte-Beuve, C.A., Le Général Jomini (1869).
• Shy, John. "Jomini." In Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
• Swain, Colonel [USA] Richard M. "`The Hedgehog and the Fox': Jomini, Clausewitz, and History." Naval War College Review, Autumn 1990, 98-109.

This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, a publication now in the public domain.

External links

• Works by Antoine-Henri Jomini at Project Gutenberg
• (English) The Art of War Full text from Project Gutenberg
• (English) Notice of the Present Theory of War, and of Its Utility
• (French) Monographie du général Jomini
• The Influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's Le Précis de l'Art de la Guerre

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