Dictionary:

appeasement

  (ə-pēz'mənt)

1. 1. An act of appeasing.
   2. The condition of being appeased.
2. The policy of granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace.

Definition: satisfaction; pacification
Antonyms: aggravation, annoyance, irritation, provocation, resistance

A policy of acceding to hostile demands in order to gain peace. The term is today normally used in a pejorative sense by most politicians and communicators. Its alleged practitioners are usually held to be willing, in an ignoble or cowardly fashion, to sacrifice other people's territories or rights in an attempt to buy off an aggressor or wrong-doer. Moreover ‘appeasement’ is supposed never to succeed for long: the aggressor always returns demanding further concessions. And the implication is usually that refusal to ‘appease’ would, by contrast, have a happy ending as in any morality play.

‘Appeasement’ has often been seen in these terms ever since the outbreak of the European war over Poland in 1939. But the word had no such connotations when it first became fashionable during the 1920s and early 1930s. As late as 1936 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, later widely thought of as an ‘anti-appeaser’, stated in the House of Commons that ‘it is the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have continually before us’. A consensus had developed in most countries, and in Great Britain in particular, that the Peace Settlement of 1919, based on questionable assumptions about war guilt, had been too severe to the First World War's defeated powers. Hence it was thought that the way to avoid a second such war was for the victors to try to meet the reasonably justified grievances of the losers. This meant working by negotiation to end reparations, to address German grievances with respect to permitted levels of armaments, to evacuate those parts of Germany that were occupied by the victors, and to meet claims for frontier adjustments in cases involving a denial of the principle of self-determination. At first, France, supported by some of her East European allies, was hesitant about accepting this approach. But gradually Great Britain, supported by most other countries, broke down French resistance.

The rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany 1933 did not at first make much difference to this pursuit of ‘appeasement’ by the victors of 1918. It was widely hoped that he would become more moderate as he gained experience in office and as Germany's reasonable grievances were met. Thus Great Britain and France did nothing to prevent Hitler's proclamation that ‘illegal’ German rearmament was taking place, his remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss (annexation) with Austria. Nor would public opinion in Great Britain or France, still less in the United States, have favoured war over these issues. A war against Mussolini's Italy for attacking Abyssinia would have been more popular, but the British and French governments were too afraid of the growing strength of Germany and Japan to take any serious risk of joining in a conflict that did not directly affect their interests.

The public mood in Great Britain and France changed only in 1938-9—largely as a result of Hitler's treatment of Czechoslovakia. Hitler seemed at first to have a reasonable case when he drew attention to the discontent of the German-speaking minority of Czechoslovak citizens living in the Sudetenland area that was contiguous to Germany. And British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was generally applauded when he masterminded the transfer of this territory to Germany at the Munich Conference held in September 1938. But Winston Churchill led a vociferous minority who claimed that Hitler had behaved in such a threatening manner that he had effectively humiliated Great Britain and France and that he was really aiming at European mastery if not world conquest.

In March 1939 Churchill appeared to have been vindicated when Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia without serious justification. It seems probable that Chamberlain's initial inclination was nevertheless to continue with the policy of ‘appeasement’ as long as Hitler continued to move east. For he recognized that Great Britain had never seen Eastern Europe as an area of vital interest and he was aware that in any case the military balance of forces was not such as to make it easy to check Hitler in that region. And he had no desire to ally with the Soviet Union whose communist system he detested even more than fascism. But the majority in the British Cabinet, responding to public opinion, decided to abandon ‘appeasement’. Accordingly, a ‘security guarantee’ was given to Poland and this was honoured with an Anglo-French declaration of war in September 1939 when Germany invaded. The policy of ‘appeasement’ was thus discredited and has remained so among ordinary people ever since.

Some historians have attempted to launch ‘revisionist’ accounts that support Chamberlain's broad approach. They point out that Great Britain and France were unable to defeat Germany in 1939-40—with the result that Poland was to be subjugated for half a century. As A. J. P. Taylor, an early ‘revisionist’, wrote: ‘Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better—to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole?’

— David Carlton

For more information on appeasement, visit Britannica.com.

Appeasement is generally used to describe the policy towards Nazi Germany pursued by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain between 1937 and 1939, and has negative connotations. In fact, appeasement had a more respectable history. British unhappiness with the reparations required to be paid by Germany after the First World War led to a policy of economic appeasement. During the early years of Nazi rule in Germany (1933-6) a similar policy operated in relation to trade; in April 1933 an Anglo-German Trade Pact was concluded by Ramsay MacDonald's National Government, in the belief that although the Nazis were not likeable, one ought to do business with them.

Anglo-French acquiescence in Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland March 1936), in violation of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, marked a new phase of appeasement. In March 1938 Hitler ordered the anschluss, the union with Austria forbidden at Versailles, and indicated his determination also to meet the demands (real or imaginary) of Germans living in the Sudetenland, in Czechoslovakia, for union with Germany. At Munich, on 29 September 1938, the Sudetenland was transferred to Germany. Chamberlain, who visited Hitler twice during this crisis, was a national hero. Only after the German occupation of Prague March 1939) was appeasement abandoned.

A political policy of conceding to aggression by a warlike nation.

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Appeasement is a policy of accepting the imposed conditions of an aggressor in lieu of armed resistance, usually at the sacrifice of principles. Usually it means giving into demands of an aggressor in order to avoid war. Since World War II, the term has gained a negative connotation in the British government, in politics and in general, of weakness, cowardice and self-deception. A famous example is Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy during the inter-war period 1919-1939 when he used a policy of appeasement in order to prevent (in vain) another general European war.

Different views on Appeasement

The meaning of the term "appeasement" has changed throughout the years. According to Paul Kennedy in his Strategy and Diplomacy, 1983, appeasement is "the policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be, expensive, bloody and possibly dangerous." It gained its negative reputation for its use in the build up to World War II. It had previously been employed by the British government successfully, see The Treaty with Ireland 1921.

Further quotations:

"At bottom, the old appeasement was a mood of hope, Victorian in its optimism, Burkean in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good and that progress could only be for the better. The new appeasement was a mood of fear, Hobbesian in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was there to stay and, however horrible it might be, should be accepted as a way of life with which Britain ought to deal." Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement, 1968.

"Each course brought its share of disadvantages: there was only a choice of evils. The crisis in the British global position by this time was such that it was, in the last resort, insoluble, in the sense that there was no good or proper solution." Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1983.

"The word in its normal meaning connotes the Pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Chamberlain's premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense." D.N. DIlks, Appeasement Revisited, Journal of Contemporary History, 1972.

The majority of the Conservative party in Britain in the late thirties were in favour of appeasement. This was mainly because they considered that Hitler would be satisfied with gaining control of parts of Central Europe. Churchill was relatively isolated in believing that Germany could be a threat for the British Empire.

However, appeasement has also been deemed successful by many historians, as with the 'bought' year of 1938-39, Britain rapidly increased military production and with the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia allowed the protection of the British Isles. ^{[citation needed]} It must, however, also be pointed out, that in turn, Nazi Germany was able to significantly boost its military power in the time thus granted, and quite possibly to a greater extent than the Allies^{[citation needed]}, particularly since the annexation of Czechoslovakia gave the third Reich access to well-developed Czech industrial resources and significantly improved its strategic standing, avoiding a conflict through the unfavorable terrain of the Czech-German border (even where this was unfortified) in comparison to Poland, which also suffered afterwards from a lengthened border with Germany.^{[citation needed]}

As said by Winston Churchill^[1]:

“

An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last.

”

References

1. ^ Churchill Quote. Retrieved on April 07, 2007.

Bibliography

• Alex Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," World Politics 29 (1977)
• Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," International Security 14 (1989) in JSTOR
• John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (1989)
• Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the Manipulation of the Press (1989).
• Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938-June 1941 (1991)
• James Levy. Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936-1939, (2006)
• Frank McDonough, Richard Brown, and David Smith. Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement (2002)
• Peter Neville. Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War (2005)
• Gaines Post Jr.; Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937 Cornell University Press. 1993
• G. C. Peden, "A Matter of Timing: The Economic Background to British Foreign Policy, 1937-1939," History 69 (1984)
• Stephen R. Rock. Appeasement in International Politics (2000)
• Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (1989).
• Robert Paul Shay, Jr., "British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits" Princeton University Press" (1977).

See also

• Appeasement of Hitler - one of the most significant and best-known cases of appeasement in history during the inter-war period of the 1930s
• Danegeld - The term has come to be used as a warning and a criticism of paying any coercive payment whether in money or kind.
• Finlandization - the influence that one neighboring powerful country can have on the policies of a smaller nearby country

External links

• Eulogy for Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill

Further reading

• British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age Of Appeasement, 1935-1939 - R.J.Q. Adams

• British Foreign and Imperial Affairs, 1919-39 - Alan Farmer (2nd Ed.)
• British Foreign Policy 1919-39 - Paul W Doerr
• British Appeasement in the 1930s - William R Rock
• Churchill - Roy Jenkins
• Baldwin - Roy Jenkins
• Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation - David Dutton
• Eden - D. R. Thorpe
• Europe and the Czechs - Penguin Books Shiela Grant Duff, September 1938
• Neville Chamberlain - David Dutton
• The Fascist Challenge And The Policy Of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, London : G. Allen & Unwin, 1983 ISBN 0-04-940068-1.
• The Parting of Ways - A Personal Account of the Thirties. Peter Owen, 1982, ISBN 0-7206-0586-5
• Munich : Prologue to Tragedy - Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, New York : Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.

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