- For other uses of "Zimmermann", see Zimmermann (disambiguation)
Arthur Zimmermann (October 5, 1864 - June 6, 1940) was State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire from November 22, 1916,
until his resignation on August 6, 1917. His name is associated
with the Zimmermann Telegram during World War
I. However, he was also closely involved in plans to support an Irish rebellion, an
Indian rebellion, and to help the Communists
undermine Tsarist Russia.
His career
He was born in Marggrabova (now part of Olecko,
Mazury, Poland) in East
Prussia, and died of pneumonia in Berlin. He studied law from 1884 to 1887 in Königsberg, East Prussia, and Leipzig. A period as a junior lawyer followed
and later he received his doctorate of law. In 1893, he took up a career in diplomacy and entered the consular service in Berlin.
He arrived in China in 1896 (Canton in 1898), and rose to the rank of consul in 1900. While stationed in the Far East,
he witnessed the Boxer Rebellion in China.
Later he was called to the Foreign Office, became Under Secretary of State in 1911, and on November 24 1916, he accepted his confirmation as Secretary of State,
succeeding Gottlieb von Jagow in this position. Actually, he had assumed a large
share of his superior's negotiations with foreign envoys for several years prior to his appointment because of von Jagow's
reservedness in office. He was the first non-aristocrat to serve as foreign secretary.
The Kronrat
As acting secretary he had also taken part in the so-called Kronrat, the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser
William II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, in which the decision was taken to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo,
which ultimately was to lead to the outbreak of war. He later disavowed the name Kronrat since it was the Kaiser's opinion
that was decisive in the discussion, but with which Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann concurred.
His resignation
On August 6, 1917, he resigned as foreign secretary and was
succeeded by Richard von Kühlmann.
One of the causes of his resignation was the famous telegram he sent on January 16 1917. Two-and a half years into World War I, the United States had
maintained a status of strict neutrality while the Allied armies had been fighting those of the Central Powers in the trenches of northern France and Belgium. Although President Woodrow Wilson had been re-elected – winning
the election on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war" – it became increasingly difficult to maintain that position.
After the Royal Navy had been engaged in a successful naval blockade against all German
shipping for some time, the German Supreme High Command concluded that only a total submarine
offensive would break the stranglehold. Although the decision was made on January 9,
1917, the Americans were not informed of the operation until January
31. The Germans abrogated their Sussex pledge (not to sink merchant ships without
due warning and to save human lives wherever possible) and began an unrestricted U-boat campaign
on February 1, 1917. Since it was obvious that US shipping
would also come under attack in the course of this operation, it became just a matter of time before the USA was drawn into the
conflict.
See Zimmermann telegram for a detailed description of the telegram and the events
surrounding it.
Background to the telegram
Germany had been pursuing various interests in Mexico from the beginning of the
20th century. Although a latecomer in the area, with Spain, Britain, and France having
established themselves there centuries earlier, the Kaiser's Germany too attempted to secure a continuing presence. This entailed
many different approaches to the Mexican Republic and its changing, often revolutionary governments as well as, if not always,
assuring the United States of Germany's peaceful intentions. German diplomacy in that area depended on sympathetic relations with
the Mexican government of the day. During Arthur Zimmermann's period in office, among the options discussed, Germany offered to
improve communications between the two nations and suggested that Mexico purchase German submarines for its navy.
After Francisco Villa's cross-border raids into New
Mexico, President Wilson sent a punitive expedition into Mexico to pursue the raiders. It was then, that the Germans were
encouraged to believe (mistakenly) that this and other concerns in the area, would tie up US resources and military operations
for some time to come, sufficiently to justify the overtures made by Arthur Zimmermann in the telegram to the Venustiano Carranza government. The proposals included an agreement for a German alliance with
Mexico, while Germany would still try to maintain a state of neutrality with the United States. If this policy were to fail, the
note suggested, the Mexican government should make common cause with Germany, try to persuade the Japanese government to join the
new alliance, and attack the US. Germany on its part would promise financial assistance and the restoration of its former
territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico.
It is against this background that the Zimmermann telegram has to be seen.
The sending of the telegram
On 16 January 1917 Foreign Secretary Zimmermann sent the
telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff, who
in his turn forwarded it secretly to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von
Eckardt.
British intelligence intercepted it on 17 January, but were unable to decipher it at that
stage as it had been sent in a new code which neither the British cryptographers nor the
German embassy in Mexico possessed. It was only when it had been transcribed for von Eckardt into the old code, which too was
duly intercepted, that the British were able to compare the two codes and so were able to read the latest code and learn the
contents of the message.
It was at this stage that British intelligence realized that to transmit the telegram without delay to President Wilson would
indicate to the Germans that Britain was able to decipher their codes, a fact which would jeopardize British intelligence operations. A British agent then obtained
a copy of the Mexican version of the cable, with slight variations in the text, and thus rendered it plausible how Britain knew
of the telegram.
Its effect
On February 24, the telegram was finally delivered to the US ambassador in Britain,
Walter Hines Page, who two days later retransmitted it to President Wilson. On
March 1, the United States Government passed the text of the telegram to the press.
At first, some sectors of the US papers, especially those of the Hearst press
empire, tried to claim that the telegram was a forgery by British intelligence in an attempt to persuade the US government to
enter the war on Britain's side. This opinion was reinforced by German and Mexican diplomats, as well as pro-German and pacifist
opinion-formers in the United States. However, on March 29 1917,
Arthur Zimmermann gave a speech confirming the text of the telegram and so put an end to all speculation as to its
authenticity.
By that time a number of US ships had been torpedoed with heavy loss of life, and on April 2,
President Wilson asked Congress to agree to declare war on Germany, and on April 6 Congress
complied. The United States had entered World War I on the Allied side.
Arthur Zimmermann's speech
The speech was intended to explain his side of the situation. He began that he had not written a letter to Carranza but had
given instructions to the German ambassador via a "route that had appeared to him to be a safe one".
He also said that despite the submarine offensive, he had hoped that the USA would remain neutral. His instructions (to the
Mexican government) were only to be carried out after the US declared war, and he believed his instructions to be "absolutely
loyal as regards the US". In fact, he blamed President Wilson for breaking off relations with Germany "with extraordinary
roughness" after the telegram was received, and that therefore the German ambassador "no longer had the opportunity to explain
the German attitude, and that the US government had declined to negotiate".
Thinking that the USA would remain neutral while their ships were being attacked does indicate extreme naivety on Arthur
Zimmermann's part. However, it is possible he was hoping (in an equally naïve way) the world would see the desperate situation
Germany had found itself in during the blockade of German shipping, and it would bring some understanding to that situation.
There was honesty in his speech since he would have had occasion to reflect on the impact of the telegram and its aftereffects
in the meantime, yet still was prepared to present its original ideas. However, it also revealed he was seriously misinformed
about the real strength of the United States vis-à-vis its southern neighbour, but that was the fault of the German intelligence
services.
Mexico's reply
Later, a general assigned by Carranza to assess the realities of a Mexican takeover of their former provinces came to the
conclusion that it would not work. Taking over the three states would almost certainly cause future problems and possibly war
with the US; Mexico would also be unable to accommodate a large Anglo population within its borders; and Germany would not be
able to supply the arms needed in the hostilities that would surely arise.
Carranza declined Zimmermann's proposals on April 14.
The fact-finding mission of Nuncio Pacelli
At the end of June 1917, Zimmermann found the first real opportunity for paving the way to peace negotiations during his
period of administration. At several meetings with Nuncio Eugenio
Pacelli (later to become Pope Pius XII) and Uditore
Szioppa, who were on a fact-finding mission, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann outlined their plans. There would
be no annexations of territories, no border adjustments with Russia, Poland was to remain an independent state, all occupied
areas of France and Belgium were to be evacuated, and Alsace-Lorraine would be ceded to
France. The only exception in return was to be the restitution of all former German colonies to Germany.
That none of these plans came to fruition was due to the fact that neither of the two German participants would be very much
longer in office.
As an afterthought, it was Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's belief – unlike that of the General Staff's – that once the
United States entered the war, the prospects for Germany would indeed be bleak.
Nurse Edith Cavell's execution
Arthur Zimmermann as foreign secretary also felt called upon to comment on Edith
Cavell's execution by firing squad on October 12 1915.
The incident had caused a sensation in the UK and US press and political capital was being made out of it. He began by saying
that "it was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed", but that it was necessary.
He continued by saying that although it was a terrible thing that the woman had been executed, consideration should be given
to the consequences if a state, particularly one at war, were to leave women unpunished after they had committed crimes aimed at
the safety of its armies. No criminal court in the world – least of all one with jurisdiction over the laws of war – would make
such a distinction (as man and woman are equal before the law), etc. He had before him the court's verdict and was "convinced
that no court in the world would have given any other verdict", and so on.
Looked at in those days, although it was part of his office to defend the indefensible, to the world it would have been easy
to condemn him for this, especially since these crimes in peacetime almost certainly would have been no crimes at all. But with
hindsight, we have gained some understanding of some of the processes which caused these "miscarriages" of justice, especially
since the offence of "cowardice before the enemy", for example, was punishable by firing squad in most armies.
Peace in the East
In March 1917, with the imminent collapse of the Russian front, Zimmermann took steps to promote Peace in the East with
the Russians, a proposal that was of immense importance to Germany at the time. The foreign secretary set forth the following:
regulations for frontline contacts with the opposite side; reciprocal withdrawal of the occupied areas; an amicable agreement
about Poland, Lithuania and Kurland; and a promise to aid Russia in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. Last not least, Lenin and the emigré revolutionaries would be allowed to pass through Germany to Russia by train. These
proposals once carried out, would free Germany's armies in the east and allow them to be concentrated in the west, a
master-stroke that would reinforce the German western front vastly. Zimmermann thus contributed to the outcome of the
October Revolution.
See also
External links
References
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