Asymmetric warfare originally referred to war between two or more actors or groups whose relative power differs
significantly. Contemporary military thinkers tend to broaden this to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics; today "asymmetric
warfare" can describe a military situation in which two belligerents of unequal power
interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of
unconventional warfare, the "weaker" combatants attempting to use strategy to
offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.[1]
History
Typically at least one of the parties involved may be referred to as partisans.
Partisan comes from the Tuscan word, "partigiano", meaning a member of a party of light or
irregular troops engaged in harassing an enemy, esp. a member of a guerrilla band
engaged in fighting or sabotage against an occupying army.
The first known wide usage of asymmetric war was by Parthians, who freed Persia from Seleucid rule (remaining from Alexander's invasion) and continued the same techniques against Romans and other invaders from the North of the empire.[2]
Strategic basis
In most conventional warfare, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type and the outcome can be predicted by the
quantity of the opposing forces or by their quality, for example better command and control of their forces. There are times
where this is not true because the composition or strategy of the forces makes it impossible for either side to close in battle
with the other. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the French army and the maritime forces
of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the
words of Admiral Jervis during Campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not
come. I say only they will not come by sea".
Tactical basis
The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
- One side can have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the decisive
English Longbow at the Battle of Agincourt
is an example. The advantage may be the other way around. For example, the vast numerical superiority of the Chinese forces
during their initial involvement in the Korean War overwhelmed the technological superiority
of the United Nations forces.
- Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For
example, for several centuries the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx made them far superior to their enemies. The Battle of
Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well
known example.
- If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use
unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles in which the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of
harassment without violating the Laws of war. This tactic can sometimes be used to play on
the inward political situations of a nation and its citizens' patience with the war, perhaps provoking demonstrations.
- If the inferior power is in an aggressive position, however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war
(jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like
tactics. For example, the Law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce
or clearly-marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic
depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from using
civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior power uses this tactic, it depends on the
premise that the superior power will respect the law that they are violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if
they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.
The use of terrain in asymmetric warfare
Terrain can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force
inhibitor against the larger force. Such terrain is called difficult terrain.
The contour of the land is an aid to the army; sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances…
those who do battle without knowing these will lose. ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Tactics usually attributed to guerrilla warfare are often used in asymmetrical
warfare by the smaller side. In both cases, the forces may rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence and
difficult terrain for cover and escape. The population and terrain are often well-known to native forces, who can use both to
escape reprisal from conventional armies and supply themselves to continue their operations. The use of asymmetrical tactics by
outside forces often requires extensive reconnaissance to make use of terrain
characteristics.
Minority forces often operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and
mountainous areas. This tactic takes advantage of the relative immobility of a larger army in such terrain. In urban areas they
will blend into the population and are often dependent on a support base among the people to hide their whereabouts.
The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. ― Mao Zedong.
For a detailed description of the advantages for the weaker force in the use of built-up areas when engaging in asymmetric
warfare, see the article on urban warfare.
War by proxy
Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or
sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by
proxy. This is typically done to give deniability to the state
actor. The deniability can be important to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to
negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or
to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war
crimes.
Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
There are two different viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and terrorism.[citation needed] In the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a
component of fourth generation warfare.[citation needed] When practiced outside the
laws of war, it is often defined as "terrorism". Terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic by
the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict.
The other view is that asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with terrorism, even though
terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic by the weaker side.[citation needed] It is typical, in an asymmetric conflict, for the stronger side to accuse
the weaker side of being bandits, pillagers or terrorists. These accusations are usually part
of propaganda campaigns, although they are sometimes true. Some argue that asymmetric warfare
is sometimes called "terrorism" by those wishing to deny the political aims of their weaker opponents and to exploit the negative
connotations of the word. There are those who hold the view that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." An example of this is over Kashmir: the
Pakistanis claim that a war of freedom for the Kashmiris is being fought with the
Indians, who in turn, label them as terrorists. The sectarian killings upon Iraqi civilians by insurgents are
similarly labeled as terrorism by some and resistance by others.
One example of asymmetric warfare involving terrorism is the use of terrorism by the much lesser Mongol forces in the creation and control of the Mongol empire. The other
is the use of terrorism by the superior Nazi forces in the Balkans, in their attempt to suppress the resistance movement.
Examples of asymmetric warfare
20th century asymmetric warfare
Second Boer War
The Second Boer War was the first major war of the 20th century and one in which
asymmetric warfare featured prominently. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the
British captured Johannesburg, the Boers' largest city, and captured the capitals of the
two Boer Republics. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated by
the victors in the traditional European way. However instead of capitulating, the Boers fought a protracted guerrilla war. Between twenty and thirty thousand Boer commandos
were only defeated after the British brought to bear four hundred and fifty thousand troops, about ten times as many as were used
in the conventional phase of the war. During this phase the British introduced
internment in concentration camps for the Boer civilian population and also implemented a
scorched earth policy. Later, the British began using blockhouses built within machine gun range of one another and flanked by
barbed wire to slow the Boers' movement across the countryside and block paths to valuable
targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's counter insurgency tactics.
The Boer commando raids deep into the Cape Colony, which were organized and commanded by
Jan Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted for later use
the tactics used by the Boer commandos.
World War I
Post-World War I
- Abd-el-Krim resistance from 1920 to 1924 against a ten-times stronger French and Spanish
army, led by General Petain.
- TIGR, the first antifascist national-defensive organization in Europe, was fighting against
Mussolini's regime in the North-East Italy.
World War II
British
United States
Post World War 2
Cold War
The end of World War II established the two most powerful victors, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR, or just the Soviet Union) as the two dominant world superpowers.
Cold War examples of proxy wars
- See also proxy war
An example of war by proxy was East Germany's covert support for the Red Army Faction (RAF) which was active from 1968 and carried out a
succession of terrorist attacks in West Germany during the 1970s and to a lesser extent in the 1980s. After German reunification in 1990, it was discovered that the RAF had
received financial and logistic support from the Stasi, the security and intelligence organization of East Germany. It had also given
several RAF terrorists shelter and new identities. It had not been in the interests of either the RAF or the East Germans to be
seen as co-operating. The apologists for the RAF argued that they were striving for a true socialist (communist) society not the
sort that existed in Eastern Europe. The East German government was involved in Ostpolitik,
and it was not in its interest to be caught overtly aiding a terrorist organization operating in West Germany. For more details
see the History of Germany since 1945.
In the Korean War the Soviet Union aided the Communists in North Korea and China against
the United Nations forces led by the United States, but the Soviet Union did not enter the war directly.
In the Viet Nam War the Soviet Union supplied North Viet
Nam and the Viet Cong with training, logistics
and materiel but unlike the United States Armed
Forces they fought the war through their proxies and did not enter the conflict directly.
The war between the mujahadeen and the Red Army during
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a classic asymmetric war. The aid given
by the U.S. to the mujahadeen during the war was only covert at the tactical level, the
Reagan Administration told the world that it was helping the freedom-loving
people of Afghanistan. Of all the proxy wars fought by the USA against the USSR during the
Cold War this was the most cost effective and politically successful, as it was the USSR's most
humiliating military defeat, and that defeat was a contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet Union.
Post Cold War
In the rivalry that arose during the Cold War, small powers, especially those described as composing the Third World, were able to seek protection from one power or the other, or play the powers off against each
other, to try to achieve their own national or regional goals.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, powers that had been client states of the Soviet Union, states that were able
to gain aid and support from the United States as bulwarks against Soviet power, and states that had successfully played the
superpowers against each other, found themselves with fewer options to oppose the USA or gain material advantages from either of
the former rivals.
21st century
Israel/Palestinians
The battle between the Israelis and Palestinians
is a classic case of asymmetrical warfare. Israel has a powerful conventional army, while the Palestinians do not have a
regular army; instead, organizations (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) utilize asymmetric tactics to combat the larger,
more well equipped Israeli forces. For example: the Palestineans deploy their forces inside civilian areas and facilities in an
attempt to prevent Israel from responding with conventional forces and tactics, whereas Israel attacks those civilian areas and
facilities and assigns the responsibility to Palestinian and Lebanese armies for adopting the practice of human shielding.
Afghanistan
insert histories here
Iraq
The victory by the U.S. led coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf
War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, demonstrated that training, tactics and
technology can provide overwhelming victories in the field of battle during modern conventional warfare. After Saddam Hussein's
regime was removed from power and the 2003 Occupation of Iraq began, the
Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare
training, tactics and technology were of much less use against continued opposition from the various insurgent groups operating
inside Iraq.
See also
References
Further reading
Articles
- Christopher Hemmer, "Responding to a Nuclear Iran" [1]
- Robert B. Asprey, "War in the Shadows, The Guerilla in History", William Morrow, 1994, ISBN
0-688-12815-7, 1279 pages. Authoritative survey from Darius the Great to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly, 1994?.
- Barbara Tuchman, "The Proud Tower, Europe 1880–1914" re: anarchist assassins.
- UN reports on use of child soldiers as assassins.
- General Sir Rupert Smith, "The Utility of Force: The art of war in the modern world", Allen
Lane, 2006.
- Sun Tzu 6.
- Mackey, Robert R. (2004). The UnCivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861–1865. Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0-8061-3624-3. Asymmetric warfare as practiced by the Confederate States in the American Civil War. Includes
detailed information of U.S. Army counter-irregular operations as well as CSA irregulars.
Bibliographies
Books
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, New York & Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2005 ISBN 0-521-54869-1
- Barnett, Roger W., Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power, Washington D.C., Brassey's, 2003
ISBN 1-57488-563-4
- Bing, Stanley, Sun Tzu Was a Sissy: Conquer Your Enemies, Promote Your Friends, and Wage the Real Art of War, New
York, HarperCollins, 2004 ISBN 0-06-073477-9
- Friedman, George, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle
between the United States and Its Enemies, London, Little, Brown, 2004 ISBN 0-316-72862-4
- Giap, Vo Nguyen, People's War, People's Army, Honolulu, University Press of
the Pacific, 2001 ISBN 0-89875-371-6
- Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press,
1998 ISBN 0-8032-7075-5
- Kaplan, Robert D., Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos,
New York, Vintage, 2003 ISBN 0-375-72627-6
- Jon Latimer, Burma: The Forgotten War, London: John Murray, 2004 ISBN
0-7195-6576-6
- Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, Panama City, Pan American
Publishing Company, 2002 ISBN 0-9716807-2-8
- Metz, Steven and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy:
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College, 2001
ISBN 1-58487-041-9 [2]
- Poole, H. John, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods,
Emerald Isle, NC, Posterity Press, 2004 ISBN 0-9638695-7-4
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, New York, Dover Publications, 2002 ISBN 0-486-42557-6
- Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign, IL, University of Illinois Press,
2000 ISBN 0-252-06892-0
Articles and papers
- Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1
(Summer 2001), pp. 93–128.
- J. Paul Dunne, et al., "Managing Asymmetric Conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 58 (2006), pp. 183–208.
- C. A. "Bert" Fowler Asymmetric
Warfare: A Primer -- IEEE Spectrum, March, 2006. A mathematical approach to the
concept.
- Marcus Corbin Reshaping the
Military for Asymmetric Warfare CDI website October 5, 2001.
- Vincent J. Goulding, Jr. Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare From Parameters, Winter 2000–01, pp.
21–30.
- Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", World Politics, Vol. 27, No.
2 (January 1975), pp. 175–200.
- Montgomery C. Meigs Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare (PDF)
- Richard Norton-Taylor Asymmetric Warfare: Military Planners Are Only Beginning to Grasp the Implications of September 11 for Future
Deterrence Strategy, in The Guardian, October
3, 2001
- Michael Novak, "Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War: A Moral Obligation in NRO, February 10, 2003
- Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action, International Review of
the Red Cross Vol. 87 No. 857 (March 2005), p. 149-174.
- Jonathan B. Tucker Asymmetric Warfare, a 6 page analysis, Summer 1999.
- Asymmetry and other
fables, Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 August 2006
- David Buffaloe 'Defining Asymmetric Warfare' [3] September 2006
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