From the moment when Albert Einstein in 1940 suggested to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that a new and decisive military weapon, the atom bomb, might be developed from the phenomenon of the nuclear chain reaction, atomic scientists assumed a critical role in the development of weaponry that would change the nature of modern warfare. Important scientists involved at this early stage included the physicists Niels Bohr and Leo Szilard, and some of them opposed the use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945. The scientific knowledge and skills required to create such weapons—first the atom bomb and then the hydrogen bomb—separated this small group of scientists from their fellows, initially because of the extraordinary security requirements of the Manhattan Project, the program to design and build the first atomic bomb. Later, the weight of responsibility for creating a device that could for the first time destroy civilization led them to become involved in the most fundamental issues of international policy.
In 1953, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific leader of the Manhattan Project, had his security clearances revoked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, ostensibly because of admitted violations of security procedures; however, it was generally believed that the action was taken because of Oppenheimer's opposition to the development of the even more destructive hydrogen bomb, which was vigorously pressed by the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Adm. Lewis Strauss. During the security proceeding before the commission, Oppenheimer's colleague and close associate, the physicist Edward Teller, testified against him. As a result, Teller himself was ostracized by a large part of the atomic science community, symbolizing a fundamental division of opinion on nuclear weapons policy.
Other scientists prominent in the development of the atomic bomb included the physicists Hans Bethe and Enrico Fermi, the chemist George Kistiakowsky, and the mathematician John von Neumann, whose invention of the high‐speed computer was critical in the development process.
As the nuclear policy concerns of government policymakers have moved from building a nuclear arsenal to assuring that many atomic weapons could survive an attack and then retaliate (a “secure second strike capability”), to negotiating international agreements to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange and control the spread of nuclear weapons, and now to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, atomic scientists have been involved at every stage. They served as technical experts but also as proponents of policy options. The creation of the office of science adviser to the president, and of the president's Science Advisory Committee, provided significant input on nuclear policy, particularly during the incumbency as science advisers of George Kistiakowsky under President Eisenhower, and Jerome Wiesner under President John F. Kennedy.
The atomic science community has tended to support more severe constraints on the use of nuclear weapons, somewhat in contrast to the attitudes of political scientists, who seem more willing, in Herman Kahn's phrase, to think about the unthinkable. Even before the end of the Cold War, and in the face of rigorous security arrangements, atomic scientists in the West were able to develop working relationships with Soviet colleagues concerned about avoiding nuclear holocaust. On the other hand, the scientists on the staff of the nuclear weapons laboratories have persisted, perhaps understandably, in arguing and lobbying for continued testing of nuclear weapons, even in the face of international agreement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
With the parallel development of fissionable materials as a potential source of energy for peacetime use, atomic scientists have also been involved in discussions on how to minimize the production of weapons‐grade materials, as byproducts of nuclear reactors, and how to deal with the problem of nuclear waste.
The creation of the first atom bomb called for the highest levels of scientific creativity; but it is generally acknowledged that today, many well‐named scientists would be able to fabricate at least a crude nuclear device. The focus of concern within the atomic science community has therefore shifted to more sophisticated technical problems of delivery, reliability, and control, with a consequent splintering of scientific expertise. The dynamic that continues to exert most force on the community is the awareness of the destructive power that their science has unleashed.
[See also Bush, Vannevar; Cold War: Domestic Course.]
Bibliography
- Charles P. Curtis, The Oppenheimer Case, 1955.
- Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy, 1965.
- George Kistiakowsky, A Scientist in the White House, 1976.
- Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon, 1980.
- Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 1983
