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Austro-Prussian war

Austro-Prussian war (also called the Austro-Prussian-Italian war). This war was a violent solution to the 19th-century German and Italian independence questions. The German question pitted Austria against Prussia in a struggle for control of the 39-state German Confederation established in 1815. Austria wished to uphold the loose-knit confederation; Prussia sought to meld it into a unitary German empire, whose capital would be Berlin. The Italian question ranged Austria against Italy, which claimed the Austrian province of Venetia, and allied with Prussia in April 1866 to get it.

Emperor Franz Josef I of Austria declared war in June 1866, ostensibly to punish Prussian encroachments in Schleswig-Holstein (which had been jointly administered by Austria and Prussia since 1864) and Italian troop movements near the Venetian frontier, but really to remove the Prussian and Italian threats to Austria's power and prestige. That Austria, the conservative, ‘restorationist’ power, was, induced to declare war on the two ‘revisionist’ powers was a tribute to the masterful diplomacy of Prussia's foreign minister, Count Otto von Bismarck, who manipulated the German and Italian questions to corner Austria in 1866.

Austria fought on two fronts in the war: in Bohemia against the Prussians, in Venetia against the Italians. Although the Austrian army (400, 000 men) was outnumbered by the combined armies of Prussia (300, 000 men) and Italy (200, 000 men), it was highly rated, and Franz Josef entertained ambitious war aims. He aimed to partition Prussia, and refound the German Confederation by enlarging Austria's German allies (Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hessia, and Hanover) with land and treasure taken from Prussia. In Venetia, he aimed to crush the Italian army and induce a political crisis inside Italy that would set back the process of national unification.

The Austro-Prussian war, 1866. (Click to enlarge)
The Austro-Prussian war, 1866.
(Click to enlarge)


The Austrians failed to reckon with military reforms enacted by Prussia's CGS Moltke ‘the Elder’ in the years between 1858 and 1866. Moltke had streamlined the old Prussian militia (Landwehr), tripled the active duty strength of the regular army, and established permanent army corps to accelerate Prussia's wartime mobilization. He had also adapted Prussia's railways and telegraphs for military use, a novelty at the time. Yet the most portentous Prussian reform was Moltke's adoption of the breech-loading needle gun and small unit fire tactics in the early 1860s. This was revolutionary; the Austrian, French, and Russian armies were still using muzzle-loading rifles (to conserve ammunition) and battalion-sized columns (to deliver ‘shock’) in 1866. Moltke planned to devastate Austria's massed columns of infantry with rapid fire; his needle rifle could be loaded and fired four times more quickly than the Austrian rifle.

Austria's North Army of 240, 000 men was commanded by Benedek, who knew Italy well but who had no ideas for a war with Prussia, who chose Gen Alfred Henikstein, a jovial but inept boon companion, to be his COS. When both Benedek and Henikstein failed to produce plans for a war with Prussia, Emperor Franz Josef added a second COS: Gen Gideon von Krismanic. This bureaucracy stifled all initiative, and as Moltke's mobilization roared ahead, deploying 260, 000 men by road and rail to the frontier of Bohemia in six weeks, Benedek's limped along so slowly that Krismanic decided to deploy the bulk of North Army at Olmütz in Moravia. This was a fateful decision. Krismanic left a single corps (and two allied Saxon divisions) in Bohemia; this 60, 000-man detachment (Iser Army) was supposed to hold the Prussians long enough for Benedek to complete his mobilization in Olmütz and march westward to their rescue. It was a bad plan whose defects Moltke fully exploited.

The Prussians invaded Saxony and Bohemia on 16 June on a broad front in three armies: Elbe Army at Halle (46, 000 men), First Army at Görlitz (93, 000 men), and Second Army at Breslau (115, 000 men). Three hundred miles (483 km) separated Elbe and Second Armies, which many considered reckless, but Moltke planned either to smash Benedek's widely separated armies in detail, or sweep them into a great, crushing ‘pocket battle’ (Kesselschlacht) in the vicinity of Königgrätz on the Elbe. Moltke's daring deployment greatly facilitated by the railway was Napoleonic in conception. The three Prussian armies would march separately to minimize logistical friction, and combine only in battle.

All went according to plan. In the last days of June, the Prussian armies passed through Saxony (obligingly vacated by the Saxon army, which was on the Iser) and into Bohemia, Austria's richest, most industrialized province. Benedek's faulty deployment at Olmütz substantiated the Moltkean aphorism that ‘an error in the original concentration of an army can scarcely be corrected in the entire course of the war’, for once the Prussians were through the Bohemian mountains, North Army exhausted itself marching westward to engage them. The first battles of the war demonstrated the awesome effectiveness of the Prussian needle rifle, and the obsolescence of Austrian shock tactics. At Trautenau and Vysokov on 27 June, whole Austrian corps launched repeated bayonet attacks on isolated Prussian advance guards, with catastrophic results. At Trautenau, the Austrians lost 5, 000 men, the Prussians just 1, 300. The death toll among professional officers was as alarming; the Austrians lost 191, the Prussians 56. At Vysokov, a plateau that commanded a principal highway from Prussia to Austria, the Austrians spent 5, 720 men in futile charges against a well-concealed Prussian division, which lost only 1, 122 men. On 28 June, the Austrians attempted to hold the village of Skalice at the foot of the Vysokov plateau, but were routed again, losing 6, 000 men to Prussia's 1, 300. Austrian casualties at Skalice were so dreadful that Benedek resolved never again to employ shock tactics, which partly explained his later paralysis.

On the Iser river line, where 60, 000 Austro-Saxon troops awaited the approach of the 140, 000 men of Elbe and first Armies, the Prussians hardly needed the advantage conferred on them by the needle rifle. They routed Iser Army in three successive battles: at Podol on 27 June, at Münchengrätz on the 28th, and at Jicin on the 29th. In these battles, the Prussians benefited from mass desertion among Austria's Italian regiments, which had been shifted from Venetia to Bohemia to no good effect.

On 3 July, Benedek united the remains of Iser and North Armies on the hills between the fortress of Königgrätz and the village of Sadowa. The position, with the Elbe river behind it, was ill-chosen; indeed it was intended only as a temporary resting place on North Army's retreat back to Olmütz. But Benedek did not reckon with the speed of Moltke's advance. The victories at Skalice and Jicin enabled Moltke to draw his three armies together to attempt a great envelopment of Benedek at Königgrätz. Moltke nearly succeeded, pinning Benedek's left and centre in the morning of 3 July with Elbe and First Armies, and turning his right in the afternoon with Second Army, which struck Benedek's flank with 110, 000 men late in the day. Only rain and the distance Second Army had to cover to reach the field saved Benedek. (Paradoxically, only Benedek's excessive caution at Königgrätz saved Moltke. Because Second Army was so slow to arrive, Benedek enjoyed a considerable advantage in troop numbers until late afternoon—240, 000 against 135, 000—but was so intimidated by the needle gun that he dared not counter-attack.) The Austrians lost 44, 000 men at Königgrätz, nearly five times Prussian losses of 9, 000. With North Army ruined, Emperor Franz Josef asked for a ceasefire on 22 July, and conceded all of Bismarck's demands: Austria permitted Prussia to dissolve the German Confederation, annex Hanover, and regroup most of the remaining German states into a Prussian-run ‘North German Confederation’. In this way, Prussia replaced Austria as the premier German power, and emerged as a serious rival to France in Europe.

The Austrians were more successful in Italy, where Archduke Albrecht's South Army smashed the Italian army at the second battle of Custoza in June and defeated the Italian navy at Lissa in July. At Custoza, where 75, 000 Austrians repulsed 127, 000 Italians, the Austrians successfully employed the shock tactics they had used so unsuccessfully against the Prussians. This was more an indictment of the skittish Italian army than a tribute to Austrian tactics, which needlessly piled up 5, 000 casualties. At Lissa, Austria's Adm Wilhelm Tegetthoff briefly revolutionized naval tactics. With just seven ironclad frigates, he routed an Italian fleet of eleven ironclads by running under their powerful broadsides and ramming them. For the new kingdom of Italy, the war of 1866 was an unmitigated disaster. Yet Italy was a Prussian ally and a French client, and shared in the fruits of Moltke's victory in Bohemia and in Napoleon III's efforts to mediate the war's end. After Königgrätz, the Austrians tried to win France to their side by ceding Venetia to Napoleon III and redeploying South Army to the critical northern front. The French emperor retroceded Venetia to Italy, fulfilling the promise he had made in 1859 to ‘unify Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic’.

Bibliography

  • Craig, Gordon A., The Battle of Königgrätz (London, 1964).
  • Wawro, Geoffrey, The Austro-Prussian War (Cambridge, 1996)

— Geoffrey D. W. Wawro

 
 

(June – August 1866) Conflict between Prussia on one side and Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and minor German states on the other. A contrived dispute by Prussia's Otto von Bismarck over the Schleswig-Holstein Question resulted in the June 1866 Prussian attack on Austrian forces in Bohemia. The Prussian army, modernized and reorganized by Albrecht Theodor Emil, count von Roon, and Helmuth von Moltke, decisively defeated Austria at the Battle of Königgrätz and elsewhere. By August the war was formally concluded by the Treaty of Prague, which assigned Schleswig-Holstein and other territories to Prussia. The effect of the war was to exclude Austria from Germany.

For more information on Seven Weeks' War, visit Britannica.com.

 
Columbia Encyclopedia: Austro-Prussian War
or Seven Weeks War, June 15–Aug. 23, 1866, between Prussia, allied with Italy, and Austria, seconded by Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover, Baden, and several smaller German states. It was deliberately provoked by Bismarck, over the objections of his king, in order to expel Austria from the German Confederation as a step toward the unification of Germany under Prussian dominance. The pretext for precipitating the conflict was found in the dispute between Prussia and Austria over the administration of Schleswig-Holstein. When Austria brought the dispute before the German diet and also decided to convene the Holstein diet, Prussia, declaring that the Gastein Convention (see under Gastein) had thereby been nullified, invaded Holstein. When the German diet responded by voting for a partial mobilization against Prussia, Bismarck declared that the German Confederation was ended. With an efficient military machine that amazed Europe, Prussia overran the German states allied with Austria and crushed (July 3) the Austrians at Sadová (or Sadowa; also known as the battle of Königgrätz), in E Bohemia. However, Bismarck had no intention of weakening Austria, a potential ally, more than necessary. The preliminary treaty of Nikolsburg (July 26) was followed (Aug. 23) by the Treaty of Prague. Against Italy, the Austrians had won victories on the land, at Custozza, and on the sea, at Lissa. Nevertheless, the peace treaty forced Austria to cede Venetia to Italy. Prussia, satisfied with the exclusion, acknowledged in the treaty, of Austria from German affairs, demanded no territory from Austria, but annexed Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfurt, in addition to Schleswig-Holstein. The German Confederation was replaced by the Prussian-led North German Confederation. Thus the war paved the way for the establishment (1871) of the German Empire and the reorientation of Austria (reorganized in 1867 as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) toward the east. The moderate peace terms facilitated the Austro-German alliance of 1879.

Bibliography

See H. Friedjung, The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866 (10th ed. abr., tr. 1935, repr. 1966); G. A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz (1964); E. A. Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865–66 (1966).


 
Wikipedia: Austro-Prussian War
Austro-Prussian War (Seven Weeks' War)
Part of the wars of German unification
Battle_of_Königgrätz_by_Georg_Bleibtreu.jpg
Battle of Königgrätz, by Georg Bleibtreu. Oil on canvas, 1869.
Date 1866
Location Bohemia, Germany, Italy and Adriatic Sea
Result Prusso-Italian victory
Territorial
changes
Prussia annexes Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Kassel, Frankfurt, Nassau and parts of Hesse-Darmstadt;
Italy annexes Venetia;
Prussia forms the North German Confederation;
The Austrian Empire becomes Austria-Hungary
Combatants
Flag of Austrian Empire Austria

Flag of Saxony Saxony
Flag of Bavaria Bavaria
Flagge_Großherzogtum_Baden_(1871-1891).svg Baden
Flag of Württemberg Württemberg
Flag of Province of Hanover Hanover
Other minor German States (formerly as the German Confederation)

Flag of Prussia Prussia

Flag of Italy Italy
Other minor German States

Strength
600,000 Austrians and German allies 500,000 Prussians and German allies
300,000 Italians
Casualties
20,000 dead or wounded 37,000 dead or wounded (German and Italian)

The Austro-Prussian War (also called the Seven Weeks War, the Unification War[1], or the German Civil War) was a war fought in 1866 between the Austrian Empire and its German allies and the Kingdom of Prussia with its German allies and Italy, that resulted in Prussian dominance over the German states. In Germany and Austria it is called the Deutscher Krieg (German war), Österreichisch-preussischer Krieg (Austro-Prussian War) or Bruderkrieg (war of brothers). In the Italian unification process, this is called the Third Independence War.

Aside from the major impact of birthing the modern unified nation state and nineteenth-century world power, the war severed the ties the British nobility had with government in Germany due to Prussia's annexation of the Kingdom of Hanover which had been ruled by the same royal family (the House of Hanover) that ruled Great Britain since 1714 (although after 1837 the two states were ruled by different members of the family due to differing succession laws). This, combined with the formation of the German Empire a few years later arguably strained Anglo-German relations to a point from which they never fully recovered in decades leading up to World War I.

Causes

For centuries, the Holy Roman Emperors who mostly came from the Habsburg family had nominally ruled all of 'Germany' - the Holy Roman Empire. In fact, however, the territory of Central Europe was split into a few large states and hundreds of tiny entities (spiritual and temporal principalities, free cities), each jealously maintaining its de facto sovereignty and independence with the assistance of outside powers, particularly France. Austria was traditionally considered the leader of the German states, but Prussia was becoming increasingly powerful and by the late 18th century was ranked as one of the great powers of Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars had ended in 1815, the German states were reorganized in a loose confederation: the German Confederation, under Austrian leadership.

In the meantime, partly in reaction to the triumphant French nationalism of Napoleon, and partly as an organic feeling of commonality glorified during the romantic era, German nationalism became a potent force during this period. The ultimate aim of most German nationalists was the union of all Germans into one state. Two different ideas of national unification eventually came to the fore. One was a Grossdeutschland that would include all German-speaking lands, including and dominated by the multi-national empire of Austria; the other (preferred by Prussia) was a Kleindeutschland that would exclude even the german parts of Austria and be dominated by Prussia.

There are many different interpretations of Bismarck's behavior prior to the Austrian-Prussian war, which concentrate mainly on whether the 'Iron chancellor' had a master plan that resulted in this war, the North German confederation, and eventually the unification of Germany.

Bismarck maintained that he orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the Franco-Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany. However, historians such as A.J.P Taylor dispute this interpretation and believe that Bismarck did not have a master plan, but rather was an opportunist who took advantage of the favourable situations that presented themselves. Taylor thinks Bismarck manipulated events into the most beneficial solution possible for Prussia. Possible evidence can be found in Bismarck's orchestration of the Austrian alliance during the Second War of Schleswig against Denmark, which can be seen as his diplomatic ‘masterstroke.’ Taylor also believes that the alliance was a "test for Austria rather than a trap", and that the goal was not war with Austria, contradicting what Bismarck later gave in his memoirs as the main reason for establishing the alliance. It was in Prussia’s best interests to gain an alliance with Austria so that the combined allied force could easily defeat Denmark and as a result settle the issue of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The alliance can therefore be regarded as an aid to Prussian expansion, rather than a provocation of war against Austria. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian expansionist, rather than a German nationalist who sought the unification of Germany. It was later at the convention of Gastein that the Austrian alliance was set up to lure Austria into war.

Bismarck had also set up an alliance with Italy committing them to war if Prussia went to war within three months. This treaty virtually guaranteed a commitment on Bismarck's side to muster up a war with Austria within these 3 months in order to ensure Austria's full strength would not be attacking Prussia.

The timing of declaration was perfect, because all other European powers were bound by alliances that forbade them from entering, or had domestic problems that had priority. Britain had no stake economically or politically in a potential war between Prussia and Austria. Russia was unlikely to enter on the side of Austria due to ill will following their alliance during the Crimean War, and Prussia had stood by Russia during the Polish revolts where as Austria did not. France was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria because Bismarck and Napoleon III met in Biarritz and allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-Prussian war. Nobody knows what was discussed, but many historians think Bismarck was guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war. Finally, Italy was already in an alliance with Prussia, which meant that Austria would be fighting their combined power with no allies of their own. Bismarck was aware of his numerical superiority, but still “he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he gave a favourable account of the international situation."

Military factors

Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages which the Prussian army enjoyed over that of the Austrian Empire. To oppose this view, A.J.P Taylor believes that Bismarck was reluctant to go to war as it "deprived him of control and left the decisions to the generals whose ability he distrusted". The two most important personalities within the Prussian army were War Minister Albrecht Graf von Roon and Chief of the General Staff Helmuth Graf von Moltke. The truth may be more complicated than simply that Bismarck, who famously said "Politics is the art of the possible," initially sought war with Austria, or that he was initially against the idea of going to war with Austria.

Rival military systems

In 1862, von Roon had implemented several army reforms (and to do so had been instrumental in ensuring that Bismarck was appointed Chancellor). Roon ensured that all Prussian citizens were liable to conscription. Before this date, the size of the army had been fixed by earlier laws which had not taken population growth into account, making conscription inequable and unpopular for this reason. While some Prussian men remained in the army or the reserves until they were forty years old, about one in three (or even more in some regions where the population had expanded greatly as a result of industrialisation) escaped with only token service in the Landwehr, a loosely organised "Home Guard".

Universal conscription, combined with an increase in the term of active service from two years to three years, dramatically increased the size of the army. It also provided Prussia with a reserve army equal in size to that which Moltke actually deployed against Austria. Had France under Napoleon III attempted to intervene in force on Austria's side, the Prussians could have faced him with equal or superior numbers of troops.

The three-year term of active service, during which troops were continually trained and drilled, also ensured a better standard of training and discipline than that of the Austrian army, particularly in the infantry. Some Austrian commanders still dismissed infantry conscripts to their homes on permanent leave soon after their induction into the army, retaining a cadre of long-term soldiers for formal parades and routine duties. The conscripts sent on leave had to be trained almost from scratch when they were recalled to their units on the outbreak of war. The Austrian cavalry and artillery however were as well-trained as their Prussian counterparts. Austria possessed two incomparable divisions of heavy cavalry, but weapons and tactics had advanced since the Napoleonic Wars and heavy cavalry were no longer a decisive arm on the battlefield.

Speed of mobilisation

An important difference in the Prussian and Austrian military systems was that the Prussian army was locally based, organised as Kreise (lit. circles), each containing a Korps headquarters and its component units. The vast majority of reservists lived within a few hours' journey from their korps' depots, and mobilisation to full strength would take very little time.

By contrast, the Austrians deliberately ensured that units were stationed far from the areas from which their soldiers were recruited - to prevent army units taking part in separatist revolts. Conscripts on leave or reservists recalled to their units as a result of mobilisation faced a journey which might take weeks before they could report for duty. The Prussian army was therefore able to mobilise far more quickly than the Austrian army.

Speed of concentration

The railway system of Prussia was more extensively developed than that within Austria. Railways made it possible to supply larger numbers of troops than had previously been possible, and also allowed the rapid movement of troops within friendly territory. The better Prussian rail network therefore allowed the Prussian army to concentrate more rapidly than the Austrians. Von Moltke, reviewing his plans to von Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men". Von Moltke had also said earlier, "Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the war that we must have".

The Austrian army under Benedek in Bohemia (the present-day Czech Republic) might previously have been expected to enjoy the advantage of the "central position", being able to concentrate on successive attacking armies strung out along the frontier. The Prussian ability to concentrate faster nullified this advantage. By the time the Austrians were fully assembled, they would be unable to concentrate against any one Prussian army without having the other two instantly attack their flank and rear, threatening their lines of communication.


Armaments and tactics

Finally, the Prussian infantry were equipped with the Dreyse needle gun, a breech-loading rifle capable of far more rapid fire than the muzzle-loading rifles with which the Austrians were equipped. In the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, French troops had taken advantage of the fact that the rifles of the time fired high if sighted for long range. By rapidly closing the range, French troops could come to close quarters without sustaining too many casualties from the Austrian infantry. In the aftermath of this war, the Austrians had adopted the same methods, which they termed the "Stosstaktik". Although they had some warnings of the German weapon, they ignored these and retained the crude "Stosstaktik" as their main method.

In one respect, the Austrian army had superior equipment in that their artillery consisted of breech-loading rifled guns, while the Prussian army retained many muzzle-loading smoothbore cannon. New Krupp breech-loading guns were only slowly being introduced. In the event, the other shortcomings of the Austrian army were to prevent their artillery from being decisive.

Economic factors

In 1866 the Prussian economy was rapidly growing, partly as a result of the Zollverein, and this gave her an advantage in the war. It enabled Prussia to supply her armies with breech-loading rifles, and later with new Krupp breach loading artillery. In contrast, the Austrian economy was suffering after the 1848 revolutions in Hungary and the Second Italian War of Independence. Austria only had one bank, the Creditanstalt, and the nation was heavily in debt. Many historians, including Andrina Stiles believe that Prussia's economic success had an impact on the outbreak of war. The conflict between Austria and Prussia for mastery in Germany had an important economic dimension, suggesting that conflict between Austria and Prussia on the battlefield was related to their long term struggle for economic supremacy.[citation needed]

Political and dynastic factors

The most important cause for war apart from Bismarck was the Prussian king. The King had decided on war reluctantly. A.J.P Taylor said “William 1st, not German nationalists made the war of 1866 possible”. It wasn’t Bismarck who was the sole cause for the war 1866 as the king made the final decision and made the war possible. [citation needed]

Alliances

Most of the German states sided with Austria against Prussia, even though Austria had declared war. Those that sided with Austria included the Kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hanover. Southern states such as, Baden, Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau also joined with Austria.

Some of the northern German states joined Prussia, in particular Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Brunswick. The Kingdom of Italy participated in the war with Prussia, because Austria still held the territory of Venetia wanted by Italy to complete the process of Italian Unification. In return for Italian aid against Austria, Bismarck agreed not to make a separate peace until Italy had obtained Venetia.

Notably, the other foreign powers abstained from this war. French Emperor Napoleon III, who expected a Prussian defeat, chose to remain out of the war to strengthen his negotiating position for territory along the Rhine, while the Russian Empire still bore a grudge against Austria from the Crimean War.

Alliances of the Austro-Prussian War, 1866
Aliances in the Austro-Prussia War
Kingdom of Prussia Austrian Empire neutral

Kingdom of Italy
Mecklenburg-Schwerin
Mecklenburg-Strelitz
Oldenburg
Anhalt
Brunswick
Saxe-Altenburg
Saxe-Coburg and Gotha
Lauenburg
Lippe-Detmold
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen
Waldeck-Pyrmont
Bremen
Hamburg
Lübeck

Kingdom of Bavaria
Kingdom of Hanover
Kingdom of Saxony
Kingdom of Württemberg
Baden
Hesse-Darmstadt
Nassau
Hesse-Kassel
Saxe-Meiningen
Reuss-Greiz
Schaumburg-Lippe
Frankfurt

Limburg
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Reuss-Schleiz
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt

Disputed Territory

Schleswig
Holstein

Course of the war

The first major war between two continental powers in many years, this war used many of the same technologies as the American Civil War, including railroads to concentrate troops during mobilization and telegraphs to enhance long distance communication. The Prussian Army used von Dreyse's breech-loading needle-gun, that could be rapidly loaded while the soldier was seeking cover on the ground, whereas the Austrian muzzle-loading rifles could only be loaded slowly, and generally from a standing position.

The main campaign of the war occurred in Bohemia. Prussian Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke had planned meticulously for the war. He rapidly mobilized the Prussian army and advanced across the border into Saxony and Bohemia, where the Austrian army was concentrating for an invasion of Silesia. There, the Prussian armies led nominally by King Wilhelm converged, and the two sides met at the Battle of Königgrätz (Sadová) on July 3. The Prussian Elbe Army advanced on the Austrian left wing, and the First Army on the centre, prematurely; they risked being counter-flanked on the left. Victory therefore depended on the timely arrival of the Second Army on the left wing. This was achieved through the brilliant staffwork of its Chief of Staff, Leonhard Graf von Blumenthal. Superior Prussian organization and élan decided the battle against Austrian numerical superiority, and the victory was near total, with Austrian battle deaths nearly seven times the Prussian figure. Austria rapidly sought peace after this battle.

Except for Saxony, the other German states allied to Austria played little role in the main campaign. Hanover's army defeated Prussia at the Second Battle of Langensalza on June 27, but within a few days they were forced to surrender by superior numbers. Prussian armies fought against Bavaria on the Main River, reaching Nuremberg and Frankfurt. The Bavarian fortress of Würzburg was shelled by Prussian artillery, but the garrison defended its position until armistice day.

The Austrians were more successful in their war with Italy, defeating the Italians on land at the Battle of Custoza (June 24) and on sea at the Battle of Lissa (July 20). Garibaldi's "Hunters of the Alps" defeated the Austrians at the Battle of Bezzecca, on 21 July, conquered the lower part of Trentino, and moved towards Trento. Prussian peace with Austria–Hungary forced the Italian government to seek an armistice with Austria, on 12 August. According to Treaty of Vienna, signed on October 12, Austria ceded Venetia to France, which in turn ceded it to Italy (for details of operations in Italy, see Third Italian War of Independence).

Aftermath and consequences

Aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War. Prussia (dark blue) and its allies (blue) against Austria (red) and its allies (pink). Neutral members of the German Confederation are in green, Prussia’s territorial gains after the war are in light blue
Enlarge
Aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War. Prussia (dark blue) and its allies (blue) against Austria (red) and its allies (pink). Neutral members of the German Confederation are in green, Prussia’s territorial gains after the war are in light blue

In order to forestall intervention by France or Russia, Bismarck pushed King William I to make peace with the Austrians rapidly, rather than continue the war in hopes of further gains. The Austrians accepted mediation from France's Napoleon III. The Peace of Prague on August 23, 1866 resulted in the dissolution of the German Confederation, Prussian annexation of many of Austria’s former allies, and the permanent exclusion of Austria from German affairs. This left Prussia free to form the North German Confederation the next year, incorporating all the German states north of the Main River. Prussia chose not to seek Austrian territory for itself, and this made it possible for Prussia and Austria to ally in the future, since Austria was threatened more by Italian and Pan-Slavic irredentism than by Prussia. The war left Prussia dominant in Germany, and German nationalism would compel the remaining independent states to ally with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and then to accede to the crowning of King Wilhelm as German Emperor. United Germany would become one of the most powerful of the European countries.

For the defeated parties

In addition to war reparations, the following territorial changes took place:

  • Austria – Surrendered the province of Venetia to Italy and lost all official influence over member states of the former German Confederation. Austria’s defeat was a telling blow to Habsburg rule; the Empire was transformed via the Ausgleich to the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in the following year.
  • Schleswig and Holstein – Became the Prussian Province of Schleswig-Holstein
  • Hanover – Annexed by Prussia, became the Province of Hanover
  • Hesse-Darmstadt – Surrendered some of its northern territory (the Hessian Hinterland) to Prussia. The northern half of the remaining land (Upper Hesse) joined the North German Confederation
  • Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, Frankfurt – Annexed by Prussia. Combined with the territory surrendered by Hesse-Darmstadt to form the new Province of Hesse-Nassau
  • Saxony, Saxe-Meiningen, Reuss-Greiz, Schaumburg-Lippe – Spared from annexation but joined the North German Confederation in the following year

For the neutral parties

The war meant the end of the German Confederation. Those states who remained neutral during the conflict took different actions after the Prague treaty:

  • Liechtenstein – Became an independent state and declared permanent neutrality, while maintaining close political ties with Austria. This neutrality was respected during both World Wars.
  • Limburg and Luxembourg – The Treaty of London in 1867 declared both of these states to be part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Limburg became the Dutch province of Limburg. Luxembourg was guaranteed independence and neutrality from its three surrounding neighbors (Belgium, France and Prussia) but it rejoined the German customs union, the Zollverein, and remained a member until its dissolution in 1919.
  • Reuss-Schleiz, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt – Joined the North German Confederation

Notes

    See also

    External links


     
     

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    Copyrights:

    Military History Companion. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Copyright © 2001, 2004 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
    Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. © 2006 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
    Columbia Encyclopedia. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition Copyright © 2003, Columbia University Press. Licensed from Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/cup/  Read more
    Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Austro-Prussian War" Read more

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