Baruch Spinoza

Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Email
Top

(born Nov. 24, 1632, Amsterdamdied Feb. 21, 1677, The Hague) Dutch Jewish philosopher, a major exponent of 17th-century rationalism. His father and grandfather had fled persecution by the Inquisition in Portugal. His early interest in new scientific and philosophical ideas led to his expulsion from the synagogue in 1656, and he thereafter made his living as a lens grinder and polisher. His philosophy represents a development of and reaction to the thought of Ren Descartes; many of his most striking doctrines are solutions to difficulties created by Cartesianism. He found three unsatisfactory features in Cartesian metaphysics: the transcendence of God, mind-body dualism, and the ascription of free will both to God and to human beings. To Spinoza, those doctrines made the world unintelligible, since it was impossible to explain the relation between God and the world or between mind and body or to account for events occasioned by free will. In his masterpiece, Ethics (1677), he constructed a monistic system of metaphysics and presented it in a deductive manner on the model of the Elements of Euclid. He was offered the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg but declined it, seeking to preserve his independence. His other major works are the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) and the unfinished Tractatus Politicus.

For more information on Benedict de Spinoza, visit Britannica.com.

Top

The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) ranks as a major thinker in the rationalist tradition, and his "Ethics" is a classic of Western philosophy. In his writings the crucial issues of metaphysics are exemplified more clearly than in any thinker since Plato.

Baruch, or Benedict, Spinoza was born on Nov. 24, 1632, in Amsterdam, where his family had settled after fleeing religious persecution in Portugal. His grandfather, Abraham, was the acknowledged leader of the Jewish community, and his father was a successful merchant and active in civic affairs. Michael Spinoza had three children, of whom the future philosopher was the only son. Spinoza's mother died when he was 6, and his father and one sister died by the time he was in his early 20s. Little is precisely known about his early education except that biblical and Talmudic texts were studied at the synagogue school and that the young Spinoza showed a facility for languages and eventually mastered Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Hebrew, Latin, Greek, and German. In 1656 Spinoza was expelled by his congregation on charges of atheism. The edict asked for God to curse him and warned "that none may speak with him by word of mouth, nor by writing, nor show any favor to him, nor be under one roof with him." The philosopher responded with calm detachment and Christianized his name to Benedict.

Teacher and Lens Grinder

For the next 4 years Spinoza worked as a teacher in a private academy in Amsterdam run by Francis van den Ende, a former Jesuit, a doctor, and a political activist. His future interests in mathematics, physics, and politics supposedly stem from this period. From 1660 to 1663 he lived near Leiden among a free religious sect who called themselves Collegiants, and there he wrote Principles of Cartesianism, Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being, and the first book of Ethics.

Spinoza then moved to a suburb of The Hague, where he worked as a lens grinder. The Ethics was completed between 1670 and 1675. In 1670 he anonymously published his Theological-Political Treatise. In addition to these not very extensive writings, Spinoza conducted a large correspondence with various scientists and philosophers. Two of the most important were Henry Oldenburg, the first secretary of the British Royal Society, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, who visited him in 1676. Three years previously Spinoza had declined a professorship at the University of Heidelberg in order to preserve his "freedom of philosophizing." The same intellectual integrity is seen also in a letter to a former student who accused Spinoza of intellectual presumption. While acknowledging that he had not written the best philosophy, he stated "I do know that I think the true one." Spinoza died in The Hague on Feb. 20, 1677, of consumption aggravated by inhaling dust while polishing lenses.

Origins of Rationalism

Rationalism is the name ascribed to a movement of thought that originated in the 17th century, and it is usually associated with the names of René Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. The point of departure for all rationalists is subjectivity: a discovery of the philosophic implications of the person with a heightened sense of his uniqueness, his inviolability, and, above all, the power of knowledge. Descartes began his career as a highly original mathematical physicist. He generalized from his conception of the method of mathematical reasoning and believed that its proper application might guarantee local certitude in all areas of knowledge. The justification of his theory of reasoning led Descartes to several metaphysical commitments concerning the nature of reality.

In simplest terms, Descartes maintained that God was a supreme rationalist who had created an orderly universe that could be known by following the clear and distinct ideas of reason. In order to avoid the determinist and irreligious implications of such a conception of the universe, Descartes separated the mind as a free spiritual power from the physical world of determined mechanical relations. With this step a set of contradictory dualisms between subject and object, thought and extension, spirit and nature, God and world, and freedom and necessity were bequeathed to philosophy. The only work that Spinoza published under his own name was René Descartes' Principles of Philosophy (1663), and although the book was mainly expository, he could not forbear pointing out that Descartes's errors resulted from his inability to follow out the metaphysical implications of the logic of rationalism, especially with respect to the notion of substance.

Spinoza's Ethics

Spinoza's Ethics consists of five books. Oddly enough, the first is about God and the meaning of substance. The second book deals with the mind and knowledge. The third, fourth, and fifth books seem concerned with topics usually associated with ethical discussions: the passions, human enslavement to the emotions, and finally human freedom by virtue of intellect. Hence the central concern of the treatise is to move from a consideration of God to the realization of human freedom by an analysis of knowledge and passion and their conflict. Thus, for Spinoza, an ethic that studies the purpose of life is simultaneously a metaphysic, a theory of knowledge, and a psychology of human nature.

This is made clearer if one is familiar with an earlier and unpublished work, which he called On the Improvement of the Understanding. In a highly personal manner Spinoza began by saying that he resolved to seek true happiness and joy "after experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile." Men everywhere esteem "riches, fame, and the pleasures of sense," but their pursuit seems to diminish rather than to enhance men's lives through frustration or overindulgence. The only remedy for the wretchedness of life is to improve or literally "cure" the mind. Man's attitude toward reality is equal to his sense of what is true and important. In a striking passage Spinoza wrote: "All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly to depend on the quality of the object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it - no sadness will be felt if it perishes - no envy if it is possessed by another - no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances of the mind."

Nature of Reality

Because of man's "mixed perceptions" and confused knowledge, he desires perishable objects. To see reality clearly, man would need an exact knowledge of himself and of general nature in order to understand the extent to which they can be modified in the search for lasting happiness. This can be accomplished only by a more and more inclusive understanding of reality. Imagine, Spinoza wrote to a correspondent, a parasite living in the bloodstream being asked to describe its environment. From its perspective each drop of blood would seem to be separate. But, in truth, the action of each independent drop can be understood only as a determined part of a larger system. And this system, in turn, is a small part of a larger whole. The ultimate aim of philosophic knowledge is what Spinoza called a "synoptic intuition" of all reality as a deductive system. And this is why the Ethics begins with a consideration of God as substance. In Spinoza's view the task is not so much to explain God as to understand what it means to be a man.

The Ethics is subtitled More Geometrics, and its geometrical method, using axioms, postulates, and definitions to prove its propositions, relates to the content as well as to the technique of exposition. As a rationalist, Spinoza aimed at nothing less than total certitude, and the clearest way was to utilize deductive reasoning. But the content of the system is such that the truth of each proposition depends, in part, on its necessary connection with the others.

The first book of the Ethics draws out the implications of one of the central assumptions of the Western metaphysical tradition: that the intrinsic order of nature is an effect of an ordering mind, God. The startling conclusion that Spinoza draws is that the words nature, substance, and God are interchangeable. There can be only one such being, who is self-caused and of which everything else is an effect. An effect manifests only what it has received from its cause, and the causal principle can only communicate what it is. With these axioms Spinoza argued monism, or the oneness of reality, in proposition after proposition; and the effect that, if God is causa sui and first cause (and if there is no such cause, then there is no reality), such an entity must be understood as an "absolutely infinite being." In logic, at least, there cannot be an infinite being and something else. Thus all finite existence must be rooted in a necessary existent, and there is one system of nature in which all limited things begin or cease inevitably according to causal sequences and interdependencies. Spinoza adopted a scholastic distinction to express the only conceivable differences that can be predicated of infinite being: Natura Naturans is nature as active or is God as the free cause that brings all things to pass according to necessary principles, and Natura Naturata is nature as passive or existent at any one moment.

Nature and Origin of the Mind

Spinoza's argument is conducted a priori, or without appeal to experience, and its truth or falsity rests on what the concept of substance entails logically. Accordingly, God exists by definition, or negatively one must posit a reason for the nonexistence of such a being and again only God would suffice. For him, reason is identical with cause, and the only legitimate distinctions that one can impute to the reason of the universe is to logically separate that which causes and that which is caused.

The second book of Ethics examines the nature and origin of the mind. An infinite substance possesses infinite attributes, but the mind perceives only two: thought and extension. Yet the relation between mind and matter is not dualistic but one of identity, for "thinking substance and extended substance is one and the same substance comprehended now under this and now under that attribute." To understand this doctrine, sometimes referred to as "psychophysical parallelism," the mind must overcome its reliance on sense knowledge ("opinion") and even advance beyond scientific understanding ("adequate ideas") of cause-and-effect relations to a synoptic vision ("intuition") of the complete system of reality. In this perspective the mind of man is an individually existing modification of infinite intelligence, the body is the object of that idea, and the two are like different sides of a coin.

With this understanding of man's place in nature, Spinoza took up the questions of moral life. Action occurs when an individual is the cause of his own conduct, and a passion when he is the partial cause. Virtue is the power of knowing how to act in accord with nature, whereas men suffer in proportion to the number of inadequate ideas that they have.

The essence of man is the struggle "to preserve in being." Adequate ideas replace passions, rational self-control supplants the impotence of desires. The issue is life itself: whether one is ensnared in "human bondage" as a prey to the whims of desire or external persons or objects, or one achieves the freedom that Spinoza calls "blessedness" and that is virtue's own reward. He was enough of a psychologist to see that ultimately passions can be overcome only by stronger passions. Thus in cultivating a knowledge and intellectual love of God man comes to know himself and to experience a freedom from external restraint.

Further Reading

For studies of Spinoza consult the following works: F. Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (1880); E. Caird, Spinoza (1902); H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (1934); and S. Hampshire, Spinoza (1956).

Oxford Dictionary of Politics:

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza

Top

(1632-77) Dutch philosopher and theologian. Spinoza was born in Amsterdam, of Spanish-Portuguese-Jewish origin. His family had taken refuge there to escape persecution in Spain. His thirst for knowledge led him to study under Francis van den Enden, a freethinker. By 1656 his views were so unorthodox that he was accused of atheism and banned from the synagogue. He earned his living by grinding lenses, which put him in touch with developments in optics, and hence with the advances in mathematics of the time. Meanwhile he continued his reflections and wrote many philosophical works, especially on ethics.

In the Tractatus Theologico-Philosophicus of 1670, and the unfinished Tractatus Politicus, he advocated freedom of thought, religious thought in particular. Like Hobbes, he believed that the state came into being to prevent anarchy. But unlike Hobbes he did not believe autocracy was the solution. He passionately believed in democracy, in the right to disagree and hold contrary opinions short of anarchy. The ultimate objective was wisdom, which, for Spinoza was reasoned judgement or rational behaviour. It was this that the state was established to promote.

— Cyril Barrett

Encyclopedia of Judaism:

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza

Top

Philosopher (1632-1677). Spinoza was born in Amsterdam to a Marrano family from Portugal that had fled to Holland and returned to Judaism. As a child, he received a formal Jewish education in the Ets Ḥayyim Talmud Torah. Upon completion of his studies, he began to delve deeply into the works of the medieval Jewish philosophers, such as Gersonides (Levi Ben Gershom) and Maimonides, both of whom profoundly influenced his views and philosophic system.

From the age of 22, Spinoza began to draw closer to the Christian circles in the city and to express an interest in the general sciences. His "atheistical" and heretical views aroused concern both in the Jewish community and in Amsterdam's Calvinist circles, leading to his Excommunication by the Amsterdam Jewish community in 1656. Following this, he left Amsterdam and spent most of the rest of his life in The Hague, earning his livelihood by polishing lenses for reading glasses.

Spinoza's philosophic thought is complex and difficult, combining metaphysics, ethics, psychology, anthropology, political thought, and the philosophy of religion. The religious base is one of its major hubs, as Spinoza offers man an alternative to the established religions.

His first great work was the Theologico-PoliticaI Treatise (1670), in which he criticized the major tenets of religion, protested against the subjugation of the state to religion, and preached freedom of the spirit and thought. He also expounded his views on the Bible, which paved the way for subsequent Bible criticism. The book shook the foundations of traditional theology and caused a major storm, after which, Spinoza no longer dared to put his ideas into print and only lectured on them before his faithful disciples.

His most important work, the Ethics, was published after his death. In it he developed his pantheistic theory, in which he identifies nature with God, as expressed in his famous saying, "Deus sive natura" ("God or nature"). Its major thesis is the idea of the unity and necessity of all reality, disavowing the exercise of Divine will to order the universe and arguing instead that all things follow naturally and changelessly, as things given, from the very existence of God as such.. When Spinoza used the term "nature," he was not only referring to the world or to all of physical nature, but to everything that exists. Biblical monotheism appears in Spinoza as if in the highest degree of purity, having been purified of all the historic additions of worship and commandment. In this sense, there is a clear link between his thought and the history of Jewish thought.

Spinoza also identified, clearly and profoundly, the new political reality in Europe, and discussed its significance for the fate of the Jewish people. As a result, he was critical of the Jewish heritage, both from a philosophical and a modernizing viewpoint. His major conclusion was that the laws of the Halakhah were not in keeping with the new culture, which meant that a change in the status of religion in the life of the individual and the state was required. Because of his views, he was considered a heretic even after his death and his teachings were proscribed by both Christians and Jews. Only at the end of the 18th century did philosophers begin to study his ideas. Since then his writings have become an inseparable part of modern philosophy.


Spinoza, Baruch (1632-77). In France the great Judaeo-Cartesian philosopher was known largely from the article in Bayle's Dictionnaire and an essay by Boulainviller. For Cartesian rationalists like himself (e.g. Fénelon), Spinoza's logic was irreligious and dangerous. Refuted both by less radical free-thinkers and Christian apologists, he was commonly seen by 18th-c. readers as a subversive critic of the Bible (in the Tractatus theologico-philosophicus) and a materialistic atheist denying free will (in the Ethics). Condillac criticized him as a system-builder. Voltaire in later works was comparatively impartial, but until the 19th c. few were sympathetic and knowledgeable except Diderot.

[Christopher Betts]

Top

Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch Despinoza), (Amsterdam, 1632-77, The Hague), a philosopher of Jewish descent, was expelled from the Synagogue in 1656. In 1676 he rejected an invitation to teach philosophy at Heidelberg University, preferring to remain in obscurity. He made his living by grinding and polishing lenses. Spinoza's writings are in Latin, and the anonymously published Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670) was the only one of his works to appear in his lifetime. Like his posthumous works, it was placed on the Roman Catholic Index Librorum Prohibitorum. His Ethics, for which he is most esteemed (Ethica ordine geometrica demonstrata), appeared in five parts in 1677 shortly after his death. In spite of the dryness of the Euclidean method, they express an attitude of love, kindness, and tolerance for his fellow-men. The ethical views, however, have not been specially influential in German literature, which has been attracted more by Spinoza's monistic view of God and Nature as one substance, existing in various modes.

The impact of Spinoza outside philosophical circles was first felt in Germany in the second half of the 18th c. In the time of the Sturm und Drang he came to be regarded as a kind of godfather to vague pantheistic ideas and sentiments. Largely at second hand he exercised considerable influence on the young Goethe and later on the writers of the Romantic movement (see Romantik), who saw God in Nature and felt that Spinoza offered them a philosophical justification for doing so. Lessing showed a genuine interest in the philosophy of Spinoza and in a conversation with F. H. Jacobi in 1780 declared, ‘Es gibt keine Philosophie als die Philosophie des Spinoza’. Spinoza is the subject of novels by B. Auerbach and by E. G. Kolbenheyer.

Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy:

Benedictus de Spinoza

Top

Spinoza, Benedictus de (1632-77) Dutch Jewish rationalist. Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza was born in Amsterdam into a distinguished Jewish family, exiled from Spain and living in the relative religious freedom of the Netherlands. He attended the Jewish school, and became learned in the work of Jewish and Arabic theologians; one of his teachers was the Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel, a distinguished liberal figure of the time. However, contact with dissident Christian movements, and with the scientific and philosophical thought of Descartes, led Spinoza to distance himself from orthodox life, and in 1656 he was deemed a heretic, cast out of the synagogue, and cursed with the comprehensive ‘anathema where with Joshua anathematized Jericho’, of which one clause alone calls for him to be cursed with all the curses of the firmament.

For a short time Spinoza was exiled from Amsterdam, but he returned and began a life supporting himself by grinding lenses and teaching. During this period he wrote the Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well Being (written in Latin but surviving in Dutch, trs. 1883). In 1660 he moved to the country, and began composing the Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae (1663, trs. as The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, 1905), a geometrically structured exposition of the philosophical system of Descartes. This was published in 1663. Now living at Voorburg, Spinoza became acquainted with Jan de Witt, the principal focus of opposition to the House of Orange. This led in 1670 to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (trs. as Political Treatise, 1883), a work whose advocacy of tolerance and peace caused it to be condemned by the Reformed Church in 1673, and banned the following year. At this time Spinoza moved to the Hague, where he lived with great frugality on a small pension, working on the Ethics and a grammar of Hebrew. In 1672 Spinoza undertook a small diplomatic mission to the invading French army, but on his return was under some suspicion as a spy, and narrowly escaped being killed by the mob, as de Witt had been before him. By now a recognized figure, he refused offers of various posts, and lived out his remaining years in the same frugal state, writing and corresponding. He abandoned his original intention of publishing the Ethics, believing that it would simply generate controversy and rancour. Spinoza's final publication was the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, published in the year of his death (trs. as Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect, 1883). He died of phthisis, possibly brought on by his trade as a lens-grinder. There remain numerous testimonies to his simplicity, virtue, charm, and courage.

The central themes of the Ethics are developed in the four parts of the book. These concern first God, then the nature and origin of the mind, the origin and nature of the emotions, and human servitude and the strength of the emotions. The stage is set by acceptance of a basic rationalist presumption, that the nature of the world is transparent to the intellect, so that relations of dependence amongst ideas reflect (or are perhaps identical with) relations of dependence amongst events and states in nature. Substance being conceived as that which is self-dependent, there follows the ontological argument for the existence of God as the one necessary being, but not distinct from the world (for there is only one substance: any other substance would owe its existence to God, and therefore not be self-dependent). Rather God is immanent in the world, and individual things are themselves modes or modifications of God: the one reality is ‘God or nature’, deus sive natura. This God is naturally rather removed from the God of simple religious faith, and while Spinoza's crystalline remark that ‘whoever loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return’ has subsequently spoken to many thinkers, in his own time the accusation of atheism constantly hung over him.

Spinoza's monism extends to mind and matter: each is a different characteristic, or way of rationally appreciating the essence of the same one eternal reality. Like Descartes, Spinoza believed that it is the intellect rather than the senses that discloses the essential nature of things. A complete and adequate idea of God shows that he has two attributes: he can be conceived under the heading of extension, or under that of thought. In other words God, or reality, can be conceived in these two incommensurable ways, and each discloses an attribute or part of his essence (a problem in interpreting Spinoza is that God is supposed to have infinitely many attributes, although only these two are found). Understanding aims to increase our knowledge of God (or the universe) by discovering the way in which it makes up a closed system, self-sufficient and completely unified, in which everything that happens is necessary, and nothing could be otherwise than it is.

Against this metaphysical background Spinoza clearly faces trouble making sense of the nature of the single self, and human activity, and these form the subject of the latter two books of the Ethics. For Spinoza, thinking is a consciousness of the body. The same mode is conceived under the attribute of extension and under that of thought, so that body and mind are not related causally, but as parallel expressions of the one reality. In this God-intoxicated system (as it was called by the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hardenberg), error and evil need explanation, and in each case Spinoza identifies them with privation. Error is the lack of adequate ideas, and evils are merely absences or privations, that ‘express no essence’. (This approach to the problem of evil later received especial critical attention from Hume.) The senses provide only modifications of our body but no knowledge, and most of our notions are only confused and lacking the marks of final adequacy. These are found in Spinoza's version of Descartes's clear and distinct ideas: conceptions of the formal essence of God that are inextricably joined to their own proof. Like the theorems of mathematics, they cannot be understood without being seen to be true.

In such a rigid and deterministic world there may seem to be no room for human free will. But Spinoza finds its place by abstracting from the dimension of time. Freedom becomes the capacity to see the world under the heading of eternity, and without bondage to emotions and desires. These themselves are the result of ignorance of the causes whereby we are determined. Activity and agency are the result of adequate cognition. In other words, it stops being true that I am controlled by things, and starts being true that I control them, in so far as in my thoughts the course of events is displayed as it then turns out. (The equation of freedom with this unity of reason and reality played a major role in the subsequent philosophy of Kant.) To advance towards this adequacy, emotions must be understood, and the aim of Spinoza's subtle attempt to provide a ‘geometry of the emotions’ is to show that most of what drives us is unknown to us, but that when we understand our motivations we gain control over them and emend or improve them (this idea has been hailed as the fundamental truth on which psychoanalysis depends). In the end, true religion, true science, and true philosophy are identical, and each consists in the intellectual love of God.

In his political writings Spinoza draws out the implications of his system for the theory of government. It is the business of the state not to attempt to put limits on the exercise of reason, but to provide the conditions in which it may flourish: what is necessary is a constitutional democracy providing a forum for reason and freedom of opinion within a framework of law.

Spinoza's method and system went largely unappreciated during the subsequent ascendancy of empiricist and Enlightenment ideals, and the decline of the ontological argument at the hands of Hume and Kant. He was rediscovered by the German idealists, and indeed absolute idealism is well seen as simply adding an element of time, or a capacity for dynamic self-realization, to the attributes of Spinoza's one God, whose essence is equally that of the spatially extended world, and that of reason itself.

Columbia Encyclopedia:

Benedictus de Spinoza

Top
Spinoza, Baruch or Benedict (spinō'), 1632-77, Dutch philosopher, b. Amsterdam.

Spinoza's Life

He belonged to the community of Jews from Spain and Portugal who had fled the Inquisition. Educated in the orthodox Jewish manner, he also studied Latin and the works of René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and other writers of the period, and also had a thorough grounding in scholastic theology and philosophy. His independence of thought led to his excommunication from the Jewish group in 1656; at about that time he abandoned the Hebrew form of his name, Baruch, for the Latin form, Benedict.

Until about 1660, Spinoza lived in or near Amsterdam, and afterward he lived in Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and The Hague. He was a lens grinder of great skill, but this activity was probably more related to his scientific interests than to any economic necessity. With his needs largely provided for by a series of grants, pensions, and bequests, he lived modestly, devoting much of his time to the development of his philosophy. Spinoza became known in spite of his retiring mode of life; he had wide correspondence and was visited by other philosophers. In 1673, he was offered a professorship at Heidelberg, but he elected to retain his peaceful life and especially his independence of thought. He died of tuberculosis, apparently aggravated by his inhaling glass dust from lens grinding. Through Gotthold Lessing, Johann Gottfried von Herder, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Spinoza influenced German idealism. During his lifetime and for a period afterward, however, his pantheism was regarded as blasphemous, which is one reason why most of his writing was published after his death.

Spinoza's Works

His major works, virtually all of which are available in English translation, include a rewording (1663) of part of Descartes's work, A Treatise on Religious and Political Philosophy (1670, the only example of his own thought published in his lifetime), and his important Ethics, probably finished in 1665 but published posthumously (1677). His Opera Posthuma (1677) also include his Political Treatise, Treatise on the Improvement of Understanding, Letters, and Hebrew Grammar. He began a translation of the Hebrew Bible and was one of the first to raise questions of higher criticism of the Bible.

Metaphysics

Spinoza's philosophy is deductive, rational, and monist. He shares with Descartes an intensely mathematical appreciation of the universe: Things make sense when understood in relation to a total structure; truth, like geometry, follows from first principles with a logic accessible and evident to man's mind. Whereas for Descartes mind and body are different substances, Spinoza holds that the two are different aspects of a single substance, which he called alternately God and Nature. Just as the mind is not substantially alien to the body, so Nature is not the product or agency of a supernatural God. The universe is a single substance, capable of an infinity of attributes, but known through two of them: physical "extension" and "thought." God is not the creator of a Nature beyond himself; God is Nature in its fullness.

Spinoza's rationalism, unlike that of later idealists, does not proceed at the expense of empirical observation. "Adequate ideas" are a coherent logical association of physical experiences. When ideas are confused or contradictory it is not because they are false (in the sense of contrary to fact) but because they are incomplete or improperly related to the totality of experience.

Ethics

Spinoza's ethics proceed from a premise similar to that of Hobbes-that men call "good" whatever gives them pleasure-but they reach very different conclusions. Human beings, indeed all of Nature, share a common drive for self-preservation, the conatus sese conservandi. By this drive all individuals seek to maintain the power of their being, and in this sense virtue and power are one. But in Spinoza's system power is discovered to be a knowledge of necessity. Powerful, or virtuous, persons act because they understand why they must; others act because they cannot help themselves.

To be free is to be guided by the law of one's own nature (which in Spinoza's rational universe is never at variance with the law of another nature); bondage consists in being moved by causes of which we are unaware because our ideas are confused. Another important feature of Spinoza's ethical system is his view of the intellect as active. He rejects the distinction between reason and will that assumes that ideas can be passively entertained. All thinking is action, and all action has its accompaniment in thought. What accounts for action is not an agency (the will) beyond the intellect, but ideas. Ideas are active and move us to act; an absence of action may be accounted an absence of insight: knowledge, virtue, and power are one.

Political Philosophy

Politically, Spinoza and Hobbes again share assumptions about the social contract: Right derives from power, and the contract binds only as long as it is to one's advantage. The important difference between the two men is their understanding of the ends of the system: for Hobbes advantage lies in satisfying as many desires as possible, for Spinoza advantage lies in an escape from those desires through understanding. Put another way, Hobbes does not imagine a community of individuals whose desires can be consistently satisfied, so repression is always necessary; Spinoza can imagine such a community and such consistent satisfaction, so in his political and religious thought the notion of freedom, especially freedom of inquiry, is basic.

Bibliography

See biographies by S. Nadler (1999) and R. Goldstein (2006); H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (2 vol., 1934; repr. 1969); G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge (1954, repr. 1964); H. Allison, Benedict de Spinoza (1975); S. Hampshire, Spinoza (1975); L. Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion (1982).

Spinoza, Baruch (Benedictus de Spinoza; 1632–1677), Dutch philosopher. Baruch Spinoza's radical metaphysical, theological, moral and political ideas made him one of the most vilified thinkers of his day. Spinoza was born in Amsterdam to a Portuguese-Jewish family. He was raised and educated within the city's community of Sephardic Jews, many of whom had once been forced converts (conversos) to Christianity in Spain and Portugal. At the age of twenty-three, however, Spinoza, now a young businessman, was expelled from the congregation. The writ of cherem, or ban, the most vitriolic ever issued by the community's leaders, speaks only of his "abominable heresies and monstrous deeds," and the specific reasons for his expulsion remain vague. It is fairly certain, however, that among the offenses for which Spinoza was punished were his ideas on God, Jewish law, and immortality.

Spinoza's earliest philosophical writings, dating from the late 1650s and early 1660s, include the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and the aborted Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. He first came to public attention with the publication of a critical exposition of Descartes's Principles of Philosophy (1663). It was the anonymously published Theological-Political Treatise of 1670, however, that brought him great notoriety. The reaction to this stunningly bold work of Bible criticism and political thought was immediate and harsh; it was banned by numerous political and religious authorities, and its author was excoriated as a blaspheming atheist. As a result of the outcry, Spinoza decided not to publish his philosophical masterpiece, the Ethics; it did not appear in print until after his death, together with other unpublished writings, including A Compendium of Hebrew Grammar, some correspondence, and the never-completed Political Treatise.

In the Ethics Spinoza rejects the traditional providential God of the Jewish and Christian religions. The notion of a benevolent, wise, purposive, judging God is, he insists, an anthropomorphic fiction, one that gives rise only to superstition and irrational passions. God, according to Spinoza, is nothing but the active, generative aspects of nature. In an infamous phrase, Spinoza refers to Deus sive Natura (God, or Nature), and identifies it with the substance, essential attributes, and causal principles of the universe. All beings are "in" God, but only in the sense that Nature is all-encompassing, and nothing stands outside Nature's laws. Everything happens in Nature with a deterministic necessity. Even human beings, often (he alleges) regarded as autonomous creatures whose freedom puts them outside Nature's dominion, are a part of Nature and thus subject to its rigorous determinism. Some measure of freedom or "activity" is obtainable for human beings but only insofar as they can achieve an intellectual understanding of Nature and themselves and thereby exercise control over their passions. Spinoza adopts a Stoic conception of human well-being. Happiness is the result of virtue and consists in success in the pursuit of knowledge and self-mastery. Moreover, the rewards of virtue are to be found in this life. While human beings do "participate" in eternity, particularly through the knowledge they acquire, there is no personal immortality. Spinoza's metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy reveal a variety of influences, especially Descartes, medieval Jewish philosophy, and ancient sources. However, there can be no denying the originality of his thought.

In the Theological-Political Treatise Spinoza turns to a critique of organized religion and an investigation into the status, history, and interpretation of the Bible. He begins with a deflationary account of prophecy (the prophets, he insists, were simply people with highly active imaginations) and a denial of the possibility of miracles (since Nature's laws admit of no exceptions). He insists, moreover, that Jewish ceremonial law was only of temporary validity (that is, during the Temple period) and is no longer binding on contemporary Jews. His most stunning theses, however, concern Scripture. Spinoza argues that the Bible is not literally of divine origin and that its first five books (the Pentateuch) are not the writings of Moses. Rather, Scripture as we now have it is simply a work of literature, a compilation of human writings passed down through generations and edited in the Second Temple period. Others before Spinoza had suggested that Moses was not the author of the entire Pentateuch, but no one had taken that claim to the extreme limit that Spinoza did, arguing for it with such boldness and learning and at such length. Nor had anyone before Spinoza been willing to draw from it the conclusions about the interpretation of Scripture that Spinoza drew. The meaning of Scripture is to be sought not by appeal to theological dogma or to demonstrated truth—after all, the authors of Scripture were neither theologians nor philosophers—but by a close examination of the texts themselves and by a historical investigation into the backgrounds and intentions of its authors. If there is a universal truth conveyed by Scripture, it is a simple moral principle: love God and your neighbor.

Spinoza's discussion of Scripture takes place in the broader political context of his argument for a liberal, tolerant secular state, one in which the freedom to philosophize is defended against attempts to make it conform to so-called religious truth. For it is the "excessive authority and egotism of preachers," he tells one of his correspondents, that most threatens the freedom "to say what we think." The key to diminishing the undue influence of the clergy, who justify their abuses by appealing to the holiness of a certain book as the Word of God, is to demonstrate the true nature of Scripture and its message and eliminate the "superstitious adornments" of popular religion. By naturalizing Scripture, Spinoza hopes to redirect the authority invested in it from the words on the page to its moral message; and by formulating what he takes to be the proper method of interpreting Scripture, he seeks to encourage his readers to examine it anew and find therein the doctrines of the true religion. Only then will people be able to delimit exactly what needs to be done to show proper respect for God and obtain blessedness.

Bibliography

Primary Source

Spinoza, Benedictus de. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Translated by Edwin Curley. Princeton, 1984.

Secondary Sources

Allison, Henry. Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction. Rev. ed. New Haven, 1987.

Garrett, Don, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1996.

Nadler, Steven. Spinoza: A Life. Cambridge, U.K., and New York. 1999.

—STEVEN NADLER

Oxford Companion to the Mind:

Benedict de Spinoza

Top
(Baruch Spinoza)
(1632–77). Dutch philosopher, one of the last great metaphysical thinkers of the 'rationalist' period in philosophy. In his major work, The Ethics, he starts from supposedly self-evident truths and rigorously develops them through the use of reason and deductive argument. His commitment to the power of reason and to the view that man can gain knowledge of reality through the powers of the mind alone culminates in a profound vision of the world and of man's place within it.

Spinoza was born in Amsterdam of Portuguese Jewish stock. He was educated initially in the Jewish school, but later received Latin lessons from a private tutor, Van Den Ende, who introduced him to the scientific and philosophical developments of the day. Spinoza's growing commitment to secular thought and philosophy brought him into conflict with the Jewish authorities, and in 1656 he was expelled from the synagogue for his 'heretical' views. His Hebrew name, Baruch, he abandoned for its Latin form, Benedictus. The remainder of his life was spent developing his philosophical system while earning a living from polishing and grinding lenses. His reputation as a heretic and atheist did not prevent him carrying on an extensive correspondence with other major thinkers, but only one of his works, the Theological–Political Treatise, was published (anonymously) during his lifetime. His other works — A Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, The Ethics, and the unfinished Political Treatise — were collected and published by his friends shortly after his death from consumption.

Spinoza developed his theory of the mind partly in an attempt to solve the problems raised by Descartes' account of the mind and body as two fundamentally different substances. For Descartes the mind and body are independent and mutually exclusive systems, and it is well known that this strict dualistic theory made it extremely difficult to explain the apparent causal interaction between mental and physical items (see dualism).

Spinoza rejected Descartes' dualistic account and replaced it with a theory of 'substance monism'. This may be explained as follows. Substance is that which is self-dependent — needing nothing other than itself in order to exist. So far, both Descartes and Spinoza are in agreement. But where Descartes asserts that there are many such substances (including each finite mind and body), Spinoza argues that there can be only one being which has the character of substance, and this being is God or nature itself. All finite things, ourselves included, are dependent upon other things for existence. Only God — the being beside whom there is nothing else, for he is infinite — has the nature of substance. This being so, all finite things, in particular minds and bodies, are not substances but 'modifications' or 'modes', that is, beings that are manifestations or fragmented expressions of the one reality. Mental and physical items alike have no reality save that which they have as parts of substance.

God or nature (these are synonymous terms for Spinoza) may, however, be viewed in two ways. We may think of the one substance either as a thinking being, or as extended in space. For Descartes, thought and extension constitute the essence of mental and physical substances respectively. In contrast, Spinoza regards thought and extension as two ways of conceiving one and the same reality. He is committed not to mental and physical things but to things that may be conceived in two different ways. He claims that, whether we conceive of God in mental terms or in physical terms, we are thinking of just one being in either case. He then applies this 'conceptual dualism' to all items in the world. Every finite thing or 'mode' can be viewed in two ways, either as mental or as physical. Whatever there is, is fully explicable in either way. But, as in the case of God, there is only one thing that is being described.

When Spinoza came to speak of the human mind and body he said: 'Mind and body are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension.' This seems to amount to an identity claim — there is just one thing, which may be viewed and described either as a mind or as a body. This approach to the mind–body problem has some adherents today. Many accept that a human being can be described in two fundamental ways, attributing to him both psychological and physical properties, while also accepting that there is only one being — the human person — which is being so characterized.

With Spinoza's monistic theory, Descartes' problem — that of explaining causal interaction between disparate items — vanishes, for there are not two things at all; the mind and body do not interact, for one thing cannot interact with itself. Anything that occurs in the body can be explained in mental terms and anything that occurs in the mind may be explained and described physically. Spinoza would therefore be sympathetic to those materialist or physicalist philosophers who claim that mental states just are physical happenings in the brain. But they would be less happy with Spinoza's reverse claim — that any physical occurrence may be fully explained in mental terms.

Spinoza speaks of the mind as the 'idea' of the body. As such it is aware of the body and of the things that happen to it. When light rays hit the retina of the eye, for example, the physical process may be described in mental terms as an image or sensory idea. But Spinoza thought that such sense perceptions are invariably confused or 'inadequate', because we take them to be the true representations of external objects whereas in reality they are merely reflections of our own bodily processes. (See illusions; perceptions as unconscious influences; sensations.)

Spinoza claims that all finite things endeavour or strive to maintain themselves in being and to perfect their existence. Thus the body will try to avoid those things that are harmful to it and will pursue those things that it needs in order to survive. The mind too, in Spinoza's view, exhibits this endeavour (or conatus, as he calls it) in its attempt to resist ideas that are inadequate and confused and to grasp those that help it to understand itself, the body, and the external world. Spinoza thinks the mind will be aware that its sense perceptions are inadequate, for they will lack the clarity, distinctness, and self-evident character of all true ideas. This being so, the mind will naturally try to replace sense perceptions with more adequate ideas, through a process of reasoned reflection and the application of self-evident principles. Once this stage is reached the mind is active rather than passive: it pursues and grasps the truth through its innate power of understanding, rather than remaining at the mercy of arbitrary and confused images and sense impressions.

This process of replacing sense impressions with adequate conceptions can also be applied to the emotions. For Spinoza, emotions are merely confused and inadequate ideas which befuddle the mind and which, for the most part, make us extremely unhappy. He thinks that to the extent that we allow our emotions to rule us we are in a state of slavery or bondage: 'When a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune.' Our emotions can be overcome by replacing the inadequate ideas on which they are grounded with a clear and distinct understanding of their causes. If emotions are confused ideas and if they arise from inadequate understanding, it seems to follow that increased knowledge will change them, and enable us to become free of their power over us. As Spinoza says: 'An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.' This account of active self-improvement through the analysis and clarification of ideas has led some commentators to greet Spinoza as an early precursor of Freudian psychoanalysis.

For Spinoza, the mastery of emotions, and the state of improved understanding achieved through the mind's reasoning powers, enables us to become more active and free. But the freedom which Spinoza grants us has seemed to some to be no freedom at all. When the mind understands things adequately it perceives them as necessary, and sees that they could not have been otherwise. Reason, Spinoza tells us, perceives things 'under a certain form of eternity', and we then see that nothing could have been different, because everything results from God, who himself is a necessary and eternal being.

Our freedom consists in recognizing the necessity of our nature, understanding ourselves as expressions and manifestations of God's power and laws, and as having no existence save that which he grants us. Viewed rightly, we see ourselves and all things as in a sense eternal, for we no longer judge things as contingent happenings in time, but as determined by immutable laws. This understanding, which Spinoza calls 'intuition', constitutes the mind's highest achievement and its complete fulfilment. Knowing itself and other things in this manner, the mind achieves a certain immortality, and with true contentment realizes that death, which is a mere temporal event, cannot destroy it.

Spinoza thus ends his Ethics on a note of almost religious fervour which has encouraged some in the view that he was a mystic. Although his philosophy has influenced many, and has been hailed by idealists, materialists, atheists, and theists alike, his vision is perhaps most pertinent today to all those who wish to find a place for spiritual fulfilment in a world governed by natural laws.

A translation by
  • R. H. M. Elwes, Basic Works, was published in two volumes in New York in 1955, and The Correspondence of Spinoza, trans. A. Wolf, appeared also in New York in 1966
  • .

    (Published 1987)

    — Joanna North

      Bibliography
    • Hampshire, S. (1951). Spinoza.
    • Scruton, R. (1986). Spinoza.


    Quotes By:

    Baruch (Benedict de) Spinoza

    Top

    Quotes:

    "Desire is the essence of a man."

    "Fame has also this great drawback, that if we pursue it, we must direct our lives so as to please the fancy of men."

    "None are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who wish to be the first and are not."

    "Only that thing is free which exists by the necessities of its own nature, and is determined in its actions by itself alone."

    "To give aid to every poor man is far beyond the reach and power of every man. Care of the poor is incumbent on society as a whole."

    "Fear cannot be without hope nor hope without fear."

    See more famous quotes by Baruch (Benedict de) Spinoza

    Top
    Baruch Spinoza
    Born (1632-11-24)24 November 1632
    Amsterdam, Dutch Republic
    Died 21 February 1677(1677-02-21) (aged 44)
    The Hague, Dutch Republic
    Era 17th-century philosophy
    Region Western Philosophy
    School Rationalism, founder of Spinozism
    Main interests Ethics, Epistemology, Metaphysics
    Notable ideas Panentheism, Pantheism, Determinism, Deism, neutral monism, intellectual and religious freedom / separation of church and state, Criticism of Mosaic authorship of some books of the Hebrew Bible, Political society derived from power, not contract

    Baruch Spinoza and later Benedict de Spinoza (24 November 1632 – 21 February 1677) was a Dutch philosopher.[1] Revealing considerable scientific aptitude, the breadth and importance of Spinoza's work was not fully realized until years after his death. By laying the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment[citation needed] and modern biblical criticism,[2] he came to be considered one of the great rationalists[2] of 17th-century philosophy. His magnum opus, the posthumous Ethics, in which he opposed Descartes's mind–body dualism, has earned him recognition as one of Western philosophy's most important contributors. In the Ethics, "Spinoza wrote the last indisputable Latin masterpiece, and one in which the refined conceptions of medieval philosophy are finally turned against themselves and destroyed entirely."[3] Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said of all contemporary philosophers, "You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all."[4]

    Spinoza's name in different languages is Hebrew: ברוך שפינוזהBaruch Spinoza, Portuguese: Benedito or Bento de Espinosa and Latin: Benedictus de Spinoza; in all these languages, the given name means "the Blessed". Spinoza was raised in the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam. He developed highly controversial ideas regarding the authenticity of the Hebrew Bible and the nature of the Divine. The Jewish religious authorities issued a cherem (Hebrew: חרם, a kind of ban, shunning, ostracism, expulsion, or excommunication) against him, effectively excluding him from Jewish society at age 23. His books were also later put on the Catholic Church's Index of Forbidden Books.

    Spinoza lived quietly as a lens grinder, turning down rewards and honors throughout his life, including prestigious teaching positions, and gave his family inheritance to his sister. Spinoza's philosophical accomplishments and moral character prompted 20th century philosopher Gilles Deleuze to name him "the 'prince' of philosophers."[5]

    Spinoza died at the age of 44 allegedly of a lung illness, perhaps tuberculosis or silicosis exacerbated by fine glass dust inhaled while grinding optical lenses. Spinoza is buried in the churchyard of the Christian Nieuwe Kerk in The Hague.[6]

    Contents

    Biography

    Family and community origins

    Spinoza's ancestors were of Sephardic Jewish descent, and were a part of the community of Portuguese Jews that grew in the city of Amsterdam after the Alhambra Decree in Spain (1492) and the Portuguese Inquisition (1536) had led to forced conversions and expulsions from the Iberian peninsula.[7]

    Attracted by the Decree of Toleration issued in 1579 by the Union of Utrecht, Portuguese "conversos" first sailed to Amsterdam in 1593 and promptly reconverted to Judaism.[8] In 1598 permission was granted to build a synagogue, and in 1615 an ordinance for the admission and government of the Jews was passed.[9] As a community of exiles, the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam were highly jealous of their identity.[10]

    Some historians argue the Spinoza family ("Espinosa" in Portuguese) had its origins in Espinosa de los Monteros, near Burgos, Spain.[11] Others claim they were Portuguese Jews who had moved to Spain and then were expelled back to their home country in 1492, only to be forcibly converted to Catholicism in 1498.[citation needed]

    Spinoza's father was born roughly a century after this forced conversion in the small Portuguese city of Vidigueira, near Beja in Alentejo. When Spinoza's father was still a child, Spinoza's grandfather, Isaac de Spinoza (who was from Lisbon), took his family to Nantes in France. They were expelled in 1615 and moved to Rotterdam, where Isaac died in 1627.

    Spinoza's father, Miguel (Michael), and his uncle, Manuel, then moved to Amsterdam where they reassumed practicing Judaism. Miguel was a successful merchant and became a warden of the synagogue and of the Amsterdam Jewish school.[12] He buried three wives, however, and three of his six children died before reaching adulthood.[13]

    17th century Holland

    Amsterdam and Rotterdam operated as important cosmopolitan centers where merchant ships from many parts of the world brought people of various customs and beliefs. This hustle and bustle ensured, as in the Mediterranean region during the Renaissance, some possibility of free thought and shelter from the crushing hand of ecclesiastical authority.[citation needed] Spinoza may have had access to a circle of friends who were basically heretics in the eyes of tradition.[citation needed] One of the people he may have known was Niels Stensen, a brilliant Danish student in Leiden; others included Coenraad van Beuningen and his cousin Albert Burgh, with whom Spinoza is known to have corresponded.[citation needed]

    Early life

    Vlooienburg in 1625 on a map by Balthasar Florisz van Berckenrode.
    Spinoza lived where the Moses and Aaron church is located now, but there is strong evidence he was born there too.[14]

    Baruch de Espinoza, as he was called in Portuguese, was born on 23 November 1632 in the Jodenbuurt in Amsterdam, Netherlands. He was the second son of Miguel de Espinoza, a successful, although not wealthy, Portuguese (i.e. Sephardic Jewish) merchant in Amsterdam.[15] His mother, Ana Débora, Miguel's second wife, died when Baruch was only six years old.[16] Spinoza's mother tongue was Spanish, although he also knew Hebrew, Portuguese, Dutch, perhaps French, and later Latin.[17] Although he wrote in Latin, Spinoza learned Latin late in his youth.

    Spinoza had a traditional Jewish upbringing, attending the Keter Torah yeshiva of the Amsterdam Talmud Torah congregation headed by the learned and traditional senior Rabbi Saul Levi Morteira. His teachers also included the less traditional Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel, "a man of wide learning and secular interests, a friend of Vossius, Grotius, and Rembrandt,"[18] whose home was a center for Jewish scholars in Amsterdam[4][page needed] and who later took a leading part in promoting the readmission of Jews to England.[19] While presumably a star pupil, and perhaps considered as a potential rabbi, Spinoza never reached the advanced study of the Torah in the upper levels of the curriculum.[20] Instead, at the age of 17, after the death of his elder brother, Isaac, he cut short his formal studies in order to begin working in the family importing business.[21].

    In 1653, at age 20, Spinoza began studying Latin with Frances van den Enden (Franciscus van den Enden), a notorious free thinker, former Jesuit, and radical democrat who likely introduced Spinoza to scholastic and modern philosophy, including that of Descartes.[22] (A decade later, in the early 1660s, Van den Enden was considered to be a Cartesian and atheist,[23] and his books were put on the Catholic Index of banned books.)

    Spinoza's father, Miguel, died in 1654 when Spinoza was 21. He duly recited Kaddish, the Jewish prayer of mourning, for eleven months as required by Jewish law.[24] When his sister Rebekah disputed his inheritance, he took her to court to establish his claim, and then renounced it in her favor.[25]

    Spinoza adopted the Latin name Benedictus de Spinoza,[26] began boarding with Van den Enden, and began teaching in his school.[27] He is said to have fallen in love with his teacher's daughter, Clara, but she rejected him for a richer student (although this story has also been discounted on the basis that Clara Maria van den Enden was born in 1643 and would have been no more than about 18 years old at the time Spinoza left Amsterdam.[28] In 1671 she married Dirck Kerckring).

    During this period Spinoza also became acquainted with the Collegiants, an anti-clerical sect of Remonstrants with tendencies towards rationalism, and with the Mennonites who had existed for a century but were close to the Remonstrants.[29] Many of his friends belonged to dissident Christian groups which met regularly as discussion groups and which typically rejected the authority of established churches as well as traditional dogmas.[1]

    Questioned by two members of the synagogue, Spinoza at this time apparently responded that God has a body and nothing in scripture says otherwise.[30] He was later attacked on the steps of the synagogue by a knife-wielding assailant shouting "Heretic!" He was apparently quite shaken by this attack and for years kept (and wore) his torn cloak, unmended, as a souvenir.[31]

    After his father's death in 1654, Spinoza ran the family importing business along with his younger brother Gabriel (Abraham).[32] The business ran into serious financial difficulties, however, perhaps as a result of wars involving Holland, England and France.[vague] In March 1656, Spinoza filed suit with the Amsterdam municipal authorities to be declared an orphan in order to escape his father's business debts, so that he could inherit his mother's estate (which his father had inherited in trust for him) without it being subject to his father's creditors.[33] In addition, after having made substantial contributions to the Talmud Torah synagogue in 1654 and 1655, he reduced his December 1655 contribution and his March 1656 pledge to nominal amounts (and the March 1656 pledge was never paid).[34]

    Spinoza was eventually able to relinquish responsibility for the business and its debts to his younger brother, Gabriel, and devote himself to philosophy and optics.

    Expulsion from the Jewish community

    Statue of Spinoza, near his house on the Paviljoensgracht in The Hague.

    On 27 July 1656, the Talmud Torah congregation of Amsterdam issued a writ of cherem (Hebrew: חרם, a kind of ban, shunning, ostracism, expulsion, or excommunication) against the 23 year old Spinoza.[35] The following document translates the official record of the cherem:[36]

    The Lords of the ma’amad, having long known of the evil opinions and acts of Baruch de Espinoza, have endeavord by various means and promises, to turn him from his evil ways. But having failed to make him mend his wicked ways, and, on the contrary, daily receiving more and more serious information about the abominable heresies which he practiced and taught and about his monstrous deeds, and having for this numerous trustworthy witnesses who have deposed and born witness to this effect in the presence of the said Espinoza, they became convinced of the truth of the matter; and after all of this has been investigated in the presence of the honorable chachamin, they have decided, with their consent, that the said Espinoza should be excommunicated and expelled from the people of Israel. By the decree of the angels, and by the command of the holy men, we excommunicate, expel, curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza, with the consent of God, Blessed be He, and with the consent of all the Holy Congregation, in front of these holy Scrolls with the six-hundred-and-thirteen precepts which are written therein, with the excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho, with the curse with which Elisha cursed the boys, and with all the curses which are written in the Book of the Law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down, and cursed be he when he rises up; cursed be he when he goes out, and cursed be he when he comes in. The Lord will not spare him; the anger and wrath of the Lord will rage against this man, and bring upon him all the curses which are written in this book, and the Lord will blot out his name from under heaven, and the Lord will separate him to his injury from all the tribes of Israel with all the curses of the covenant, which are written in the Book of the Law. But you who cleave unto the Lord God are all alive this day. We order that no one should communicate with him orally or in writing, or show him any favor, or stay with him under the same roof, or within four ells of him, or read anything composed or written by him.

    The Talmud Torah congregation issued cherem routinely, on matters great and small, so such an edict was not unusual[37]

    The language of Spinoza's cherem is unusually harsh, however, and does not appear in any other cherem known to have been issued by the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam.[38] The exact reason for expelling Spinoza is not stated.[39] The cherem refers only to the "abominable heresies that he practiced and taught," to his "monstrous deeds," and to the testimony of witnesses "in the presence of the said Espinoza." There is no record of such testimony, but there appear to have been several likely reasons for the issuance of the cherem.

    First, there were Spinoza's radical theological views that he was apparently expressing in public. As philosopher and Spinoza's biographer Steven Nadler puts it: "No doubt he was giving utterance to just those ideas that would soon appear in his philosophical treatises. In those works, Spinoza denies the immortality of the soul; strongly rejects the notion of a providential God—the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; and claims that the Law was neither literally given by God nor any longer binding on Jews. Can there be any mystery as to why one of history's boldest and most radical thinkers was sanctioned by an orthodox Jewish community?"[40]

    Second, there is ample basis to assume that the Amsterdam Jewish community, largely comprising former "conversos" having within the last century fled from the Portuguese Inquisition (and their children and grandchildren), must have been concerned to protect its reputation from any association with Spinoza lest his controversial views provide the basis for their own possible persecution or expulsion.[41] There is little or no evidence that the Amsterdam municipal authorities were directly involved in Spinoza's cherem itself. But "in 1619, the town council expressly ordered [the Portuguese Jewish community] to regulate their conduct and ensure that the members of the community kept to a strict observance of Jewish law";[42] and other evidence, such as bans adopted by the synagogue itself on public wedding or funeral processions and on discussing religious matters with Christians, lest such activity might "disturb the liberty we enjoy,"[43] makes it clear that the danger of upsetting the civil authorities was never far from mind. Thus, the issuance of Spinoza's cherem was almost certainly, in part, an exercise in self censorship by the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam.[44]

    Third, it appears likely that Spinoza himself had already taken the initiative to separate himself from the Talmud Torah congregation and was vocally expressing his hostility to Judaism itself. He had probably stopped attending services at the synagogue either after the lawsuit with his sister or after the knife attack on its steps. He might already have been voicing the view expressed later, in his Theological-Political Treatise, that the civil authorities should suppress Judaism as harmful to the Jews themselves. Either for financial or other reasons,[45] he had in any case effectively stopped contributing to the synagogue by March 1656. And he had committed the "monstrous deed," contrary the regulations of the synagogue and the views of certain rabbinical authorities (including Maimonides), of filing suit in a civil court rather than with the synagogue authorities[46]--to renounce his father's heritage, no less. Upon being notified of the issuance of the cherem, he is reported to have said: "Very well; this does not force me to do anything that I would not have done of my own accord, had I not been afraid of a scandal."[47] Thus, unlike most of the cherem issued routinely by the Amsterdam congregation to discipline its members, the cherem issued against Spinoza did not lead to repentance and so was never withdrawn.

    After the cherem, Spinoza is said to have addressed an "Apology" (defense), written in Spanish, to the elders of the synagogue, "in which he defended his views as orthodox, and condemned the rabbis for accusing him of 'horrible practices and other enormities' merely because he had neglected ceremonial observances."[48] This "Apology" does not survive, but some of its contents may later have been included in his Theological-Political Treatise.[49]

    The most remarkable aspect of the cherem may be not so much its issuance, or even Spinoza's refusal to submit, but the fact that Spinoza's expulsion from the Jewish community did not lead to his conversion to Christianity.[50] Spinoza kept the Latin (and so implicitly Christian) name Benedict de Spinoza, maintained a close association with the Collegiants, a Christian sect, even moved to a town near the Collegiants' headquarters, and was buried in a Christian graveyard--but there is no evidence or suggestion that he ever accepted baptism or participated in a Christian mass. Thus, by default, Baruch de Espinoza became the first secular Jew of modern Europe.[51]

    The philosopher Richard Popkin questions the historical veracity of the cherem, which Popkin claims emerged close to 300 years after Spinoza's death.[52][why?]

    Later life and career

    Spinoza's house in Rijnsburg from 1661-3, now a museum
    Study room of Spinoza

    Spinoza spent his remaining 21 years writing and studying as a private scholar.[1]

    After the cherem, the Amsterdam municipal authorities, "responding to the appeals of the rabbis, and also of the Calvinist clergy, who had been vicariously offended by the existence of a free thinker in the synagogue,"[53] promptly expelled Spinoza from Amsterdam. He spent a brief time in or near the village of Ouderkerk aan de Amstel, but returned soon afterwards to Amsterdam and lived there quietly for several years, giving private philosophy lessons and grinding lenses, before leaving the city in 1660 or 1661.[54]

    During this time in Amsterdam, Spinoza wrote his Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, "of which two Dutch translations survive, discovered about 1810."[55]

    Spinoza moved around 1660 or 1661 from Amsterdam to Rijnsburg, (near Leiden), the headquarters of the Collegiants.[56] In Rijnsburg he began work on his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy as well as on his masterpiece, the Ethics. In 1663 he returned briefly to Amsterdam, where he finished and published the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (the only work published in his lifetime under his own name), and then moved the same year to Voorburg.[57]

    In Voorburg, Spinoza continued work on the Ethics and corresponded with scientists, philosophers, and theologians across Europe.[58] He also wrote and in 1670 published his Theological Political Treatise in defense of secular and constitutional government--and in support of Jan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of the Netherlands, against the Stadholder, the Prince of Orange.[59] While published anonymously, the work did not long remain so, and de Witt's enemies characterized it as "forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil, and issued with the knowledge of Jan de Witt."[60] It was condemned in 1673 by the Synod of the Reformed Church and formally banned in 1674.[61]

    In 1670 Spinoza moved to The Hague, where he lived on a small pension from Jan de Witt and a small annuity from the brother of his dead friend, Simon de Vries.[62] He worked on the Ethics, wrote an unfinished Hebrew grammar, began his Political Treatise, wrote two scientific essays ("On the Rainbow" and "On the Calculation of Chances"), and began a Dutch translation (that he later destroyed) of the Bible.[63]

    Spinoza chose the Latin word "caute" (be cautious), inscribed beneath a rose, itself a symbol of secrecy, as his device.[64] "For, having chosen to write in a language that was so widely intelligible, he was compelled to hide what he had written."[65]

    Spinoza earned a comfortable living from lens-grinding. While the lens-grinding aspect of Spinoza's work is uncontested, the type of lenses he made is in question. Many have said he produced excellent magnifying glasses, while some historians describe him as a maker of lenses for eyeglasses. He was also supported by small, but regular, donations from close friends.[1]

    In 1676, Spinoza met with Leibniz at The Hague for a discussion of his principal philosophical work, Ethics, which had been completed in 1676. Leibniz then began to plagiarize the as-yet unpublished work when he returned to Germany.[66] This meeting was described in Matthew Stewart's The Courtier and the Heretic.[67] Spinoza never married nor fathered any children. When he died, he was considered a saint by the general Christian population and was buried in holy ground.[68]

    Spinoza's health began to fail in 1676, and he died on 20 February 1677, at the age of 45.[69] His premature death was said to be due to lung illness, possibly silicosis as a result of breathing in glass dust from the lenses he ground. Later, a shrine was made of his home in The Hague.[70]

    Textbooks and encyclopedias often depict Spinoza as a solitary soul who eked out a living as a lens grinder; in reality, he had many friends but kept his needs to a minimum.[1] He preached a philosophy of tolerance and benevolence. Anthony Gottlieb described him as living "a saintly life."[1] The reviewer M. Stuart Phelps noted "No one has ever come nearer to the ideal life of the philosopher than Spinoza."[71] Another reviewer, Harold Bloom, wrote: "As a teacher of reality, he practiced his own wisdom, and was surely one of the most exemplary human beings ever to have lived."[72] According to the New York Times "In outward appearance he was unpretending, but not careless. His way of living was exceedingly modest and retired; often he did not leave his room for many days together. He was likewise almost incredibly frugal; his expenses sometimes amounted only to a few pence a day."[73] According to Harold Bloom and the Chicago Tribune "He appears to have had no sexual life."[72][74] Spinoza also corresponded with Peter Serrarius, a radical Protestant and millennarian merchant. Serrarius is believed to have been a patron of Spinoza at some point after his conversion.[citation needed] By the beginning of the 1660s, Spinoza's name became more widely known, and eventually Gottfried Leibniz[67] and Henry Oldenburg paid him visits, as stated in Matthew Stewart's The Courtier and the Heretic.[67] Spinoza corresponded with Oldenburg for the rest of his short life.

    Writings and correspondence

    The writings of Rene Descartes have been described as "Spinoza's starting point."[72] Spinoza's first publication was his geometric exposition (proofs using the geometric method on the model of Euclid with definitions, axioms, etc.) of Descartes's Parts I and II of Principles of Philosophy (1663). Spinoza has been associated with Leibniz and Descartes as "rationalists" in contrast to "empiricists".[75]

    From December 1664 to June 1665, Spinoza engaged in correspondence with Blyenbergh, an amateur Calvinist theologian, who questioned Spinoza on the definition of evil. Later in 1665, Spinoza notified Oldenburg that he had started to work on a new book, the Theologico-Political Treatise, published in 1670. Leibniz disagreed harshly with Spinoza in Leibniz's own published Refutation of Spinoza, but he is also known to have met with Spinoza on at least one occasion[67][75] (as mentioned above), and his own work bears some striking resemblances to specific important parts of Spinoza's philosophy (see: Monadology).

    When the public reactions to the anonymously published Theologico-Political Treatise were extremely unfavourable to his brand of Cartesianism, Spinoza was compelled to abstain from publishing more of his works. Wary and independent, he wore a signet ring engraved with his initials, a rose,[citation needed] and the word "caute" (Latin for "cautiously").

    The Ethics and all other works, apart from the Descartes' Principles of Philosophy and the Theologico-Political Treatise, were published after his death, in the Opera Posthuma edited by his friends in secrecy to avoid confiscation and destruction of manuscripts. The Ethics contains many still-unresolved obscurities and is written with a forbidding mathematical structure modeled on Euclid's geometry[1] and has been described as a "superbly cryptic masterwork."[72]

    Philosophy

    The opening page of Spinoza's magnum opus, Ethics

    Substance, attributes and modes

    These are the fundamental concepts with which Spinoza sets forth a vision of Being, illuminated by his awareness of God. They may seem strange at first sight. To the question "What is?" he replies: "Substance, its attributes, and modes".

    Karl Jaspers[76]

    Spinoza believed God exists and is abstract and impersonal.[1] Spinoza's system imparted order and unity to the tradition of radical thought, offering powerful weapons for prevailing against "received authority." As a youth he first subscribed to Descartes's dualistic belief that body and mind are two separate substances, but later changed his view and asserted that they were not separate, being a single identity. He contended that everything that exists in Nature (i.e., everything in the Universe) is one Reality (substance) and there is only one set of rules governing the whole of the reality which surrounds us and of which we are part. Spinoza viewed God and Nature as two names for the same reality,[72] namely the single substance (meaning "that which stands beneath" rather than "matter") that is the basis of the universe and of which all lesser "entities" are actually modes or modifications, that all things are determined by Nature to exist and cause effects, and that the complex chain of cause and effect is understood only in part. His identification of God with nature was more fully explained in his posthumously published Ethics.[1] That humans presume themselves to have free will, he argues, is a result of their awareness of appetites while being unable to understand the reasons why they want and act as they do. Spinoza has been described by one writer as an "Epicurean materialist."[72]

    Spinoza contends that "Deus sive Natura" ("God or Nature") is a being of infinitely many attributes, of which thought and extension are two. His account of the nature of reality, then, seems to treat the physical and mental worlds as one and the same. The universal substance consists of both body and mind, there being no difference between these aspects. This formulation is a historically significant solution to the mind-body problem known as neutral monism. Spinoza's system also envisages a God that does not rule over the universe by providence, but a God which itself is the deterministic system of which everything in nature is a part. Thus, according to this understanding of Spinoza's system, God would be the natural world and have no personality.

    In addition to substance, the other two fundamental concepts Spinoza presents and develops in the Ethics are attribute – that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance, and mode – the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

    Spinoza was a thoroughgoing determinist who held that absolutely everything that happens occurs through the operation of necessity. For him, even human behaviour is fully determined, with freedom being our capacity to know we are determined and to understand why we act as we do. So freedom is not the possibility to say "no" to what happens to us but the possibility to say "yes" and fully understand why things should necessarily happen that way. By forming more "adequate" ideas about what we do and our emotions or affections, we become the adequate cause of our effects (internal or external), which entails an increase in activity (versus passivity). This means that we become both more free and more like God, as Spinoza argues in the Scholium to Prop. 49, Part II. However, Spinoza also held that everything must necessarily happen the way that it does. Therefore, humans have no free will. They believe, however, that their will is free. In his letter to G. H. Schuller (Letter 58), he wrote: "men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which [their desires] are determined."[77]

    Spinoza's philosophy has much in common with Stoicism inasmuch as both philosophies sought to fulfill a therapeutic role by instructing people how to attain happiness. However, Spinoza differed sharply from the Stoics in one important respect: he utterly rejected their contention that reason could defeat emotion. On the contrary, he contended, an emotion can only be displaced or overcome by a stronger emotion. For him, the crucial distinction was between active and passive emotions, the former being those that are rationally understood and the latter those that are not. He also held that knowledge of true causes of passive emotion can transform it to an active emotion, thus anticipating one of the key ideas of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis.[78]

    Some of Spinoza's philosophical positions are:

    • The natural world is infinite.
    • Good and evil are related to human pleasure and pain.
    • Everything done by humans and other animals is excellent and divine.
    • All rights are derived from the State.
    • Animals can be used in any way by people for the benefit of the human race, according to a rational consideration of the benefit as well as the animal's status in nature.[79][80]

    Ethical philosophy

    Encapsulated at the start in his Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding (Tractatus de intellectus emendatione) is the core of Spinoza's ethical philosophy, what he held to be the true and final good. Spinoza held good and evil to be relative concepts, claiming that nothing is intrinsically good or bad except relative to a particular individual. Things that had classically been seen as good or evil, Spinoza argued, were simply good or bad for humans. Spinoza believes in a deterministic universe in which "All things in nature proceed from certain [definite] necessity and with the utmost perfection." Nothing happens by chance in Spinoza's world, and nothing is contingent.

    Spinoza's Ethics

    In the universe anything that happens comes from the essential nature of objects, or of God/Nature. According to Spinoza, reality is perfection. If circumstances are seen as unfortunate it is only because of our inadequate conception of reality. While components of the chain of cause and effect are not beyond the understanding of human reason, human grasp of the infinitely complex whole is limited because of the limits of science to empirically take account of the whole sequence. Spinoza also asserted that sense perception, though practical and useful for rhetoric, is inadequate for discovering universal truth; Spinoza's mathematical and logical approach to metaphysics, and therefore ethics, concluded that emotion is formed from inadequate understanding. His concept of "conatus" states that human beings' natural inclination is to strive toward preserving an essential being and an assertion that virtue/human power is defined by success in this preservation of being by the guidance of reason as one's central ethical doctrine. According to Spinoza, the highest virtue is the intellectual love or knowledge of God/Nature/Universe.

    In the final part of the "Ethics", his concern with the meaning of "true blessedness", and his explanation of how emotions must be detached from external cause and so master them, give some prediction of psychological techniques developed in the 1900s. His concept of three types of knowledge – opinion, reason, intuition – and his assertion that intuitive knowledge provides the greatest satisfaction of mind, lead to his proposition that the more we are conscious of ourselves and Nature/Universe, the more perfect and blessed we are (in reality) and that only intuitive knowledge is eternal. His unique contribution to understanding the workings of mind is extraordinary, even during this time of radical philosophical developments, in that his views provide a bridge between religions' mystical past and psychology of the present day.

    Given Spinoza's insistence on a completely ordered world where "necessity" reigns, Good and Evil have no absolute meaning. The world as it exists looks imperfect only because of our limited perception.

    However, Schopenhauer contended that Spinoza's book is the opposite of ethics. "...[I]t is precisely ethics on which all pantheism is wrecked. If the world is a theophany, then everything that man does, and indeed every animal does, is equally divine; nothing can be censurable and nothing can be more praiseworthy than anything else."[81] According to Schopenhauer, Spinoza's "teaching amounts to saying; 'The world is because it is; and it is as it is because it is so.'...Yet the deification of the world...did not admit of any true ethics; moreover, it was in flagrant contradiction with the physical evils and moral wickedness of this world."[82]

    History of reception

    Panentheist, pantheist, or atheist?

    An early engraving of philosopher Spinoza, captioned in Latin, "A Jew and an Atheist".

    It is a widespread belief that Spinoza equated God with the material universe. However, in a letter to Henry Oldenburg he states that: "as to the view of certain people that I identify god with nature (taken as a kind of mass or corporeal matter), they are quite mistaken".[83] For Spinoza, our universe (cosmos) is a mode under two attributes of Thought and Extension. God has infinitely many other attributes which are not present in our world. According to German philosopher Karl Jaspers, when Spinoza wrote "Deus sive Natura" (God or Nature) Spinoza meant God was Natura naturans not Natura naturata, and Jaspers believed that Spinoza, in his philosophical system, did not mean to say that God and Nature are interchangeable terms, but rather that God's transcendence was attested by his infinitely many attributes, and that two attributes known by humans, namely Thought and Extension, signified God's immanence.[84] Even God under the attributes of thought and extension cannot be identified strictly with our world. That world is of course "divisible"; it has parts. But Spinoza insists that "no attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided" (Which means that one cannot conceive an attribute in a way that leads to division of substance), and that "a substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible" (Ethics, Part I, Propositions 12 and 13).[85] Following this logic, our world should be considered as a mode under two attributes of thought and extension. Therefore the pantheist formula "One and All" would apply to Spinoza only if the "One" preserves its transcendence and the "All" were not interpreted as the totality of finite things.[84]

    Martial Guéroult suggested the term "Panentheism", rather than "Pantheism" to describe Spinoza’s view of the relation between God and the world. The world is not God, but it is, in a strong sense, "in" God. Not only do finite things have God as their cause; they cannot be conceived without God.[85] In other words, the world is a subset of God.

    In 1785, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi published a condemnation of Spinoza's pantheism, after Lessing was thought to have confessed on his deathbed to being a "Spinozist", which was the equivalent in his time of being called an atheist. Jacobi claimed that Spinoza's doctrine was pure materialism, because all Nature and God are said to be nothing but extended substance. This, for Jacobi, was the result of Enlightenment rationalism and it would finally end in absolute atheism. Moses Mendelssohn disagreed with Jacobi, saying that there is no actual difference between theism and pantheism. The issue became a major intellectual and religious concern for European civilization at the time.

    The attraction of Spinoza's philosophy to late 18th-century Europeans was that it provided an alternative to materialism, atheism, and deism. Three of Spinoza's ideas strongly appealed to them:

    • the unity of all that exists;
    • the regularity of all that happens; and
    • the identity of spirit and nature.

    Spinoza's "God or Nature" (Deus sive Natura) provided a living, natural God, in contrast to the Newtonian mechanical "First Cause" or the dead mechanism of the French "Man Machine". Coleridge and Shelley saw in Spinoza's philosophy a religion of nature.[1] Novalis called him the "God-intoxicated man".[72][86] Spinoza inspired the poet Shelley to write his essay "The Necessity of Atheism".[72]

    Spinoza was considered to be an atheist because he used the word "God" (Deus) to signify a concept that was different from that of traditional Judeo–Christian monotheism. "Spinoza expressly denies personality and consciousness to God; he has neither intelligence, feeling, nor will; he does not act according to purpose, but everything follows necessarily from his nature, according to law...."[87] Thus, Spinoza's cool, indifferent God[88] is the antithesis to the concept of an anthropomorphic, fatherly God who cares about humanity.

    Steven Nadler suggests that settling the question of Spinoza's atheism or pantheism depends on an analysis of attitudes. If pantheism is associated with religiosity, then Spinoza is not a pantheist, since Spinoza believes that the proper stance to take towards God is not one of reverence or religious awe, but instead one of objective study and reason, since taking the religious stance would leave one open to the possibility of error and superstition.[89]

    Comparison to Eastern philosophies

    Similarities between Spinoza's philosophy and Eastern philosophical traditions have been discussed by many authorities. The 19th-century German Sanskritist Theodore Goldstücker was one of the early figures to notice the similarities between Spinoza's religious conceptions and the Vedanta tradition of India, writing that Spinoza's thought was "... a western system of philosophy which occupies a foremost rank amongst the philosophies of all nations and ages, and which is so exact a representation of the ideas of the Vedanta, that we might have suspected its founder to have borrowed the fundamental principles of his system from the Hindus, did his biography not satisfy us that he was wholly unacquainted with their doctrines... We mean the philosophy of Spinoza, a man whose very life is a picture of that moral purity and intellectual indifference to the transitory charms of this world, which is the constant longing of the true Vedanta philosopher... comparing the fundamental ideas of both we should have no difficulty in proving that, had Spinoza been a Hindu, his system would in all probability mark a last phase of the Vedanta philosophy."[90][91]

    Max Muller, in his lectures, noted the striking similarities between Vedanta and the system of Spinoza, saying "the Brahman, as conceived in the Upanishads and defined by Sankara, is clearly the same as Spinoza's 'Substantia'."[92] Helena Blavatsky, a founder of the Theosophical Society also compared Spinoza's religious thought to Vedanta, writing in an unfinished essay "As to Spinoza’s Deity—natura naturans—conceived in his attributes simply and alone; and the same Deity—as natura naturata or as conceived in the endless series of modifications or correlations, the direct outflowing results from the properties of these attributes, it is the Vedantic Deity pure and simple."[93]

    Spinoza's political theory

    Late 20th century Europe demonstrated a greater philosophical interest in Spinoza, often from a left-wing or Marxist perspective. Karl Marx liked his materialistic account of the universe.[1] Notable philosophers Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri, Étienne Balibar and Marilena Chaui have each drawn upon Spinoza's philosophy. Deleuze's doctoral thesis, published in 1968, refers to him as "the prince of philosophers."[94] Other philosophers heavily influenced by Spinoza include Constantin Brunner and John David Garcia. Stuart Hampshire wrote a major English language study of Spinoza, though H. H. Joachim's work is equally valuable. Unlike most philosophers, Spinoza was highly regarded by Nietzsche.

    Spinoza was an important philosophical inspiration for George Santayana. When Santayana graduated from college, he published an essay, “The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza”, in The Harvard Monthly.[95] Later, he wrote an introduction to Spinoza’s Ethics and ‘De intellectus emendatione’.[96] In 1932, Santayana was invited to present an essay (published as "Ultimate Religion")[97] at a meeting at The Hague celebrating the tricentennial of Spinoza's birth. In Santayana's autobiography, he characterized Spinoza as his “master and model” in understanding the naturalistic basis of morality.[98]

    Spinoza's religious criticism and its effect on the philosophy of language

    Tractatus Theologico-Politicus

    Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein evoked Spinoza with the title (suggested to him by G. E. Moore) of the English translation of his first definitive philosophical work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, an allusion to Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein deliberately borrowed the expression sub specie aeternitatis from Spinoza (Notebooks, 1914-16, p. 83). The structure of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does have some structural affinities with Spinoza's Ethics (though, admittedly, not with the latter's own Tractatus) in erecting complex philosophical arguments upon basic logical assertions and principles. Furthermore, in propositions 6.4311 and 6.45 he alludes to a Spinozian understanding of eternity and interpretation of the religious concept of eternal life, stating that "If by eternity is understood not eternal temporal duration, but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present." (6.4311) "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole." (6.45)

    Leo Strauss dedicated his first book ("Spinoza's Critique of Religion") to an examination of the latter's ideas. In the book, Strauss identified Spinoza as part of the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism that eventually produced Modernity. Moreover, he identifies Spinoza and his works as the beginning of Jewish Modernity.[72] More recently Jonathan Israel, Professor of Modern European History at The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, has made a detailed case that from 1650-1750 Spinoza was "the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition, morality, and what was everywhere regarded, in absolutist and non-absolutist states alike, as divinely constituted political authority."[99]

    Spinoza in literature and popular culture

    Spinoza has had influence beyond the confines of philosophy. The 19th century novelist George Eliot produced her own translation of the Ethics, the first known English translation of it. Eliot liked Spinoza's vehement attacks on superstition.[1] In his autobiography "From My Life: Poetry and Truth", Goethe recounts the way in which Spinoza's Ethics calmed the sometimes unbearable emotional turbulence of his youth. Goethe later displayed his grasp of Spinoza's metaphysics in a fragmentary elucidation of some Spinozist ontological principles entitled Study After Spinoza.[100] Moreover, he cited Spinoza alongside Shakespeare and Carl Linnaeus as one of the three strongest influences on his life and work.[101] The 20th century novelist W. Somerset Maugham alluded to one of Spinoza's central concepts with the title of his novel Of Human Bondage. Albert Einstein named Spinoza as the philosopher who exerted the most influence on his world view (Weltanschauung). Spinoza equated God (infinite substance) with Nature, consistent with Einstein's belief in an impersonal deity. In 1929, Einstein was asked in a telegram by Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein whether he believed in God. Einstein responded by telegram: "I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings."[102][103] Spinoza's pantheism has also influenced environmental theory; Arne Næss, the father of the deep ecology movement, acknowledged Spinoza as an important inspiration.

    Moreover, the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges was greatly influenced by Spinoza's world view. Borges makes allusions to the philosopher's work in many of his poems and short stories, as does Isaac Bashevis Singer in his short story The Spinoza of Market Street.[104] The title character of Hoffman’s Hunger, the fifth novel by the Dutch novelist Leon de Winter, reads and comments upon the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione over the course of the novel. Spinoza has been the subject of numerous biographies and scholarly treatises.[86][105][106][107]

    Spinoza is an important historical figure in the Netherlands, where his portrait was featured prominently on the Dutch 1000-guilder banknote, legal tender until the euro was introduced in 2002. The highest and most prestigious scientific award of the Netherlands is named the Spinoza prijs (Spinoza prize). Spinoza was included in a 50 theme canon that attempts to summarise the history of the Netherlands.[108]

    Spinoza's life has been honored by educators.[52]

    The 2008 play "New Jerusalem," by David Ives, is based on the cherem (ban, shunning, ostracism, expulsion or excommunication) issued against Spinoza by the Talmud Torah congregation in Amsterdam in 1656, and events leading to it.[109] The play was first performed in January 2008 in Boston and then in December 2008 at the Classic Stage Company, New York, NY.[2] The play was also performed (to rave reviews) at Theater J in Washington, D.C. in 2010,[110] and then again (also to rave reviews) in 2012.[111] While the play is dramatically powerful, it should not be taken as history, and in particular it proposes two interpretations of the cherem that are clearly inconsistent with the consensus of historians. First, the play portrays Spinoza as an active member of the Talmud Torah congregation who was strongly committed to his Jewish identity and was unwilling and unhappy to lose it (albeit unwilling to compromise in order to save it); whereas in fact it appears that the cherem to a large extent simply ratified Spinoza's own prior rejection of and withdrawal from the Jewish community on his own initiative.[112] Second, the play portrays the cherem as having been initiated, demanded, and even supervised by the Amsterdam civil authorities (personified by Abraham van Valkenburgh, a regent of Amsterdam and a major character in the play); but the consensus of historians is rather that, while there might have been some coordination with the civil authorities, the initiative for the cherem lay almost entirely with the authorities of the Talmud Torah congregation.[113] A specialist might also quibble with some aspects of the portrayal of the Jewish community's reaction to Spinoza's views: pantheism was not necessarily heretical within the Jewish tradition at the time (and indeed may be reflected in the Kabbalist tradition);[114] whereas Spinoza's views on the Law, on the providential God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and on the immortality of the soul are more likely to have raised hackles.[115] But the play apparently portrays fairly accurately the Portuguese Jewish community's likely fear of being tarred by association with Spinoza's views, as well as some of those views themselves (which in the second act are largely quoted from his later writings).

    Director David Slade used Spinoza's ideas about evil and morality as to explain what had shaped the vampire Marlow in the film 30 Days of Night.

    See also

    Bibliography

    By Spinoza

    About Spinoza

    • Albiac, Gabriel, 1987. La sinagoga vacía: un estudio de las fuentes marranas del espinosismo. Madrid: Hiperión D.L. ISBN 978-84-7517-214-9
    • Balibar, Étienne, 1985. Spinoza et la politique ("Spinoza and politics") Paris: PUF.
    • Boucher, Wayne I., 1999. Spinoza in English: A Bibliography from the Seventeenth Century to the Present. 2nd edn. Thoemmes Press.
    • Boucher, Wayne I., ed., 1999. Spinoza: Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Discussions. 6 vols. Thoemmes Press.
    • Damásio, António, 2003. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, Harvest Books,ISBN 978-0-15-602871-4
    • Deleuze, Gilles, 1968. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression. Trans. "Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza" Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books).
    • ———, 1970. Spinoza - Philosophie pratique. Transl. "Spinoza: Practical Philosophy".
    • ———, 1990. Negotiations trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press).
    • Della Rocca, Michael. 1996. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-509562-3
    • Garrett, Don, ed., 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge Uni. Press.
    • Gatens, Moira, and Lloyd, Genevieve, 1999. Collective imaginings : Spinoza, past and present. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-16570-9, ISBN 978-0-415-16571-6
    • Goldstein, Rebecca, 2006. Betraying Spinoza: The Renegade Jew Who Gave Us Modernity. Schocken. ISBN 978-0-8052-1159-7
    • Goode, Francis, 2012. Life of Spinoza. Smashwords edition. ISBN 978-1-4661-3399-0
    • Gullan-Whur, Margaret, 1998. Within Reason: A Life of Spinoza. Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0-224-05046-3
    • Hampshire, Stuart, 1951. Spinoza and Spinozism, OUP, 2005 ISBN 978-0-19-927954-8
    • Hardt, Michael, trans., University of Minnesota Press. Preface, in French, by Gilles Deleuze, available here.[117]
    • Israel, Jonathan, 2001. The Radical Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • ———, 2006. Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752, (ISBN 978-0-19-927922-7 hardback)
    • Ives 2009: Ives, David, "New Jerusalem: The Interrogation of Baruch de Spinoza at Talmud Torah Congregation: Amsterdam, July 27, 1656," 2009 (Dramatists Play Service, Inc., New York, ISBN 9870822223856).
    • Kasher, Asa, and Shlomo Biderman. "Why Was Baruch de Spinoza Excommunicated?"
    • Kayser, Rudolf, 1946, with an introduction by Albert Einstein. Spinoza: Portrait of a Spiritual Hero. New York: The Philosophical Library.
    • Lloyd, Genevieve, 1996. Spinoza and the Ethics. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-10781-5, ISBN 978-0-415-10782-2
    • LeBuffe, Michael. 2010. Spinoza and Human Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    • Lucas, P. G., 1960. "Some Speculative and Critical Philosophers", in I. Levine (ed.), Philosophy (London: Odhams)
    • Lovejoy, Arthur O., 1936. "Plenitude and Sufficient Reason in Leibniz and Spinoza" in his The Great Chain of Being. Harvard University Press: 144-82 (ISBN 978-0-674-36153-9). Reprinted in Frankfurt, H. G., ed., 1972. Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Anchor Books.
    • Macherey, Pierre, 1977. Hegel ou Spinoza, Maspéro (2nd ed. La Découverte, 2004).
    • ———, 1994-98. Introduction à l'Ethique de Spinoza. Paris: PUF.
    • Magnusson 1990: Magnusson, M (ed.), Spinoza, Baruch, Chambers Biographical Dictionary, Chambers 1990, ISBN 978-0-550-16041-6.
    • Matheron, Alexandre, 1969. Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, Paris: Minuit.
    • Montag, Warren. Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries. (London: Verso, 2002).
    • Moreau, Pierre-François, 2003, Spinoza et le spinozisme, PUF (Presses Universitaires de France)
    • Nadler 1999: Nadler, Steven, Spinoza: A Life, 1999 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England, ISBN 978-0-521-55210-3).
    • Nadler 2001: Nadler, Steven, Spinoza's Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind, 2001 (Oxford University Press, Oxford England, New York NY, reprinted 2004, ISBN 0-19-926887-8).
    • Nadler 2006: Nadler, Steven, Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction, 2006 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England, ISBN 978-0-521-83620-3).
    • Nadler 2011: Nadler, Steven, A Book Forged in Hell: Spinoza's Scandalous Treatise and the Birth of the Secular Age, 2011 (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, ISBN 978-0-691-13989-0).
    • Negri, Antonio, 1991. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics.
    • ———, 2004. Subversive Spinoza: (Un)Contemporary Variations).
    • Popkin, R. H., 2004. Spinoza (Oxford: One World Publications)
    • Prokhovnik, Raia, Spinoza and Republicanism (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
    • Ratner, Joseph, 1927. The Philosophy of Spinoza (The Modern Library: Random House)
    • Scruton 1986: Scruton, Roger, Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction, 1986 (Oxford University Press, Oxford England), 2002 (reprinted as A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford England, ISBN 0-19-280316-6).
    • Stewart, Matthew. The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza and the Fate of God.2006. W.W. Norton[75]
    • Stolze, Ted and Warren Montag (eds.), The New Spinoza; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
    • Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952. Reprint. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
    • ———ch. 5, "How to Study Spinoza's Tractus Theologico-Politicus;" reprinted in Strauss, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1997), 181-233.
    • ———Spinoza's Critique of Religion. New York: Schocken Books, 1965. Reprint. University of Chicago Press, 1996.
    • ———, "Preface to the English Translation" reprinted as "Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion," in Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New York: Basic Books, 1968, 224-59; also in Strauss, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, 137-77).
    • Smilevski, Goce. Conversation with SPINOZA. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2006.
    • Williams, David Lay. 2010. "Spinoza and the General Will," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72 (April): 341-56.
    • Wolfson, Henry A. "The Philosophy of Spinoza". 2 vols. Harvard University Press.[106]
    • Yovel, Yirmiyahu, "Spinoza and Other Heretics, Vol. 1: The Marrano of Reason." Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989.
    • Yovel, Yirmiyahu, "Spinoza and Other Heretics, Vol. 2: The Adventures of Immanence." Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989.

    References

    1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Anthony Gottlieb. "God Exists, Philosophically (review of "Spinoza: A Life" by Steven Nadler)". The New York Times, Books. 18 July 1999. http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/07/18/reviews/990718.18gottlit.html. Retrieved 7 September 2009. 
    2. ^ a b c "Play shows the price of Spinoza's ideas -- (David Ives' play "New Jerusalem: The Interrogation of Baruch de Spinoza at Talmud Torah Congregation.")". The Boston Globe. 14 January 2008. http://www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles/2008/01/14/play_shows_the_price_of_spinozas_ideas/?rss_id=Boston.com+--+Theater+and+arts+news. Retrieved 8 September 2009. [dead link]; Ives 2009.
    3. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.32.
    4. ^ a b Hegel's History of Philosophy. Google Books. http://books.google.com/books?id=ESNZ3TUdN40C&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=%22you+are+either+a+spinozist+or+not+a+philosopher+at+all%22&source=bl&ots=XRsqJEbyNT&sig=bCClaJ9V6lL_CJbOR-S3zaGwHqo&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    5. ^ quoted in the translator's preface of Deleuze Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1990).
    6. ^ de Spinoza, Benedictus; Hessing, Siegfried (1977). Speculum Spinozanum, 1677-1977. Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 828. http://books.google.com/books?id=M3muAAAAIAAJ. , Snipped view of page 828
    7. ^ Magnusson 1990.
    8. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.15.
    9. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.19.
    10. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.19.
    11. ^ Javier Muguerza in his Desde la perplejidad
    12. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.19.
    13. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.20. (Scruton states that only Baruch and Rebekah reached adulthood, but Baruch's younger brother Gabriel apparently did as well.)
    14. ^ Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas, Band 2, Erläuterungen. S. 98, 119.
    15. ^ See Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.1.
    16. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.23 (his mother's death when he was six years old).
    17. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.31.
    18. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.20.
    19. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.20.
    20. ^ See Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.1
    21. ^ See Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.1).
    22. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, pp.20-21; Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.27, n.27, p.189.
    23. ^ Frank Mertens, Ghent University (30 June 2009). "Franciscus van den Enden/Biography". http://users.telenet.be/fvde/Bio3.htm. Retrieved 7 October 2011. 
    24. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.1.
    25. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.21.
    26. ^ Strathern, Paul (25 September 1998). Spinoza in 90 Minutes. Ivan R. Dee. pp. 24–25. ISBN 978-1-56663-215-7. 
    27. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.21; Nadler 2001 ch.2 p.27, n.27, p.189.
    28. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.31.
    29. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.20.
    30. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.21.
    31. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.21.
    32. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.1.
    33. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.25.
    34. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, pp.26-27.
    35. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.21.
    36. ^ Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (23 April 2001), ISBN 978-0-521-00293-6, Page: 120
    37. ^ Yitzhak Melamed, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012. See also Nadler 2001, ch. 1, p.7.
    38. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.1, p.2.
    39. ^ Steven B. Smith, Spinoza's book of life: freedom and redemption in the Ethics, Yale University Press (1 December 2003), p.xx/Introduction google books
    40. ^ Steven Nadler, Baruch Spinoza, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Fri 29 Jun 2001; substantive revision Mon 1 December 2008, plato.standord.eu
    41. ^ Nadler 2001, ch. 2, pp. 17-22.
    42. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.19.
    43. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.20.
    44. ^ See Nadler 2001, ch.2, pp.19-21.
    45. ^ See Nadler 2001, ch.2, p.28, n.28, p.189.
    46. ^ Nadler 2001, ch.2, pp.25-25.
    47. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    48. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    49. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    50. ^ Yitzhak Melamed, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012.
    51. ^ Yitzhak Melamed, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012.
    52. ^ a b Richard H. Popkin (2004). "Spinoza". 
    53. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    54. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    55. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch.1, p.22.
    56. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.23.
    57. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.24.
    58. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.25.
    59. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.25-26.
    60. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.26.
    61. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.26.
    62. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.26.
    63. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.26.
    64. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.32.
    65. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.32.
    66. ^ Strathern, Paul (25 September 1998). Spinoza in 90 Minutes. Ivan R. Dee. p. 53. ISBN 978-1-56663-215-7. 
    67. ^ a b c d Lucas, 1960.
    68. ^ [Citation needed.].
    69. ^ Scruton 1986 (2002 ed.), ch. 1, p.29.
    70. ^ Special Features (5 December 1926). "Shrine will be made of old Spinoza home; Society That Bears His Name Seeks Fund to Buy Dwelling of Great Philosopher at The Hague on the 250th Anniversary of His Death". The New York Times. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60A14F73C5F147A93C7A91789D95F428285F9. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    71. ^ Phelps, M. Stuart (21 February 1877). "Spinoza. Oration by M. Ernest Renan, delivered at the Hague, February 21, 1877 by Translated by M. Stuart Phelps [pp. 763-776"]. New Englander and Yale Review Volume 0037 Issue 147 (November 1878). http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=nwng;cc=nwng;rgn=full%20text;idno=nwng0037-6;didno=nwng0037-6;view=image;seq=00777;node=nwng0037-6%3A1. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    72. ^ a b c d e f g h i Harold Bloom (book reviewer) (16 June 2006). "Deciphering Spinoza, the Great Original -- Book review of "Betraying Spinoza. The Renegade Jew Who Gave Us Modernity." By Rebecca Goldstein". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/16/arts/16iht-idside17.1986759.html. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    73. ^ "How Spinoza lived". The New York Times. 17 March 1878. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9407E0DD143EE73BBC4F52DFB5668383669FDE. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    74. ^ "New Light on Spinoza -- Joseph Freudenthal's Book, Published in German, Gives Facts.". The Chicago Tribune. 19 November 1899. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/427142411.html?dids=427142411:427142411&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Nov+19%2C+1899&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune&desc=NEW+LIGHT+ON+SPINOZA.&pqatl=google. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    75. ^ a b c Lisa Montanarelli (book reviewer) (8 January 2006). "Spinoza stymies 'God's attorney' -- Stewart argues the secular world was at stake in Leibniz face off". San Francisco Chronicle. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/01/08/RVGO9GEOKH1.DTL. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    76. ^ Spinoza, Karl Jaspers p.9
    77. ^ Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVI, Appendix: "[M]en think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire."
    78. ^ Roger Scruton, Spinoza, A very Short Introduction, p.86
    79. ^ Ethics, Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note I.: "Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours...." (Emphasis added to quotation.)
    80. ^ Schopenhauer criticized Spinoza's attitude toward animals: "His contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights,...in conjunction with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable." The World as Will and Representation, tr.E.F.J. Payne (1958) Dover. New York 1966 Vol. 2, Chapter 50, p.645. = Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (hrsg.Arthur Hübscher), Reclam Stuttgart, 1987 Band 2, p.837
    81. ^ Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains, Vol. 4, "Pandectae II," § 91
    82. ^ Parerga and Paralipomena, volume 1, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 12.
    83. ^ Correspondence of Benedict de Spinoza, Wilder Publications (26 March 2009), ISBN 978-1-60459-156-9, letter 73
    84. ^ a b Karl Jaspers, Spinoza (Great Philosophers), Harvest Books (23 October 1974), ISBN 978-0-15-684730-8, Pages: 14 and 95
    85. ^ a b Genevieve Lloyd, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Spinoza and The Ethics (Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks), Routledge; 1 edition (2 October 1996), ISBN 978-0-415-10782-2, Page: 40
    86. ^ a b Hutchison, Percy (20 November 1932). "Spinoza, "God-Intoxicated Man"; Three Books Which Mark the Three Hundredth Anniversary of the Philosopher's Birth Blessed Spinoza. A Biography. By Lewis Browne. 319 pp. New York: The Macmillan Company. $4. Spinoza . Liberator of God and Man. By Benjamin De Casseres, 145pp. New York: E. Wickham Sweetland. $2. Spinoza the Biospher Pinoza. By Frederick Kettner. Introduc- tion by Nicholas Roerich, New Era Library. 255 pp. New York: Roerich Museum Press. $2.50. Spinoza". The New York Times. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40A14F83A5513738DDDA90A94D9415B828FF1D3. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    87. ^ Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, § 47, Holt & Co., New York, 1914
    88. ^ "I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings.” These words were spoken by Albert Einstein, upon being asked if he believed in God by Rabbi Herbert Goldstein of the Institutional Synagogue, New York, 24 April 1921, published in the New York Times, 25 April 1929; from Einstein: The Life and Times Ronald W. Clark, New York: World Publishing Co., 1971, p. 413; also cited as a telegram to a Jewish newspaper, 1929, Einstein Archive 33-272, from Alice Calaprice, ed., The Expanded Quotable Einstein, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
    89. ^ "Baruch Spinoza (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/#GodNat. Retrieved 24 December 2011. 
    90. ^ Literary Remains of the Late Professor Theodore Goldstucker, W. H. Allen, 1879. p32.
    91. ^ The Westminster Review, Volumes 78-79, Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1862. p1862
    92. ^ Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy. F. Max Muller. Kessinger Publishing, 2003. p123
    93. ^ H.P Blavatsky's Collected Writings, Volume 13, pages 308-310. Quest Books
    94. ^ Deleuze, 1968.
    95. ^ George Santayana, "The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza", The Harvard Monthly, 2 (June 1886: 144–52)
    96. ^ George Santayana, "Introduction", in Spinoza’s Ethics and ‘De intellectus emendatione’(London: Dent, 1910, vii–xxii)
    97. ^ George Santayana, "Ultimate Religion", in Obiter Scripta, eds. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936) 280-297.
    98. ^ George Santayana, Persons and Places (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1986) 233–36.
    99. ^ Israel, J. (2001) Radical Enlightenment; Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p159.
    100. ^ "Goethe: Studie nach Spinoza - Aufsätze und Rezensionen". Textlog.de. 30 October 2007. Archived from the original on 13 May 2011. http://web.archive.org/web/20110513034307/http://www.textlog.de/41473.html. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    101. ^ "Linné on line - What people have said about Linnaeus". Linnaeus.uu.se. http://www.linnaeus.uu.se/online/life/8_3.html. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    102. ^ "Einstein believes in "Spinoza's God"; Scientist Defines His Faith in Reply, to Cablegram From Rabbi Here. Sees a Divine Order But Says Its Ruler Is Not Concerned "Wit Fates and Actions of Human Beings."". The New York Times. 25 April 1929. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10B1EFC3E54167A93C7AB178FD85F4D8285F9. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    103. ^ "Einstein's Third Paradise, by Gerald Holton". Aip.org. http://www.aip.org/history/einstein/essay-einsteins-third-paradise.htm. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    104. ^ Spinoza of Market Street and Other ... - Google Books. Google Books. http://books.google.com/books?id=Whx4wgXnp5EC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&ots=k4L_QadzfL&dq=%22spinoza+of+market+street%22&ie=ISO-8859-1&output=html. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    105. ^ "Spinoza's First Biography Is Recovered; The oldest biography of Spinoza. Edited with Translations, Introduction, Annotations, &c., by A. Wolf. 196 pp. New York: Lincoln Macveagh. The Dial Press.". The New York Times. 11 December 1927. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60D1EFF395C147A93C3A81789D95F438285F9. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    106. ^ a b Irwin Edman (22 July 1934). "The Unique and Powerful Vision of Baruch Spinoza; Professor Wolfson's Long-Awaited Book Is a Work of Illuminating Scholarship. (Book review) The Philosophy of Spinoza. By Henry Austryn Wolfson". The New York Times. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0610FC395D13728DDDAB0A94DF405B848FF1D3. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    107. ^ Cummings, M E (8 September 1929). "Roth Evaluates Spinoza". Los Angeles Times. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/370934682.html?dids=370934682:370934682&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Sep+08%2C+1929&author=&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&desc=ROTH+EVALUATES+SPINOZA&pqatl=google. Retrieved 8 September 2009. 
    108. ^ "Entoen.nu". Entoen.nu. http://www.entoen.nu/. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 
    109. ^ Ives 2009.
    110. ^ Washington Post 9 July 2010
    111. ^ Washington Post, 6 March 2012, Pressley, Nelson, " 'New Jerusalem: the Interrogation of Baruch Spinoza' Returns to Theater J," Lifestyle section, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/new-jerusalem-the-interrogation-of-baruch-de-spinoza-returns-to-theater-j/2012/03/06/gIQAsRHcvR_story.html ; City Paper, 9 March 2012, Klimek, Chris, "Heresy Loves Company," http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/42326/new-jerusalem-the-interrogation-of-baruch-de-spinoza-at-theater/ .
    112. ^ Rabbi Charles Feinberg, Congregation Adas Israel, Washington, D.C., speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012.
    113. ^ Yitzhak Melamed, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012.
    114. ^ Yitzhak Melamed, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, speaking at an Artistic Director's Roundtable, Theater J, Washington D.C., 18 March 2012.
    115. ^ Nadler 2001.
    116. ^ See G. Licata, “Spinoza e la cognitio universalis dell’ebraico. Demistificazione e speculazione grammaticale nel Compendio di grammatica ebraica”, Giornale di Metafisica, 3 (2009), pp. 625-661.
    117. ^ "Multitudes Web - 01. Préface à L'Anomalie sauvage de Negri". Multitudes.samizdat.net. Archived from the original on 11 June 2011. http://web.archive.org/web/20110611234714/http://multitudes.samizdat.net/article.php3?id_article=1355. Retrieved 2 May 2011. 

    External links

    Works


    Post a question - any question - to the WikiAnswers community:

    Copyrights:

    Mentioned in

    Spinozism (monistic approach to philosophy)
    Abraham Cohen de Herrera (Jewish philosopher)
    excommunication (in religion)
    Frederick Kettner (parapsychology)
    Judah Abravanel (Spanish philosopher, physician & poet)