Arras/Vimy Ridge, battle of (1917). The British offensive at Arras, of which the Canadian capture of Vimy Ridge formed a notable part (see Canadian Expeditionary Force), was the result of Allied discussions in early 1917 which placed the British army, controversially, under French command for the spring offensive. Nivelle, the French C-in-C, championed what he saw as a war-winning offensive on the Aisne and in the Soissonais (see Nivelle offensive), and Haig was directed to attack at Arras on 9 April to draw in German reserves.
The battle, launched at 05.30 on a sleety morning, began very well. In the north Byng's Canadian Corps, attacking with its four divisions side by side, took Vimy Ridge in a well-prepared operation which left it dominating the Douai plain. This success had wide implications, and to Canadian troops in France and their families and friends at home it was a proud demonstration of Canada's nationhood. When Byng was promoted shortly afterwards, Maj Gen Currie of 1st Canadian Division took over, becoming the first Canadian lieutenant general.
To the south, Third Army under Allenby attacked from the suburbs of Arras towards Monchy-le-Preux and Fampoux. German defences, laid out in three main lines, were strong, but a well-orchestrated counter-battery programme crippled artillery support. Heavy and accurate bombardment smashed defences, but tanks were a disappointment on the churned-up ground. North of the Scarpe, XVII Corps took Fampoux and the Point du Jour Ridge. Things went slightly less well for VI Corps to its south, but the long Observation Ridge was captured—together with 60 guns in Battery Valley behind it. Orange Hill also fell, and though progress at the southern end of the battlefield was poor, both Neuville Vitasse and Telegraph Hill were taken. The day ended with some attackers up on the German third line, leading Ludendorff to write: ‘The battle of Arras … was a bad beginning for the decisive struggle of this year … The consequences of a break-through 12 to 15 kilometres [7.5-9.5 miles] wide and 6 or more kilometres [3.75 miles] deep are not easy to meet.’
Allenby was in a position to do even more serious damage to the Germans, possibly compelling them to withdraw to the Drocourt-Quéant switch-line behind their front position. But he misread the battle, sending cavalry forward into the snow-flurries around Monchy on the 10th, and it proved difficult to co-ordinate fire support for fresh attacks with guns stalled behind captured trenches and communications cut. Monchy fell, though the Germans came within an ace of retaking it in a deft counter-attack on the 14th. At Bullecourt, south of the main attack sector, a promising Australian attack broke down when its tank support failed, leading to long-lasting recriminations between Australians and the Tank Corps.
By this stage some of Allenby's commanders were horrified by the losses suffered in what had become a grim attritional battle in filthy weather, and three divisional commanders took the unusual step of protesting directly to Haig. The operation was called off on 15 April having cost the Allies 150, 000 men—a heavier daily loss rate than the Somme or Passchendaele—and the Germans some 20, 000 fewer. While it succeeded in drawing in their reserves as intended, and demonstrated growing tactical skill especially as far as artillery was concerned, the losses incurred in the later stages were unconscionable.
— Richard Holmes
