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Second Battle of Franklin

 
Wikipedia: Second Battle of Franklin
Second Battle of Franklin
Part of the American Civil War
Battle of Franklin II 1864.jpg
Battle of Franklin, by Kurz and Allison (1891).
Date November 30, 1864
Location Franklin, Williamson County, Tennessee
Result Union victory[1]
Belligerents
United States United States (Union) Confederate States of America CSA (Confederacy)
Commanders
John M. Schofield John Bell Hood
Strength
27,000[2] 27,000[2]
Casualties and losses
2,326 (189 killed, 1,033 wounded, 1,104 missing/captured)[2] 6,252 (1,750 killed, 3,800 wounded, 702 missing/captured)[2]

The Second Battle of Franklin (more popularly known simply as The Battle of Franklin) was fought at Franklin, Tennessee, on November 30, 1864, as part of the Franklin-Nashville Campaign of the American Civil War. It was one of the worst disasters of the war for the Confederate States Army. Confederate Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee conducted numerous frontal assaults against fortified positions occupied by the Union forces under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and was unable to break through or to prevent Schofield from a planned, orderly withdrawal to Nashville.

The Confederate assault, sometimes called the "Pickett's Charge of the West", resulted in devastating losses to the men and the leadership of the Army of Tennessee—fifteen Confederate generals (six killed or mortally wounded, eight wounded, and one captured) and 53 regimental commanders were casualties. A further loss to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas at the subsequent Battle of Nashville in December marked the end of the Army of Tennessee as a fighting force.

Contents

Background

Following his defeat in the Atlanta Campaign, Hood had hoped to lure Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman into battle by disrupting his supply lines from Chattanooga to Atlanta. After a brief period in which he pursued Hood, Sherman elected instead to conduct his March to the Sea from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia. He left forces under the command of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, the commander of the Army of the Cumberland, to defend Tennessee and defeat Hood: principally the IV Corps from the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, and the XXIII Corps from the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Schofield.[3]

Hood moved through northern Alabama and concentrated his army at Florence from October 30 to November 21. Rather than attempting to pursue Sherman through Georgia, Hood decided to execute a new plan: move north into Tennessee, defeat Thomas's army before it could concentrate, seize the important manufacturing center of Nashville, and continue north into Kentucky, possibly as far as the Ohio River.[4]

The Army of Tennessee marched north from Florence on November 21. Schofield, who commanded Stanley's corps as well as his own, retreated in the face of this advance, marching rapidly north from Pulaski to Columbia. The Federals were able to reach Columbia and erect fortifications just hours before the Confederates arrived. On November 24–29, the "Battle of Columbia" was a series of skirmishes and artillery bombardments against Columbia. On November 28, Thomas directed Schofield to begin preparations for a withdrawal north to Franklin. He was expecting (incorrectly) that Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps arrival from Missouri was imminent and he wanted the combined force to defend against Hood on the line of the Harpeth River at Franklin instead of the Duck River at Columbia. On November 29 Hood sent Cheatham's and Stewart's corps on a flanking march north, crossing the Duck River at Davis's Ford east of Columbia while two divisions of Lee's corps and most of the army's artillery remained on the southern bank to deceive Schofield into thinking a general assault was planned against Columbia.[5]

At the Battle of Spring Hill on November 29, Hood attempted to intercept the retreating Union corps and their supply trains, hoping to destroy Schofield before he could link up with Thomas in Nashville, about 18 miles north of Franklin. The resulting combined Union force would be over 60,000 men, approximately twice the size of the Confederate army. However, because of a series of command failures and miscommunication, the Confederates were unable to inflict serious damage on the Federals and could not prevent their safe passage through the village of Spring Hill during the night. In the morning Hood was surprised and furious to discover Schofield's escape, and after an angry conference with his subordinate commanders in which he blamed all but himself for the failure, ordered his army to resume its pursuit.[6]

Opposing forces

Principal Confederate commanders
Principal Union commanders

Confederate

Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood's[7] Army of Tennessee, at 39,000 men, constituted the second-largest remaining army of the Confederacy, ranking in strength only after Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The army consisted of the corps of:

At Franklin, about 27,000 Confederates were engaged, primarily from the corps of Cheatham, Stewart, and Forrest, and Johnson's division of Lee's corp.[2]

Union

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commander of the Army of the Ohio, led a force of about 27,000 consisting of:

Union defensive plans

Schofield's advance guard arrived in Franklin at about 6 a.m., after a forced march north from Spring Hill. Jacob Cox, a division commander temporarily commanding the XXIII Corps, immediately began preparing strong defensive positions around the deteriorated entrenchments originally constructed for the First Battle of Franklin in 1863. The defensive line formed approximately a semicircle around the town, from northwest to southeast; the other half of the semicircle was the Harpeth River.

Schofield decided to defend at Franklin with his back to the river because he had no pontoon bridges available that would enable his men to cross the river; the bridges had been left behind in his retreat from Columbia because they lacked wagons to transport them. He needed time to repair one of the two permanent bridges spanning the river (both of which had been burned) and to lay planking over the undamaged railroad bridge to enable it to carry wagons and troops. His supply train parked in the side streets to keep the main pike open, while wagons continued to cross the river, first via a ford next to the burned-out pike bridge, and later in the afternoon by the two makeshift bridges. By the beginning of the assault, nearly all the supply wagons were across the Harpeth and on the road to Nashville.

By noon the Union works, a strong exterior line fronted by a ditch and a secondary support line some 65 to 40 yards (37 m) behind the center, were ready. Counter-clockwise from the northwest were the divisions of Kimball (IV Corps), Ruger (XXIII Corps), and Cox (XXIII Corps). Two brigades of Wagner's division of IV Corps were a half mile forward of the center, screening the Confederate approach, with orders to fall back if pressed. Wood's division of IV Corps was posted north of the Harpeth to watch for any flanking attempt. Schofield planned to withdraw his infantry across the river by 6 p.m. if Hood had not arrived by then.

Battle

View north from Hood's headquarters on Winstead Hill (engraving from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)

Hood's army began to arrive on Winstead Hill, two miles (3 km) south of Franklin, around 1 p.m. Hood was noted for his aggressive, sometimes reckless battlefield leadership, and had, since his assumption of command of the Army of Tennessee, stung it with the criticism that the troops were reluctant to fight except behind breastworks. Over the objections of his top generals, he ordered a frontal assault in the dwindling afternoon light against the Union forces, now strongly entrenched behind two lines of breastworks, and with Wagner a half mile in front. Many believe that Hood was still angry that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill. But Hood's definite and immediate objective was to try to crush Schofield before he and his troops could escape to Nashville. The Confederates began moving forward somewhere between 3:30 p.m. and 4 p.m., with Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's corps on the left of the assault and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's on the right. The Confederates, without artillery support, had to traverse two miles of open ground, in view of the Union soldiers.

Battle of Franklin      Confederate      Union

Hood's attack initially enveloped Wagner's forward brigades under Lane and Conrad, which despite orders not to engage in front of the works, stood their ground. Whether or not Wagner ordered the change in orders from those issued by XXIII Corps commander Gen. Cox remains a matter of controversy (Wagner claimed he did not; one brigade commander contradicted him in official reports and Wagner was relieved of command in December). The veteran soldiers of these brigades fled back to the main breastworks, while untried replacements were reluctant to move under fire and were captured. The fleeing troops were closely pursued by the Confederates, eventually intermingling with them, so much so that defenders in the breastworks could not fire without hitting fellow soldiers.

Officers in Strickland's brigade (Ruger's division, west of the turnpike) had understandably failed to prepare for such an event. This, combined with the opening in the works through which the Columbia Pike passed, caused a weak spot in the Union line at the Carter House. The Confederate divisions of Maj. Gens. Patrick Cleburne, John C. Brown, and Samuel G. French converged on this spot and a number of their troops broke through the now not-so-solid Federal defenses. Strickland's regiments fell back to avoid capture. A spontaneous counterattack, led by the brigade of Col. Emerson Opdycke and fortified by rallied elements of Wagner's men, newly mustered regiments such as the 44th Missouri, 175th and 183rd Ohio, and two veteran Kentucky regiments, managed to seal the gap and kill, capture, or repel the Confederates who had penetrated the defense, after brief but vicious hand-to-hand combat. By 5 p.m., when the sun set, the Union line was again firmly entrenched. Meanwhile, on the east side of the battlefield, Maj. Gens. William W. Loring and Edward C. Walthall saw their troops torn apart. Maj. Gen. William B. Bate on the west side of the field fared no better, and no further assaults were attempted on the flanks.

In the center, however, the Confederates, believing that an irreparable breach had been made and seeking to exploit it, made repeated but uncoordinated assaults on the Union second line. After dark, around 7 p.m., the division of Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson attacked and had no more luck than its predecessors, but was the only division of Lee's intact corps to be ordered to attack. Large numbers of Confederate troops became pinned down in the ditch fronting the main line, and an intense firefight transpired for hours, each side firing through embrasures or over the top of the parapets at close range in an attempt to dislodge the other.

That some Union troops were armed with Spencer and Henry repeating rifles added to the already considerable advantages of the defenders. Particularly, near the Carter House where the Confederates focused their attack, 350 men of the 12th Kentucky and 65th Illinois were firing with 16-shot, lever-action Henry rifles,[10] the predecessors to the Winchester repeating rifle. These rifles, capable of at least 10 shots per minute, gave these men several times more firepower than what their numbers indicated had they been armed with the usual muzzle-loading rifle-muskets. The Confederate generals could not know this fact when they ordered repeated charges to attack what appeared like a weak spot, only to have their regiments mauled. Other regiments of dismounted Union cavalry were also armed with the 7-shot breech-loading Spencer carbine, which likewise gave them a firepower advantage against the Confederates.

The fighting had mostly subsided by 9 p.m. The overall attack had been awesome, described by some as a tidal wave, and known as the "Pickett's Charge of the West." But it was actually much larger than the famous charge at Gettysburg. In the East, 12,500 Confederates in nine brigades had crossed a mile (1.6 km) of open ground in a single assault lasting about 50 minutes. In Franklin, some 19,000 in 18 brigades marched into the guns a distance of nearly two miles (3.2 km) and conducted assaults in multiple waves that lasted over five hours.

Across the river to the east, Confederate cavalry commander Forrest attempted to turn the Union left flank, but the Union cavalry under Wilson repulsed his advance.

Schofield, who spent the battle in Fort Granger (just across the Harpeth River, northeast of Franklin), ordered his infantry to cross the river, starting at 11:00 p.m., despite objections from Cox that withdrawal was no longer necessary. (Union reinforcements under Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith were already in Nashville.) Although there was a period in which the Union army was vulnerable, straddling the river, Hood was too stunned to take advantage of it. The Union army began entering the breastworks at Nashville at noon on December 1.

Aftermath

The devastated Confederate force was left in control of Franklin, but its enemy had escaped again. Hood was unable to destroy Schofield or prevent his withdrawal to link up with Thomas in Nashville. And his unsuccessful result came with a frightful cost. More men of the Confederate Army of Tennessee were killed in five hours at Franklin than in two days at the Battle of Shiloh. The Confederates suffered 6,252 casualties, including 1,750 killed and 3,800 wounded. An estimated 2,000 others suffered less serious wounds and returned to duty before the Battle of Nashville. But more importantly, the military leadership in the West was decimated, including the loss of perhaps the best division commander of either side, Patrick Cleburne. Fifteen Confederate generals (six killed or mortally wounded, eight wounded, and one captured) and 53 regimental commanders were casualties. The six generals killed or mortally wounded were Cleburne, John C. Carter, John Adams, Hiram B. Granbury, States Rights Gist, and Otho F. Strahl.

Union losses were 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, 1,104 missing, most of whom were prisoners, both wounded and unwounded. Many of the prisoners, including all captured wounded and medical personnel, were recovered on December 18 when Union forces re-entered Franklin in pursuit of Hood.

The Army of Tennessee was all but destroyed at Franklin. Nevertheless, Hood immediately advanced against the Union army now combined under Thomas, firmly entrenched at Nashville, despite being outnumbered and exposed to the elements, thus leading his battered forces to further, and final, disaster in the Battle of Nashville.

In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Battle Cry of Freedom, historian James M. McPherson wrote,

Having proved even to Hood's satisfaction that they could assault breastworks, the Army of Tennessee had shattered itself beyond the possibility of ever doing so again.[11]

Battlefield today

The Carter House, which stands today and is open to visitors, was located at the center of the Union position. The site covers about 15 acres (61,000 m2). The house and outbuildings still show hundreds of bullet holes. The Carnton Plantation, home to the McGavock family during the battle, also still stands and is likewise open to the public. Confederate soldiers swept past Carnton toward the left wing of the Union army and the house and outbuildings were converted into the largest field hospital present after the battle. Adjacent to Carnton is the McGavock Confederate Cemetery, where 1,481 Southern soldiers killed in the battle are buried. Adjacent to the 48 acres (190,000 m2) surrounding Carnton is another 110 acres (0.45 km2) of battlefield, which is currently being converted to a city park. Much of the rest of the Franklin battlefield has been lost to commercial development. The spot where Gen. Cleburne fell, for instance, was covered until late 2005 by a Pizza Hut restaurant. Although the restaurant was purchased by a preservation group and demolished, the Civil War Preservation Trust continues to rank the Franklin battlefield as one of the ten most endangered sites. City officials and historic-preservation groups have recently placed a new emphasis on saving what remains of the land over which this terrible battle raged.

Notes

  1. ^ NPS
  2. ^ a b c d e Eicher, p. 774.
  3. ^ Jacobson, p. 41; McPherson, Battle Chronicles, p. 179.
  4. ^ McPherson, Battle Chronicles, p. 180; Jacobson, pp. 44-47; Sword, pp. 68, 72-73; Nevin, p. 82.
  5. ^ Jacobson, pp. 53, 55, 72-75; Eicher, p. 770; Sword, pp. 84, 89, 91; McPherson, Battle Chronicles, pp. 180-82; Welcher, pp. 586-88; Nevin, pp. 82-83, 88.
  6. ^ Eicher, p. 771; Sword, pp. 124-54; Kennedy, p. 392.
  7. ^ Eicher, p. 769. At the start of the Atlanta Campaign, Hood was appointed a temporary "full" general, but this appointment was never confirmed by the Confederate Congress and was later rescinded.
  8. ^ Sword, pp. 444-47.
  9. ^ Sword, pp. 448-51; Eicher, pp. 770, 774. Although Schofield was the commander of the Army of the Ohio through 1865, historians of the campaign do not always use this designation for the combination of corps assembled against Hood, referring in some cases only to the "Federal Army." See, for example, Welcher, vol. II, pp. 599, 611; Sword, p. 448; Jacobson, p. 452.
  10. ^ Jacobson, pp. 286-87, 329-30.
  11. ^ McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 813.

References

  • Connelly, Thomas L., Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee 1862–1865, Louisiana State University Press, 1971, ISBN 0-8071-2738-8.
  • Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
  • Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
  • Jacobson, Eric A., and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause & for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, O'More Publishing, 2007, ISBN 0-9717444-4-0.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998, ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
  • McPherson, James M., ed., Battle Chronicles of the Civil War: 1864, Grey Castle Press, 1989, ISBN 1-55905-024-1.
  • McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States), Oxford University Press, 1988, ISBN 0-19-503863-0.
  • Nevin, David, and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Sherman's March: Atlanta to the Sea, Time-Life Books, 1986, ISBN 0-8094-4812-2.
  • Sword, Wiley, The Confederacy's Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville, William Morrow & Co., 1974, ISBN 0-688-00271-4.
  • Welcher, Frank J., The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations, Volume II: The Western Theater, Indiana University Press, 1993, ISBN 0-253-36454-X.
  • National Park Service battle summary

Further reading

External links

Coordinates: 35°55′03″N 86°52′24″W / 35.9174°N 86.8733°W / 35.9174; -86.8733


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