| Battle of Fredericksburg |
| Part of the American Civil War |
Battle of Fredericksburg by Kurz and Allison. |
|
|
| Combatants |
| United States of
America |
Confederate States of
America |
| Commanders |
| Ambrose E. Burnside |
Robert E. Lee |
| Strength |
| Army of the Potomac ~114,000
engaged |
Army of Northern Virginia
~72,500 engaged |
| Casualties |
| 12,653 (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing) |
5,377 (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing) |
|
Fredericksburg Campaign |
| Fredericksburg |
The Battle of Fredericksburg, fought in and around Fredericksburg,
Virginia, from December 11 to December 15,
1862, between General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the
Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj.
Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, is remembered as one of the most one-sided battles of the
American Civil War. The Union Army suffered terrible casualties in futile frontal
assaults on December 13 against entrenched Confederate defenders on the heights behind the
city, bringing to an early end their campaign against the Confederate
capital of Richmond.
Background and Burnside's plan
The battle was the result of an effort by the Union Army to regain the initiative in its struggle against Lee's smaller but
more aggressive army. Burnside was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac in November, replacing Maj. Gen.
George B. McClellan. Although McClellan had stopped Lee at the Battle of Antietam in September, President
Abraham Lincoln believed he lacked decisiveness, did not pursue and destroy Lee's army
in Maryland, and wasted excessive time reorganizing and re-equipping his army following major
battles.
Burnside, in response to prodding from Lincoln and General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Halleck, planned a late fall offensive; he communicated his plan to Halleck on November
9. The plan relied on quick movement and deceit. He would concentrate his army in a visible fashion near Warrenton, feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House, or Gordonsville. Then he
would rapidly shift his army southeast and cross the Rappahannock River to
Fredericksburg, hoping that Robert E. Lee would sit still, unclear as to Burnside's intentions, while the Union Army made a rapid
movement against Richmond, south along the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad from Fredericksburg. Burnside selected this plan because he was concerned that if he
were to move directly south from Warrenton, he would be exposed to a flanking attack
from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, whose corps was at that time in the
Shenandoah Valley south of Winchester. He also believed that the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. While Burnside began
assembling a supply base at Falmouth, near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration
entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan. Lincoln eventually approved but cautioned him to move with great
speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated.
Movement to battle
The Union Army began marching on November 15, and the first elements arrived in Falmouth
on November 17. Burnside's plan quickly went awry—he had ordered pontoon bridges to be sent
to the front and assembled for his quick crossing of the Rappahannock, but because of administrative bungling, the bridges had
not preceded the army. As Sumner arrived, he strongly urged an immediate crossing of the river to scatter the token Confederate
force of 500 men in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside began to panic, worried that the
increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed. He squandered his
initiative and ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth.
By November 21, Longstreet's Corps had arrived near Fredericksburg, and Jackson's was
following rapidly. Lee at first anticipated that he would fight Burnside northwest of Fredericksburg and that it might be
necessary to drop back behind the North Anna River. But when he saw how slowly Burnside was moving, he directed all of his army
toward Fredericksburg. The first pontoon bridges arrived at Falmouth on November 25, much
too late to enable the Army of the Potomac to cross the river without opposition. Burnside still had an opportunity, however,
because he was facing only half of Lee's army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might be able to attack Longstreet and
defeat him before Jackson arrived. Once again he squandered his opportunity. The bridges arrived at the end of the month, and by
this time Jackson was present and Longstreet was preparing strong defenses.
Burnside originally planned to cross his army east of Fredericksburg, 10 miles (16 km) downstream, but Early's division
arrived there and blocked him. So he decided to cross directly at Fredericksburg. On December
9, he wrote to Halleck, "I think now the enemy will be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than any
other part of the river. ... I'm convinced that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated at Port Royal, its left resting on
Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn." In addition to his numerical advantage in troop strength, Burnside also had the advantage
of knowing his army could not be attacked effectively. On the other side of the Rappahannock, 220 artillery pieces had been
located on the ridge known as Stafford Heights to prevent Lee's army from mounting any major counterattacks.
Lee had great faith in his army, even though he was fairly uncertain of the plans of the opposing commander as late as two
days before the Union Army attempted a crossing. He deployed approximately 20,000 men under Longstreet on his left flank, which
was anchored on the ridge known as Marye's Heights, just to the west of the city, behind a stone wall at the crest of the ridge.
Fearing a crossing downstream, south of the city, he deployed the rest of his men to the south under Jackson. The area was
interspersed with hills, another excellent defensive position.
Union engineers began to assemble six pontoon bridges on the morning of December 11, two
just north of the town center, a third on the southern end of town, and three close to the south, near the confluence of the
Rappahannock and Deep Run. They came under punishing sniper fire, primarily from the Mississippi
brigade of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale. Eventually his subordinates convinced
Burnside to send landing parties over in the boats that evening to secure a small beachhead and roust the snipers. The
Confederate army chose not to resist the landings vigorously because of the covering Union artillery, but some of the first
urban combat of the war occurred as buildings were cleared by infantry and by artillery
fire from across the river. Union gunners sent more than 5,000 shells against the town and the ridges to the west. After the
bridges were in place, Burnside's men looted the city with a fury that enraged Lee, who compared their depredations with those of
the ancient Vandals. The destruction also angered Lee's men, many of whom were native
Virginians. Over the course of December 11 to December
12, Burnside's men deployed outside the city and prepared to attack Lee's army.
Battle
The battle opened south of the city at 8:30 a.m. on December 13, when Franklin sent two
divisions from the Left Grand Division into a previously unseen gap in Jackson's defenses on the right. By 10 a.m., a thick fog
began to lift, and the initially sluggish movements picked up speed. Meade's division formed the main attack, supported by the
divisions of Doubleday and Gibbon. The attack was stalled by the Virginia Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham, and an artillery duel between Pelham's two cannons (a 12-pound brass Napoleon and a
rifled Blakely) and the Union artillery batteries lasted for about an hour. General Lee observed the action and commented about
Pelham, age 24, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young." As Meade finally made traction, he ran into Brig. Gen.
Maxcy Gregg's brigade, scattering it. Gregg was shot and mortally wounded; he died two days
later.
To Meade's right, Gibbon's attack against the brigades of Brig. Gens. William Dorsey
Pender and Edward L. Thomas made good progress, but Meade's and Gibbon's men
became separated; by 1:30 p.m., a heavy Confederate counterattack pushed them back. Because of the foggy conditions, Federal
artillery could not provide much assistance. The Union men were driven back and chased by the Confederate infantry, raising
concerns that they might be trapped at the river. Eventually the divisions of Sickles and Birney were brought up to strengthen
the Federal line, and Stonewall Jackson's counterattack ground to a halt. The focus of action moved north to Marye's Heights.
The initial assaults west of Fredericksburg began at 11 a.m. as French's division moved along the Plank Road, facing a
steep-banked drainage ditch and a wide, open plain of 400 yards, dominated by Confederate infantry and artillery behind a sunken
road and stone wall. Earlier, Longstreet had been assured by artillerist Edward Porter
Alexander, "A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it." The Union men attacking had to file in columns
over two small bridges across the drainage ditch, making them a massed target. Attempts to shift the attack farther to the right
failed because of swampy ground. As in the south, Union artillery was prevented by fog from effectively silencing the Confederate
guns.
Burnside had anticipated this attack on the right would be merely supportive of his main effort on the left, but Franklin had
stalled and resisted entreaties to continue, so Burnside shifted his emphasis. After French's division was repulsed with heavy
losses, Burnside sent in the divisions of Hancock and Howard, which met a similar fate. By this time, Pickett's division and one
of Hood's brigades had marched north to reinforce Marye's Heights. Griffin's division renewed the attack at 3:30 p.m., followed
by Humphrey's division at 4 p.m. At dusk, Getty's division assaulted from the east and was also repulsed.
Six Union divisions had been sent in, generally one brigade at a time, for a total of sixteen individual charges, all of which
failed, costing them from 6,000 to 8,000 casualties.[2]
Watching the carnage from the center of his line, a position now known as Lee's Hill, General Lee was quoted as saying, "It is
well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it." The action on the heights also included the charge of the
Irish Brigade, which lost 50% of its strength in the battle but advanced further up
the heights than any other Union Brigade. Confederate losses at Marye's Heights totaled around 1,200.[3] The falling of darkness and the pleas of
Burnside's subordinates were enough to put an end to the attacks. Longstreet later wrote, "The charges had been desperate and
bloody, but utterly hopeless."[3]
Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the fields leading to the Heights, unable to move or assist the
wounded because of Confederate fire.
The armies remained in position throughout the day on December 14, when Burnside briefly
considered leading his old IX Corps in one final attack on Marye's Heights, but he reconsidered. That afternoon, Burnside asked
Lee for a truce to attend to his wounded, which Lee graciously granted. The next day the Federal forces retreated across the
river, and the campaign came to an end.
Aftermath
The casualties sustained by each army showed clearly how disastrous the Union army's tactics were, and Burnside was relieved
of command a month later (following the humiliating failure of his "Mud
March"). The Union army suffered 12,653 casualties (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing).[4] Two Union generals were mortally wounded:
Brig. Gens. George D. Bayard and Conrad F. Jackson. The Confederate army lost
5,377 (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, 653 captured/missing),[4][5] most of them in the
early fighting on Jackson's front. Confederate Brig. Gen. T. R. R. Cobb was
killed.
The South erupted in jubilation over their great victory. The Richmond Examiner described it as a "stunning defeat to
the invader, a splendid victory to the defender of the sacred soil." General Lee, normally reserved, was described by the
Charleston Mercury as "jubilant, almost off-balance, and seemingly
desirous of embracing everyone who calls on him." The newspaper also exclaimed that, "General Lee knows his business and the army
has yet known no such word as fail."[6]
Reactions were opposite in the North, and both the Army and President Lincoln came under strong attacks from politicians and
the press. The Cincinnati Commercial wrote, "It can hardly be in human nature
for men to show more valor or generals to manifest less judgment, than were perceptible on our side that day." Senator
Zachariah Chandler, a Radical Republican,
wrote that, "The President is a weak man, too weak for the occasion, and those fool or traitor generals are wasting time and yet
more precious blood in indecisive battles and delays." Pennsylvania
Governor Andrew Curtin visited the White
House after a trip to the battlefield. He told the president, "It was not a battle, it was a butchery." Curtin reported
that the president was "heart-broken at the recital, and soon reached a state of nervous excitement bordering on insanity."
Lincoln himself wrote, "If there is a worse place than hell, I am in it."[7]
Portions of the Fredericksburg battlefield are now preserved as part of Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.
See also
References
- Catton, Bruce, Terrible Swift Sword: The Centennial History of the Civil War, Volume
2, Doubleday, 1963, ISBN 0-385-02614-5.
- Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN
0-684-84944-5.
- Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
- Gallagher, Gary W., Ed., The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock, University of North Carolina
Press, 1995, ISBN 0-8078-2193-4.
- Goolrick, William K., and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Rebels Resurgent: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville,
Time-Life Books, 1985, ISBN 0-8094-4748-7.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian, Random
House, 1958, ISBN 0-394-49517-9.
- Tucker, Spencer C., "First Battle of Fredericksburg", Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and
Military History, Heidler, David S., and Heidler, Jeanne T., eds., W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
- National Park Service
battle description
Notes
- ^ NPS
- ^ Historians differ in reporting Union casualties in the Marye's Heights
sector. Esposito, in notes for map 73, cites "over 6,000." Goolrick, p. 87, cites 7,000. Gallagher, p. 23, "nearly 8,000." All
other references list total battle casualties.
- ^ a b Goolrick, p. 87.
- ^ a b Eicher, p. 405.
- ^ Foote, p. 44, claims that this number was later acknowledged to be 4,201,
based on over 1,000 men who had been considered wounded or missing returning from Christmas holidays with their families
immediately after the battle. Goolrick, p. 779, agrees with this figure.
- ^ Goolrick, p. 92.
- ^ Goolrick, pp. 92-93.
External links
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