Battle of Navarino

 

(nävärē'nō) , 1827, naval battle resulting from the intervention of the European powers in the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). England, France, and Russia had demanded an armistice in the Greek-Turkish warfare. The Turks refused to bring the fighting to a halt, and the three European powers sent their fleets to stop Egyptian reinforcements for the Turks from landing in Greece. In Sept., 1827, a large Egyptian fleet, with troop transports, commanded by Ibrahim Pasha, landed at Navarino (now Pylos). The allied fleet commander, Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, persuaded Ibrahim to await further instructions from his father, Muhammad Ali of Egypt. When the Greeks continued operations, Ibrahim disregarded his agreement; thereupon the allied ships entered (Oct.) the harbor and destroyed the bottled-up Egyptian fleet. The destruction of the fleet helped bring about the withdrawal (1828) of Muhammad Ali from the war in Greece.

Bibliography

See study by C. M. Woodhouse (1965).

It has been suggested that Navarino Massacre be merged into this article or section. (Discuss)

Battle of Navarino
Part of the Greek War of Independence Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829)
The Naval Battle of Navarino (1827). Oil painting by Carneray.
Date 20 October 1827 Location Navarino, Greece Result Decisive British, French and Russian victory
Combatants
United Kingdom France Russian Empire	Ottoman Empire Ottoman Vilayet of Egypt Ottoman Vilayet of Tunisia
Commanders
Edward Codrington (C-in-C) Henri de Rigny Login Heyden	Ibrahim Pasha (C-in-C) Amir Tahir Pasha (Adm comm) Moharram Bey Capitan Bey
Strength
10 battleships 10 frigates 4 brigs 2 schooners 1 cutter	3 battleships 17 frigates 30 corvettes 28 brigs 5 schooners 5 or 6 fireships
Casualties
181 dead, 480 wounded Total: 661	4109 dead or wounded

Russo–Turkish War, 1828–1829
Navarino – Varna – Kulevicha – Akhalzic

The naval Battle of Navarino was fought on 20 October 1827, during the Greek War of Independence (1821–29) in Navarino Bay, on the west coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, in the Ionian Sea. A combined Ottoman and Egyptian armada was destroyed by a combined British, French and Russian naval force, at the port of Navarino. It is notable for being the last major naval battle in history to be fought entirely with sailing ships. The Allied ships were better armed than their Egyptian and Ottoman opponents and their crews were better trained, contributing to a complete victory.

Background

The context of the Battle of Navarino was the Greek War of Independence. This had begun in 1821 as an uprising by Greek nationalists against the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled Greece for over three centuries.

By 1827, the Greek rebellion seemed close to failure. In 1825, Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (ruled 1808-39) (Fig.7) had succeeded in breaking the stalemate that the war had reached. He persuaded his powerful vassal Muhammad Ali of Egypt, wali (lord) of Egypt (ruled 1805-49), to deploy his Western-trained and equipped army and navy against the Greeks. In return, he promised to grant the Peloponnese as a hereditary fief to Ali's son, Ibrahim. In February 1825, Ibrahim led an expeditionary force of 10,000 into the rebel heartland, the Peloponnese, and soon overran its western part. Ibrahim's forces then moved onto the Greek mainland, capturing the pivotal strongholds of the Acropolis of Athens and, in April 1826, despite a heroic Greek defence, Messolonghi (Navpaktos, Aetolia), which controlled the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth.^[1]In response to Greek guerrilla attacks on his forces in the Peloponnese, Ibrahim launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing by means of deportations of civilians to slavery in Egypt and a scorched earth policy which threatened the population with starvation. He also brought in Arab settlers, aiming ultimately to replace the indigenous population.

The Greeks remained defiant, appointing able philhellenic British and French veteran officers to command their forces^[2], and in May 1827 declaring an independent Greek State (today known as the First Hellenic Republic). But the Republic's land and sea forces were far inferior to those of the Ottomans and Egyptians^[3] and it was virtually bankrupt. Many of the key fortresses on what little territory it controlled were in Ottoman hands. It seemed only a matter of time before the Greeks were forced to capitulate.

At this critical juncture, the Greek cause was rescued by the decision of three European great powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, to intervene jointly in the conflict.

Motives of the Great Powers

The only great power that had given unqualified support to the Greek rebellion from its inception was Russia. As the sole Orthodox Christian great power, Russia had long seen herself as the protector (and potential liberator) of the Balkan subjects of the Ottoman empire, the Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks, who were predominantly of the Orthodox faith.^[4] This emotional bond dovetailed neatly with Russia's geostrategic interests. As Russia expanded southwards into the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, it did so at the expense of the Ottoman empire, fighting a series of seven wars against the latter in the 17th and 18th centuries (the Russo-Turkish Wars). Supporting a breakaway Greek state, which would be a natural ally of Russia, was an obvious way to advance Russian influence in south-east Europe. In addition, wealthy Greek phanariote aristocratic clans, which largely controlled Russia's Black Sea trade, had substantial political and commercial influence in Russia.

The difficulty facing Russian military planners was that direct assistance to the Greeks could only be provided by means of a naval expeditionary force, which would have to sail from St Petersburg all the way round Europe and through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea. (The Black Sea was cut off by Ottoman control of the Bosporus). This was not practicable without British consent, because of Britain's naval supremacy. The British government was strongly opposed to this kind of unilateral action by the Russians against the Ottomans (see below). The other option was indirect assistance in the form of a land invasion of the Balkan part of the Ottoman Empire from Russian territory, to force the Sublime Porte (or simply, Porte, the Ottoman government) to accept Greek independence. This course was actively considered and strongly supported by nationalists. But until Navarino in late 1827, it was regarded as too costly and risky by some senior political and military echelons.

The war party in St. Petersburg became much stronger after the Egyptian invasion of the Peloponnese and the start of Ibrahim Pasha's ethnic cleansing campaign. But the Ottoman government bought off immediate Russian intervention by signing the Convention of Akkerman in October 1826, conceding long-standing Russian demands for (genuine) Romanian and Serb autonomy.

In Britain and France, the ruling circles were far less enthusiastic about the Greek cause than in Russia. The two governments saw the Greek rebellion as an affront to the Conservative Order, the fundamental post-Napoleonic principle of international relations enshrined by the Congress of Vienna: that the legitimate monarchies of Europe, and their territorial borders, should be inviolable (although it was disputed whether this applied to a non-Christian "Asiatic" power as Turkey). Even more importantly, both governments greatly feared Russian ambitions in the Balkans and the Middle East and were concerned that a successful Greek secession could trigger a series of revolts that could lead to the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and Russian hegemony in the Levant (eastern Mediterranean).

However, both governments were under pressure from home public opinion to lend assistance the Greeks. In the eyes of the vast majority of Britons and Frenchmen, the Greeks were gallant Christian freedom-fighters struggling against an oppressive and corrupt Islamic tyranny. In Britain the philhellenes, a group of wealthy and well-connected supporters of the Greek cause that included Romantic poet Lord Byron, raised large sums of money for the Greeks and agitated in the press. In France, a deeply unpopular Bourbon monarchy, restored to power by the Allies after the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, was faced by an upsurge of sympathy for the Greek cause. From 1826, the atrocities committed by Ibrahim Pasha's army in the Peloponnese caused a furor in Europe.

Initially, British diplomacy aimed at stalling Russian military intervention in support of the Greeks, in order to give the Ottomans time to defeat the rebellion, which the British confidently expected them to do (see the Duke of Wellington 's diplomacy at the Congress of Verona, 1822). But as the conflict persisted year after year, and as the Russians grew ever more impatient, together with outrage at Egyptian atrocities in the Peloponnese, the British position changed towards a compromise: Greek autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty. The formula was enough to satisfy the Russians, while for the British it had the attraction of preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. This was especially the policy of British politician George Canning, who was more sympathetic to the Greek cause than Wellington, and who was appointed prime minister in April 1827 (Fig.1).

Treaty of London

The three Powers signed the Treaty of London on 6 July 1827. Citing the disruption of trade in the Levant caused by the war as the justification for allied intervention, the treaty called for an immediate armistice between the belligerents, in effect demanding a cessation of Ottoman military operations in Greece- just when the Ottomans had victory in their grasp. It also offered Allied mediation in the negotiations on a final settlement that were to follow the armistice.^[5]

The treaty called on the Porte to grant the Greeks autonomy. The treaty envisaged Greece remaining under Ottoman suzerainty, and paying an annual tribute to the Sultan^[6] . This would place Greece in the same constitutional position as the Romanian principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia). However, the treaty provided for the amount of tribute to be agreed by both sides and fixed permanently. This was to avoid the situation of the Principalities, where the tribute was variable at the behest of the Porte, and had become a crushing burden which had kept those countries in poverty for two centuries.

A secret clause in the agreement provided that if the Porte failed to accept the armistice within a month, each signatory Power would despatch a consul to Nafplion, the capital of the Hellenic Republic, thereby granting de facto recognition to the rebel government, something no Power had done hitherto.^[7]

The same clause authorized the signatories in concert to instruct their naval commanders in the Mediterranean to "take all measures that circumstances may suggest" (i.e. including military action) to enforce the Allied demands, if the Ottomans failed to comply within the specified time limit. However, the clause added that Allied commanders should not take sides in the conflict.^[8]

The treaty was thus a contradictory document. It called for a negotiated settlement, but predetermined what the end result of those negotiations should be. It offered mediation, but threatened the use of force. It authorized force to be used, but forbade joining in the hostilities. Above all, although it was couched in neutral language, in reality it favored the Greek position.

On 20 August, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington (1770-1851) (Fig.2), veteran of 44 years at sea and hero of the Battle of Trafalgar, received his government's instructions regarding enforcement of the treaty. He was to enforce an armistice and to interdict the flow of reinforcements and supplies from Asia Minor and Egypt to Ottoman forces in Greece. He was to use force only as a last resort.^[9]

On 29 August 1827, the Porte formally rejected the Treaty of London's stipulations, triggering de facto recognition of the Hellenic Republic by the Allied powers. On 2 September, the Greek provisional government accepted the armistice. This freed Codrington to concentrate on coercing the Ottoman side.

Prelude

Navarino bay is a large natural harbor on the west coast of Messenia (SW Peloponnese) (Figs.4, 5). It is approximately 5km long (between the headlands) and 3km wide. The bay is sheltered from the open sea by a long, narrow islet (Sphacteria). This islet leaves two entrances to the bay. The northern one is very narrow and shallow, 100 m wide and just 1m deep in places ^[10], impassable to large boats. The southern one is much wider, 1500m, with an effective passage of 1000m width due to rocks. The southern entrance was at that time guarded by an Ottoman-held fort, at Navarino (Pylos). During the Greek insurgency, the bay was used by the Ottoman navy as its main operational base in the Peloponnese.

The main Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, which had been warned by the British and French to stay away from Greece, left Alexandria on 5 August 1827 and joined other Ottoman/Egyptian units at Navarino on 8 September. In response, Codrington arrived with his squadron off Navarino on 12 September. In talks with Ibrahim Pasha and the Ottoman admiral, he extracted what he believed were verbal promises that they would cease offensive operations by land and sea.^[11]

But the Ottomans ignored these alleged undertakings. On at least two occasions, squadrons of the Ottoman fleet sailed out of Navarino bay to support Ottoman military operations elsewhere in the Peloponnese. Codrington, operating from nearby Zante (Zakynthos) island (one of the Ionian islands, at that time under British control^[12]), intercepted them and was obliged to fire repeated warning cannonades to induce them to turn back.^[13] In the meantime, Ibrahim resumed his brutal scorched earth policy on land. The fires of burning villages and fields were clearly visible from Allied ships standing offshore. A British landing party reported that the population of Messenia was close to mass starvation.^[14] On 13 October Codrington was joined off Navarino by his allied support, a French squadron under H. de Rigny and a Russian squadron under L. Heyden, both of whom, being junior admirals, agreed to serve under Codrington's command.

On 18 October, after futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington, in conference with his Allied colleagues, took the fateful decision to enter Navarino bay and anchor his ships face-to-face with the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet. It was decided that with winter approaching, it was impracticable to maintain an effective blockade of Navarino and that in any event, the population of the Peloponnese had to be safeguarded.^[15]. Although this was highly provocative act, Codrington claimed that there was no intention to engage in battle, but only to make a show of force to induce the Ottomans to respect the armistice and to desist from atrocities against the civilian population.^[16]The move would effectively immobilise the Ottoman fleet and place enormous pressure on Ibrahim Pasha to comply with Allied instructions.

Relative strength of the two Fleets

At this point, 22 Allied warships^[17] with a total of 1258 guns (cannon) faced 78 Ottoman vessels^[18] with 2180 guns.^[19] But the Ottoman superiority in numbers masked a decisive inferiority in firepower and crew quality.

The Allies had a crushing superiority in front line combat vessels: ten battleships to the Ottomans' three. This was crucial, as James states that experience in the Napoleonic Wars had shown that even frigates were ineffectual against battleships.^[20]In addition, the Allied ships in general had guns of larger caliber, and better-trained gunners. This meant that the Allied crews could fire more devastating, more frequent and more accurate broadsides.

The great majority of the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet were small boats - 58 corvettes and brigs - which were helpless against the Allied heavyweights. The Ottomans had a number of double-decked frigates which were heavily armed with up to 64 guns each and could have partly compensated for the deficit in battleships. But their smaller gun-caliber negated their numerical advantage in guns over the single-decked Allied frigates. The Egyptian fleet was much better equipped and trained than the Ottomans. But the Egyptian ships were crewed by a large number of French mercenary sailors, whose willingness to fight against their own country's navy was doubtful. This factor probably contributed to the Egyptians' poor performance.

The Ottomans possessed a shore battery on each side of the main entrance to the bay, in Navarino fort and on the islet of Pylos, which bestraddled the approach. These could seriously have impeded Allied entry into the bay, but Codrington was clearly confident that the Ottomans would not start a shooting war. (Or, on an alternative interpretation, he hoped that they would, to give him an excuse to destroy the Ottoman fleet).

Battle

The Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was anchored in a crescent formation, in three lines, extending from Navarino fort (S) to a point about halfway along the beach where the Navarino - Kalamata road turned inland (N). On the flanks were stationed corvettes and fireships.^[21] The Allied plan was to anchor in the free water inside the crescent. In conventional naval doctrine, this would have been regarded as an unacceptable risk, as it would have invited the enemy to try to surround the Allies.^[22] Furthermore, with the prevailing wind blowing from the SW, straight up the entrance, Codrington risked becoming trapped, unable to extricate his squadrons quickly if he needed to. The adoption of this high-risk plan shows the total confidence of the Allied commanders in the tactical superiority of their vessels.

At 2 PM, 20 October, Allied warships, with Codrington in the lead in HMS Asia, began filing into the bay through the southern entrance, proceeding in two lines abreast, British followed by French to starboard (SE, closest to Navarino) and Russians to port. There was no attempt to prevent their entry by the Ottoman shore batteries or their corvettes posted at the entrance, but Codrington received a message from Ibrahim Pasha. This stated that he had not given permission for the Allies to enter the bay, and demanded that they withdraw. Codrington dismissed Ibrahim's objection, replying that he had come to give orders, not to take them. He warned that if the Ottomans opened fire, their fleet would be destroyed.^[23]

As his flagship cast anchor in the middle of the Ottoman line, Codrington ordered a brass band to play on deck to emphasize his peaceful intentions. However, the entire crew, as in all Allied ships, was at battle stations, with gun ports half open. Meanwhile as the Allied vessels moved into position, along the Ottoman lines trumpets sounded action stations. Ottoman crews scrambled to meet the unexpected intrusion into their base.

Allied captains were under strict orders to open fire only if they were attacked. Despite this, fighting soon broke out. Codrington claimed that hostilities were started by the Ottomans. The outbreak, according to Allied sources, occurred in the following manner:

At the entrance to the bay, Capt T. Fellowes on the frigate Dartmouth had been detailed, with six smaller boats^[24] to keep watch on the group of Ottoman corvettes and fireships on the left flank of the Ottoman line. As the Allied ships continued moving into the bay, Fellowes noticed that an Ottoman crew was preparing a fireship and sent a boat to instruct them to desist. The Ottomans fired on the boat and lighted the fireship. Fellowes sent a cutter to tow the fireship to a safe distance, but the Ottomans fired on the cutter, inflicting casualties. Fellowes opened musket fire on the fireship crew to cover his men. At this point the French flagship Sirene, which was just then entering the bay, opened fire with muskets to support Fellowes. An Ottoman corvette then attacked Sirene with its guns. This chain reaction spread along the line, so that within a short time, there was general engagement.^[25]

The battle thus began before the Allies could complete their deployment. In fact, this proved to be a tactical advantage, as it meant some Allied ships were not yet at anchor and could therefore manoeuvre more swiftly.

With ships blasting each other at very close range, the encounter was mostly a matter of attrition, in which superior Allied firepower and gunnery were critical. For example, Codrington's flagship Asia was anchored between Ottoman admiral Capitan Bey's flag, the battleship Fatih Bahri on one side and Moharram Bey's flag, the double-decked frigate Guerriere on the other. Both Ottoman boats were crippled, one after the other, by crushing broadsides from Asia (Fig.6). The same story was repeated along the line.^[26]

Within four hours, virtually the entire Ottoman fleet had been destroyed. Three quarters were sunk: many of them, dismasted but still afloat and reparable, were blown up or set on fire by their own crews to prevent them falling into Allied hands (Fig.5).^[27]This contributed to the horrendous Ottoman and Egyptian casualty figures, as many men were trapped in burning or exploding vessels. Casualties were given to Codrington by the Ottoman naval secretary as approx. 3000 killed, 1109 wounded.^[28] Of the entire Ottoman/Egyptian armada of 78 boats, just eight remained seaworthy.^[29]

Allied casualties were given by Codrington as 181 killed, 480 wounded. Several Allied ships were severely damaged: Russian battleship Azov had been hit 153 times, seven of them below the waterline. Gangut and Iezekiil were also disabled. The three British battleships had to be sent to England for repairs.^[30]

Aftermath

The Battle of Navarino was the decisive turning point of the Greek War of Independence.

The battle irreparably crippled Ottoman/Egyptian sea power, depriving the Ottomans of the opportunity to complete the subjugation of Greece. Some 13,000 Ottoman and Egyptian troops remained in the Peloponnese but, cut off from reinforcement and resupply by sea, their position was untenable in the long run.

The Sultan did not, however, concede defeat in Greece for a further two years. Instead he responded to the defeat with the same defiance as when the Greek revolt first broke out in 1821.^[31] A few weeks after the battle, in a symbolic gesture, he proclaimed jihad (holy war) against the European powers in his claimed role as khalifa (caliph, or spiritual leader) of all Muslims. More concretely, he closed the Bosporus to international shipping, a move certain to provoke Russia, whose entire Black Sea trade had to pass through the Straits. He also revoked the Convention of Akkerman, signed the previous year. The Sultan ordered his vassal Muhammad Ali not to withdraw his army from the Peloponnese.

The Sultan's reaction triggered the long-expected Russian land attack. Russia declared war in April 1828 and a Russian army swept through the Romanian Principalities and crossed the Danube, starting the 8th Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829). By mid-1829, after a long and bitterly-contested campaign, they had achieved a complete victory. In September 1829, with a Russian army camped just 40 miles from his capital, Constantinople, the Sultan was forced to capitulate. By the Treaty of Adrianople, he conceded a long list of Russian demands, one of which was acceptance of Greek autonomy as defined in the Treaty of London. Meanwhile Codrington had persuaded Muhammad Ali to withdraw his Egyptians from the Peloponnese, after lengthy negotiations. Ibrahim Pasha's army finally left in October 1828, a year after Navarino. The remaining Ottoman garrisons were cleared by a French expeditionary force under Gen. J-N. Maison. Greek forces then regained control of Central Greece by April 1829 in a lightning campaign.^[32]

The Sultan's acceptance of the Treaty of London came too late to save Ottoman sovereignty over Greece. Buoyed by the Ottoman disasters on land and sea, and their own military successes, the Greeks had no intention of accepting anything less than full independence. Finally, at the London Conference of 1832, the Allies dropped their policy of Ottoman suzerainty and accepted Greek independence, but insisted the state should be a monarchy not a republic. Later that year, the Sultan was forced by the Allied powers to sign the Treaty of Constantinople (1832) formally recognizing the new Kingdom of Greece as an independent state.^[33]

Table of Combatant Ships

	BRITAIN	FRANCE	RUSSIA	Allied Powers Total	OTTOMANS/EGYPTIANS**	Ottoman/Egyptian Total
Battleships	Asia (FF) (84) Genoa (76) Albion (74)	Breslau (84) Scipion (80) Trident (74)	Gangut (84) Azov (F) (80) Iezekiil (80) Aleksandr Nevskii (80)	10 (796)	Ghiuh Rewan (FF) (84) Fahti Bahri (F) (74) Burj Zafer (70)	3 (228)
Frigates	Glasgow (50) Cambrian (48) Dartmouth (42) Talbot (28)	Sirene (F)(dd) (60) Armide (44)	Provornyi (48) Konstantin (44) Elena (38) Kastor (36)	10 (438)	Ihsanya (dd) (64) Surya (dd) (56) Guerriere (F)(dd) (60) Leone (dd) (60) Fevz Nusrat (dd) (64) Ka'íd Zafer (dd) (64) 1 other dd 10 single-deck frigates	17 (818)
Other*	2 brigs			2 (24)	30 corvettes 28 brigs	58 (1134)
Total	9	5	8	22 (1258)	78	78 (2180)

Source: Compiled from information in W. James Naval History of Great Britain (London, 1837) Vol.VI pp476-89

Note Exact figures for the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet are difficult to establish. The figures given above are mainly those enclosed by Codrington in his report. These were obtained by one of his officers from the French secretary of the Ottoman fleet, a M. Leteiller. However, another report by Leteiller to the British ambassador to the Porte gives 2 more frigates and 20 less corvettes/brigs for a total of 60 warships. W. James in Naval History of Great Britain (1837) Vol VI p478 assesses the Ottomans' "effective" strength as even lower: 3 battleships, 15 large frigates and 18 corvettes, totaling just 36 ships.

Key

* Other excludes schooners, fireships and launches

Figures in brackets indicate no. of guns
FF = Flagship (Commander-in-Chief)
F = Flagship
dd = double-deck frigate

** Ottoman Empire/Egypt/Tunisia (Ibrahim Pasha)

• Capitan Bey Squadron (Alexandria): 2 battleships, 5 frigates, 12 corvettes
• Moharram Bey Squadron (Alexandria): 4 frigates, 11 corvettes, 21 brigs, 5 schooners, and 5 (or 6?) fireships
• Tunis Squadron (Alexandria): 2 frigates, 1 brig
• Tahir Pasha Squadron (Admiral commanding)(Constantinople): 1 battleship, 6 frigates, 7 corvettes, 6 brigs

Notes

See also

• History of Greece
• Greek War of Independence

References

• Naval wars in the Levant 1559–1853 (1952), R. C. Anderson. ISBN 1-57898-538-2

External links

• Extract from W. James Naval History of Great Britain (1837) Vol VI 471-90 Main source used for this article, includes reproduction of several original documents, esp. Codrington's own report on the battle
• Aerial View of Navarino Bay
• Navarino Bay (Aerial View)
• Navarino with Location Map

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