Fourth Enemy Offensive

Fourth Enemy Offensive
Part of the Yugoslav Front of World War II
The bridge on the Neretva river, repaired and twice-destroyed during the battle. Today, a monument.
Date 20 January – March 1943 Location Vicinity of the Neretva river, Herzegovina, occupied Yugoslavia Result Partisan retreat and heavy losses, Chetnik defeat, Axis failure to achieve strategic goals
Belligerents
Axis:  Germany  Italy  Independent State of Croatia Chetniks	Allies: Partisans
Commanders and leaders
Alexander Löhr Mario Roatta Draža Mihailović[1] Branko Ostojić Dobroslav Jevđević Pavle Đurišić	Josip Broz Tito
Strength
90,000 men 12,000-15,000 Chetniks 12 air squadrons	Unknown (about 20,000 men)
Casualties and losses
	11,915 killed 616 executed 2,506 captured
Thousands of displaced, killed, wounded, or disappeared civilians

The Fourth Enemy Offensive (Serbo-Croatian: Četvrta neprijateljska ofenziva/ofanziva), codenamed Fall Weiss, was a combined Axis strategic offensive launched during against the Partisans throughout occupied Yugoslavia. It is one of the most significant confrontations of the Yugoslav National Liberation War (a theater of World War II). The offensive took place in early 1943, between 20 January^[2][3] and mid-to-late March^[4] 1943.

The operation is most remembered in Yugoslavia for its final phase, the Battle of the Neretva (Bitka na Neretvi) named after the Neretva river. The final phase is also known as the Battle for the Wounded (Bitka za ranjenike).

Background

In late 1942, with the Axis situation in North Africa deteriorating, the German high command became concerned about the possibility of an Allied landing in the Balkans. This was of particular concern due to the substantial resources they were extracting from Yugoslavia, including timber, copper and bauxite. In the event of an Allied landing, resistance forces in Yugoslavia would be likely to interfere with German defensive operations as well as continued resource extraction. As a result, on 16 December 1942, Hitler ordered the Armed Forces Commander in South-East Europe, Generaloberst Alexander Löhr to crush the resistance in Yugoslavia.^[3][5] In a meeting of 18–19 December, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht decided on the destruction of the Bihać Republic.^[6] On 8 January, Löhr and Mario Roatta, commander of the 2nd Italian army, met in Zagreb and devised a detailed plan.^[6]

Operation

The Germans aimed to destroy the central command of the Partisan movement, the Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as well as the main Partisan hospital. The Axis rallied ten divisions equaling 90,000 troops and in addition twelve air squadrons.^[7] Chetnik auxiliaries and formations consisting of between 12,000 and 15,000 men also took part and worked closely with the Italians.^[8]

The operation was carried out in three stages:^[9]

• Weiss 1 aimed at destroying Partisan-held areas: Lika, Kordun, Banija, Cazinska Krajina, and Grmeč. It was started on 20 January 1943 and lasted until 25 February.
• Weiss 2 focused on Partisans in the south-east of the Bihać Republic: Drvar, Glamoč, Livno, Jajce, and Ključ.
• Weiss 3 was launched in March, and centered around the areas of northern Herzegovina, but the targeted Partisans managed to break out from an encirclement into northern Montenegro, and the third phase was not successfully completed.

During the battle, the Partisans were caught in a pocket with their backs to the Neretva river. On their - western - side, were German forces, including several elite units and supported by panzer brigades. The eastern side (opposite the Partisan pocket) was guarded only by Chetnik formations, who were acting in coordination with the Germans. To reach this side the Partisans would have to cross one or more of the five bridges on the Neretva river. If the Partisans could cross the river they would be relatively safe; however, they had insufficient time to cross as the Axis forces were preparing for their final push.

Battle of the Neretva

In order to counter this strategic "checkmate", the Partisan commander, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, prepared an elaborate deception. He ordered his sappers to actually blow up all the bridges on the river. When air reconnaissance brought this information to the German command, they concluded that the Partisans must be preparing a final dash north of their current position (along the western shore of the Neretva), and had blown up the bridge to prevent desertion as well as attack by Chetnik forces from the other side of the river. They thus began a redeployment of troops in the area to block the anticipated movement.

This redeployment gave the Partisan engineers precious time needed to sufficiently repair the bridge and to eliminate the Chetnik troops defending its far side. The Germans, characteristically, quickly caught on, but were unable to correct their mistake and prepare a serious attack in time, because of their previous redeployment orders. With their rearguard fighting off an increasingly powerful German advance, the Partisans crossed the river under intense air bombardment (the Axis deployed large Luftwaffe formations), but the mountainous landscape prevented accurate destruction of the makeshift bridge. After the escape was complete, the weak bridge was finally rendered useless to prevent pursuit. The humiliating strategic defeat was amplified by Tito being able to keep his well known pledge not to leave the wounded behind, as they faced certain execution at the hands of the Axis (which later actually happened in the aftermath of the Battle of the Sutjeska).^[10]

Aftermath

By the end of March, the Germans claimed to had killed about 11,915 Partisans, executed 616, and captured 2,506.^[11] Despite these heavy losses and a tactical victory for the Axis powers, the partisan formations secured their command and the hospital, and were able to continue operations. In fact, once they reached the eastern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Partisans had to face only the Chetniks, and in turn almost entirely incapacitated them in the area west of the Drina river.

The next major operation in Yugoslavia was Operation Schwarz.

In popular culture

The 1969 Oscar-nominated motion picture The Battle of Neretva depicts these events.

Alistair MacLean's 1968 thriller novel Force 10 From Navarone, subsequently filmed, also brings forth the fight of outnumbered Partisans against Germans and Chetniks, and the blowing up of the Neretva bridge. But the actual historical events are not in play, and the story is entirely fictional.

See also

• Seven enemy offensives
• Sava Kovačević
• Resistance during World War II
• Anti-partisan operations in World War II

Notes

References

• Hoare, Marko Attila (2006). Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-726380-1. 
• Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-1589-4. 
• Roberts, Walter R. (1973). Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941-1945. Rutgers University Press. http://books.google.com/books?id=43CbLU8FgFsC&printsec=frontcover. 
• Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks. 1. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0857-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=yoCaAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover.