In the Battle of Thermopylae of 480 BC, an alliance of Greek city-states fought the invading Persian Empire at the pass of Thermopylae in central
Greece. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held back the Persians for three days in one of history's
most famous last stands. A small force led by King Leonidas of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive army of
Xerxes I of Persia (Xerxes the Great) could pass. After three days of battle, a local
resident named Ephialtes is believed to have betrayed the Greeks by revealing a
goat path that led behind the Greek lines.
The Greeks were represented by "three hundred Spartan armed men; one thousand from Tegea and
Mantinea, half from each place; one hundred and twenty from Orchomenus in Arcadia and one thousand from the rest of Arcadia; that many
Arcadians, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius,
and eighty Mycenaeans. These were the Peloponnesians
present; from Boeotia there were seven hundred Thespians and
four hundred Thebans."[3] In the final battle, when it became clear that the Persians were going to win, most of the
Greek allies retreated but Leonidas and 300 Spartan soldiers stayed to fight. Though they "knew that they must die at the hands
of [the Persians], they displayed the greatest strength they had."[4]
The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained heavy losses, extremely disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The
fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army offered Athens the
invaluable time to prepare for a decisive naval battle that would come to determine the
outcome of the war.[5] The subsequent Greek
victory at the Battle of Salamis left much of the Persian Empire's navy destroyed and Xerxes was forced to retreat back to Asia, leaving his army in Greece under Mardonius, who was to meet the
Greeks in battle one last time. The Spartans assembled at full strength and led a pan-Greek army
that defeated the Persians decisively at the Battle of Plataea, ending the
Greco-Persian War and with it the expansion of the Persian Empire into Europe. The performance of the defenders at the
battle of Thermopylae is often used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force
multipliers,[6] and has become a symbol of
courage against overwhelming odds.[6]
Greek preparations
The Battle of Thermopylae was the first main event in what is generally termed the Second Persian War. Its political origin is
to be found in the events of the First Persian War,[7] when
Xerxes' father, King Darius I of Persia, or Darius the Great, invaded Greece
for the first time and was defeated by Athens at the Battle
of Marathon in 490 BC. Just prior to that battle Darius had sent heralds around to the Greek states offering the
opportunity to submit,[8] which would avoid war and make
them eligible for blandishments from the
king. As was customary, this was signaled by asking for "earth and water", betokening
their submission, which was duly kept by the assiduous bureaucrats of the Persian Empire. The Athenians responded at that time by
throwing the emissaries into pit, and the Spartans by throwing others into a well, with a suggestion to dig it out for
themselves.[9]
Consequently when Xerxes sent the envoys around again[10] just prior to the Battle of Thermopylae he omitted Athens and Sparta. Support gathered around these
two leading states. A congress met at Corinth in late autumn of 481
BC,[11] and a confederate alliance of
Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance
and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. Herodotus does not formulate an abstract name for the polity, such as "congress" or "alliance", but calls them
simply "οἱ Ἕλληνες" (the Greeks) and "the Greeks who had sworn alliance" (Godley translation) or
"the Greeks who had banded themselves together" (Rawlinson translation).[12] Sparta and Athens had a leading role in the congress[13] but interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive
strategy. Little is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussion during its proceedings. Only 70 of the
approximately 700 Greek cities sent representatives.
The Persian army first encountered a joint force of 10,000 Athenian and Spartan hoplites led
by Euanetus and Themistocles in the vale of Tempe.
Upon hearing this, Xerxes sent the army through the Sarantaporo strait, which was unguarded, and sidestepped them. The hoplites,
warned by Alexander I of Macedon, vacated the pass.[14] The allied Greeks judged that the next strategic choke point where the Persian force could be stopped was Thermopylae.[15] They
decided to defend it and send a fleet to Artemision, a naval choke point, as Xerxes'
army was being supplied and supported by sea. Using the fleet, Xerxes' army might have crossed Maliacos bay and outflanked the
Greek army again.[16]
The Greek high strategy is confirmed by an oration later in the same century:
But while Greece showed these inclinations [to join the Persians], the Athenians, for their part, embarked in their ships and
hastened to the defence of Artemisium; while the Spartans and some of their allies went off to make a stand at Thermopylae,
judging that the narrowness of the ground would enable them to secure the passage.[17]
Some modern historians, such as Bengtson,[18] claim that
the purpose of the land force was to slow down the Persian army whilst the Persian navy was
defeated at sea. Another theory is that the land army was expected to hold back the Persian forces in the north and defeat it
through attrition, epidemics, and food deprivation.[16]
Historians have also argued that the Athenians were confident that a small Greek force led by Leonidas would be enough to hold
back the Persians; otherwise, they would have already vacated their city and sent their whole army to Thermopylae.[16] There is one known case in which a small force did stop
a larger invading force from the north: in 353 BC/352 BC the
Athenians managed to stop the forces of Philip II of Macedon by deploying 5,000
hoplites and 400 horsemen.[19]
Herodotus writes:
The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage
the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as was likely they might have
done had they seen that Sparta was backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian Festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in
full force to join the army. The rest of the allies intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic Festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylae
decided so speedily; wherefore they were content to send forward a mere advance guard. Such accordingly were the intentions of
the allies.[20]
The legend of Thermopylae as told by Herodotus has it that Sparta consulted the Oracle at
Delphi before setting out to meet the Persian army. The Oracle is
said to have made the following prophecy in hexameter
verse:[21]
O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Persia,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
He cannot be withstood by the courage of bulls nor of lions,
Strive as they may; he is mighty as Jove; there is naught that shall stay him,
Till he have got for his prey your king, or your glorious city.
In essence, the Oracle's warning was that either Sparta would be conquered and left in ruins or one of her two hereditary kings, descendant of Heracles, must sacrifice his life to defend her.
Leonidas took charge of his personal fighting unit, the 300 Spartans (and the 900 helots), and
headed to Thermopylae.[22] Herodotus writes
that Leonidas was idolized by his men. He was convinced that he was going to certain death and his forces were not adequate for a
victory, and so selected only men who had fathered sons who were old enough to take over the family responsibilities.
Plutarch mentions in his Sayings of Spartan Women that, after encouraging him, Leonidas'
wife Gorgo asked what she should do on his departure. He replied, "Marry a good
man, and have good children."[23]
Battle
Arrival of the Persians
Herodotus attests a conversation that took place early in the expedition between Xerxes and Demaratus, an exiled Spartan king under his employment. Xerxes asked Demaratus whether he thought that the
Greeks would put up a fight, for in his opinion neither the Greeks nor even all peoples of Europe together would be able to stop
him because they were disunited.[24] Demaratus
replied:
First then, no matter what, the Spartans will never accept your terms. This would reduce Greece to slavery. They are sure to
join battle with you even if all the rest of the Greeks surrendered to you. As for Spartan numbers, do not ask how many or few
they are, hoping for them to surrender. For if a thousand of them should take the field, they will meet you in battle, and so
will any other number, whether it is less than this, or more.
Xerxes laughed at this answer, claiming that "free men" of any number would never be able to stand against his army which was
unified by a single ruler, and that obedience to one single master would make his troops extremely courageous, or they would be
led into battle "by the whip" even against an army of any size.[24] He added that "even if the Greeks have larger numbers than our highest estimate, we still would
outnumber them 100 to 1", claiming that his army too contained men as tough as the ones Demaratus had described even though the
deployment of the phalanx didn't allow a pushing match to be initiated. [24]
On the Persian Empire army's arrival at Thermopylae, Greek troops instigated a council
meeting. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. They were well aware that the Persians would have
to go through Athens in order to reach them there. The Phocians
and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending
Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas and the Spartans agreed to defend Thermopylae.[24]
Meanwhile, the Persians entered the pass and sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the
camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were
indulging in calisthenics and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable.
Seeking again the counsel of Demaratus, Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom
to adorn their hair when they were about to risk their lives. Demaratus called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the
Great King that they intended to dispute the pass. He emphasized that he had tried to warn Xerxes earlier in the campaign, but
the King had refused to believe him. He added that if Xerxes ever managed to subdue the Spartans, no other nation in the world
would dare to defend themselves against him.[24]
Xerxes remained incredulous, finding it unbelievable for such a small army to contend with his own. Plutarch informs that he
then sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first, he asked Leonidas to join him by offering the kingship of all Greece.
Leonidas answered: "If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to
die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots."[25]
Despite their extremely disproportionate numbers, Greek morale was high. Herodotus writes that when Dienekes, a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "to blot out the
sun", he responded with a characteristically laconic remark, "So much the better,
we shall fight in the shade." (Taken by the Hellenic Army XX Armored
Division as their motto).
Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he sent Medes and
Cissians, along with relatives of those who had died 10 years earlier in the battle of Marathon to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him.[26][27] According to Ctesias, the first wave numbered 10,000 soldiers
and were commanded by Artapanus. They were "cut to pieces" with only two or three
Spartans dead.[28]
Failure of the frontal assault
On August 18, 480 B.C.[29], Xerxes sent in the Medes who had been
only recently conquered by the Persians, perhaps, as Diodorus Siculus suggested,
because he wanted them to bear the brunt of the fighting.[30] The Medes soon found themselves in a frontal assault.
The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. That the wall was guarded shows that the Greeks were using it
to establish a reference line for the battle, but they fought in front of it.[31]
Details of the tactics are scant. The Greeks probably deployed in a phalanx, a wall
of overlapping shields and layered spear points, spanning the width of the pass since attacking individually would have left the
Spartan warriors vulnerable to Persian arrows. Herodotus says that the units for each state were kept together.[22] The Persians, armed with arrows and short
spears, could not break through the long spears of the Greek phalanx, nor were their lightly armored men a match for the superior
armor, weaponry, and strategy of the Greek hoplites. [32] Glotz has argued that three Persian
Empire soldiers were necessary to put down one hoplite.[33] In this way they killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which
he was watching the battle three times.[34]
According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the Persian emperor, having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a
second assault: the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men.[32][35] However, according to Ctesias, the Immortals did not attack until the second day. Ctesias
tells that Xerxes sent another 20,000 troops against the Greeks, after the first 10,000 were defeated, who also failed to open
the pass even though they were flogged by their leaders to press on.[28] On his side, Leonidas had arranged a system of relays between the hoplites of the various cities so
as to constantly have fresh troops on the front line. In the heat of the battle, however, the units did not get a chance to
rotate. Able to approach the Greek line only in such numbers as the space allowed, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes,
and Xerxes had to withdraw them as well. The first day of battle probably ended there.[32]
On the second day Xerxes sent, according to Ctesias, another 50,000 men to assault the pass, but again they failed. The
account of the slain gives some indication why: the wall of bodies must have broken up the Persian line and detracted from their
morale. Climbing over the bodies, they could see that they had stepped into a killing machine but the officers behind prevented
them from withdrawing. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed. By now he concluded that a
head-on confrontation against Spartan-led troops in a narrow place was the wrong approach.[28]
Encirclement of the Greeks
Late on the second day of battle, as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a
Malian Greek traitor named Ephialtes
informed him of a path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army through the pass. Ephialtes was motivated by the
desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma, coming to mean "nightmare" and becoming the
archetypal term for a "traitor" in Greek.[36]
Xerxes sent his commander Hydarnes through the pass with the Immortals and other troops (a force of about 40,000), according to Ctesias.[28] The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea
behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at
Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1,000 Phocian volunteers on the heights to guard that path.[37]
Their first warning of the approach of the Immortals was the rustling of oak leaves at first light on the third day of the
battle. Herodotus says that they jumped up and were greatly amazed.[38] Hydarnes was perhaps as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as they were to see him
and the Persian forces. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes and proceeded by firing "showers of
arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand, but the Persians took the left branch
of the pass to Alpenus and hence circled behind the main Greek force.[38]
Last stand of the Spartans, Thespians and Thebans
Before first light on August 20, 480 B.C.E.[29], Leonidas learned that the Phocians had
not held and he called a council of war at dawn. During the council some Greeks argued
for withdrawal in the face of the overwhelming Persian advance, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the
Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered
the alternative point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders.[39] The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death, while the
Thebans were held as hostage against their will. However, a contingent of about 700
Thespians, led by general Demophilus, the son of
Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans.[40] Unknown and unremembered by most, 900 Laconian Helots (serfs of the Spartan state) also died fighting in the last stand.[1]
Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying their oath and following the oracle of Delphi (see below). However, it might also have
been a calculated strategy to delay the advance of the Persians and cover the retreat of the Greek army. Once the pass was
cleared the Persians could use their cavalry to pursue and stop the retreat of the Greek infantry in the more open terrain. The
heavily armed Greek infantry could not have outrun Persia's cavalry; once halted in the open, the Greeks could be overwhelmed by
superior numbers and a cavalry charge. In fact, with the Persians so close at hand, the decision to stand and fight was probably
a tactical requirement only made more palatable by the oracle.[16] At dawn Xerxes made libations, pausing to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.[4]
The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter
as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to xiphoi (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus states that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault.[41]
Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward the rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand
on a small hill behind the wall. The Thebans "moved away from their companions, and with hands upraised, advanced toward the
barbarians ..." (Rawlinson translation), but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted.[42] "Here they defended themselves to the last, such as still had swords
using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth; ...." Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill
surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until the last Greek was dead.[43] Modern archaeologists have found evidence of the final arrow
shower.[44]
Aftermath
When the body of Leonidas was recovered by the Persians, Xerxes, in a rage at the loss of
so many of his soldiers, ordered that the head be cut off and the body crucified. Herodotus
observes that this was very uncommon for the Persians, as they had the habit of treating enemies that fought bravely against them
with great honor[45] (the example of Pytheas
captured earlier off Skyros also suggests that[46]). However, Xerxes was known for his rage, as when he had the
Hellespont whipped because it would not obey him.[47]
Xerxes was curious as to why there was such a small Greek force guarding Thermopylae and interrogated some Arcadian prisoners.
The answer was that all the other men were participating in the Olympic Games, a
very important event for them. When Xerxes asked what the prize for the winner was, "an olive-wreath" came the answer. Upon
hearing this, Tritantaechmes, a Persian general, said to Mardonius: "Good heavens! Mardonius,
what kind of men are these against whom you have brought us to fight? Men who do not compete for money, but for honor".[48]
After the Persians' departure, the defeated Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected
to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' bones were returned to Sparta where he was buried again with
full honors and funeral games were held every year in his memory.[49]
The simultaneous naval Battle of Artemisium was a stalemate, whereupon the
Athenian navy retreated. The Persians were now in control of the Aegean Sea and all of
peninsular Greece as far south as Attica. The Spartans prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth and the Peloponnese, while Xerxes went on to
sack Athens, whose inhabitants had already fled to the island of Salamis. In September, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the naval Battle of Salamis, which led to the rapid retreat of Xerxes. The remaining Persian army, left under
the charge of Mardonius, was defeated in the Battle of
Plataea by a combined Greek army again led by the Spartans, under the regent Pausanias.[50]
Topography of the battlefield
At the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore of the Gulf of Malis so narrow that only one chariot
could pass through.[51] On the southern side
of the track stood the cliffs, while on the north side was the gulf. Along the path was a series of three constrictions, or
"gates" (pylai), and at the center gate a short wall that had been erected by the Phocians in the
previous century to aid in their defense against Thessalian invasions.[51] The name "hot gates" comes from the
hot springs that were located there.
Today, the pass is not near the sea but is inland due to infilling of the Gulf of Malis. The old track appears at the foot of
hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. Recent core samples indicate that the pass
was only 100 m. wide and the waters came up to the gates. Says Lyn Dore: "Little do the visitors realize that the battle took
place across the road from the monument."[52] The pass
still is a natural defensive position to modern armies.
Detailed maps of the region are to be found at these sites:
Pictures showing the terrain are to be found at these sites:
Size of the Persian army
Primary sources
In 480 BC, the Persian army and navy arrived at Doriscus in Thrace. A bridge of ships had been made at Abydos. This allowed the
land forces to cross the Hellespont. At Doriscus Xerxes conducted a review and a count of his army and navy, which was recorded by the Persian
scribes. Herodotus must have had some sort of knowledge of this account, as he lists and
describes the units and gives the size of Xerxes' combined forces as follows:
| Units |
Numbers |
| Fleet crew |
517,610[53] |
| Infantry |
1,700,000[54] |
| Cavalry |
80,000[55] |
| Arabs and Libyans |
20,000[53] |
| Greek troops allied with Persians |
324,000[56] |
| Total |
2,641,610 |
This number is doubled in order to account for support personnel and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force
numbered 5,283,220 men.[57] The poet
Simonides, who was a contemporary, talks of three million combatants.[58] One century later, Ctesias of Cnidus gives 800,000 as the total number of the army that met in Doriscus.[59]
Modern estimates
Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical
capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route. An early and very influential modern,
George Grote, set the tone by expressing incredulity at the numbers given by
Herodotus:[60] "To
admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible." Grote's main objection is the supply problem,
but he nowhere states any measure of supply capability nor did he have available any scientific data on the topic. He does not
reject Herodotus altogether, citing the latter's reporting of the Persians' careful methods of accounting and their stockpiling
of supply caches for three years. He points to the contradictions in the ancient estimates and refrains from making one of his
own or implying that such an estimate is possible. It was up to subsequent scholars to make them.
One of the main reasons often given for these values is a lack of water. Sir Frederick Maurice,[61] was among the first to estimate that the army could not have
surpassed 175,000 due to this reason, at a time when hydrological data on Greek rivers was unavailable. Another reason he
suggested was that it may have been impossible for such a large army to camp in an area of a few square miles.[61] A widely supported view holds that Herodotus may
have confused the Persian terms for chiliarchy (1,000) and myriarchy (10,000), leading to an estimate of 210,000
soldiers on foot.[62] The topic has been
controversial but modern estimates for the land force figures range from 60,000 to 300,000,[63] though higher and lower estimates have been suggested by several
scholars,[64] but more popular views
support ranges between 100,000-150,000 or 150,000-200,000.[65] All these estimates concern the land forces alone, whereas the entire Persian presence in
Greece, including support troops and fleet crew, would almost double the number.[62]
The numbers given by Herodotus on the Persian fleet are considered largely realistic. It is generally maintained that
Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian Empire records of the forces involved in the expedition,[65] and it is more likely the numbers on the fleet were
given precisely, whereas the contingent of the army may have been listed in general terms rather than exact figures.[65] Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that
Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by
sea.[65]
Size of the Greek army
According to Herodotus,[66] the
Greek army included the following forces:
To this number must be added 1,000 other Lacedemonians (Spartan Hoplites) mentioned by
Diodorus Siculus[67] and perhaps 800 auxiliary troops from other Greek cities, bringing the total up to 7,000. A
further 900 Helots (Spartan serfs) also fought at the battle. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total
of Greek troops, while Pausanias gives 11,200.[68] Many modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer
his claim of 7,000 men. The numbers changed later on in the battle as, under orders, the entire army retreated and only 2,000
Spartans, Helots, Thespians and Thebans remained.[1]
Monuments at the site
Epitaph of Simonides
Epitaph with Simonides' epigram
Simonides composed a well-known epigram, which was
engraved as an epitaph on a commemorative stone placed on top of the burial mound of the
Spartans at Thermopylae. It is also the hill on which the last of them died.[58] The original stone has not been preserved. Instead the epitaph was
engraved on a new stone erected in 1955. The text from Herodotus is:[58]
- Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
- κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.
- Ō xein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti tēide
- keimetha tois keinōn rhēmasi peithomenoi.
An ancient alternative substitutes πειθόμενοι νομίμοις for ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι;
i.e., substitutes "laws" for "sayings." The sayings are not personal but refer to official and binding phrases of some
sort.[69]
The form of this ancient Greek poetry is an elegiac couplet. Some English
translations are given in the table below.
| Translation |
Notes |
Go tell the Spartans, thou that passest by,
That here, obedient to their laws, we lie. |
William Lisle Bowels |
Friend, tell the Spartans that on this hill
We lie obedient to them still.
|
Michael Dodson (1951) |
| Stranger, tell the Spartans that we behaved as they would wish us to, and are buried here. |
William Golding, The Hot Gates
(1965) |
Stranger, report this word, we pray, to the Spartans,
that lying Here in this spot we remain, faithfully keeping their laws.[70] |
George Campbell Macaulay |
| Stranger, make known to the Spartans that, fallen here, we have done their bidding. |
S. F. A. R. Haerens |
Stranger! To Sparta say, her faithful band,
Here lie in death, remembering her command. |
Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (1955) |
Go tell the Spartans, passerby,
That here, by Spartan law, we lie. |
Frank Miller, 300 (1998) |
Stranger, bear this message to the Spartans,
that we lie here obedient to their laws. |
W. R. Paton |
Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by,
that here, obedient to their laws, we lie. |
Steven Pressfield, Gates of Fire
(1998) |
Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell
That here, obeying her behests, we fell.[71] |
George Rawlinson |
Go, way-farer, bear news to Sparta's town
that here, their bidding done, we laid us down.[72] |
Cyril E. Robinson |
Go tell the Spartans, you who read:
We took their orders, and lie here dead.[73] |
Aubrey de Sélincourt |
John Ruskin expressed the meaning of this poem to western civilization as follows:[74]
Also obedience in its highest form is not obedience to a constant and compulsory law, but a persuaded or voluntary yielded
obedience to an issued command .... His name who leads the armies of Heaven is "Faithful and True"... and all deeds which are
done in alliance with these armies ... are essentially deeds of faith, which therefore ... is at once the source and the
substance of all known deed, rightly so called ... as set forth in the last word of the noblest group of words ever, so far as I
know, uttered by simple man concerning his practice, being the final testimony of the leaders of a great practical nation ...:
[the epitaph in Greek].
Leonidas monument
Additionally, there is a modern monument at the site, called the "Leonidas Monument" in honour of the Spartan king. It
features a bronze statue of Leonidas. A sign, under the statue, reads simply: "Μολών λαβέ"
("Come and take them!"). The metope below depicts battle scenes. The two marble statues on the left and the right of the
monument, represent respectively the river Eurotas and the mount Taygetos, hallmarks of Sparta.
Thespians monument
In 1997, a second monument was officially unveiled by the Greek government, dedicated to the 700 Thespians who fought with the
Spartans. The monument is made of marble and features a bronze statue depicting the god Eros, who was worshiped in ancient Thespiae. Under the statue, a sign reads "In memory of the seven
hundred Thespians".
A plate, below the statue, explains its symbolism :
- The headless male figure symbolizes the anonymous sacrifice of the 700 Thespians to their country.
- The outstretched chest symbolizes the struggle, the gallantry, the strength, the bravery and the courage.
- The open wing symbolizes the victory, the glory, the soul, the spirit and the freedom.
- The broken wing symbolizes the voluntary sacrifice and death.
- The naked body symbolizes Eros, the most important god of the ancient Thespians, the god of creation, beauty and life.
The monument to the Thespians is placed beside the one to the Spartans.
Thermopylae in popular culture
-
The Battle of Thermopylae has been an icon of western
civilization since the day it completed. This icon expresses itself in countless instances of adages, poetry and song, literature, films, television and
video games. A more serious aspect has been its didactic
use. Scarcely a book or article on military topics
fails to mention and comment on the battle.
-
Prior to the battle, the Hellenes remembered the Dorians, an
ethnic distinction to which the Spartans belonged, as the conquerors and displacers of the
Ionians in the Peloponnesus. After the battle, Spartan
culture became an inspiration and object of emulation and has been so ever since.
Notes
- ^ a b c d e Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars.
University of California Press, page 140. ISBN
0520203135.
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 24
- ^ Herodotus VII, 202
- ^ a b Herodotus VII, 223
- ^
Bury, J. B. & Meiggs, Russell (Editor) (July 2000), A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great (4th
Revised ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-0333154939. Page 271.
- ^ a b Eikenberry, Lt. Gen. Karl W. (Summer 1996).
"Take No
Casualties". Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly XXVI (2): pages 109-118. Retrieved on 2007-10-17.
- ^ A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these historial terms
may be found in Sekunda, Nick (2002). Marathon 490 Bc: The First Persian Invasion
of Greece. Osprey Publishing, page 7. ISBN 1841760005.
- ^ Herodotus VI, 48
- ^ Herodotus VII, 133
- ^ Herodotus VII, 32
- ^ Herodotus VII,145. He does not use the term "congress" or any ancient equivalent. He only says that they exchanged
pledges and consulted together.
- ^ Herodotus, VII, 148
- ^ Herodotus VII, 161
- ^ Herodotus VII,173
- ^ Herodotus VII,175
- ^ a b c d Despotopoulos, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volume
B
- ^ Lysias, Funeral oration 30, translated by
W.R.M. Lamb, M.A.
- ^ Bengtson, Hermann (1969). Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die rö̈mische
Kaiserzeit. Munich: Beck.
- ^ Diodorus Siculus book
16 chapter 38
- ^ Herodotus VII.206 entire.
- ^ Herodotus;
George Rawlinson (Translator) (2005). The History of
Herodotus: Polymnia (html). Greek Texts page 50. Greek-Texts.com & Greece Http Ltd.. Retrieved on 2007-10-18.
- ^ a b Herodotus VII.204
- ^ Lacaenarum apophthegmata, Plutarch.
- ^ a b c d e Herodotus, Hist. VII
- ^ (Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)
- ^ Herodotus VII,210
- ^ Diodorus Siculus,
Library, XI,6,4
- ^ a b c d Photius, Myriobiblon code 72: Ctesias Persica par. 26
- ^ a b The Rise and Fall of the Spartans, History International cable TV
network, viewed August 21, 2007
- ^ Diodorus Siculus,
Library, XI,6,3
- ^ Herodotus VII, 208
- ^ a b c Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,7
- ^ Glotz G., Roussel P., Cohen R., Histoire Grecque vol. I-IV, Paris 1948
- ^ Herodotus VII, 212
- ^ Herodotus VII, 211
- ^ Tegopoulos-Fytrakis dictionary of modern
Greek, word:Εφιάλτης
- ^ Herodotus VII, 217
- ^ a b Herodotus VII, 218
- ^ Herodotus VII, 219-220
- ^ Herodotus VII, 222
- ^ Herodotus VII, 224
- ^ Herodotus, VII 233
- ^ Herodotus, VII, 225
- ^ Reed College's Thermopylae describes the
excavations by Spyridon Marinatos.
- ^ Herodotus VII,238
- ^ See Herodotus VII,181
- ^ Herodotus 7.35.
- ^ Herodotus, VIII, 26
- ^ Pausanias 3.14.1
- ^ Herodotus book IX
- ^ a b
- ^
Dore, Lyn (2001), "Once the War Is Over", in Freeman, P.W.M. & Pollard, A., Fields of Conflict:
Progress and Prospect in Battlefield Archaeology, David Brown Book Co., pp. pages 285-286, ISBN 9781841712499.
The article can be viewed at [1]
- ^ a b Herodotus VII, 184
- ^ Herodotus VII, 60
- ^ Herodotus VII, 87
- ^ Herodotus VII, 185
- ^ Herodotus VII,186
- ^ a b c
- ^ Ctesias; J.H. Freese (Translator);
Photius (Editor) (1996-2007). Excerpt 27 (html).
Persica. Livius articles on ancient history. Retrieved on 2007-10-19.
- ^ Grote, George. A History of Greece: Part II: Chapter XXXVIII From the Battle of Marathon to the March of
Xerxes Against Greece.
Throughout the decades many editions of Grote have been published. The page numbers depend on the edition. However, Grote used
top-of-page captions instead of subsections. The presentation on the size of Xerxes' army is to be found under "Muster of the
Army of Xerxes."
- ^ a b Maurice, F (1930). "The size of the army of
Xerxes I of Persia in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C.". Journal of Hellenic Studies 50: 115–128. DOI:10.2307/.
- ^ a b The Cambridge companion to Herodotus p. 217, Carolyn Dewald, John.
Marincola
- ^ Thomas Kelly (University
of Minnesota) (2003). "Persian Propaganda - A Neglected Factor in Xerxes' Invasion of Greece and Herodotus", Iranica
Antiqua 38, p. 198.
- ^ Stecchini under External links below.
- ^ a b c d
- ^ Herodotus, VII, 202 and also 203.
- ^ Diodorus Siculus, book
XI,5
- ^ Pausanias 10,20,2
- ^ Macan, Reginald Walter. Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth & Ninth Books with Introduction and Commentary: Commentary on Herodotus,
Histories, book 7, chapter 228 (html) section 8. The Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University). Retrieved on 2007-10-18.
- ^ Campbell, George Campbell
(1889). The History of Herodotus: Translated into English. MacMillan and Co., Limited, page 220.
Downloadable Google Books.
- ^ Herodotus;
George Rawlinson (Translator) (2005). The History of
Herodotus: Polymnia. Greek Texts page 51. Greek-Texts.com & Greece Http Ltd.. Retrieved on 2007-10-19.
- ^ Robinson, C.E. (2007).
Hellas - A Short History of Ancient Greece. Pantheon Books, page 65. ISBN 1406766992.
- ^ Herodotus; John M. Marincola (Contributor); Aubrey de
Selincourt (Translator) (2003). The Histories. penguin group (usa), page 495. ISBN
9780140449082.
The translation dates to 1954.
- ^
Ruskin, John (1894), "Part VIII: Of
Ideas of Relation - I. of Invention Formal: Chapter I: The Law of Help", The Complete Works: Modern Painters: Volume the
Fifth, New York: Bryan, Taylor and Company. Page 212.
Further reading
- Barkworth, Peter R. (1993). "The Organization of Xerxes'
Army". Iranica Antiqua XXVII: pages 149-167. Retrieved on 2007-10-18.
- Bradford, Ernle (2004). Thermopylae: The Battle for the West. Da Capo
Press. ISBN 0306813602.
- Cartledge, Paul (2006). Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World.
Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press. ISBN 1585675660.
- Matthews, Rupert (2006). The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in
Context. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing. ISBN 1862273251.
- Morris, Ian Macgregor (2000). "'To Make a New Thermopylae': Hellenism, Greek Liberation, and
the Battle of Thermopylae". Greece & Rome 47 (2): pages 211–230.
See also
External links
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Coordinates:
38°47′60″N, 22°31′60″E
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