| Bowsher v. Synar |
Supreme Court of the United States |
Argued April 23, 1986
Decided July 7, 1986 |
| Full case name |
Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States v. Synar, Member of Congress, Et al. |
| Citations |
478 U.S. 714 (more)
478 U.S. 714; 106 S. Ct. 3181;92 L. Ed. 2d 583; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 141 |
| Holding |
| Congress cannot reserve removal power over executive officers to itself, except for impeachment. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the separation of powers doctrine. |
| Court membership |
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| Case opinions |
| Majority |
Burger, C. J., joined by Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor |
| Concurrence |
Stevens, joined by Marshall |
| Dissent |
White and Blackmun |
| Laws applied |
| U.S. Const. art. I and U.S. Const. art. II |
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) struck down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress because the law empowered Congress to terminate the United States Comptroller General for certain specified reasons, including "inefficiency, 'neglect of duty,' or 'malfeasance.'"
Facts
Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, allowable deficit levels were calculated with an eye to eliminating the federal deficit. If the budget exceeded the allowable deficit, across-the-board cuts were required. Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General then evaluated these reports, made his own conclusion, and made a recommendation to the President, who was then required to issue an order effecting the reductions required by the Comptroller General unless Congress made the required cuts in other ways within a specified amount of time. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three people recommended by the presiding officers of the House and Senate. He is removable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress (which requires majority votes in both houses and is subject to the veto). Congress can give a number of reasons for this removal, including “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” or “malfeasance.”
Holding
The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it doesn’t possess this power, it can’t delegate it to its agents. The CG is an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power. Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.
Reasoning
(1)Definition of “executive power.” The CG’s function under the Act is the “very essence” of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to carry out, without variation, the CG’s directive regarding the budget resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the “very essence” of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through impeachment.
(2)Impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for “maladministration,” with Madison arguing that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” Thus, Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch through impeachment.
White's Dissent
Justice White's dissent argued that the act should have been upheld. Determining the level of spending by the federal government is a legislative function, not an executive one, he argued. Even if the power were “executive,” White did not see anything wrong with delegating that power to an agent as long as Congress can only influence him by a means that is subject to the Presentment and Bicameralism Clause requirements (which the act satisfied, since the CG can only be influenced by Congress by a joint resolution).
White also focused on a less formalistic approach to separation of powers questions. He stated that even “the results of a constitutional legislative process may be unconstitutional if they are in fact destructive of the scheme of separation of powers.” The key question, White contended, is whether there is a real threat of “encroachment or aggrandization of one branch at the expense of the other.” This Act, White argued, didn't pose such a threat.
Explanation of Case
This case represents one of many decisions in which members of the Supreme Court use contrasting methods to approach separation of powers problems. Separation of powers issues usually arise when Congress creates an innovative structure for a government program. Since the text of the Constitution only gives broad outlines as to how the government is to be structured, judges and scholars often disagree on how to approach the issue of whether such an innovative structure is constitutionally permissible.
Roughly, there are two approaches to this problem. Formalists focus on the few constraints that the text of the Constitution creates (for example, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses). INS v. Chadha, in which the Supreme Court held that legislative vetoes violate the constitution, is a good example of formalist reasoning. The majority in Bowsher similarly employs a somewhat formalistic analysis. Some formalists also argue that the Constitution creates three distinct types of power—legislative, judicial, and executive—and that these types of powers can only be exercised by the Congress, the judiciary, and the President, respectively.
Functionalists argue that the text of the Constitution does not address most separation of powers issues raised in modern government and thus that courts should employ a more holistic approach. Functionalists often argue that innovative power structures should be allowed as long as they don't allow one branch of the government to become too powerful. White's dissent is a good example of the functionalist approach.
See also
External links
- Text of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) is available from: · Enfacto · Findlaw
