Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). The outbreak of war in 1914 was greeted with enthusiasm in Canada, but regular Canadian forces were minuscule—about 3, 100 men—plus a poorly trained active militia of 75, 000. The Minister of Militia and Defence, Col Sam Hughes, acted as a human dynamo in creating the CEF. He accepted the offer to raise a battalion of ex-regulars, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), which went on to serve with the British 27th Division; he set up a major camp at Valcartier, which trained civilian volunteers; and the first contingent of the CEF left for England on 1 October. Hughes was a controversial figure, considered insane by some of his enemies. His tenure was marked by scandal, corruption, errors, and heavy-handed political interference in the CEF. Perhaps the most notorious example is Hughes's insistence on the CEF being equipped with the Canadian Ross rifle rather than the superior British Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifle.
The 1st Canadian Division went into the line on the western front in February 1915, under the command of Maj Gen Alderson, a British regular. The division fought heroically during the second battle of Ypres in April 1915, when poison gas was used on the battlefield for the first time (by the Germans). The arrival of the 2nd Canadian Division allowed the formation of a Canadian Corps in September 1915, initially commanded by Alderson. He was replaced by Byng, another British regular, in May 1916. He proved popular with the Canadians, and the Canadian Corps became known as the ‘Byng Boys’ after a popular musical review. In November 1915 the PPCLI joined the Canadian Corps, and in January 1916 the Canadian Cavalry Brigade joined a British formation. The 3rd Division was formed in France in February 1916, and in August 4th Division joined the Canadian Corps in France. A 5th Division was formed in 1917 but was disbanded in 1918 to help keep the other divisions up to strength.
In 1916, with the Canadian Corps near Ypres, it fought at Saint-Eloi (May) and Mount Sorrel (June). In September it was committed to the fighting on the Somme at Courcelette, where its record of success was mixed. However, in common with the rest of the British army, the CEF benefited from the painful lessons of the Somme. On 9 April 1917 the four-division strong Canadian Corps seized Vimy Ridge (see Arras/Vimy Ridge). This marked the emergence of the Canadians as an élite force, and is seen as a formative moment in the emergence of Canada as a nation. In June 1917 Byng was promoted to command British Third Army, and was replaced by Arthur Currie, a Canadian militia officer. By this stage the corps staff was largely Canadian, and Canada had become a ‘junior but sovereign ally’ of the British. Under Currie's command, the Corps captured Passchendaele Ridge in November 1917.
The CEF's finest hour came in 1918. The Canadians played a prominent role in the battle of Amiens, and then acted as one of the spearhead formations of the Allied offensives. The Canadians broke the Drocourt-Quéant Line on 2 September, crossed the Canal du Nord in late September, and entered Mons on the morning of 11 November, the last day of the war. The Canadian Corps was considerably stronger, and had greater firepower, than equivalent British formations. Nonetheless, the tactical excellence of the Canadians and Currie's skilful generalship were major factors in the success of the Canadian Corps, which was a truly élite formation.
The reputation of the CEF for indiscipline is something of a myth, although discipline and officer-man relations in Canadian units were somewhat more relaxed than in some British units. Equally mythical is the notion that Canadian military effectiveness was derived from the influence of the North American frontier. Seventy per cent of the ‘First Contingent’ were British-born, and taking the war as a whole, under half—47 per cent—of those who went overseas were born in Canada. Of those men who enlisted by March 1916, only 6.5 per cent were farmers, while 65 per cent were manual workers. Moreover, the influence of British commanders and staff officers on the CEF was important, and the development of the expertise of the Canadian Corps should be placed in the context of the ‘learning curve’ experienced by the entire British army on the western front. About 418, 000 served with the CEF, and 56, 000 were killed.
Bibliography
- Morton, Desmond, When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in WW I (Toronto, 1993)
— Gary Sheffield
