Even before the Revolutionary War gave New impetus to American expansionism, the colonial political and economic elites were deeply interested in the improvement of inland transportation. Vessels that plied offshore waters, small boats and rafts on the streams down to tidewater, and local roads and turnpikes served the immediate commercial needs of farmers and townspeople in the Atlantic coastal area. But the loftier dreams of planters, merchants, and political leaders—as well as of the common farmers who constituted by far most of the free population in British America—looked beyond the "fall line" that separated the rivers flowing to the coast from those that ran to the Ohio-Mississippi basin. A vast area for settlement and productivity—and riches—lay in the interior, and by the early 1790s demands for diffusion of New transport technologies and for investment in internal improvements were voiced frequently in both state and national political forums.
It was widely recognized that unless bulk agricultural commodities, which were the staples of a commercialized and expanding farm economy, could be carried cheaply and over long distances, settlement and economic growth would be badly hampered in the region beyond the Appalachian Mountains. Then, too, there were opportunities for construction of short lines on the Atlantic seaboard to link already developed areas (coal mines, farming and lumber regions, and rising industrial sites), with the promise of immediate traffic and revenues. The latter were "exploitative" projects, tapping existing trade routes and resources; but the major east-west projects were "developmental," promoted with the goal of opening Newly or sparsely settled areas to economic opportunities. There was also a nationalistic or patriotic goal of canal promotion: to bind together far-flung sections of the young nation and to prove the efficacy of republican government.
And yet total canal construction in the United States up to 1816 totaled only 100 miles—the longest canal project being the Middlesex, which linked Boston's harbor with the farm region to the north. Other lines of some importance linked Norfolk, Virginia, to Albemarle Sound and connected the Santee River area to Charleston, South Carolina. Although many other canal projects were proposed up and down the Atlantic coast, progress was difficult because of shortages of capital and skepticism with regard to engineering feasibility projects. Moreover, regional or local jealousies notoriously worked against successful mobilization of governmental support in both the U.S. Congress and the state legislatures.
In the period from the mid-1820s to the Civil War, however, the United States underwent a vast expansion of canal construction, becoming the world's leading nation in both mileage of canals and the volume of tonnage carried on them. The canal lines were of crucial importance in the integration of a national economy, and they played a key role in the so-called "Transportation Revolution" that expedited both westward expansion and a robust industrialization process in the North and West.
Advantages, Disadvantages, and Construction Challenges
Canal technology proved especially attractive for several reasons. Since the 1760s, successful large-scale canal projects had been built in both Great Britain and France, and these canals had brought enormous economic advantages to the regions they served. The engineering advances pioneered in Europe gave American promoters confidence that they could build canals with equal success.
There was a downside to canal technology, too, though it was not always fully recognized in America. Difficult topography or uncertain water supply meant complex and highly expensive construction design. Canal building before the 1850s was mainly done with hand tools, augmented only by some primitive animal-powered machinery. A canal line had to be furnished with locks, permitting boats to pass through from one water level to another. The segments of line between the locks were of very gradual grade to permit controlled flow. At each lock, a gate at its higher level would be opened while the gate on the lower end was kept closed; once a boat entered the lock's chamber from the higher level, the upper gate was closed (holding the water flow back) while the lower gate was opened. As water ran out, the boat was carried down to the lower level, then passed through the open gate. For "upstream" movement, from the lower level to the higher, the process was reversed. The lock would be drained to the lower level, the boat would enter through the bottom gate, which was then closed, and water would then be admitted from the upper gate, lifting the boat up to the higher level. In steep areas, "flights" of locks, closely spaced, were necessary and often involved complex engineering; for transit of the boats, these series of locks meant a slow stretch and usually long waiting periods.
Locks varied in size. Lifts ranged from two to thirty feet, and there were great differences in the distances between gates as well as in the construction materials used. Masonry locks and metal or metal-trimmed gates were far more expensive—and more durable—than wooden gates and timber-supported rubble for the walls as found on some of the lines. The total rise and fall over an entire line was measured as "lockage," and served as an index of the difficulty of construction. For example, New York's Erie Canal route measured lockage of 655 feet, by contrast with Pennsylvania's lockage of 3,358 feet between Philadelphia and the Ohio River.
The size of the boats that could be accommodated, as well as the volume of water needed, were functions of the dimensions of the canal bed, or its "prism," as well as of the size of lock chambers. Prisms on American canals varied greatly, most of them ranging from forty to sixty feet in width at the top, with sloping sidewalls leading to a bottom of twenty-five to forty-five feet across. The Pennsylvania system was the most complex in engineering using inclined planes and steam-powered winches to drag boats out of the water and over some of the steepest hills.
To supply the line with flowing water, engineering plans had to include river connections, dams and reservoirs with feeder lines to the canals, and often massive culverts and aqueducts. Building the sidewalls to minimize loss of water through seepage was another challenging and expensive aspect of design. On many of the larger canals, such as the Ohio lines, engineers took advantage of fast-flowing feeder streams to design water-mill sites into the line.
Once a canal was in operation, moreover, maintaining navigation was a continuous challenge. Winter ice, droughts, floods, and breaches in the water-supply system would frequently cause navigational closings. Even in the best of circumstances, it was difficult to maintain regular schedules on the lines because of traffic bottlenecks at the locks and the continuous maintenance needed to keep water flowing.
Although steam-powered propeller craft were used on a few canal lines, this form of transport placed dangerous pressure on the canal walls. Hence, the use of horses or mules to haul canal boats was nearly universal, with the animals walking along the "towpath" alongside the line. Freight boats typically of 50-to 125-ton capacity operated at speeds of one to three miles per hour. On most lines they were owned by individuals or private companies, the line being a common carrier under the law.
In the short run, all the disadvantages of canal technology were more than offset by the cost savings for long-distance hauling, especially of bulk goods and produce. In the long run, however, innovations in steam technology and railroad engineering were destined to render many canals the losers in a New competitive age in transport that took shape in the late 1840s and the 1850s.
The Erie Canal
The great breakthrough came in 1817 with New York State's commitment to building the Erie Canal to connect the Hudson River at Albany with Buffalo on Lake Erie, a project far greater than any previously attempted in America. The Erie was important to subsequent canal development in several ways, most notably because it provided a model of public enterprise through its financing, administration, and implementation. The state raised capital through bond issues both in New York and in Europe, and supplemented these funds with tax revenues. Actual construction was overseen by a board of commissioners, some of whom were personally involved in the fieldwork, but the project became a celebrated "school for engineers," with most of the junior personnel learning their skills on the job under the tutelage of Benjamin Wright and James Geddes, two of less than twenty men who then constituted the profession in America. Many of the Erie engineers went on to direct canal surveys in other states.
The canal was divided into sections for purpose of construction, with private contractors taking on the work under the state engineers' supervision—a scheme that was emulated by nearly all the major canals subsequently built. It was an immediate commercial success once opened to its full length in 1825, leading the New York legislature to authorize a series of additional canals as well as the improvement and enlargement of the original line.
No nonmilitary enterprise in the United States had ever involved such expenditures as did the Erie, whose initial construction cost $6 million. The number of laborers employed was also unprecedented in any economic enterprise of the day. The state's construction expenditures energized local economies, giving part-time employment to farmers and creating sudden demand for stone, timber, mules, and oxen, and provisions for workers. Like canals and other public works throughout the country, moreover, the Erie attracted immigrant workers (mainly Irish and German) who were employed to do much of the most dangerous work.
The Erie's commercial impact on the rural countryside and on New York City's role as a center for trade with the interior and for exports to Europe—together with the rich stream of revenues from the tolls—heightened expectations everywhere in the country that other canals could produce equally spectacular fiscal and developmental results.
The Post-1825 Boom in Canal Building
Emulation of New York followed quickly. In 1825 Pennsylvania authorized a $10 million project, combining canal technology with the use of inclined planes. It was completed in 1834, tapping the Ohio Valley's farm country at Pittsburgh and giving Philadelphia trade advantages similar to those that its rival New York City had obtained from the Erie. The first of the western states to build a major line was Ohio, which authorized construction in 1825. Although still small in population and financial resources, Ohio, too, resorted to creation of a state enterprise and borrowed heavily both in the East and in Europe. Erie Canal engineers were brought in at first, but Alfred Kelley of Cleveland and Micajah Williams of Cincinnati, local entrepreneurs with no prior engineering experience, took principal charge of overseeing construction once the technical plans were adopted. Although administrative incompetence and corruption plagued the Pennsylvania project, Ohio's record was widely admired for its efficiency and strength of design. One line, the Ohio Canal, was completed in 1834 and extended from Cleveland on Lake Erie to Portsmouth on the Ohio River—the first water link between the Great Lakes and the great Mississippi-Ohio basin. A second line, completed in the mid-1840s, linked Cincinnati with Toledo to the north.
Other important lines begun or fully built prior to 1840 included the Delaware and Hudson Canal, a successful private line in the Pennsylvania coal country; the Delaware and Raritan Canal, also private, linking Philadelphia and New York; and the Chesapeake and Delaware Ohio Canal, which with substantial state support built a line, surveyed by the engineer William Strickland, through Maryland to link Baltimore with the Philadelphia port.
In the period 1815–1834, $60 million was invested in 2,088 miles of canals, with 70 percent of the funds coming from governmental sources, mainly the states. Most of the funds were borrowed at home and abroad. Also, Congress authorized the Army Engineers to conduct surveys for the states and federal companies; made some direct federal investments; and gave several million acres of public lands to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to subsidize their canal projects during this period.
In the decade following, 1834–1844, the "canal enthusiasm" continued to animate state governments and private promoters. Rivalries among states and competition among cities were intense, feeding the spirit of optimism. A new wave of canal construction followed, with the projects again heavily financed by loans from Europe and the eastern cities. Almost 1,300 miles of canal were built during this ten-year period. They cost $72 million, of which 79 percent represented public funds. In addition to major New state canal systems begun in Illinois and in Indiana (where the Wabash and Erie line would open another link for direct trade between the Ohio River and Lake Erie), and in Illinois, three of the pioneering state projects—the Erie, Ohio's two main canals, and the Pennsylvania system—were further expanded to satisfy sections of their states that had been left out of the original system designs. As the New canals were generally of larger dimensions than the first ones to be built, the carrying capacity for canal traffic doubled between 1834 and 1844. Until 1839, conditions of prosperity and expansion sustained the canal-building movement, and expenditures for the New canals stimulated overall economic growth.
Financial Problems and Railroad Competition
The 1837 financial panic and the 1839–1843 depression created enormous fiscal problems for many canal states, leading to defaults on state debts in Pennsylvania and Indiana. Because many of the expansion projects and new lines produced toll revenues far below expectations, moreover, there was widespread disillusionment with state enterprise; and this became a factor favoring railroads as an alternative to canals, especially given the much greater reliability of rail transport. In the Ohio-Indiana-Illinois area, by 1848 the proliferation of canal lines also produced intensified competition between the various Great Lakes and Mississippi River routes, now also served by steamboat lines on these connecting waters. The east-west and local railroads of the 1850s made matters worse. The result was heavy downward pressure on canal rates, consequently reduced revenues, and, soon, a scenario of operating deficits that placed an unwelcome burden on taxpayers.
Transport competition drove down rates so much that the period from the mid-1840s to the Civil War formed a distinctive "second phase" of the Transportation Revolution. By 1850–1852, for example, western canal tolls were less than a third the level of the 1830s, creating still further fiscal problems for the canal states and companies. Where private investment had been invited on a matching basis for "mixed" canal enterprises, the costs fell hard on the capitalists as well. But while revenues fell, ton-miles of canal transportation continued to expand on all the major lines throughout the 1850s.
During the period 1844–1860, a last major cycle of canal construction produced 894 miles of line at a cost of $57 million. Here again, governmental activism was crucial, with public funds accounting for two-thirds of the total expended. Much of this increase constituted the completion or improvement of lines built earlier; in addition, the still-successful Erie system in New York was further enlarged and upgraded. A large expenditure was made, too, on the Sault Ste. Marie Ship Canal, a short but massive deepwater project that connected Lake Huron with Lake Superior.
Although much of the canal system experienced operating deficits in the 1850s, the impetus these New facilities had given the economy had clearly warranted most of the capital invested. Commercialization of agriculture in the western states and other interior had been made possible, while eastern manufacturers and importers were afforded economical access to interior markets. Coal-mining and iron centers were linked, and consumer prices fell where the transport facilities had proliferated. In sum, the areas served by canals were enabled to build on comparative economic advantage; and, at least in the northern states, processing of primary products carried by the canals served as the origin of manufacturing growth that augmented urban commercial activity.
Railroad competition led to many closings of once-important canals; indeed, more than 300 miles of line were abandoned by 1860. A few of the canals did continue to carry heavy traffic after the Civil War. The most important to commerce in the twentieth century was the Atlantic intra-coastal waterway, which permitted vessels to transit offshore waters safely from New England to Florida. The Erie retained importance as a barge canal, as did some of the shorter coal-carrying lines. Some of the old canal lines became rights-of-way for railroads or modern roads; others were absorbed into the changing landscape as development went forward. In scattered locations, a few segments of the great canal lines are today preserved or restored for enjoyment of citizens seeking a glimpse of the once-glorious era of canal transport in America.
Bibliography
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—Harry N. Scheiber