Carroll v. United States

267 U.S. 132 (1925), argued 4 Dec. 1923, rescheduled 28 Jan. 1924, reargued 14 Mar. 1924, decided 2 Mar. 1925 by vote of 6 to 2; Taft for the Court, McReynolds and Sutherland in dissent. George Carroll and John Kiro were convicted of transporting liquor in an automobile in violation of the Volstead Act (national Prohibition). Federal officers acknowledged that they were not following Carroll and Kiro at the time of arrest but that when they saw them, they suspected that they were carrying prohibited liquor and decided to give chase. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the car search that yielded the evidence and specifically reviewed Carroll and Kiro's claim that since there was no basis to search the car, the resulting evidence should have been excluded from trial.

The Court rejected their claim and recognized the car search exception to the warrant requirement for the first time. Detailing the legislative history of the National Prohibition Act, Chief Justice William H. Taft concluded for the majority that Congress intended to distinguish the need for a search warrant in private dwellings from searches conducted in automobiles or other moving vehicles. Furthermore, Taft emphasized that such a distinction was consistent with Fourth Amendment guarantees and other Supreme Court decisions and argued that “the right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest” (p. 158).

Justice James McReynolds was joined in dissent by Justice George Sutherland. He argued that there was insufficient cause to stop the vehicle without a warrant, that the mere suspicion that existed was ill founded, and that the Volstead Act did not authorize arrest or seizure on simple suspicion. McReynolds noted that without explicit statutory authorization, the common‐law tradition that distinguished between arrest without warrant in the case of felonies and misdemeanors should apply. He concluded, then, that the “validity of the seizure under consideration depends on the legality of the arrest,” and supported Carroll's contention that his Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment rights had been violated (p. 169).

The Court has continued the position first articulated in Carroll that although the privacy interests in an automobile have constitutional protection, its mobility justifies less sweeping protection and therefore exemption from more customary warrant requirements. Later Court decisions have not extended this exception to any or all movable containers (e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 1977), although the Court has continued to apply less stringent protection for automobiles than stationary objects.

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See also Search Warrant Rules, Exceptions to

— Susette M. Talarico

• 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
• Vote: 6–2
• For the Court: Taft
• Dissenting: McReynolds and Sutherland

In 1923, George Carroll and John Kiro were transporting alcoholic beverages in an automobile. Federal officers suspected they might be carrying liquor, stopped their car, and searched it. They found liquor and arrested Carroll and Kiro, who were charged with violating the Volstead Act (the federal law prohibiting the sale or transportation of alcoholic beverages). Carroll and Kiro were convicted, but they appealed because the federal officers had searched their automobile without a warrant.

The Issue

Carroll claimed that the federal officers who searched his automobile had violated the 4th Amendment of the Constitution, which states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Carroll argued that the federal officers had no legal grounds for searching his car, so the evidence they found should have been excluded from his trial.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court decided against Carroll. The warrantless search of the car was constitutional, said Chief Justice William Howard Taft, because the vehicle could be driven away and the people in it could escape before a warrant could be obtained. Thus, an exception to the 4th Amendment warrant requirement could be made.

Dissent

Justice George Sutherland joined Justice James McReynolds in dissent. McReynolds argued that no exceptions should be made in cases involving searches of cars to the 4th Amendment requirement of a warrant as protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He concluded that Carroll had been wrongfully arrested.

Significance

This case established a rule about searches of automobiles that has been upheld in subsequent cases such as United States v. Ross (1982). In California v. Acevedo (1991), the rule was strengthened by the Court's decision to eliminate a warrant requirement for searches and seizures of closed containers found in an automobile.

See also Searches and seizures; United States v. Ross