267 U.S. 132 (1925), argued 4 Dec. 1923, rescheduled 28 Jan. 1924, reargued 14 Mar. 1924, decided 2 Mar. 1925 by vote of 6 to 2; Taft for the Court, McReynolds and Sutherland in dissent. George Carroll and John Kiro were convicted of transporting liquor in an automobile in violation of the Volstead Act (national Prohibition). Federal officers acknowledged that they were not following Carroll and Kiro at the time of arrest but that when they saw them, they suspected that they were carrying prohibited liquor and decided to give chase. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the car search that yielded the evidence and specifically reviewed Carroll and Kiro's claim that since there was no basis to search the car, the resulting evidence should have been excluded from trial.
The Court rejected their claim and recognized the car search exception to the warrant requirement for the first time. Detailing the legislative history of the National Prohibition Act, Chief Justice William H. Taft concluded for the majority that Congress intended to distinguish the need for a search warrant in private dwellings from searches conducted in automobiles or other moving vehicles. Furthermore, Taft emphasized that such a distinction was consistent with Fourth Amendment guarantees and other Supreme Court decisions and argued that “the right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest” (p. 158).
Justice James McReynolds was joined in dissent by Justice George Sutherland. He argued that there was insufficient cause to stop the vehicle without a warrant, that the mere suspicion that existed was ill founded, and that the Volstead Act did not authorize arrest or seizure on simple suspicion. McReynolds noted that without explicit statutory authorization, the common‐law tradition that distinguished between arrest without warrant in the case of felonies and misdemeanors should apply. He concluded, then, that the “validity of the seizure under consideration depends on the legality of the arrest,” and supported Carroll's contention that his Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment rights had been violated (p. 169).
The Court has continued the position first articulated in Carroll that although the privacy interests in an automobile have constitutional protection, its mobility justifies less sweeping protection and therefore exemption from more customary warrant requirements. Later Court decisions have not extended this exception to any or all movable containers (e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 1977), although the Court has continued to apply less stringent protection for automobiles than stationary objects.
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See also Search Warrant Rules, Exceptions to
— Susette M. Talarico
