Civil Rights Act of 1964

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Act that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in Employee Benefit Plans regarding contributions or benefits based on race or gender.

In 1964, the United States passed one of its strongest civil rights laws in history, the Civil Rights Act. The act bans discrimination because of a person's color, race, national origin, religion, or sex; it primarily protects the rights of African Americans and other minorities. Major features of the Civil Rights Act include the freedom to vote and use hotels, restaurants, theaters, parks, and all other public places. The law also encouraged the desegregation of public schools and authorized the withdrawal of federal funds from programs practicing discrimination. Other major features included the prohibition of job discrimination and the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission.

The Civil Rights Act was an attempt to improve the quality of life for African Americans and other minority groups. Historical momentum for civil rights legislation grew in the mid-1940s due to the extensive black migration to northern cities. During this time, Congress be came active in the pursuit of civil rights, with the judicial branch of the government at its heels. Shortly afterwards, the Supreme Court joined the civil rights forces and in doing so added to the historical pressure for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the most important and influential Supreme Court decisions involving civil rights legislation was the 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, which desegregated American public schools and paved the way for the civil rights movement.

The specific source of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was President John F. Kennedy. He began gaining support for it in a televised national address by urging Americans to take action to guarantee equal treatment for all. Kennedy then proposed an act dealing with voting rights, public accommodations, desegregation of public schools, and many more items on the civil rights agendas. On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the bill that Kennedy had fought for, which created a major piece of civil rights legislation. Although the Civil Rights Act did not resolve all problems of discrimination, it did open the door to further progress by lessening racial restrictions on the use of public facilities, providing more job opportunities, strengthening voting laws, and limiting federal funding of discriminatory programs.

Bibliography

Congress Link Web Site. http://www.congresslink.org.

Western Area Power Administration Web Site. http://www.wapa.gov/CSO/eeo.eeomgr27.htm.

World Book Web Site. http://www.worldbook.com.

[Article by: NIKOLE M. POGEMAN]

Slavery, segregation, poverty, and racism have shaped the health status of African Americans throughout American history. One hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, blacks were still denied the right to vote in some states and received an inferior education in most. Barriers to public health services and hospital care contributed to excess illness and death. Historically, African Americans have used the public policy process to facilitate the social changes necessary to win the full rights of citizenship. This process peaked during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, probably the most progressive legislation in American history. The act outlawed discrimination in public accommodations, public schools, and health care facilities. It also made possible the Medicaid-Medicare legislation of 1965, which led to improved health status of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minority groups.

(SEE ALSO: African Americans; Community and Migrant Health Centers; Community Organization; Enabling Factors; Ethnicity and Health; Inequalities in Health; Landmark Public Health Laws and Court Decisions; Politics of Public Health; Public Health and the Law)

Bibliography

Saraf, J. (1997). "Civil Rights Movement." In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

— STEPHEN B. THOMAS

The broad underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eliminate the pervasive discrimination against racial minorities that had long existed in American society. The two most important provisions of the act are Title II and Title VII, which provide federal administrative and judicial remedies against racial and other group‐based kinds of discrimination in public accommodations and in employment, respectively. The Supreme Court has interpreted the act with reference to its broad underlying purpose and has resolved the major substantive and remedial questions under the act in such a way as to maximize the protection afforded to racial minorities.

The Court has ensured that racial minorities will have full access to all public facilities by broadly defining a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of Title II to include facilities such as a “family restaurant” (Katzenbach v. McClung, 1964), a recreational area (Daniel v. Paul, 1969), and a community swimming pool (Tillman v. Wheaton‐Haven Recreation Association, 1973). As a result of this expansive interpretation, no person, because of race, can be excluded from any facility that is open to the public as a whole.

The Court likewise has interpreted Title VII with a view toward improving significantly the employment opportunities for racial minorities at all levels and in the workplaces of all employers. Most importantly, the Court has held that Title VII reaches not only intentional employment discrimination, but also employment practices that have a discriminatory effect on racial minorities and other protected groups (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 1971). The focus on racially discriminatory effect, or to use the legal phrase, “racially disparate impact,” has resulted in the invalidation of many tests and other employment requirements that are not job‐related and that would deny employment opportunities to racial minorities (see Discriminatory Intent).

The Court has also upheld the use of judicially imposed affirmative hiring and promotional remedies to overcome the present consequences of an employer's past racial discrimination (Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1986). However, since section 703(h) of the act protects “bona fide security systems” from court interference, these remedies do not include out‐of‐line seniority layoffs in order to maintain court‐ordered minority hiring gains (Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 1984). Affirmative hiring and promotional remedies have been imposed in a large number of class actions against major employers and have had the effect of providing minorities with a fair share of the jobs in the workforces of these employers.

At the same time, the Court has held that Title VII does not prevent an employer from undertaking “voluntary, race‐conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” in the employer's workforce (United Steelworkers v. Weber, 1979). The employer may adopt hiring, training, and promotional programs that give a limited preference to racial minorities in order to open up employment opportunities in the occupations that traditionally had been closed to them (see Affirmative Action).

In more recent years, there have been fewer class action cases and more cases brought by employees asserting claims of individual discrimination. Following a series of decisions in the late 1980s that generally favored the interests of employers in resisting discrimination claims, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which blunted the full effect of those decisions and clarified and expanded the protection provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see Civil Rights Act of 1991). The Court's application of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has generally resulted in more favorable decisions for employees asserting discrimination claims. For example, the Court has held that in a “mixed motive” case, in which the employee presents circumstantial evidence showing that discrimination was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, the employer will be liable unless it can show that it would have taken the same action without regard to the discriminatory motivating factor (Desert Practice, Inc. v. Costa, 2003).

The Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII, when viewed in perspective, has provided racial minorities and other protected groups with a very significant legal weapon in their quest for equal employment opportunity and has gone a long way to providing them with a fair share of the jobs in the American economic system. Title VII also provides the means by which individual employees can challenge impermissible discrimination in the workplace. The Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a whole has moved the United States a long way in the direction of eliminating the pervasive discrimination that for so long had been a prominent feature of American life.

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See also Employment Discrimination; Race and Racism

Bibliography

• Harold S. Lewis, Jr.and Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination Law (2001)

— Robert A. Sedler

Congressional concern for civil rights diminished with the end of Reconstruction and the Supreme Court's 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases holding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. In 1957, Congress, under pressure from the civil rights movement, finally returned to the issue. However, the congressional response was a modest statute creating the Civil Rights Commission with power to investigate civil rights violations but not to enforce civil rights laws and establishing a feeble remedy for voting rights violations. The Civil Rights Act of 1960 slightly strengthened the voting rights provision.

During his campaign for the presidency in 1960, John F. Kennedy drew support from African Americans by promising to support civil rights initiatives. Once elected, Kennedy was reluctant to expend his political resources on civil rights programs he considered less important than other initiatives. Increasing civil rights activism, including sit-ins at food counters that refused service to African Americans, led Kennedy to propose a new civil rights act in May 1963. Kennedy lacked real enthusiasm for the proposal, which he saw as a necessary concession to the important constituency of African Americans in the Democratic Party. The bill languished in the House of Representatives until after Kennedy's assassination, when President Lyndon B. Johnson adopted the civil rights proposal as his own, calling it a memorial to Kennedy. Johnson had sponsored the 1957 act as part of his campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1960. Although Johnson was sincerely committed to civil rights, he had not allayed suspicion among liberal Democrats that he lacked such a commitment, and his support for the civil rights bill helped him with that constituency as well.

Johnson demonstrated the depth of his commitment through extensive efforts to secure the act's passage. The act passed the House in February 1964 with overwhelming bipartisan support, but southern senators opposed to the bill mounted the longest filibuster on record to that date. Senate rules required a two-thirds vote to end a filibuster, which meant Johnson had to get the support of a majority of Republicans. He negotiated extensively with Senator Everett Dirksen, the Senate's Republican leader, appealing to Dirksen's patriotism and sense of fairness. Dirksen extracted some small compromises, and with Republican support for Johnson, the filibuster ended. Within two weeks, the statute passed by a vote of 73–27.

The 1964 act had eleven main provisions or titles. Several strengthened the Civil Rights Commission and the voting rights provisions of the 1957 and 1960 acts, including a provision authorizing the U.S. attorney general to sue states that violated voting rights. But the act's other provisions were far more important. They dealt with discrimination in public accommodations and employment and with discrimination by agencies, both public and private, that received federal funds.

Title II

Title II banned racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, which were defined broadly to include almost all of the nation's restaurants, hotels, and theaters. These provisions were directed at the practices the sit-ins had protested, and to that extent they were the center of the act. The Civil Rights Cases (1883) held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the power to ban discrimination by private entities. By 1964, many scholars questioned that holding and urged Congress to rely on its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to justify the Civil Rights Act. Concerned about the constitutional question, the administration and Congress re-lied instead on the congressional power to regulate inter-state commerce. The hearings leading up to the statute's enactment included extensive testimony about the extent to which discrimination in hotels and restaurants deterred African Americans from traveling across the country. The Supreme Court, in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), had no difficulty upholding the public accommodations provisions against constitutional challenge, relying on expansive notions of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce that had become settled law since the New Deal. Although compliance with Title II was not universal, it was quite widespread, as operators of hotels and restaurants quickly understood that they would not lose money by complying with the law.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act banned discrimination in employment. Representative Howard Smith, a conservative Democrat from Virginia, proposed an amendment that expanded the groups protected against discrimination to include women. A similar proposal had been rattling around Congress for many years. The idea was opposed by many labor unions and some advocates of women's rights, who were concerned that banning discrimination based on sex imperiled laws that they believed protected women against undesirable work situations. Representative Smith, who before 1964 supported banning discrimination based on sex, hoped the amendment would introduce divisions among the act's proponents. His strategy failed, and the final act included a ban on discrimination based on sex.

Lawsuits invoking Title VII were soon filed in large numbers. The Supreme Court's initial interpretations of the act were expansive. The Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), held that employers engaged in prohibited discrimination not simply when they deliberately refused to hire African Americans but also when they adopted employment requirements that had a "disparate impact," that is, requirements that were easier for whites to satisfy. The Court's decision made it substantially easier for plaintiffs to show that Title VII had been violated because showing that a practice has a disparate impact is much easier than showing that an employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. The Court also allowed cases to proceed when a plaintiff showed no more than that he or she was qualified for the job and that the position remained open after the plaintiff was denied it, such as in McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973). In United Steel-workers of America v. Weber (1971), the Court rejected the argument that affirmative action programs adopted voluntarily by employers amounted to racial discrimination.

Later Supreme Court decisions were more restrictive. After the Court held that discrimination based on pregnancy was not discrimination based on sex in General Electric Company v. Gilbert (1976), Congress amended the statute to clarify that such discrimination was unlawful. Another amendment expanded the definition of discrimination based on religion to include a requirement that employers accommodate the religious needs of their employees. The Court further restricted Title VII in several decisions in 1989, the most important of which, Ward's Cove Packing Company, Inc., v. Atonio (1989), allowed employers to escape liability for employment practices with a disparate impact unless the plaintiffs could show that the practices did not serve "legitimate employment goals." These decisions again provoked a response in Congress. President George H. W. Bush vetoed the first bill that emerged from Congress, calling it a "quota bill." In Bush's view it gave employers incentives to adopt quotas to avoid being sued. Congressional supporters persisted, and eventually Bush, concerned about the impact of his opposition on his reelection campaign, signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which included ambiguous language that seemingly repudiated the Ward's Cove decision.

Title VI

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination by organizations that receive federal funds. The impact of this provision was immediate and important. Most school districts in the Deep South and many elsewhere in the South had resisted efforts to desegregate in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954). Attempts to enforce the Court's desegregation rulings required detailed and expensive litigation in each district, and little actual desegregation occurred in the Deep South before 1964. Title VI made a significant difference when coupled with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the nation's first major program of federal aid to local education programs. Proposals for federal aid to education had been obstructed previously when civil rights advocates, led by Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr., insisted that anyone who received federal funds would be barred from discriminating. These "Powell amendments" prompted southern representatives to vote against federal aid to education. The political forces that led to the adoption of Title VI also meant that southern opposition to federal aid to education could be overcome. The money available to southern school districts through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 broke the logjam over desegregation, and the number of school districts in which whites and African Americans attended the same schools rapidly increased.

Federal agencies' interpretations of Title VI paralleled the Court's interpretation of Title VII. Agencies adopted rules that treated as discrimination practices with a disparate impact. In Alexander v. Choate (1985), the Supreme Court held that Title VI prohibited only acts that were intentionally discriminatory, not practices with a disparate impact. The Court regularly expressed skepticism about the agency rules, although it did not invalidate them. Instead, in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001), the Court held that private parties could not sue to enforce the agencies' disparate-impact regulations. That decision substantially limited the reach of Title VI because the agencies themselves lack the resources to enforce their regulations to a significant extent.

Efforts by courts and presidents to limit the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been rebuffed regularly. Supplemented by amendments, the act is among the civil rights movement's most enduring legacies.

Bibliography

Graham, Hugh Davis. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Stern, Mark. Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992.

Whalen, Charles, and Barbara Whalen. The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1985.

—Mark V. Tushnet

Federal act passed to amend statutes passed after the Civil War to provide stronger protection for rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Act affected voting rights, 42 U.S.C. §§1971 et seq., the Civil Rights commission, 42 U.S.C. §§1975 et seq., and discrimination in public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§2000a et seq. The Act was passed during the Johnson presidency as part of his program to improve the status of minorities.

After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his determination to pass a strong civil rights act that would end racial discrimination in employment, education, and other spheres of life. Deputy Attorney General Nicholas D. Katzenbach, Johnson's congressional liaison, worked with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D.-Minn.) and Senate minority leader Everett M. Dirksen (R.-Ill.) to achieve a compromise that would assure final passage. The result was the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title I of the act guarantees equal voting rights by removing registration requirements and procedures biased against minorities and the underprivileged. Title II prohibits segregation or discrimination in places of public accommodation involved in interstate commerce. Title VII bans discrimination by trade unions, schools, and employers involved in interstate commerce or doing business with the federal government. This section also applies to discrimination on the basis of sex and established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce these provisions. The act also calls for the desegregation of public schools (title IV), broadens the duties of the Civil Rights Commission (title V), and assures nondiscrimination in the distribution of funds under federally assisted programs (title VI).

Initially, the most controversial provision was title II. Because the 1883 Civil Rights cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot reach private discrimination in public accommodations, Congress based title II on the Constitution's Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld title II as a constitutional application of the Commerce Clause.

Civil Rights Act of 1964

For Legislative History of Act, see p. 2355

PUBLIC LAW 88-352; 78 STAT. 241

[H. R. 7152]

An Act to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964".

TITLE I—VOTING RIGHTS

Sec. 101. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), as amended by section 1313 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stats. 637), and as further amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stats. 90), ¹ is further amended as follows:

(a) Insert "1" after "(a)" in subsection (a) and add at the end of subsection (a) the following new paragraphs:

"(2) No person acting under color of law shall—

"(A) in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any Federal election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote;

"(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election; or

"(C) employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any Federal election unless (i) such test is administered to each individual and is conducted wholly in writing, and (ii) a certified copy of the test and of the answers given by the individual is furnished to him within twenty-five days of the submission of his request made within the period of time during which records and papers are required to be retained and preserved pursuant to title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974-74e; 74 Stat. 88): Provided, however, That the Attorney General may enter into agreements with appropriate State or local authorities that preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests in accordance with the provisions of applicable State or local law, including such special provisions as are necessary in the preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests for persons who are blind or otherwise physically handicapped, meet the purposes of this subparagraph and constitute compliance therewith.

"(3) For purposes of this subsection—

"(A) the term ‘vote’ shall have the same meaning as in subsection (e) of this section;

"(B) the phrase ‘literacy test’ includes any test of the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter."

(b) Insert immediately following the period at the end of the first sentence of subsection (c) the following new sentence: "If in any such proceeding literacy is a relevant fact there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any person who has not been adjudged an incompetent and who has completed the sixth grade in a public school in, or in a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico where instruction is carried on predominantly in the English language, possesses sufficient literacy, comprehension, and intelligence to vote in any Federal election."

(c) Add the following subsection "(f)" and designate the present subsection "(f)" as subsection "(g)": "(f) When used in subsection (a) or (c) of this section, the words ‘Federal election’ shall mean any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing or selecting any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives."

(d) Add the following subsection "(h)": "(h) In any proceeding instituted by the United States in any district court of the United States under this section in which the Attorney General requests a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination pursuant to subsection (e) of this section the Attorney General, at the time he files the complaint, or any defendant in the proceeding, within twenty days after service upon him of the complaint, may file with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the entire case. A copy of the request for a three-judge court shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of the copy of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court. "In any proceeding brought under subsection (c) of this section to enforce subsection (b) of this section, or in the event neither the Attorney General nor any defendant files a request for a three-judge court in any proceeding authorized by this subsection, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or, in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the case." "It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."

TITLE II—INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

Sec. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.

(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b); (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b), it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, "commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points in the same State but through any other State or the District of Columbia or a foreign country.

(d) Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported by State action within the meaning of this title if such discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political subdivision thereof.

(e) The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsections (b).

Sec. 202. All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.

Sec. 203. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.

Sec. 204. (a) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 203, a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved and, upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in such civil action if he certifies that the case is of general public importance. Upon application by the complaint and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.

(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.

(c) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting such act or practice and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no civil action may be brought under subsection (a) before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged act or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local authority by registered mail or in person, provided that the court may stay proceedings in such civil action pending the termination of State or local enforcement proceedings.

(d) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has no State or local law prohibiting such act or practice, a civil action may be brought under subsection (a): Provided, That the court may refer the matter to the Community Relations Service established by title X of this Act for as long as the court believes there is a reasonable possibility of obtaining voluntarily compliance, but for not more than sixty days: Provided further, That upon expiration of such sixty-day period, the court may extend such period for an additional period, not to exceed a cumulative total of one hundred and twenty days, if it believes there then exists a reasonable possibility of securing voluntary compliance.

Sec. 205. The Service is authorized to make a full investigation of any complaint referred to it by the court under section 204(d) and may hold such hearings with respect thereto as may be necessary. The Service shall conduct any hearings with respect to any such complaint in executive session, and shall not release any testimony given therein except by agreement of all parties involved in the complaint with the permission of the court, and the Service shall endeavor to bring about a voluntary settlement between the parties.

Sec. 206 (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described.

(b) In any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of the copy of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court.

In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the case.

It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.

Sec. 207. (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this title and shall exercise the same without regard to whether the aggrieved party shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.

(b) The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title, but nothing in this title shall prelude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.

TITLE III—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

Sec. 301. (a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing signed by an individual to the effect that he is being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof, other than a public school or public college as defined in section 401 of title IV hereof, and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially further the orderly progress of desegregation in public facilities, the Attorney General is authorized to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section . The Attorney General may implead as defendants such additional parties as are or become necessary to the grant of effective relief hereunder.

(b) The Attorney General may deem a person or persons unable to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section when such person or persons are unable, either directly or through other interested persons or organizations, to bear the expense of the litigation or to obtain effective legal representation; or whenever he is satisfied that the institution of such litigation would jeopardize the personal safety, employment, or economic standing of such person or persons, their families, or their property.

Sec. 302. In any action or proceeding under this title the United States shall be liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, the same as a private person.

Sec. 303. Nothing in this title shall affect adversely the right of any person to sue for or obtain relief in any court against discrimination in any facility covered by this title.

Sec. 304. A complaint as used in this title is a writing or document within the meaning of section 1001, title 18, United States Code.

TITLE IV—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

DEFINITIONS

Sec. 401. As used in this title—

(a) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Education.

(b) "Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but "desegregation" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.

(c) "Public school" means any elementary or secondary educational institution, and "public college" means any institution of higher education or any technical or vocational school above the secondary school level, provided that such public school or public college is operated by a State, subdivision of a State, or governmental agency within a State, or operated wholly or predominantly from or through the use of governmental funds or property, or funds or property derived from a governmental source.

(d) "School board" means any agency or agencies which administer a system of one or more public schools and any other agency which is responsible for the assignment of students to or within such system.

SURVEY AND REPORT OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Sec. 402. The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President and the Congress, with two years of the enactment of this title, concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Sec. 403. The Commissioner is authorized, upon the application of any school board, State, municipality, school district, or other governmental unit legally responsible for operating a public school or schools, to render technical assistance to such applicant in the preparation, adoption, and implementation of plans for the desegregation of public schools. Such technical assistance may, among other activities, include making available to such agencies information regarding effective methods of coping with special educational problems occasioned by desegregation, and making available to such agencies personnel of the Office of Education or other persons specially equipped to advise and assist them in coping with such problems.

The years following World War II in the United States brought a period of economic prosperity for many Americans. The economy was strong and workers found themselves able to use their income to pay for new homes and goods and services that had been unheard of for prior generations. Not all U.S. residents, however, shared equally in the prosperity. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, white Americans enjoyed many benefits that were unavailable to people of color. African Americans attempting to vote in local, state, and federal elections faced poll taxes and rigid entry requirements, though their white neighbors had no such barriers. In parts of the United States white people had preferential seating on buses and in movie theaters; water fountains and municipal swimming pools bore signs indicating that their use was restricted by race; and drugstore soda fountains and restaurants refused to serve people of color.

In the same vein, public schools admitted students not on the basis of their residence, but rather on the basis of their race. The education provided in the schools attended by white children was different from that provided to black children. Students of color who wished to attend college had many fewer choices than white students with equal ability. Housing, too, was restricted, both by the refusal of white landlords to rent to black tenants and by the refusal of white homeowners to sell their homes to people of color. As a result, neighborhoods in many parts of the country were segregated.

During the 1950s activists like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began to stage protests against widespread racial discrimination. African American leaders held marches in cities in the South, joined by many Northern supporters, both white and black. Many of these nonviolent protests were met with violent responses, including the use of police dogs, water hoses, and physical abuse of the protesters. Newspapers and magazines covered the confrontations, bringing the struggle to the attention of many Americans who had remained unaware of the extent and severity of racial discrimination.

By the time the presidential election campaign of 1960 began, a national debate on the issue of race discrimination was occurring in the media, schools, and local government chambers. Both national parties made Civil Rights a part of their campaign platforms in 1960. The 1960 Democratic platform said: "The peaceful demonstrations for first-class citizenship which have recently taken place in many parts of the country are a signal to all of us to make good at long last the guarantees of our Constitution.... The time has come to assure equal access for all Americans to all areas of community life." The Republican platform stated, "We pledge the full use of the power, resources, and leadership of the Federal Government to eliminate discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin."

Against this backdrop, John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960. Progress on legislation addressing the promises made by both parties was slow. Congress considered legislation to address inequality in public accommodations, but failed to pass it. Legislators tried, but also failed, to pass a widespread Civil Rights law in 1963. Those who argued against the law's passage asserted that the remedies proposed by the law were unconstitutional, in violation of the rights of the states to govern their own affairs, and an impermissible infringement on the rights of business owners to decide for themselves with whom to do business. It was only after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 and the swearing-in of Lyndon Johnson in his place, that the legislative tide turned in favor of passage of Civil Rights legislation.

The Act's Provisions

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241) addressed voting rights, desegregation of public facilities, desegregation of public education, and equal employment opportunity. It provided for the extension of the Commission on Civil Rights, the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and mandated that federally assisted programs be nondiscriminatory.

The voting rights provisions of the act stated that for federal elections, persons acting "under color of law" could not apply standards to some voters that were different from those applied to all other voters, and could not use immaterial errors in written applications to bar voters from participating in federal elections. The act also barred the use of literacy tests for some voters but not others and allowed the U.S. attorney general to sue in federal court for violations of these provisions by state officials.

Title II of the act rendered illegal barriers imposed by owners of restaurants, motels, and other public businesses against people of color, stating, "all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."

Title IV called for the commissioner of education to conduct a survey to determine the extent to which public schools and public colleges were providing equal educational opportunities to all without regard to race, religion, or national origin. It also authorized the attorney general to initiate lawsuits against public educational officials in response to complaints from those who believed they had been deprived of equal educational opportunity.

Title VI provided that discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin is illegal in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." This section applied to programs in which the federal government provided grants, loans, contracts, or other financial support to other organizations, public or private.

Title VII made it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII's provisions applied to labor organizations, apprenticeship providers, and employment agencies. The act also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a bipartisan commission, intended to be independent of control by the president or the Congress. Its role has been to investigate and attempt to remedy violations of Title VII. Cases in which the EEOC is unable to reach a satisfactory resolution go on to federal court for judicial proceedings.

Important Legal Effects of the Civil Rights Act

The Civil Rights Act served to unite in federal law a number of important principles. Primary among these, of course, was the clear statement that discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin was illegal when practiced by public officials or those providing public accommodations. The voter registration drives in the early 1960s had made clear there were substantial barriers to full participation by all Americans in the federal electoral process. By allowing suits for cases in which the attorney general could find a "pattern or practice of discrimination," the act made it possible for black voters to challenge actions by local officials that deprived them of the right to participate equally with white voters.

The 1964 act strengthened earlier laws preventing racial discrimination against black voters and helped lay the groundwork for the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Civil Rights Act's prohibition of discrimination by those providing public accommodations also made possible a giant step in racial equality, preventing most local businesses from refusing service to people of color.

The Equal Employment Opportunity provisions in Title VII have had the most wide ranging, and perhaps unexpected, effects. These provisions certainly served to open opportunities to people of color seeking jobs and training opportunities previously unavailable to them. Manufacturing companies, labor unions, police and fire departments, and innumerable other employers were forced or encouraged to open their doors to applicants of all races and national origins. In addition to those expected results, however, the inclusion of the word "sex" among the prohibited bases of discrimination meant that Title VII has been the focus of considerable attention and analysis long after most of the other provisions in the act have ceased to be noteworthy.

Significance of Changes in the Law

The Civil Rights Act is well known for the remedies it provided for those routinely discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin. It also, however, made some significant advances in the way courts considered violations of these laws. For example, Title I includes a section making it possible for the U.S. attorney general to request that a three-judge panel of federal judges hear cases brought by persons alleging discrimination against them in connection with voting. This is different from the usual practice, in which a single federal judge hears a case and makes a ruling, which can then be appealed to a three-judge panel of an appellate court. One reason for this change from the standard practice was the concern on the part of those sponsoring the law that some judges and court officials had acted to block access to the courts by people of color seeking to assert their rights. This section also required that federal courts treat voting rights cases as priorities, rather than subjecting them to the usual docketing practices of the courts.

Another significant development in the law is in the connection the act makes between interstate commerce (or state action) and barriers created by owners of public accommodations to prevent people of color from using these facilities. Previously, owners of local pools, hotels, motels, theaters, and other places to which the public is admitted could claim their discriminatory decisions were individually made, motivated by their desire to please the majority of their customers. The Civil Rights Act required that businesses affecting interstate commerce be operated in a nondiscriminatory manner.

The Civil Rights Act did not explicitly make "separate but equal" education illegal; the Supreme Court had taken that step ten years earlier in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Instead, the act incorporated into federal statutory law a requirement that public schools be desegregated, allowing the U.S. attorney general to sue schools that failed to provide equal opportunities for all students and making nondiscrimination a prerequisite to receiving federal financial assistance. Not until after the enactment of the 1964 act were desegregation requirements enforced throughout the country.

Following passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, much of the activity surrounding efforts to integrate facilities of all types moved from the streets to the courts. Lawsuits concerning discrimination in many different settings allowed the courts to define, refine, and apply the provisions of the act. Education was a major arena in which legal action helped to effect desegregation. Though the decision in Brown v. Board of Education predated the Civil Rights Act, the passage of the act provided significant support for efforts of those seeking to open educational institutions to students of color.

Among the most significant post-act decisions was Regents of University of California v. Bakke (1978), in which a white student sued the medical school of the University of California, alleging that the school had violated his civil rights by setting aside several seats in the class for members of disadvantaged groups. The Court upheld the state court's decision that the quota system was unlawful, but also held that it was acceptable under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Civil Rights Act for the school to take race into consideration as one factor in an admissions program seeking educational diversity.

In 1992 the Supreme Court held that a state's obligations under Title VI of the act were not satisfied merely by operating a race-neutral admissions system. In United States v. Fordice (1992), the Court ruled that a formerly segregated public university system must eliminate remnants of the dual system even if those aspects of the program had no discriminatory purpose. The Supreme Court considered race in college admissions most recently in 2003, holding that a quota system for undergraduates of color at the University of Michigan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but further ruling that race-conscious admissions to the University's Law School were acceptable in pursuit of the goal of racial diversity so long as the University made decisions on an individual basis (Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both 2003).

Courts have also held that the act requires states operating public recreational facilities, such as pools, parks, and playgrounds, to make those facilities equally available to persons of all races. In Daniel v. Paul (1969), the Court ruled that an amusement park in Arkansas was a "place of public accommodation" covered by the act and therefore could not limit use of its facilities to whites who had paid a twenty-five cent "membership fee." The Court rejected the operator's argument that the park's operation was entirely private, noting the park was advertised in magazines and on broadcast outlets, that it served out-of-state visitors, and that the food sold in the park's snack bar moved in interstate commerce.

Subsequent legislation has further developed and amplified the provisions of the act as they apply to many areas, especially discrimination in housing, which was largely unaddressed by the act. The provisions of Titles II and VII of the act were expanded in 1990 with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) required that the Civil Rights Act's prohibitions against discrimination apply to people with physical and mental disabilities as well. Recognizing that discrimination in employment on the basis of age was a related problem, Congress supplemented Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1967 with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, further supplemented Title VII by prohibiting employers from paying men and women different wages for the same work.

Though much progress has occurred since passage of the Civil Rights Act's passage in 1964, courts and legislatures throughout the country continue to address many difficult issues on a regular basis.

Bibliography

Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–1963. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.

Carson, Clayborne, et al., eds. The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents,Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle. New York: Viking Penguin, 1991.

Williams, Juan, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987.

A federal law that authorized federal action against segregation in public accommodations, public facilities, and employment. The law was passed during a period of great strength for the civil rights movement, and President Lyndon Johnson persuaded many reluctant members of Congress to support the law.

First page of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Civil Rights Act of 1964

Long title:

An Act to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States of America to provide relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, July 2, 1964) was a landmark piece of legislation in the United States that outlawed racial segregation in schools, public places, and employment.

To circumvent limitations on congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause imposed by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, the law was passed under the Commerce Clause, which had been interpreted by the courts as a broad grant of congressional power. Once the Act was implemented, its effects were far reaching and had tremendous long-term impacts on the whole country. It prohibited discrimination in public facilities, in government, and in employment, invalidating the Jim Crow laws in the southern U.S. It became illegal to compel segregation of the races in schools, housing, or hiring. Powers given to enforce the bill were initially weak, but were supplemented during later years.

Contents 1 Origins 2 Passage 2.1 Passage in the House of Representatives 2.2 Passage in the Senate 2.3 Vote totals 2.3.1 By party 2.3.2 By party and region 3 Women's rights 4 Desegregation 5 Political repercussions 6 Major features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 6.1 Title I 6.2 Title II 6.3 Title III 6.4 Title IV 6.5 Title V 6.6 Title VI 6.7 Title VII 6.8 Title VIII 6.9 Title IX 6.10 Title X 7 Subsequent history 8 See also 8.1 Cases 9 References 10 Further reading 11 External links

Origins

John F. Kennedy addresses the nation about Civil Rights on June 11, 1963

The bill was introduced by President John F Kennedy in his civil rights speech of June 11, 1963,^[1] in which he asked for legislation "giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public—hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar establishments," as well as "greater protection for the right to vote."

He then sent a bill to Congress on June 19. Emulating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Kennedy's civil rights bill included provisions to ban discrimination in public accommodations, and to enable the U.S. Attorney General to join in lawsuits against state governments which operated segregated school systems, among other provisions. But it did not include a number of provisions deemed essential by civil rights leaders including protection against police brutality, ending discrimination in private employment, or granting the Justice Department power to initiate desegregation or job discrimination lawsuits.^[2]

Passage

Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among the guests behind him is Martin Luther King, Jr.

Passage in the House of Representatives

The bill was sent to the House of Representatives, and referred to the House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Emmanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York. After a series of hearings on the bill, Celler's committee greatly strengthened the act, adding provisions to ban racial discrimination in employment, providing greater protection to black voters, eliminating segregation in all publicly owned facilities (not just schools), and strengthening the anti-segregation clauses regarding public facilities such as lunch counters. They also added authorization for the Attorney General to file lawsuits to protect individuals against the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution or U.S. law. In essence, this was the controversial "Title III" that had been removed from the 1957 and 1960 Acts. Civil rights organizations pressed hard for this provision because it could be used to protect peaceful protesters and black voters from police brutality and suppression of free speech rights.

The bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee in November 1963, and referred to the Rules Committee, whose chairman, Howard W. Smith, a Democrat and avid segregationist from Virginia, indicated his intention to keep the bill bottled up indefinitely. It was at this point that President Kennedy was assassinated. The new president, Lyndon Johnson, utilized his experience in legislative politics and the bully pulpit he wielded as president in support of the bill.

Because of Smith's stalling of the bill in the Rules Committee, Celler filed a petition to discharge the bill from the Committee. Only if a majority of members signed the discharge petition would the bill move directly to the House floor without consideration by Smith's committee. Initially Celler had a difficult time acquiring the signatures necessary, as even many congressmen who supported the civil rights bill itself were cautious about violating House procedure with the discharge petition. By the time of the 1963 winter recess, 50 signatures were still needed.

On the return from the winter recess, however, matters took a significant turn. The pressure of the civil rights movement, the March on Washington, and the President's public advocacy of the Act had made a difference of opinion in Representatives' home districts, and soon it became apparent that the petition would acquire the necessary signatures. To prevent the humiliation of the success of the petition, Chairman Smith allowed the bill to pass through the Rules Committee. The bill was brought to a vote in the House on February 10, 1964, and passed by a vote of 290 to 130, and sent to the Senate.

Passage in the Senate

Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X at the United States Capitol on March 26, 1964. Both men had come to hear the Senate debate on the bill. This was the only time the two men ever met; their meeting lasted only one minute.^[3][4]

Johnson, who wanted the bill passed as soon as possible, ensured that the bill would be quickly considered by the Senate. Normally, the bill would have been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat from Mississippi. Under Eastland's care, it seemed impossible that the bill would reach the Senate floor. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield took a novel approach to prevent the bill from being relegated to Judiciary Committee limbo. Having initially waived a second reading of the bill, which would have led to it being immediately referred to Judiciary, Mansfield gave the bill a second reading on February 26, 1964, and then proposed, in the absence of precedent for instances when a second reading did not immediately follow the first, that the bill bypass the Judiciary Committee and immediately be sent to the Senate floor for debate. Although this parliamentary move led to a brief filibuster, the senators eventually let it pass, preferring to concentrate their resistance on passage of the bill itself.

The bill came before the full Senate for debate on March 30, 1964 and the "Southern Bloc" of southern Senators led by Richard Russell (D-GA) launched a filibuster to prevent its passage. Said Russell: "We will resist to the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our (Southern) states."^[5]

After 54 days of filibuster, Senators Everett Dirksen (R-IL), Thomas Kuchel (R-CA), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) introduced a substitute bill that they hoped would attract enough Republican votes to end the filibuster. The compromise bill was weaker than the House version in regard to government power to regulate the conduct of private business, but it was not so weak as to cause the House to reconsider the legislation.^[6]

On the morning of June 10, 1964, Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) completed an address that he had begun 14 hours and 13 minutes earlier opposing the legislation. Until then, the measure had occupied the Senate for 57 working days, including six Saturdays. A day earlier, Democratic Whip Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, the bill's manager, concluded he had the 67 votes required at that time to end the debate and end the filibuster. With six wavering senators providing a four-vote victory margin, the final tally stood at 71 to 29. Never in history had the Senate been able to muster enough votes to cut off a filibuster on a civil rights bill. And only once in the 37 years since 1927 had it agreed to cloture for any measure.^[7]

Key to the passage of the Civil Rights Act were not just the congressional maneuvers, but also the public pressure, which was fed by a campaign led by Dr. Robert Hayling and Dr. Martin Luther King in St. Augustine, Florida--the "nation's oldest city"--in the Spring and summer of 1964. The graphic incidents in St. Augustine, including the arrest of Dr. King at a segregated restaurant, the largest mass arrest of rabbis in American history, the arrest of the 72-year-old mother of the governor of Massachusetts, wade-ins at St. Augustine Beach, many brutal beatings, and the pouring of acid in a motel pool when an integrated group was swimming there, demonstrated for the American people the need to pass the law.

	"Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964" Public statement by Lyndon B. Johnson of July 2, 1964 about the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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Finally, on June 19, the substitute (compromise) bill passed the Senate by a vote of 73-27, and quickly passed through the House-Senate conference committee, which adopted the Senate version of the bill. The conference bill was passed by both houses of Congress, and was signed into law by President Johnson on July 2, 1964. Legend has it that as he put down his pen Johnson told an aide, referring to the Democratic Party, "We have lost the South for a generation."^[8]

Vote totals

Totals are in "Yea-Nay" format:

• The original House version: 290-130   (69%-31%)
• Cloture in the Senate: 71-29   (71%-29%)
• The Senate version: 73-27   (73%-27%)
• The Senate version, as voted on by the House: 289-126   (70%-30%)

By party

The original House version:^[9]

• Democratic Party: 152-96   (61%-39%)
• Republican Party: 138-34   (80%-20%)

Cloture in the Senate:^[10]

• Democratic Party: 44-23   (66%-34%)
• Republican Party: 27-6   (82%-18%)

The Senate version:^[9]

• Democratic Party: 46-21   (69%-31%)
• Republican Party: 27-6   (82%-18%)

The Senate version, voted on by the House:^[9]

• Democratic Party: 153-91   (63%-37%)
• Republican Party: 136-35   (80%-20%)

By party and region

Note: "Southern", as used in this section, refers to members of Congress from the eleven states that made up the Confederate States of America in the American Civil War. "Northern" refers to members from the other 39 states, regardless of the geographic location of those states.

The original House version:

• Southern Democrats: 7-87   (7%-93%)
• Southern Republicans: 0-10   (0%-100%)

• Northern Democrats: 145-9   (94%-6%)
• Northern Republicans: 138-24   (85%-15%)

The Senate version:

• Southern Democrats: 1-20   (5%-95%) (only Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas voted in favor)
• Southern Republicans: 0-1   (0%-100%) (this was Senator John Tower of Texas)
• Northern Democrats: 45-1   (98%-2%) (only Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia opposed the measure)
• Northern Republicans: 27-5   (84%-16%) (Senators Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, Edwin L. Mechem of New Mexico, Milward L. Simpson of Wyoming, and Norris H. Cotton of New Hampshire opposed the measure)

Women's rights

The prohibition on sex discrimination was added by Howard W. Smith, a powerful Virginian Democrat who chaired the House Rules Committee and who had strongly opposed the Civil Rights Act. The addition of "sex" to title VII is commonly described as a cynical attempt to defeat the bill by inserting objectionable amendments.^[11][12][13] Smith knew Republicans, who had included equal rights for women in their party's platform since 1944, would vote for the amendment along with southern Democrats and get it in the final bill.^[13] Smith thought that northern Democrats would not vote for the bill due to the inclusion of gender, because the clause was opposed by labor unions which the northern Democrats aligned themselves with.^[13] Representative Carl Elliott of Alabama later claimed, "Smith didn't give a damn about women's rights...he was trying to knock off votes either then or down the line because there was always a hard core of men who didn't favor women's rights,"^[14] and the Congressional Record records that Smith was greeted by laughter when he introduced the amendment.^[15]

Smith nevertheless claimed that he sincerely supported the amendment and made serious arguments in its favor.^[15] The claim was not entirely ungrounded, as Smith had long been close to Alice Paul, a women's rights activist who urged him to include sex as a protected category. The amendment had been forcefully promoted by the National Woman's Party and its allies in Congress, who had no desire to scuttle the Civil Rights Act.^[11] Thus, as William Rehnquist explained in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, “The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives...the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’” ^[16]

However, the idea that banishing sex-based discrimination was ridiculous is undermined by the passage, just one year prior, of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) by the same Congress.^{[citation needed]} The EPA had, as its main objective, abolished wage differentials based on sex. It seemed unlikely that, the following year, the very same Congress would view sex-based discrimination as ridiculous or that any member of that Congress would believe that the addition of sex as a protected class would scuttle the bill.^{[citation needed]}

Desegregation

One of the most "damaging" arguments by the bill's opponents was that once passed, the bill would require forced busing to achieve certain racial quotas in schools.^[17] Proponents of the bill, such as Emanuel Celler and Jacob Javits, said that the bill would not authorize such measures. Leading sponsor Hubert Humphrey wrote two amendments specifically designed to outlaw busing.^[17] Humphrey said "if the bill were to compel it, it would be a violation [of the Constitution], because it would be handling the matter on the basis of race and we would be transporting children because of race."^[17] While Javits said any government official who sought to use the bill for busing purposes "would be making a fool of himself," two years later the Department of Health, Education and Welfare said that Southern school districts would be required to meet mathematical ratios of students by busing.^[17]

Political repercussions

President Johnson speaks to a television camera at the signing of the Civil Rights Act.

The bill divided and engendered a long-term change in the demographics of both parties. President Johnson realized that supporting this bill would risk losing the South's overwhelming support of the Democratic Party. Both Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Vice President Johnson had pushed for the introduction of the civil rights legislation. Johnson told Kennedy aide Ted Sorensen that "I know the risks are great and we might lose the South, but those sorts of states may be lost anyway."^[18] Senator Richard Russell, Jr. warned President Johnson that his strong support for the civil rights bill "will not only cost you the South, it will cost you the election."^[19] The South indeed started to vote increasingly Republican after 1964. However, political scientists Richard Johnston and Byron Schafer have argued that this development was based more on economics than on race. ^[20]

Although majorities in both parties voted for the bill, there were notable exceptions. Republican senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona voted against the bill, remarking, "You can't legislate morality." Goldwater had supported previous attempts to pass Civil Rights legislation in 1957 and 1960. The reason for his opposition to the 1964 bill was Title II, which he viewed as a violation of individual liberty. Most Democrats from the Southern states opposed the bill, including Senators Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN), J. William Fulbright (D-AR), and Robert Byrd (D-WV).

Major features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(The full text of the Act is available online.)

Title I

Barred unequal application of voter registration requirements.

"It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."'

Title I did not eliminate literacy tests, which were one of the main methods used to exclude Black voters in the South, nor did it address economic retaliation, police repression, or physical violence against nonwhite voters. While the Act did require that voting rules and procedures be applied equally to all races, it failed to challenge the fundamental concept of voter "qualification." That is, it accepted the idea that citizens do not have an automatic right to vote but rather might have to meet some standard beyond citizenship.^[21]

Title II

Outlawed discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, and all other public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce; exempted private clubs without defining the term "private."

Title III

Prohibited state and municipal governments from denying access to public facilities on grounds of race, religion, gender, or ethnicity.

Title IV

Encouraged the desegregation of public schools and authorized the U.S. Attorney General to file suits to enforce said act.

Title V

Expanded the Civil Rights Commission established by the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1957 with additional powers, rules and procedures.

Title VI

Prevented discrimination by government agencies that receive federal funding. If an agency is found in violation of Title VI, that agency can lose its federal funding.

General

This title declares it to be the policy of the United States that discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin shall not occur in connection with programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance and authorizes and directs the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to take action to carry out this policy. This title is not intended to apply to foreign assistance programs. Section 601 – This section states the general principle that no person in the United States shall be excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against on the ground of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

Section 602 directs each Federal agency administering a program of Federal financial assistance by way of grant, contract, or loan to take action pursuant to rule, regulation, or order of general applicability to effectuate the principle of section 601 in a manner consistent with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the assistance. In seeking the effect compliance with its requirements imposed under this section, an agency is authorized to terminate or to refuse to grant or to continue assistance under a program to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding pursuant to a hearing of a failure to comply with the requirements under that program, and it may also employ any other means authorized by law. However, each agency is directed first to seek compliance with its requirements by voluntary means.

Section 603 provides that any agency action taken pursuant to section 602 shall be subject to such judicial review as would be available for similar actions by that agency on other grounds. Where the agency action consists of terminating or refusing to grant or to continue financial assistance because of a finding of a failure of the recipient to comply with the agency's requirements imposed under section 602, and the agency action would not otherwise be subject to judicial review under existing law, judicial review shall nevertheless be available to any person aggrieved as provided in section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC 1009). The section also states explicitly that in the latter situation such agency action shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of section 10. The purpose of this provision is to obviate the possible argument that although section 603 provides for review in accordance with section 10, section 10 itself has an exception for action "committed to agency discretion," which might otherwise be carried over into section 603. It is not the purpose of this provision of section 603, however, otherwise to alter the scope of judicial review as presently provided in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Title VII

Title VII of the Act, codified as Subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [2] et seq., prohibits discrimination by covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2^[22]).

Title VII also prohibits discrimination against an individual because of his or her association with another individual of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An employer cannot discriminate against a person because of his interracial association with another, such as by an interracial marriage.^[23]

In very narrow defined situations an employer is permitted to discriminate on the basis of a protected trait where the trait is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. To prove the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications defense, an employer must prove three elements: a direct relationship between sex and the ability to perform the duties of the job, the BFOQ relates to the "essence" or "central mission of the employer's business," and there is no less-restrictive or reasonable alternative (Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) 111 S.Ct. 1196). The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification exception is an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination based on sex (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 97 S.Ct. 2720). An employer or customer's preference for an individual of a particular religion is not sufficient to establish a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha School — Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Title VII allows for any employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency to bypass the "unlawful employment practice" for any person involved with the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.^{[citation needed]}

There are partial and whole exceptions to Title VII for four types of employers:

• Federal government; (Comment: The proscriptions against employment discrimination under Title VII are now applicable to the federal government under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-16)
• Federally recognized Native American tribes
• Religious groups performing work connected to the group's activities, including associated education institutions;
• Bona fide nonprofit private membership organizations.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as well as certain state fair employment practices agencies (FEPAs) enforce Title VII (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4^[22]). The EEOC and state FEPAs investigate, mediate, and may file lawsuits on behalf of employees. Every state, except Arkansas and Alabama maintains a state FEPA (see EEOC and state FEPA directory ). Title VII also provides that an individual can bring a private lawsuit. An individual must file a complaint of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of learning of the discrimination or the individual may lose the right to file a lawsuit. Title VII only applies to employers who employ 15 or more employees for more than 19 weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.^{[citation needed]}

In the late 1970s courts began holding that sexual harassment is also prohibited under the Act. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal is a notable Title VII case relating to sexual harassment that was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. In 1986 the Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that sexual harassment is sex discrimination and is prohibited by Title VII. Same-sex sexual harassment has also been held in a unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia to be prohibited by Title VII (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), 118 S.Ct. 998). Title VII has been supplemented with legislation prohibiting pregnancy, age, and disability discrimination (See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Age Discrimination in Employment Act^[24] , Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).

Title VIII

Required compilation of voter-registration and voting data in geographic areas specified by the Commission on Civil Rights.

Title IX

Made it easier to move civil rights cases from state courts with segregationist judges and all-white juries to federal court. This was of crucial importance to civil rights activists who could not get a fair trial in state courts.

Title X

Established the Community Relations Service, tasked with assisting in community disputes involving claims of discrimination.

Subsequent history

In a 1971 Supreme Court case regarding the gender provisions of the Act, the Court ruled that a company could not discriminate against a potential female employee because she had a preschool-age child unless they did the same with potential male employees.^[13] A federal court overruled an Ohio state law that barred women from obtaining jobs which required the ability to lift 25 pounds and required women to take lunch breaks when men were not required to.^[13] A Pennsylvania state court decided that printing separate job listings for men and women was illegal, which ended that practice among the country's newspapers.^[13] The United States Civil Service Commission ended the practice among federal jobs which designated them "women only" or "men only."^[13]

In 1974, the Supreme Court also ruled that the San Francisco school district was violating non-English speaking students' rights under the 1964 act by placing them in regular classes rather than providing some sort of accommodation for them.^[25]

In 1975, a federal civil rights agency warned a Phoenix, Arizona school that its end-of-year father-son and mother-daughter baseball games were illegal according to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.^[13] President Gerald Ford intervened, and the games were allowed to continue.^[13]

In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down state minimum height requirements for police officers as violating the Act; women usually could not meet these requirements.^[13]

See also

• Bennett Amendment
• African-American Civil Rights Movement
• Civil rights
• Civil Rights Act of 1968
• Matthew Shepard Act
• Martin Luther King Jr.
• St. Augustine, Florida
• Women's Rights
• Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
• Employment Non-Discrimination Act
• Affirmative action in the United States

Cases

• Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)
• Washington v. Davis (1976)
• Brown v. Trustees of Boston University (1989)
• Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989)
• Ricci v. DeStefano (2009)

References

1. ^ Transcript from the JFK library.
2. ^ Civil Rights Act Passes in the House ~ Civil Rights Movement Veterans
3. ^ McElrath, Jessica. "Martin Luther King & Malcolm X (Press conference)". African-American History: Civil Rights Movement. http://afroamhistory.about.com/od/civilrightsmovement/ig/Civil-Rights-Movement-Photos/MLK---Malcolm-X.--7g.htm. Retrieved 2008-07-28. 
4. ^ Cone, James H. (1991). Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books. pp. 2. ISBN 0-88344-721-5. "There was no time for substantive discussions between the two. They were photographed greeting each other warmly, smiling and shaking hands." 
5. ^ Civil Rights Act of 1964
6. ^ Civil Rights Act — Battle in the Senate ~ Civil Rights Movement Veterans
7. ^ Civil Rights Filibuster Ended - United States Senate
8. ^ Risen, Clay (2006-03-05). "How the South was won". The Boston Globe. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/03/05/how_the_south_was_won/. Retrieved 2007-02-11. 
9. ^ ^{a b c} King, Desmond (1995). Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government. p. 311. 
10. ^ [|Jeong, Gyung-Ho]; Gary J. Miller, Itai Sened (2009-03-14). "Closing The Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation". 67th Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. p. 29. http://polisci.wustl.edu/media/faculty/MidwestJMS.pdf. Retrieved 2009-11-04. 
11. ^ ^{a b} Freeman, Jo. "How 'Sex' Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy," Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, Vol. 9, No. 2, March 1991, pp. 163-184. online version
12. ^ Ted Gittinger and Allen Fisher, LBJ Champions the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Part 2, Prologue Magazine, The National Archives, Summer 2004, Vol. 36, No. 2 ("Certainly Smith hoped that such a divisive issue would torpedo the civil rights bill, if not in the House, then in the Senate.")
13. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h i j} Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New York: Basic Books. pp. 245-246, 249. ISBN 0465041957. 
14. ^ Dierenfield , Bruce J. "Conservative Outrage: the Defeat in 1966 of Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia." Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 1981 89 (2): p 194
15. ^ ^{a b} Gold, Michael Evan. A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth. Faculty Publications — Collective Bargaining, Labor Law, and Labor History. Cornell, 1981 [1]
16. ^ (477 U.S. 57, 63-64)
17. ^ ^{a b c d} Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New York: Basic Books. pp. 251-252. ISBN 0465041957. 
18. ^ Nick Kotz, Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws that Changed America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 61.
19. ^ Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire, (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1998), 187.
20. ^ Richard Johnston and Byron Shafer, The End of Southern Exceptionalism, (Harvard, 2006).
21. ^ Voting Rights ~ Civil Rights Movement Veterans
22. ^ ^{a b} Civil Rights Act of 1964 - CRA - Title VII - Equal Employment Opportunities - 42 US Code Chapter 21 | finduslaw
23. ^ Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Company, 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986).
24. ^ Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
25. ^ Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New York: Basic Books. p. 270. ISBN 0465041957. 

Further reading

• Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-65 (1999)
• Brauer, Carl M., "Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sexual Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act", 49 Journal of Southern History, February 1983
• Burstein, Paul, Discrimination, Jobs and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal, University of Chicago Press, 1985.
• Colburn, David. Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, Columbia University Press, 1985.
• Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1975 (1998)
• Finley, Keith M. Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil Rights, 1938-1965 (Baton Rouge, LSU Press, 2008).
• Freeman, Jo. "How 'Sex' Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy" Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, Vol. 9, No. 2, March 1991, pp. 163–184. online version
• Graham, Hugh, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972, Oxford U P, 1990.
• Harrison, Cynthia, On Account of Sex: The Politics of Women's Issues 1945-1968, U. California Press, 1988.
• Loevy, Robert D. To End All Segregation: The Politics of the Passage Of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1990)
• Loevy, Robert D. ed; The Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Passage of the Law That Ended Racial Segregation State University of New York Press. (1997)
• Loevy, Robert D. "A Brief History of the Civil Rights Act OF 1964," in David C. Kozak and Kenneth N. Ciboski, ed., The American Presidency (Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall, 1985), pp. 411–419. online version
• Rodriguez, Daniel B. and Barry R. Weingast; "The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation" ';University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151. (2003)
• Warren, Dan, If It Takes All Summer, University of Alabama Press, 2008.
• Whalen, Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press. (1985).
• Woods, Randall. LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (2006) ch 22.

External links

• Civil Rights bill.
• Text of Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Title VII - 42 US Code Chapter 21
• MLK's famous speech, plus background including Civil Rights bill.
• 1963 March on Washington, civil rights including JFK death date.
• Presidency book excerpt, the legislative history of this bill as it became an Act.
• Background facts including enactment date.
• Directory of EEOC offices, addresses, and hours of operation.
• President Lyndon B. Johnson's Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill
• Civil Rights Movement Veterans

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Jan 1 '10) - Vermont Same-sex marriage recognized, but not performed: California* - District of Columbia - New York Civil unions legalized: Connecticut** - New Hampshire*** - New Jersey Domestic partnerships legalized: California - Colorado - District of Columbia - Hawaii - Maine - Maryland - Nevada - Oregon - Washington - Wisconsin Same-sex marriage prohibited by statute: Delaware - Hawaii - Illinois - Indiana - Maine - Maryland - Minnesota - North Carolina - Pennsylvania - Puerto Rico - U.S. (Federal Level) - Washington - West Virginia - Wyoming Same-sex marriage prohibited by constitutional amendment: Alaska - Arizona - California - Colorado - Mississippi - Missouri - Montana - Nevada - Oregon - Tennessee All or comprehensive same-sex unions prohibited by constitutional amendment: Alabama - Arkansas - Florida - Georgia - Idaho - Kansas - Kentucky - Louisiana - Michigan - Nebraska - North Dakota - Ohio - Oklahoma - South Carolina - South Dakota - Texas - Utah - Virginia - Wisconsin Recognition of same-sex unions undefined by statute or constitutional amendment: American Samoa - Guam - New Mexico - New York - Rhode Island Notes: *California only recognizes same-sex marriages that were entered into prior to November 5, 2008 **The laws authorizing civil unions in Connecticut will be repealed effective October 1, 2010. Any civil unions entered into prior to that date will automatically become marriages, by operation of law, effective October 1, 2010. ***The laws authorizing civil unions in New Hampshire will be repealed effective January 1, 2010. Any civil unions entered into prior to that date will automatically become marriages, by operation of law, effective January 1, 2011. Other Issues Gambling in the United States - Prostitution in the United States - Prostitution in Nevada - Prostitution in Rhode Island

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