Civil Rights Act of 1964

Act that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in Employee Benefit Plans regarding contributions or benefits based on race or gender.

In 1964, the United States passed one of its strongest civil rights laws in history, the Civil Rights Act. The act bans discrimination because of a person's color, race, national origin, religion, or sex; it primarily protects the rights of African Americans and other minorities. Major features of the Civil Rights Act include the freedom to vote and use hotels, restaurants, theaters, parks, and all other public places. The law also encouraged the desegregation of public schools and authorized the withdrawal of federal funds from programs practicing discrimination. Other major features included the prohibition of job discrimination and the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission.

The Civil Rights Act was an attempt to improve the quality of life for African Americans and other minority groups. Historical momentum for civil rights legislation grew in the mid-1940s due to the extensive black migration to northern cities. During this time, Congress be came active in the pursuit of civil rights, with the judicial branch of the government at its heels. Shortly afterwards, the Supreme Court joined the civil rights forces and in doing so added to the historical pressure for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the most important and influential Supreme Court decisions involving civil rights legislation was the 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, which desegregated American public schools and paved the way for the civil rights movement.

The specific source of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was President John F. Kennedy. He began gaining support for it in a televised national address by urging Americans to take action to guarantee equal treatment for all. Kennedy then proposed an act dealing with voting rights, public accommodations, desegregation of public schools, and many more items on the civil rights agendas. On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the bill that Kennedy had fought for, which created a major piece of civil rights legislation. Although the Civil Rights Act did not resolve all problems of discrimination, it did open the door to further progress by lessening racial restrictions on the use of public facilities, providing more job opportunities, strengthening voting laws, and limiting federal funding of discriminatory programs.

Bibliography

Congress Link Web Site. http://www.congresslink.org.

Western Area Power Administration Web Site. http://www.wapa.gov/CSO/eeo.eeomgr27.htm.

World Book Web Site. http://www.worldbook.com.

[Article by: NIKOLE M. POGEMAN]

Slavery, segregation, poverty, and racism have shaped the health status of African Americans throughout American history. One hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, blacks were still denied the right to vote in some states and received an inferior education in most. Barriers to public health services and hospital care contributed to excess illness and death. Historically, African Americans have used the public policy process to facilitate the social changes necessary to win the full rights of citizenship. This process peaked during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, probably the most progressive legislation in American history. The act outlawed discrimination in public accommodations, public schools, and health care facilities. It also made possible the Medicaid-Medicare legislation of 1965, which led to improved health status of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minority groups.

(SEE ALSO: African Americans; Community and Migrant Health Centers; Community Organization; Enabling Factors; Ethnicity and Health; Inequalities in Health; Landmark Public Health Laws and Court Decisions; Politics of Public Health; Public Health and the Law)

Bibliography

Saraf, J. (1997). "Civil Rights Movement." In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

— STEPHEN B. THOMAS

The broad underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eliminate the pervasive discrimination against racial minorities that had long existed in American society. The two most important provisions of the act are Title II and Title VII, which provide federal administrative and judicial remedies against racial and other group‐based kinds of discrimination in public accommodations and in employment, respectively. The Supreme Court has interpreted the act with reference to its broad underlying purpose and has resolved the major substantive and remedial questions under the act in such a way as to maximize the protection afforded to racial minorities.

The Court has ensured that racial minorities will have full access to all public facilities by broadly defining a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of Title II to include facilities such as a “family restaurant” (Katzenbach v. McClung, 1964), a recreational area (Daniel v. Paul, 1969), and a community swimming pool (Tillman v. Wheaton‐Haven Recreation Association, 1973). As a result of this expansive interpretation, no person, because of race, can be excluded from any facility that is open to the public as a whole.

The Court likewise has interpreted Title VII with a view toward improving significantly the employment opportunities for racial minorities at all levels and in the workplaces of all employers. Most importantly, the Court has held that Title VII reaches not only intentional employment discrimination, but also employment practices that have a discriminatory effect on racial minorities and other protected groups (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 1971). The focus on racially discriminatory effect, or to use the legal phrase, “racially disparate impact,” has resulted in the invalidation of many tests and other employment requirements that are not job‐related and that would deny employment opportunities to racial minorities (see Discriminatory Intent).

The Court has also upheld the use of judicially imposed affirmative hiring and promotional remedies to overcome the present consequences of an employer's past racial discrimination (Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1986). However, since section 703(h) of the act protects “bona fide security systems” from court interference, these remedies do not include out‐of‐line seniority layoffs in order to maintain court‐ordered minority hiring gains (Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 1984). Affirmative hiring and promotional remedies have been imposed in a large number of class actions against major employers and have had the effect of providing minorities with a fair share of the jobs in the workforces of these employers.

At the same time, the Court has held that Title VII does not prevent an employer from undertaking “voluntary, race‐conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” in the employer's workforce (United Steelworkers v. Weber, 1979). The employer may adopt hiring, training, and promotional programs that give a limited preference to racial minorities in order to open up employment opportunities in the occupations that traditionally had been closed to them (see Affirmative Action).

In more recent years, there have been fewer class action cases and more cases brought by employees asserting claims of individual discrimination. Following a series of decisions in the late 1980s that generally favored the interests of employers in resisting discrimination claims, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which blunted the full effect of those decisions and clarified and expanded the protection provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see Civil Rights Act of 1991). The Court's application of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has generally resulted in more favorable decisions for employees asserting discrimination claims. For example, the Court has held that in a “mixed motive” case, in which the employee presents circumstantial evidence showing that discrimination was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, the employer will be liable unless it can show that it would have taken the same action without regard to the discriminatory motivating factor (Desert Practice, Inc. v. Costa, 2003).

The Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII, when viewed in perspective, has provided racial minorities and other protected groups with a very significant legal weapon in their quest for equal employment opportunity and has gone a long way to providing them with a fair share of the jobs in the American economic system. Title VII also provides the means by which individual employees can challenge impermissible discrimination in the workplace. The Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a whole has moved the United States a long way in the direction of eliminating the pervasive discrimination that for so long had been a prominent feature of American life.

.

See also Employment Discrimination; Race and Racism

Bibliography

• Harold S. Lewis, Jr.and Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination Law (2001)

— Robert A. Sedler

For more information on Civil Rights Act of 1964, visit Britannica.com.

Congressional concern for civil rights diminished with the end of Reconstruction and the Supreme Court's 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases holding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. In 1957, Congress, under pressure from the civil rights movement, finally returned to the issue. However, the congressional response was a modest statute creating the Civil Rights Commission with power to investigate civil rights violations but not to enforce civil rights laws and establishing a feeble remedy for voting rights violations. The Civil Rights Act of 1960 slightly strengthened the voting rights provision.

During his campaign for the presidency in 1960, John F. Kennedy drew support from African Americans by promising to support civil rights initiatives. Once elected, Kennedy was reluctant to expend his political resources on civil rights programs he considered less important than other initiatives. Increasing civil rights activism, including sit-ins at food counters that refused service to African Americans, led Kennedy to propose a new civil rights act in May 1963. Kennedy lacked real enthusiasm for the proposal, which he saw as a necessary concession to the important constituency of African Americans in the Democratic Party. The bill languished in the House of Representatives until after Kennedy's assassination, when President Lyndon B. Johnson adopted the civil rights proposal as his own, calling it a memorial to Kennedy. Johnson had sponsored the 1957 act as part of his campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1960. Although Johnson was sincerely committed to civil rights, he had not allayed suspicion among liberal Democrats that he lacked such a commitment, and his support for the civil rights bill helped him with that constituency as well.

Johnson demonstrated the depth of his commitment through extensive efforts to secure the act's passage. The act passed the House in February 1964 with overwhelming bipartisan support, but southern senators opposed to the bill mounted the longest filibuster on record to that date. Senate rules required a two-thirds vote to end a filibuster, which meant Johnson had to get the support of a majority of Republicans. He negotiated extensively with Senator Everett Dirksen, the Senate's Republican leader, appealing to Dirksen's patriotism and sense of fairness. Dirksen extracted some small compromises, and with Republican support for Johnson, the filibuster ended. Within two weeks, the statute passed by a vote of 73–27.

The 1964 act had eleven main provisions or titles. Several strengthened the Civil Rights Commission and the voting rights provisions of the 1957 and 1960 acts, including a provision authorizing the U.S. attorney general to sue states that violated voting rights. But the act's other provisions were far more important. They dealt with discrimination in public accommodations and employment and with discrimination by agencies, both public and private, that received federal funds.

Title II

Title II banned racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, which were defined broadly to include almost all of the nation's restaurants, hotels, and theaters. These provisions were directed at the practices the sit-ins had protested, and to that extent they were the center of the act. The Civil Rights Cases (1883) held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the power to ban discrimination by private entities. By 1964, many scholars questioned that holding and urged Congress to rely on its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to justify the Civil Rights Act. Concerned about the constitutional question, the administration and Congress re-lied instead on the congressional power to regulate inter-state commerce. The hearings leading up to the statute's enactment included extensive testimony about the extent to which discrimination in hotels and restaurants deterred African Americans from traveling across the country. The Supreme Court, in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), had no difficulty upholding the public accommodations provisions against constitutional challenge, relying on expansive notions of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce that had become settled law since the New Deal. Although compliance with Title II was not universal, it was quite widespread, as operators of hotels and restaurants quickly understood that they would not lose money by complying with the law.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act banned discrimination in employment. Representative Howard Smith, a conservative Democrat from Virginia, proposed an amendment that expanded the groups protected against discrimination to include women. A similar proposal had been rattling around Congress for many years. The idea was opposed by many labor unions and some advocates of women's rights, who were concerned that banning discrimination based on sex imperiled laws that they believed protected women against undesirable work situations. Representative Smith, who before 1964 supported banning discrimination based on sex, hoped the amendment would introduce divisions among the act's proponents. His strategy failed, and the final act included a ban on discrimination based on sex.

Lawsuits invoking Title VII were soon filed in large numbers. The Supreme Court's initial interpretations of the act were expansive. The Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), held that employers engaged in prohibited discrimination not simply when they deliberately refused to hire African Americans but also when they adopted employment requirements that had a "disparate impact," that is, requirements that were easier for whites to satisfy. The Court's decision made it substantially easier for plaintiffs to show that Title VII had been violated because showing that a practice has a disparate impact is much easier than showing that an employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. The Court also allowed cases to proceed when a plaintiff showed no more than that he or she was qualified for the job and that the position remained open after the plaintiff was denied it, such as in McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973). In United Steel-workers of America v. Weber (1971), the Court rejected the argument that affirmative action programs adopted voluntarily by employers amounted to racial discrimination.

Later Supreme Court decisions were more restrictive. After the Court held that discrimination based on pregnancy was not discrimination based on sex in General Electric Company v. Gilbert (1976), Congress amended the statute to clarify that such discrimination was unlawful. Another amendment expanded the definition of discrimination based on religion to include a requirement that employers accommodate the religious needs of their employees. The Court further restricted Title VII in several decisions in 1989, the most important of which, Ward's Cove Packing Company, Inc., v. Atonio (1989), allowed employers to escape liability for employment practices with a disparate impact unless the plaintiffs could show that the practices did not serve "legitimate employment goals." These decisions again provoked a response in Congress. President George H. W. Bush vetoed the first bill that emerged from Congress, calling it a "quota bill." In Bush's view it gave employers incentives to adopt quotas to avoid being sued. Congressional supporters persisted, and eventually Bush, concerned about the impact of his opposition on his reelection campaign, signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which included ambiguous language that seemingly repudiated the Ward's Cove decision.

Title VI

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination by organizations that receive federal funds. The impact of this provision was immediate and important. Most school districts in the Deep South and many elsewhere in the South had resisted efforts to desegregate in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954). Attempts to enforce the Court's desegregation rulings required detailed and expensive litigation in each district, and little actual desegregation occurred in the Deep South before 1964. Title VI made a significant difference when coupled with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the nation's first major program of federal aid to local education programs. Proposals for federal aid to education had been obstructed previously when civil rights advocates, led by Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr., insisted that anyone who received federal funds would be barred from discriminating. These "Powell amendments" prompted southern representatives to vote against federal aid to education. The political forces that led to the adoption of Title VI also meant that southern opposition to federal aid to education could be overcome. The money available to southern school districts through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 broke the logjam over desegregation, and the number of school districts in which whites and African Americans attended the same schools rapidly increased.

Federal agencies' interpretations of Title VI paralleled the Court's interpretation of Title VII. Agencies adopted rules that treated as discrimination practices with a disparate impact. In Alexander v. Choate (1985), the Supreme Court held that Title VI prohibited only acts that were intentionally discriminatory, not practices with a disparate impact. The Court regularly expressed skepticism about the agency rules, although it did not invalidate them. Instead, in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001), the Court held that private parties could not sue to enforce the agencies' disparate-impact regulations. That decision substantially limited the reach of Title VI because the agencies themselves lack the resources to enforce their regulations to a significant extent.

Efforts by courts and presidents to limit the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been rebuffed regularly. Supplemented by amendments, the act is among the civil rights movement's most enduring legacies.

Bibliography

Graham, Hugh Davis. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Stern, Mark. Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992.

Whalen, Charles, and Barbara Whalen. The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1985.

—Mark V. Tushnet

Federal act passed to amend statutes passed after the Civil War to provide stronger protection for rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Act affected voting rights, 42 U.S.C. §§1971 et seq., the Civil Rights commission, 42 U.S.C. §§1975 et seq., and discrimination in public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§2000a et seq. The Act was passed during the Johnson presidency as part of his program to improve the status of minorities.

After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his determination to pass a strong civil rights act that would end racial discrimination in employment, education, and other spheres of life. Deputy Attorney General Nicholas D. Katzenbach, Johnson's congressional liaison, worked with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D.-Minn.) and Senate minority leader Everett M. Dirksen (R.-Ill.) to achieve a compromise that would assure final passage. The result was the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title I of the act guarantees equal voting rights by removing registration requirements and procedures biased against minorities and the underprivileged. Title II prohibits segregation or discrimination in places of public accommodation involved in interstate commerce. Title VII bans discrimination by trade unions, schools, and employers involved in interstate commerce or doing business with the federal government. This section also applies to discrimination on the basis of sex and established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce these provisions. The act also calls for the desegregation of public schools (title IV), broadens the duties of the Civil Rights Commission (title V), and assures nondiscrimination in the distribution of funds under federally assisted programs (title VI).

Initially, the most controversial provision was title II. Because the 1883 Civil Rights cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot reach private discrimination in public accommodations, Congress based title II on the Constitution's Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld title II as a constitutional application of the Commerce Clause.

Civil Rights Act of 1964

For Legislative History of Act, see p. 2355

PUBLIC LAW 88-352; 78 STAT. 241

[H. R. 7152]

An Act to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964".

TITLE I—VOTING RIGHTS

Sec. 101. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), as amended by section 1313 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stats. 637), and as further amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stats. 90), ¹ is further amended as follows:

(a) Insert "1" after "(a)" in subsection (a) and add at the end of subsection (a) the following new paragraphs:

"(2) No person acting under color of law shall—

"(A) in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any Federal election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote;

"(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election; or

"(C) employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any Federal election unless (i) such test is administered to each individual and is conducted wholly in writing, and (ii) a certified copy of the test and of the answers given by the individual is furnished to him within twenty-five days of the submission of his request made within the period of time during which records and papers are required to be retained and preserved pursuant to title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974-74e; 74 Stat. 88): Provided, however, That the Attorney General may enter into agreements with appropriate State or local authorities that preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests in accordance with the provisions of applicable State or local law, including such special provisions as are necessary in the preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests for persons who are blind or otherwise physically handicapped, meet the purposes of this subparagraph and constitute compliance therewith.

"(3) For purposes of this subsection—

"(A) the term ‘vote’ shall have the same meaning as in subsection (e) of this section;

"(B) the phrase ‘literacy test’ includes any test of the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter."

(b) Insert immediately following the period at the end of the first sentence of subsection (c) the following new sentence: "If in any such proceeding literacy is a relevant fact there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any person who has not been adjudged an incompetent and who has completed the sixth grade in a public school in, or in a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico where instruction is carried on predominantly in the English language, possesses sufficient literacy, comprehension, and intelligence to vote in any Federal election."

(c) Add the following subsection "(f)" and designate the present subsection "(f)" as subsection "(g)": "(f) When used in subsection (a) or (c) of this section, the words ‘Federal election’ shall mean any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing or selecting any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives."

(d) Add the following subsection "(h)": "(h) In any proceeding instituted by the United States in any district court of the United States under this section in which the Attorney General requests a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination pursuant to subsection (e) of this section the Attorney General, at the time he files the complaint, or any defendant in the proceeding, within twenty days after service upon him of the complaint, may file with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the entire case. A copy of the request for a three-judge court shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of the copy of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court. "In any proceeding brought under subsection (c) of this section to enforce subsection (b) of this section, or in the event neither the Attorney General nor any defendant files a request for a three-judge court in any proceeding authorized by this subsection, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or, in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the case." "It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."

TITLE II—INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

Sec. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.

(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b); (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b), it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, "commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points in the same State but through any other State or the District of Columbia or a foreign country.

(d) Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported by State action within the meaning of this title if such discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political subdivision thereof.

(e) The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsections (b).

Sec. 202. All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.

Sec. 203. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.

Sec. 204. (a) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 203, a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved and, upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in such civil action if he certifies that the case is of general public importance. Upon application by the complaint and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.

(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.

(c) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting such act or practice and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no civil action may be brought under subsection (a) before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged act or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local authority by registered mail or in person, provided that the court may stay proceedings in such civil action pending the termination of State or local enforcement proceedings.

(d) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has no State or local law prohibiting such act or practice, a civil action may be brought under subsection (a): Provided, That the court may refer the matter to the Community Relations Service established by title X of this Act for as long as the court believes there is a reasonable possibility of obtaining voluntarily compliance, but for not more than sixty days: Provided further, That upon expiration of such sixty-day period, the court may extend such period for an additional period, not to exceed a cumulative total of one hundred and twenty days, if it believes there then exists a reasonable possibility of securing voluntary compliance.

Sec. 205. The Service is authorized to make a full investigation of any complaint referred to it by the court under section 204(d) and may hold such hearings with respect thereto as may be necessary. The Service shall conduct any hearings with respect to any such complaint in executive session, and shall not release any testimony given therein except by agreement of all parties involved in the complaint with the permission of the court, and the Service shall endeavor to bring about a voluntary settlement between the parties.

Sec. 206 (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described.

(b) In any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of the copy of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court.

In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the case.

It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.

Sec. 207. (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this title and shall exercise the same without regard to whether the aggrieved party shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.

(b) The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title, but nothing in this title shall prelude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.

TITLE III—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

Sec. 301. (a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing signed by an individual to the effect that he is being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof, other than a public school or public college as defined in section 401 of title IV hereof, and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially further the orderly progress of desegregation in public facilities, the Attorney General is authorized to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section . The Attorney General may implead as defendants such additional parties as are or become necessary to the grant of effective relief hereunder.

(b) The Attorney General may deem a person or persons unable to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section when such person or persons are unable, either directly or through other interested persons or organizations, to bear the expense of the litigation or to obtain effective legal representation; or whenever he is satisfied that the institution of such litigation would jeopardize the personal safety, employment, or economic standing of such person or persons, their families, or their property.

Sec. 302. In any action or proceeding under this title the United States shall be liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, the same as a private person.

Sec. 303. Nothing in this title shall affect adversely the right of any person to sue for or obtain relief in any court against discrimination in any facility covered by this title.

Sec. 304. A complaint as used in this title is a writing or document within the meaning of section 1001, title 18, United States Code.

TITLE IV—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

DEFINITIONS

Sec. 401. As used in this title—

(a) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Education.

(b) "Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but "desegregation" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.

(c) "Public school" means any elementary or secondary educational institution, and "public college" means any institution of higher education or any technical or vocational school above the secondary school level, provided that such public school or public college is operated by a State, subdivision of a State, or governmental agency within a State, or operated wholly or predominantly from or through the use of governmental funds or property, or funds or property derived from a governmental source.

(d) "School board" means any agency or agencies which administer a system of one or more public schools and any other agency which is responsible for the assignment of students to or within such system.

SURVEY AND REPORT OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Sec. 402. The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President and the Congress, with two years of the enactment of this title, concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Sec. 403. The Commissioner is authorized, upon the application of any school board, State, municipality, school district, or other governmental unit legally responsible for operating a public school or schools, to render technical assistance to such applicant in the preparation, adoption, and implementation of plans for the desegregation of public schools. Such technical assistance may, among other activities, include making available to such agencies information regarding effective methods of coping with special educational problems occasioned by desegregation, and making available to such agencies personnel of the Office of Education or other persons specially equipped to advise and assist them in coping with such problems.