Closed Shop refers to a union security clause in labor-management contracts that stipulates that all persons who are to be employed must be members of a specified union as a precondition for such employment.
The closed shop was a dominant feature of early unionism in the United States, a natural outgrowth of the guild features of craft organization of work. The focus of the guild was on the maintenance of the quality of output through strict enforcement of Apprenticeship standards. Many early unions stipulated that employers could hire only fully certified journeymen and would be subject to penalty if they failed to do so. Craft members, moreover, were subject to fines if caught working with persons not members of the union. The strong fraternal character of early unions helped buttress such arrangements, which seemed justified (at least to members) by the attention they gave to sustaining the quality of work by preserving the integrity of craft skills. Such arrangements also boosted wages by restricting the size of the pool of available workers. Although seldom made contractually explicit, closed shop arrangements were pervasive throughout the early twentieth century and were a source of considerable controversy and conflict.
In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act legislated a major intrusion of public policy into collective bargaining in an effort to reduce the widespread industrial conflict. Major provisions, which the newly created National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was to implement, were aimed at reducing strikes over union recognition. Appropriate bargaining units were to be defined by the board; a secret-ballot vote was then to be taken under board supervision in the matter of union representation. A union gaining more than half of that vote was to be certified by the board as the exclusive bargaining agent for that unit. The employer was then obligated to bargain in good faith with that union, and the union was obligated to equally represent all persons in the bargaining unit, whether members or not.
There were obvious advantages to the union movement in shifting the locus of decision making about union recognition from the economic to the political arena. In securing the right to exclusive representation for at least a year following certification, the union had the opportunity to extend its influence over the bargaining unit. One logical extension of such recognition was to strengthen the union's membership base and its revenue flow. Rather than overtly pursuing an exclusionary policy involving a closed shop with a union that limited membership, most unions preferred to adopt an inclusionary posture. They negotiated union security clauses to expand rather than to restrict membership. The ultimate result was a growth in closed shop arrangements.
However, the closed shop arrangement could be used against the worker as well as against the employer. Expulsion from the union meant loss of job rights, and there were several reasons why a union might expel a member. A worker might be expelled for refusing to adhere to the production ceilings established for piece-rate operations. The union might undertake selective retaliation against dissidents within the union political structure. Or, retaliation might follow a member's support of another union vying for representation rights in the shop. In brief, with a closed shop, the union was no longer a private fraternal organization. It controlled the job. It was a dispenser of bread.
Initial assaults against union exclusionary policies took the form of conspiracy charges—that the monopolistic privileges accruing to union members increased product prices, reduced production, curtailed employment, and diminished wages in nonunion industries because of the additional flow of labor squeezed out of "protected" sectors. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the National Labor Relations Act were designed to remedy these ills by banning the closed shop. The public policy behind Taft-Hartley, as well as the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, was to restrict traditional union control over the point of ingress into the labor market. Obeisance to the union movement was not to be a requisite for favored treatment in pay or promotions within the plant. The economic status of the worker was to reflect the bilateral influences of both employer and union, not the unilateral discretion of the union. Nonmembers and members were to be treated as persons with undifferentiated status in the distribution of collective-bargaining gains. Controversy diminished during the late twentieth century as unions adhered to a new doctrine: employers have the "freedom" to hire nonunion employees, just as workers have the freedom to refuse to work with nonunion employees.
Also affected by public policy and union stance were alternative forms of union security, to be sharply distinguished from the closed shop. A favored union clause, now illegal, is one in which the employer openly identifies his partiality to a union and encourages membership in that organization. An agency shop allows the union to collect agency fees or service fees from workers, while not requiring the formality of membership. These fees cover union expenses associated with collective bargaining, and are justified by the union's obligation to bargain for all employees in the bargaining unit regardless of union affiliation. A 1980 amendment to the National Labor Relations Act provides that workers with religious objections cannot be fired for failing to pay service fees to a union.
Another form of union security is the union-shop agreement. Union-shop agreements formerly specified that workers in a union were to maintain membership affiliation as a condition of employment, with escape periods typically provided during the term of the contract. The National Labor Relations Act still permits contract provisions that require employees to join the union within thirty days of hire. However, in 1985 the Supreme Court held that contracts may not limit a worker's ability to resign from the union. Union-shop agreements can no longer require maintenance of union membership. In addition, several states have also enacted Right-To-Work Laws that prohibit union-shop agreements altogether.
In short, changes in labor law and its judicial interpretation over the course of the twentieth century have undermined the ability of unions to bargain for contract provisions that enhance their security and their ability to discipline members.
Bibliography
Commons, John R., et al. History of Labour in the United States. 4 vols. See especially Volume 1, Part 6. New York: Macmillan, 1946. The original edition was published in 1918.
Hanson, Charles Goring, Sheila Jackson, and Douglas Miller. The Closed Shop: A Comparative Study in Public Policy and Trade Union Security in Britain, the USA, and West Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
Harris, Howell John. Bloodless Victories: The Rise and Fall of the Open Shop in the Philadelphia Metal Trades, 1890–1940. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Rustin, Bayard. "Right to Work" Laws; A Trap for America's Minorities. New York: A. Phillip Randolph Institute, 1967.
Schiller, Reuel E. "From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength." Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 20, no. 1 (1999): 1.
Sultan, Paul E. Right-to-Work Laws: Study in Conflict. Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1958.
—Paul E. Sultan/C. P.