In the Constitution, Article III confines the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies. This limitation has spawned a body of case law on jurisdiction over moot or premature cases (see Mootness), political questions, and problems of the plaintiff's standing. Included in this family of jurisdictional problems are collusive or feigned cases—litigation brought by “friendly” parties having no antagonistic interest who seek to secure an opinion on the constitutionality of a statute by concocting a test case.
Beginning in 1850, the Supreme Court has sternly discountenanced such cases, stating in Lord v. Veazie that a collusive suit “was in contempt of the court, and highly reprehensible” (p. 255; see Contempt Power of the Courts). The constitutional requirement mandates “a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals” (Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman, 1892, p. 345). Despite this constraint, some of the Court's leading constitutional decisions began as collusive suits, including Hylton v. United States (1796), Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Income Tax Cases (1895, see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936). The disastrous consequences of some of these decisions demonstrate the wisdom of the ban on collusive suits.
Federal courts vigilantly review the status of parties in suits before them to prevent fraud, to ensure fairness to other parties and the legislatures that enacted challenged legislation, and to prevent the manufacture of diversity jurisdiction for purposes of getting into a federal court.
See also Judicial Power and Jurisdiction.
— James B. Stoneking
