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| Commitment Fee, Commitment Letter |
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| Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of The Treadway Commission, Committeeonaccountingprocedure, Commodities Futures |
noun
Definition: assurance, obligation
Antonyms: broken promise, denial, disavowal, negation, refusal
In some philosophies of mind a commitment may be thought of as functioning slightly differently from a belief. One may be committed to a proposition in the sense of relying on it, or using it to structure explanation and prediction, but entirely in an instrumentalist spirit, and therefore without supposing it to be true. See constructive empiricism. Moral and aesthetic opinions may also be called commitments, and opposed to beliefs by being thought of as expressions of attitude. See emotivism, projectivism.
An important psychological attribute, characterized by dedication to completing a particular task in preference to doing other things. Commitment is one of the most important factors affecting an athlete's success. Athletes who want to achieve their full potential need high levels of commitment.
Proceedings directing the confinement of a mentally ill or incompetent person for treatment.
Pursuant to statute and case law, due process protections are afforded to persons involuntarily committed, including periodic judicial review. Commitment has long involved difficult issues of balancing the civil liberties of the person who is subject to commitment against other competing interests, including the rights of society to be protected from individuals who may prove dangerous as a result of their mental illness or incompetence, and the community's interest in ensuring that these individuals receive proper treatment.
Each state has its own detailed statutory scheme providing for the involuntary commitment of individuals who may be mentally ill or incompetent. These statutes usually contain language defining the types of mental illnesses and conditions covered by the law, as well as certain conditions that are excluded from coverage — generally mental retardation, epilepsy, developmental disabilities, and drug or alcohol addiction. In addition, most state commitment statutes set forth specific criteria or standards that link these conditions to justifications for involuntary commitment.
Most jurisdictions have at least one criterion that is based on a person's dangerousness to himself or herself, or others. Some states require that other criteria closely related to dangerousness be met, such as the presence of a grave disability or an inability to provide for one's basic human needs, or that some medical or psychological treatment is essential to the person's welfare. Since the 1980s and 1990s, some states have moved significantly away from a strict dangerousness standard for involuntary commitment. In Arizona, for example, a person who is "persistently or acutely disabled" because of mental illness may be subject to commitment (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540 (A) [1995]), and in Delaware, an individual who cannot make "responsible decisions" about inpatient care and treatment may be committed (Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5001 [1995]). An even broader standard has been enacted in Iowa, where the law provides that a person may be committed if he or she is likely to inflict serious emotional injury on family or others who "lack reasonable opportunity" to avoid contact with that person (Iowa Code Ann. § 229.1 [West 1995]).
In most jurisdictions, in addition to a showing of dangerousness, commitment requires a showing that inpatient hospitalization is the least restrictive treatment alternative for the person. This requirement is based on the principle, established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that even though a government purpose may be legitimate and substantial, the purpose "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved" (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 [1960]). As a result, most states, through either statutes or case law, recognize a patient's right to be treated in the least restrictive setting.
Despite the difficult legal issues relating to the restriction of liberty that results from involuntary treatment, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of civil commitment on relatively few occasions. In 1975, in perhaps its most significant decision on the issue, the Court held that a state "cannot constitutionally confine … a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends" (O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396). The Court further stated that a "mere finding" of mental illness "cannot justify a state's locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement." Although the Court appeared to establish the right of a nondangerous individual not to be involuntarily committed, it left unresolved the issue of whether a mentally ill person has a constitutional right to treatment.
In a later decision, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990), the Court further addressed dangerousness as a justification for civil commitment. The Court stated that involuntary commitment procedures "guard against the confinement of a person who, though mentally ill, is harmless and can live safely outside an institution." Confinement of such a person would be unconstitutional, the Court held.
The involuntary commitment of individuals who have been previously convicted of a crime has presented an entirely new set of constitutional considerations. The most significant issue has concerned whether a prisoner, following completion of her or his sentence, can be committed to a psychiatric facility without receiving the same due process protections afforded to other individuals subjected to civil commitment.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983). In Jones, the defendant was acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity, but was confined to a psychiatric hospital for longer than his sentence would have been had he been convicted. Michael Jones challenged the constitutionality of his commitment. A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment. The Court reasoned that punishment of an insanity acquittee is inappropriate, and thus the length of the criminal sentence that would have been imposed had the patient been found sane was not relevant. Instead, the Court held, the duration of the commitment should depend on the patient's recovery. Thus, if the patient's condition warrants further treatment, the commitment could continue, regardless of the length of the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed.
The commitment of individuals convicted of sex-related crimes has sparked even more intense debate. Courts in many states have had to address difficult questions involving so-called sexual predators: Should these individuals be allowed to reenter society after their prison term? Can a state detain them indefinitely without violating their constitutional rights?
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed these difficult issues in the case of Dennis Linehan, a convicted murderer and repeat sex offender. In 1963, Linehan confessed to the abduction, attempted rape, and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl. While serving a forty-year sentence for the crime, he escaped from prison in 1975 and attempted to rape a twelve-year-old girl. He was later apprehended and ultimately served a total of twenty-seven years in prison for both crimes, becoming eligible for parole in 1992. Following a hearing in 1992, he was committed as a psychopathic personality under a law that permitted the commitment of individuals who, by their habitual course of sexual conduct, displayed "an utter lack of power" to control their sexual impulses (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02 [West 1995]).
In 1994, Linehan appealed his commitment, even though the constitutionality of the psychopathic personality law had recently been upheld. He alleged that the state had failed to meet its burden, as required by the law, of establishing with clear and convincing evidence that he possessed an "utter lack of power" to stop his criminal misconduct. The case eventually reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, which overturned his commitment (In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 [1994]). The court ruled that the state had indeed failed to prove that Linehan could not control his sexual impulses. The court further stated that a citizen could not be deprived of freedom based simply on the possibility of future crimes and that treatment, not imprisonment, should constitute the sole purpose of commitment.
The decision, though praised by civil libertarians, was met with immediate and widespread criticism by the general public. In response to the outcry, the Minnesota Legislature quickly passed legislation allowing for the commitment of "sexually dangerous persons" if they display a sexual, mental, or personality disorder or dysfunction and if they appear likely to commit future acts of harmful sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02 subd. 18 (1995). Linehan was confined indefinitely under the new law.
Other states have likewise modified their laws governing the release of psychopathic personalities and sexually dangerous persons, with constitutional challenges in the state and federal courts certain to follow.
See: guilty; patients' rights.
Unless commitment is made, there are only promises and hopes . . . but no plans.
— Peter S. Drucker.
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Quotes:
"When you make a commitment to a relationship, you invest your attention and energy in it more profoundly because you now experience ownership of that relationship."
- Barbara De Angelis
"Competing in sports has taught me that if I'm not willing to give 120 percent, somebody else will."
- Ron Blomberg
"You need to make a commitment, and once you make it, then life will give you some answers."
- Les Brown
"A person with half volition goes backwards and forwards, but makes no progress on even the smoothest of roads."
- Thomas Carlyle
"What one has, one ought to use: and whatever he does he should do with all his might."
- Marcus T. Cicero
"It is only when you despair of all ordinary means, it is only when you convince it that it must help you or you perish, that the seed of life in you bestirs itself to provide a new resource."
- Robert Collier
See more famous quotes about Commitment

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Commitment may refer to:
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Dansk (Danish)
n. - overgivelse, forpligtelse, engagement, bindende tilsagn
Nederlands (Dutch)
verplichting, toewijding, betrokkenheid, het opsluiten/-nemen, verwijzing (naar commissie)
Français (French)
n. - engagement, attachement, (Jur) incarcération
Deutsch (German)
n. - Verpflichtung, Engagement
Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - αναληφθείσα υποχρέωση, δέσμευση, χρέος, καθήκον
Italiano (Italian)
impegno, obbligazione, obbligo, vincolo
Português (Portuguese)
n. - compromisso (m), prisão (f) de criminoso
Русский (Russian)
обязательство, преданность
Español (Spanish)
n. - compromiso, entrega, devoción, obligación
Svenska (Swedish)
n. - åtagande, engagemang (pol.), överlämnande, häktningsorder, tvångsintagning, förövande, remittering
中文(简体)(Chinese (Simplified))
托付, 交托, 下狱, 委任, 收监
中文(繁體)(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 託付, 交托, 下獄, 委任, 收監
日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 委員会付託, 委任, 投獄, 拘留, 拘留令状, 売買約定, 言質, 掛かり合い, 遂行, 収容, 公約
العربيه (Arabic)
(الاسم) التزام, تعهد
עברית (Hebrew)
n. - התחייבות, העברה, ביצוע, מחוייבות, נאמנות