[Translation of Latin sēnsus commūnis, common feelings of humanity.]
noun
Definition: good reasoning
Antonyms: foolishness, impracticality, insanity, unreasonableness
In early modern writing (e.g. Descartes) the faculty responsible for coordinating the deliveries of the different senses. In this meaning the objects of common sense are the ‘common sensibles’, i.e. qualities such as extension and motion that can be detected by more than one sense. Later the term loses any special meaning, coming to refer just to the sturdy good judgement, uncontaminated by too much theory and unmoved by scepticism, that is supposed to belong to persons before they become too philosophical. Ryle once suggested that Locke invented common sense, and Russell added that none but Englishmen have had it ever since. The term became prominent in philosophy after Moore argued in ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ that no philosophical argument purporting to establish scepticism could be more certain than his common-sense convictions. Moore's knowledge that he had a hand was more certain than any philosophical premises or trains of argument purporting to show that he did not know this. See also common sense school.
"Common Sense," influential revolutionary pamphlet by Thomas Paine, published in Philadelphia, January 1776. Paine stressed the logic of America's independence, emphasizing the defects of Britain's monarchy and the economic costs of participating in Britain's repeated European wars. Reconciliation with Britain, Paine wrote, would constitute "madness and folly." "Common Sense" avoided abstract philosophy, favoring instead the ordinary language of artisans and biblical examples to support Paine's arguments. The "plain truth" (Paine's original title for the tract) he espoused found a broad readership; around 100,000 copies circulated in 1776 alone, and the pamphlet stirred politicians and ordinary citizens to embrace American independence.
Bibliography
Conway, Moncure Daniel. The Writings of Thomas Paine. 4 vols. New York: B. Franklin, 1969.
Foner, Eric. Tom Paine and Revolutionary America. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
—Sally E. Hadden
— Richard L. Gregory
Quotes:
"Common sense is the measure of the possible; it is composed of experience and prevision; it is calculation applied to life."
- Henri Frederic Amiel
"Common sense is calculation applied to life."
- Henri Frederic Amiel
"The philosophy of one century is the common sense of the next."
- Henry Ward Beecher
"Common-sense is part of the home-made ideology of those who have been deprived of fundamental learning, of those who have been kept ignorant. This ideology is compounded from different sources: items that have survived from religion, items of empirical knowledge, items of protective skepticism, items culled for comfort from the superficial learning that is supplied. But the point is that common-sense can never teach itself, can never advance beyond its own limits, for as soon as the lack of fundamental learning has been made good, all items become questionable and the whole function of common-sense is destroyed. Common-sense can only exist as a category insofar as it can be distinguished from the spirit of inquiry, from philosophy."
- John Berger
"Common sense is the knack of seeing things as they are, and doing things as they ought to be done."
- Josh Billings
"Common sense is only a modification of talent. Genius is an exaltation of it. The difference is, therefore, in degree, not nature."
- Edward G. Bulwer-Lytton
See more famous quotes about Common Sense

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This article is written like a personal reflection or essay rather than an encyclopedic description of the subject. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (March 2011) |
Common sense is defined by Merriam-Webster as, "sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of the situation or facts."[1] Thus, "common sense" (in this view) equates to the knowledge and experience which most people already have, or which the person using the term believes that they do or should have. The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as, "the basic level of practical knowledge and judgment that we all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way".[2]
Whichever definition is used, identifying particular items of knowledge as "common sense" is difficult. Philosophers may choose to avoid using the phrase when using precise language. But common sense remains a perennial topic in epistemology and many philosophers make wide use of the concept or at least refer to it. Some related concepts include intuitions, pre-theoretic belief, ordinary language, the frame problem, foundational beliefs, good sense, endoxa, axioms, wisdom, folk wisdom, folklore and public opinion.
Common-sense ideas tend to relate to events within human experience (such as good will), and thus appear commensurate with human scale. Humans lack any common-sense intuition of, for example, the behavior of the universe at subatomic distances [see Quantum mechanics], or of speeds approaching that of light [see Special relativity]. Often ideas that may be considered to be true by common sense are in fact false. Conversely, certain ideas that are subject to elaborate academic analysis oftentimes yield superior outcomes via the application of common sense.
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According to Aristotle, the common sense is an actual power of inner sensation (as opposed to the external five senses) whereby the various objects of the external senses (color for sight, sound for hearing, etc.) are united and judged,[3] such that what one senses by "common sense" is the substance (or existing thing) in which the various attributes inhere (so, for example, a sheep is able to sense a wolf, not just the color of its fur, the sound of its howl, its odor, and other sensible attributes.) It was not, unlike later developments, considered to be on the level of rationality, which properly did not exist in the lower animals, but only in man; this irrational character was because animals not possessing rationality nevertheless required the use of the common sense in order to sense, for example, the difference between this or that thing, and not merely the pleasure and pain of various disparate sensations.[4] This also contributes to the understanding held by the Scholastics that when one senses, one senses something, and not just a diversity of sensible phenomena.
Common sense, in this view, differs from later views in that it is concerned with the way one receives sensation, and not with belief, or wisdom held by many; accordingly, it is "common", not in the sense of being shared among individuals, or being a genus of the different external senses, but inasmuch as it is a principle which governs the activity of the external senses.[5]
John Locke proposed one meaning of "common sense" in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This interpretation builds on phenomenological experience. Each of the senses gives input, and then something integrates the sense-data into a single impression. This something Locke sees as the common sense — the sense of things in common between disparate impressions. It therefore allies with "fancy", and opposes "judgement", or the capacity to divide like things into separates. The French theologian Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet arguably developed this theory a decade before Locke.[6] Each of the empiricist philosophers approaches the problem of the unification of sense-data in their own way, giving various names to the operation. However, the approaches agree that a sense in the human understanding exists that sees commonality and does the combining: "common sense" has the same meaning.
Appeal to common sense characterises a general epistemological orientation called epistemological particularism (the appellation derives from Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999)). This orientation contrasts with epistemological Methodism. The particularist gathers a list of propositions that seem obvious and unassailable and then requires consistency with this set of propositions as a condition of adequacy for any abstract philosophical theory. (Particularism allows, however, rejection of an entry on the list for inconsistency with other, seemingly more secure, entries.) Epistemological Methodists[citation needed], on the other hand, begin with a theory of cognition or justification and then apply it to see which of our pre-theoretical beliefs survive. Reid and Moore represent paradigmatic particularists, while Descartes and Hume stand as paradigmatic Methodists. Methodist methodology tends toward skepticism, as the rules for acceptable or rational belief tend to be very restrictive (for instance, Descartes demanded the elimination of doubt; and Hume required the construction of acceptable belief entirely from impressions and ideas).
Particularist methodology, on the other hand, tends toward a kind of conservatism, granting perhaps an undue privilege to beliefs in which we happen to have confidence. One interesting question asks whether epistemological thought can mix the methodologies. In such a case, does it not become problematical to attempt logic, metaphysics and epistemology with the absence of original assumptions stemming from common sense? Particularism, applied to ethics and politics, may seem to simply entrench prejudice and other contingent products of social inculcation (compare cultural determinism). Can one provide a principled distinction between areas of inquiry where reliance on the dictates of common sense seems legitimate (because necessary) and areas where it seems illegitimate (as for example an obstruction to intellectual and practical progress)? A meta-philosophical discussion of common sense may then, indeed, proceed: What is common sense? Supposing that one cannot give a precise characterization of it: does that mean that appeal to common sense remains off-limits in philosophy? What utility does it have to discern whether a belief is a matter of common sense or not? And under what circumstances, if any, might one advocate a view that seems to run contrary to common sense? Should considerations of common sense play any decisive role in philosophy? Common sense in politics is the same as: ordinary, status quo, non-innovative, safe (popular) ideas. If not common sense, then could another similar concept (perhaps "intuition") play such a role? In general, does epistemology have "philosophical starting points", and if so, how can one characterize them? Supposing that no beliefs exist which we will willingly hold come what may, do there though exist some we ought to hold more stubbornly at least?
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