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American Heritage Dictionary:
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Britannica Concise Encyclopedia:
conservatism |
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conservatism |
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Oxford Dictionary of Politics:
conservatism |
In general terms, a political philosophy which aspires to the preservation of what is thought to be the best in established society, and opposes radical change. However, it is much easier to locate the historical context in which conservatism evolved than it is to specify what it is that conservatives believe. Modern European conservatism evolved in the period between 1750 and 1850 as a response to the rapid series of changes and prospects for change which convulsed European societies; these included the ideas of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, industrialization (especially in England), and the demands for an extended or universal, generally male, suffrage. The name ‘Conservative’ for the English political party which had previously been called the Tory Party became established during the debate about electoral reform which led to the Reform Act of 1832.
The nature of conservative reactions to change has varied considerably. Sometimes it has been outright opposition, based on an existing model of society that is considered right for all time. It can take a ‘reactionary’ form, harking back to, and attempting to reconstruct, forms of society which existed in an earlier period. Other forms of conservatism acknowledge no perpetually preferable form of society but are principally concerned with the nature of change, insisting that it can only be gradual in pace and evolutionary in style. Perhaps the most unifying feature of conservatism has been an opposition to certain kinds of justification for change, particularly those which are idealistic, justified by ‘abstract’ ideas, and not a development of existing practices.
It is clear that, ideologically, conservatism can take many different forms. Liberal individualists, as well as clerical monarchists, nostalgic reactionaries, and unprincipled realists, have all been called ‘conservatives’, regarded themselves as conservative, and demonstrated the typically conservative responses to projects for change. Particular conservative writers have founded their conservatism on individualism as often as on collectivism, on atheism as much as on religious belief, and on the idealistic philosophy of Hegel as well as on profound scepticism or vulgar materialism. Furthermore conservatism has been primarily a political reaction, and only secondarily a body of ideas: those who are defending their interests against projects for change often have little interest in philosophical ideas or treat them on the basis of ‘any port in a storm’.
A further complication is that many people might be properly described as conservatives who would not describe themselves as such. A principal reason for this is that the image of conservatism in much of continental Europe became tainted, during the first half of the twentieth century, first by association with a defunct clerical-monarchist outlook and later by alliance with fascist and National Socialist movements. Thus, although the word ‘conservatism’ exists in French, German, and Italian, the number of prominent intellectuals and politicians who have described themselves as ‘conservative’ since 1945 is extremely small. When a ‘Conservative’ group existed in the European Parliament between 1989 and 1992, it had only English and Danish members. In some respects, other political movements, especially Christian Democracy, have become forms of conservatism ‘that durst not speak its name’, but even Christian Democracy is quite distinct from conservatism in its origins and principles.
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France has been taken as definitive and formative of modern conservatism, with its opposition to radical reform based on abstract principles and its pleas for the virtues, often hidden, of established, evolved institutions. But Burke himself was not a conservative. Not only did his literary and political careers precede the existence of conservatism, but he was a Whig with reformist and protoliberal views on the principal issues of the day, including India, Ireland, America, and Parliament. Until the 1920s he was claimed and cited as often by Liberals as by Conservatives. There is every reason to suppose he would have opposed ‘Conservatism’ when it emerged in 1832.
Much theoretical commentary on conservatism has contributed to the inherent confusion of the subject by starting with false assumptions. Often, the commentators are not merely hostile, but contemptuous, in the tradition of J. S. Mill's comment that the Conservative Party was, ‘by the law of their existence the stupidest party’. The assumption has been that conservative ideas are essentially flawed as well as being chosen for their political utility rather than their theoretical coherence. Alternatively, a spurious theoretical unity is attributed to conservatism, so that all conservatives are thought to believe in psychological pessimism, or the organic nature of society, or the importance of national traditions. Nor have many of the taxonomies of conservatism—for example, between ‘high’ and ‘low’, ‘wet’ and ‘dry’, ‘true’ and ‘neo’, ‘old’ and ‘new’, Tory and Conservative—afforded much insight, the distinctions having been made in too many different and contradictory ways without any one version establishing itself. A further source of unclarity is the common resort to a confused notion of a political ‘spectrum’ or ‘continuum’ which suggests that to be deeply conservative is to be on the ‘extreme right’, along with (mysteriously) divine right monarchists, libertarian anarchists, and National Socialists.
Mannheim, faced with the considerable differences between Continental and English traditions of conservatism, concluded that the drive behind conservatism was a ‘universal psychic inclination’ towards traditionalism, the doctrinal form that expressed this inclination differing between contexts. But he does detect a common negative strand to all conservatism, a critical response to ‘natural law thinking’. Conservative ideas are, thus, more genuine and profound than many critics suggest, but such unity as they have is purely negative, definable only by its opposition and rejection of abstract, universal, and ideal principles and the projects which follow from them.
This analysis of conservatism, as having only a negative doctrinal unity that allows for a vast range of positive doctrines, would seem to be the least misleading picture of what conservatism is as a general political phenomenon. It generates an intellectual method that can be described as a sceptical reductionism, which demands, of grand proposals and principles, ‘Is it really a good idea, given local conditions?’ This kind of questioning is common to Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Salisbury, Michael Oakeshott, and Margaret Thatcher; it may well be all that they have in common as conservatives.
Thus conservative reformism is quite central to the conservative tradition, rather than aberrant or peripheral. The idea of radical conservatism is less easy to accept. In so far as radicalism is interpreted according to its original meaning, which suggests that radicals propose a systematic replacement of institutions and practices, from the roots up, then radical conservatism is a contradiction in terms. It is more acceptable at a less literal level as meaning a belief, in a particular context, that drastic, immediate change is required to preserve the underlying virtues of the system. For example, the belief that a severe combination of reductions in public expenditure, the privatization of services, and high unemployment was necessary to preserve the underlying vitality of the capitalist system, might fall into this category. However, an extreme belief in ‘free’ markets and a minimal state of a kind which has never existed, or existed only in the distant past, could not properly be called conservatism at all.
In the nineteenth century conservatism was preoccupied with what might reasonably be called the liberal agenda of extended rights. To different degrees in different contexts it won or lost these struggles or simply took over what had been its opponents' policies in earlier periods. Nineteenth-century conservatism appears more successful when judged as a procedural doctrine preoccupied with the nature of change, than as a substantive doctrine concerned with the value of particular social forms. In the twentieth century conservatism has been so preoccupied with the struggle against forms of socialism that many people have made the mistake of identifying conservatism purely with anti-socialism. If this perception were correct then the demise of socialism would also be the demise of conservatism. But in fact there is never any shortage of the kind of belief to which conservatism is inherently opposed. We can be assured that forms of feminism, ecologism, radical democratic theory, and human rights doctrines will, inter alia, continue to provide the kind of political projects which serve as both opposition and stimulus to conservatism.
— Lincoln Allison
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy:
conservatism |
Originally in Burke an ideology of caution in departing from the historical roots of a society, or changing its inherited traditions and institutions. In this ‘organic’ form it includes allegiance to tradition, community, hierarchies of rank, benevolent paternalism, and properly subservient underclasses. By contrast, conservatism can be taken to imply a laissez-faire ideology of untrammelled individualism that puts the emphasis on personal responsibility, free markets, law and order, and a minimal role for government, with neither community, nor tradition, nor benevolence entering more than marginally. The two strands are not easy to reconcile, either in theory or in practice.
Gale Encyclopedia of US History:
Conservatism |
A national political and intellectual movement of self-described conservatives began to congeal in the middle of the twentieth century, primarily as a reaction to the creation of the New Deal welfare state, but also in response to the alleged erosion of traditional values and the American failure to win a quick victory in the Cold War. Among the factions within this movement, traditionalists typically stressed the virtues of order, local custom, and natural law; libertarians promoted limited government, laissez-faire economics, and individual autonomy; and militant cold warriors sought primarily to combat communism. Despite these internal differences, by 1960, conservatives had formulated a coherent critique of liberalism and built a network of political activists. In 1964, they mobilized to win the Republican presidential nomination for Senator Barry Goldwater and, subsequently, remained a major political force.
Although this late twentieth-century movement stands out in its size and success, from the outset, American life was influenced by men and women who, by some plausible standard, can be considered conservatives. Modern conservative thinkers sought to legitimate their own worldviews by discovering precursors in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Liberals responded that conservatives were merely stringing together an incongruous list of heroes for a nation whose history was, in a broad sense, liberal. Conservatives themselves often acknowledged the dilemma. Disagreeing among themselves about the essential features of modern conservatism, they offer differing evaluations of plausible precursors. Thus, any account of a conservative "tradition" is inherently problematical.
Early American Conservatives
Few modern conservatives honor the Loyalists, whose commitment to order led them to oppose the American Revolution. Rather, Edmund Burke, a British Whig who supported the cause of independence but despised the French Revolution, is typically cited as the intellectual founder of American (or Anglo-American) conservatism. The Constitution wins praise from modern traditionalists for protecting private property and limiting democracy, and its foremost authors are rightly credited with skepticism about human perfectibility. In the late eighteenth century, however, a charter that established a republic and barred religious tests for office hardly looked conservative. Moreover, skeptical of the strong central government latent in the Constitution, libertarians sometimes hail the Antifederalist defense of local prerogatives and insistence on a Bill of Rights.
While a handful of libertarians look back favorably on Thomas Jefferson, most modern conservatives scorn his optimistic view of human nature and enthusiasm for the French Revolution. They find the leaders of the Federalist Party, which rose and fell in competition with the Jeffersonian Republicans, much more appealing. Certainly, the Federalists valued hierarchy, order, and religious fidelity more than equality, democracy, and tolerance. Yet the party was by no means unambiguously conservative by modern standards. Alexander Hamilton's economic program sanctioned federal intervention, not laissez-faire, to foster capitalist development. John Marshall's jurisprudence grudgingly yielded to legislative expressions of the popular will. Furthermore, the second generation of Federalist politicians tried to save the party in the 1810s by muting their public critique of democracy.
Equally problematical is the relationship between modern conservatism and the Whig Party, which rose and fell in competition with the Jacksonian Democrats. Especially in New England, the Whigs were more likely to value decorum, orthodox Christianity, and deference to authority. The party insisted that it was preserving the moderate democracy of the nation's founders against the usurpation of power by "King Andrew" Jackson. Prominent Whigs, including Daniel Webster, even called themselves conservatives. Yet the Whig record falls short of the modern libertarian or traditionalist ideal. The party not only advocated federal appropriations for "internal improvements," but also pioneered flamboyant electoral politics in the "hard cider" campaign of 1840.
The Civil War and Conservative Politics
The antebellum South produced a distinctive intellectual conservatism in which a critique of unfettered democracy, federal power, and bourgeois individualism was increasingly tied to a defense of slavery. In the writings of James Thornwell, William Trescott, and George Fitzhugh, the slave South remained within the mainstream of Christian civilization, while the free North was capitulating to "ultraism" in the form of infidelity, socialism, and women's rights. At the same time, John C. Calhoun adapted the founders' republican ideas to protect southern interests. According to Calhoun's doctrine of the "concurrent majority," the two foremost factions in the United States—the slave states and the free states—had a right to protect their basic interests. Accordingly, the Constitution should be amended to provide for two presidents, one from each section and both armed with the veto.
Defeat of the South in the Civil War facilitated the rise of what the political scientist Clinton Rossiter called "laissez-faire conservatism." The leading ideologist of this persuasion, William Graham Sumner, adapted social Darwinism to the American scene. Not only did the fittest survive to acquire great wealth, Sumner contended, but the concentration of wealth in the hands of a competent few also maximized its productive (hence, moral) use. In a democracy, the less fit majority tried to capture the state in order to redistribute or redirect wealth. But no government could administer wealth as wisely as the industrialists and entrepreneurs who created it.
Not only did the dour, secular Sumner decline to think of himself as a conservative, but he also recognized that laissez-faire conservatives fell short of his limited government ideal. The Federalist and Whig belief in social stewardship did steadily erode with the disappearance of those parties. Yet late nineteenth-century Republicans in particular advocated both protective tariffs and federal expenditures for internal improvements. In order to strike down popular legislation that impinged on property rights, laissez-faire conservatives increased the power of at least one branch of the federal government: the judiciary. Similarly, it is ironic that the hundreds of vetoes cast by conservative Democrat Grover Cleveland in order to limit regulations and expenditures actually enhanced the power of the presidency.
What is usually called the Progressive movement has been particularly perplexing to modern conservatives—and with good reason. As libertarians lament, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and others who rode the bipartisan tide of reform created the regulatory state. Traditionalists regret that they also rallied "the people" against so-called special interests. Yet progressive Republicans and Democrats were sufficiently nationalistic in their social views and restrained in economics to preclude the creation of an explicitly conservative party. Furthermore, seeking to limit the influence of "unfit" ethnic and racial minorities, many Progressive reformers supported less democratic forms of municipal government and the disfranchisement of African Americans.
The New Deal and the New Conservatives
World War I, the subsequent red scare, and the cultural conflicts of the 1920s combined to move the political center of gravity in a more conservative direction. The major party presidential nominees were more skeptical of the regulatory state than Roosevelt or Wilson had been. Social critics and social scientists assailed the excesses of mass democracy. Organizing to protect their ways of life, diverse cultural conservatives promoted "100 percent Americanism," defended Prohibition, campaigned against the teaching of evolution in public schools, and expanded the Ku Klux Klan into the largest nativist organization in American history.
Culturally, conservative literature and criticism flourished, too. During the nineteenth century, James Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and many lesser writers affirmed tradition, order, and authority rather than economic development and democracy. Their post–World War I counterparts included the irreverent pundit H. L. Mencken, the "new humanists" Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, and the Nashville Agrarians.
The Great Depression and the New Deal finally produced a clear and durable left-center-right political spectrum. Proponents of the welfare state, in calling themselves liberals, typically supported the Democratic Party and followed Franklin D. Roosevelt. Opponents complained that Roosevelt had stolen that honorable label to camouflage his socialism, but they nonetheless came to call themselves conservatives. Conservative attacks mixed laissez-faire conservatism with venerable fears of federal control and corruption. Few defended laissez-faire more zealously than the former Democrats who led the anti-New Deal Liberty League. Although the question of federal intervention in the economy was central to sorting out the political spectrum, conservatives also thought that Roosevelt's Jewish, Catholic, and cosmopolitan followers fell short of being 100 percent Americans, as did his activist wife, Eleanor. Starting in 1937, southern Democrats—incensed by the New Deal's mild concessions to African Americans and Roosevelt's attempt to expand the Supreme Court—joined northern Republicans in an informal conservative congressional coalition to fight further expansion of the welfare state.
A distinct far right crystallized during the 1930s. Senator Huey Long, Father Charles Coughlin, and lesser activists agreed with conservatives like former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Robert Taft that the New Deal was bureaucratic, corrupt, and un-American. But far right activists not only placed a higher priority on revitalizing (as opposed to conserving) what they considered to be the American way of life, but sometimes also favored economic redistribution. Most of them rooted their politics in theologically conservative versions of Christianity, and many embraced anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. To liberals and radicals, this far right looked like an American fascism.
World War II and the Cold War heightened fears of disorder and subversion, energized a religious revival, and strengthened the congressional conservative coalition. Leaders of the modern conservative movement that began to coalesce in this hospitable environment ranged from irresponsible demagogues like Senator Joseph McCarthy to impressive thinkers like the traditionalist Richard Weaver and the libertarian economist Milton Friedman. No intellectual was more important than William F. Buckley Jr., who provided a forum in National Review magazine for attacking what he called President Dwight Eisenhower's "dime store New Deal." In 1960, Buckley took the lead in founding the Young Americans for Freedom, which became a base for the Goldwater campaign. While warding off liberal charges of "extremism," the modern conservative movement set its own boundaries to the right by repudiating anti-Semites, the John Birch Society's conspiracy theories, and segregationist presidential candidate George Wallace. Staunch conservatives typically opposed civil rights legislation as a violation of states rights and local custom. Equally important, the residual fear of military intervention abroad that had marked Robert Taft and Herbert Hoover subsided as conservatives demanded victory in the Cold War.
The political polarization of the 1960s and early 1970s strengthened conservatism. Racial conflict, secularization, liberalizing sexual mores, and the stalemated war in Vietnam War alienated many moderate Democrats, especially white southerners and working-class Catholics. Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford drew these groups into the Republican Party, even as many conservatives denounced both presidents for compromising with congressional liberals and the Soviet Union. During the late 1970s, Democrats also lost support within two other constituencies. Jewish "neoconservative" intellectuals thought Jimmy Carter too hard on Israel and too soft on the Soviet Union. Theologically conservative Protestants discovered that this "born again" Baptist president was more liberal than they had thought. Such fundamentalists and evangelicals formed the bulwark of the New Christian Right. The leading organization of this kind, the Moral Majority, was led by the Baptist minister Jerry Falwell.
The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought significant change to modern conservatism. The Republicans were now clearly the more conservative major party. Yet Reagan's conservatism was more complicated than Goldwater's two decades earlier. While Reagan denounced big government, promoted tax cuts, and undermined labor unions, his administration ran record deficits and only slightly diminished the welfare state. He celebrated religious faith in general but gave scant support to New Christian Right efforts to ban abortion or restore prayer to public schools. A large military buildup and strident anticommunist rhetoric were intended to weaken the Soviet Union. Ultimately, however, Reagan accepted a version of détente as a means to end the Cold War.
Post–cold War Conservative Identity
Post–Cold War conservatism was marked by a loss of focus, internecine disputes, and false starts. The New Christian Right leader Pat Robertson ran an ineffective race for the Republican presidential nomination in 1988. Conservative Pat Buchanan challenged President George H. W. Bush's renomination in 1992, primarily because Bush had agreed to a tax increase. Bush's defeat by Bill Clinton, a supporter of affirmative action, gay rights, and abortion, brought temporary unity to conservative ranks. In 1994, assailing Clinton's advocacy of national health insurance as well his cultural liberalism, Republicans under the leadership of Representative Newt Gingrich won control of both houses of Congress for the first time in forty years. During 1998–1999, conservatives spearheaded the unsuccessful effort to remove Clinton from office for lying under oath about his sex life. Adapting old arguments, traditionalists and New Christian Right clergy presented Clinton as a symbol of corrupt cultural relativism in general and the moral decline of the 1960s in particular.
This campaign not only dissipated energy on the right, but also revealed many conservatives as self-righteous and hypocritical. George W. Bush won the presidency in 2000 by advocating a practical and ecumenical conservatism that welcomed women, blacks, and Hispanics to the cause. Aside from a few traditionalist intellectuals and the staunchest fundamentalist Christians, there was no coherent conservative movement to Bush's right.
Bibliography
Allitt, Patrick. Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950–1985. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Brennan, Mary C. Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Buckley, William F., Jr., ed. American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Dillard, Angela D. Guess Who's Coming to Dinner Now? Multi-cultural Conservatism in America. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
Doenecke, Justus D. Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1979.
Genovese, Eugene D. The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an American Conservatism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Hodgson, Godfrey. The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996.
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot. 7th rev. ed. Chicago: Regnery, 1986.
Lora, Ronald. Conservative Minds in America. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971.
Nash, George H. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Patterson, James T. Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967.
Rossiter, Clinton L. Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion. 2d rev. ed. New York: Vintage, 1962.
—Leo R. Ribuffo
Columbia Encyclopedia:
conservatism |
Bibliography
See R. Kirk, The Conservative Mind (rev. ed. 1960); J. Habermas, The New Conservatism (1989); T. Honderich, Conservatism (1991).
Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: Politics:
conservatism |
A general preference for the existing order of society, and an opposition to efforts to bring about sharp change. (Compare liberalism.)
Random House Word Menu:
categories related to 'conservatism' |
Wikipedia on Answers.com:
Conservatism |
Conservatism (Latin: conservare, "to preserve")[1] is a political and social philosophy that promotes the maintenance of traditional institutions and supports, at the most, minimal and gradual change in society. Some conservatives seek to preserve things as they are, emphasizing stability and continuity, while others oppose modernism and seek a return to "the way things were".[2][3] The first established use of the term in a political context was by François-René de Chateaubriand in 1819, following the French Revolution.[4] The term, historically associated with right-wing politics, has since been used to describe a wide range of views.
Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish politician who served in the British House of Commons and opposed the French Revolution, is credited as one of the founders of conservativism in Great Britain.[5] According to Hailsham, a former chairman of the British Conservative Party, "Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as an attitude, a constant force, performing a timeless function in the development of a free society, and corresponding to a deep and permanent requirement of human nature itself."[6]
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English conservatism, which was called Toryism, emerged during the Restoration (1660–1688). It supported a hierarchical society with a monarch who ruled by divine right. However the Glorious Revolution (1688), which established constitutional government, led to a reformulation of Toryism which now considered sovereignty vested in the three estates of Crown, Lords, and Commons.[7]
According to conservative historians, Richard Hooker was the founding father of conservatism, the Marquess of Halifax is commended for his pragmatism, David Hume is commended for his conservative mistrust of rationalism in politics, and Edmund Burke is considered the leading early theorist. They have, however, been accused of selectivity in choosing writers who present a moderate and defensible view of conservatism. For example, Hooker lived before the emergence of conservatism, Halifax did not belong to any party, Hume was not involved in politics, and Burke was a Whig. In the 19th century, Conservatives rejected Burke because of his defense of Catholic emancipation, and found inspiration in Bolingbroke instead. John Reeves, who wrote a Tory response to the French Revolution, is ignored.[8] Conservatives also objected to Burke's support of the American Revolution, which the Tory Samuel Johnson, for example, attacked in "Taxation No Tyranny".
Conservatism developed in Restoration England from royalism. Royalists supported absolute monarchy, arguing that the sovereign governed by divine right. They opposed the theory that sovereignty derived from the people, the authority of parliament and freedom of religion. Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings, which had been written before the English Civil War, became accepted as the statement of their doctrine. Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the conservatives, known as Tories, accepted that the three estates of Crown, Lords, and Commons held sovereignty jointly.[9] However Toryism became marginalized during the long period of Whig ascendency.[10] The party, which was renamed the Conservative Party in the 1830s, returned as a major political force after becoming home to both paternalistic aristocrats and free market capitalists in an uneasy alliance.[11]
Edmund Burke was the private secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham and official pamphleteer to the Rockingham branch of the Whig Party.[12] Together with the Tories, they were the conservatives in the late 18th century United Kingdom.[13] Burke's views were a mixture of liberal and conservative, with the crucial caveat that the meaning of these terms in this time period was markedly different from popular conceptions of the present day. He supported the American Revolution but abhorred the violence of the French Revolution. He accepted the liberal ideals of private property and the economics of Adam Smith, but thought that economics should be kept subordinate to the conservative social ethic, that capitalism should be subordinate to the medieval social tradition and that the business class should be subordinate to aristocracy.[14] He insisted on standards of honor derived from the medieval aristocratic tradition, and saw the aristocracy as the nation's natural leaders.[15] That meant limits on the powers of the Crown, since he found the institutions of Parliament to be better informed than commissions appointed by the executive.[16] He favored an established church, but allowed for a degree of religious toleration.[17] Burke justified the social order on the basis of tradition: tradition represented the wisdom of the species and he valued community and social harmony over social reforms.[18]
In the 19th century, conflict between wealthy businessmen and the aristocracy split the British conservative movement, with the aristocracy calling for a return to medieval ideas while the business classes called for laissez-faire capitalism.[19]
Although conservatives opposed attempts to allow greater representation of the middle class in parliament, in 1834 they conceded that electoral reform could not be reversed and promised to support further reforms so long as they did not erode the institutions of church and state. These new principles were presented in the Tamworth Manifesto which is considered by historians to be the basic statement of the beliefs of the new Conservative Party.[20]
Some conservatives lamented the passing of a pastoral world where the ethos of noblesse oblige had promoted respect from the lower classes. They saw the Anglican Church and the aristocracy as balances against commercial wealth.[21] They worked toward legislation for improved working conditions and urban housing.[22] This viewpoint would later be called Tory Democracy.[23] However since Burke there has always been tension between traditional aristocratic conservatism and the wealthy business class.[24]
By the late 19th century, the traditional business supporters of the UK Liberal Party had joined the Conservatives, making them the party of business and commerce.[25]
In the United States, conservatism developed after the Second World War when Russell Kirk and other writers identified an American conservative tradition based on the ideas of Edmund Burke. However many writers do not accept American conservatism as genuine and consider it to be a variety of liberalism.[26]
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Another form of conservatism developed in France in parallel to conservatism in Britain. It was influenced by Counter-Enlightenment works by men such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. Latin conservatism was less pragmatic and more reactionary than the conservatism of Burke.[citation needed] Many Continental or Traditionalist conservatives do not support separation of Church and state, with most supporting state recognition of and cooperation with the Catholic Church, such as had existed in France before the Revolution.
Eventually conservatives added patriotism and nationalism to the list of traditional values they support. German conservatives were the first to embrace nationalism, which was previously associated with liberalism and the Revolution in France.[27]
Today, movements that use the name "conservative" have a wide variety of views.
Liberal conservatism is a variant of conservatism that combines conservative values and policies with classical liberal stances.[28] As these latter two terms have had different meanings over time and across countries, liberal conservatism also has a wide variety of meanings. Historically, the term often referred to the combination of economic liberalism, which champions laissez-faire markets, with the classical conservatism concern for established tradition, respect for authority and religious values. It contrasted itself with classical liberalism, which supported freedom for the individual in both the economic and social spheres.
Over time, the general conservative ideology in many countries adopted economic liberal arguments, and the term liberal conservatism was replaced with conservatism. This is also the case in countries where liberal economic ideas have been the tradition, such as the United States, and are thus considered conservative. In other countries where liberal conservative movements have entered the political mainstream, such as Italy and Spain, the terms liberal and conservative may be synonymous. The liberal conservative tradition in the United States combines the economic individualism of the classical liberals with a Burkean form of conservatism (which has also become part of the American conservative tradition, such as in the writings of Russell Kirk).
A secondary meaning for the term liberal conservatism that has developed in Europe is a combination of more modern conservative (less traditionalist) views with those of social liberalism. This has developed as an opposition to the more collectivist views of socialism. Often this involves stressing what are now conservative views of free-market economics and belief in individual responsibility, with social liberal views on defence of civil rights, environmentalism and support for a limited welfare state. This philosophy is that of Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt. In continental Europe, this is sometimes also translated into English as social conservatism.
Conservative liberalism is a variant of liberalism that combines liberal values and policies with conservative stances, or, more simply, the right wing of the liberal movement.[29][30][31] The roots of conservative liberalism are found at the beginning of the history of liberalism. Until the two World Wars, in most European countries the political class was formed by conservative liberals, from Germany to Italy. The events such as World War I occurring after 1917 brought the more radical version of classical liberalism to a more conservative (i.e. more moderate) type of liberalism.[32]
Libertarian conservatism describes certain political ideologies within the United States and Canada which combine libertarian economic issues with aspects of conservatism. Its five main branches are Constitutionalism, paleolibertarianism, neolibertarianism, small government conservatism and Christian libertarianism. They generally differ from paleoconservatives, in that they are in favor of more personal and economic freedom.
Agorists such as Samuel Edward Konkin III labeled libertarian conservatism right-libertarianism.[33][34]
In contrast to paleoconservatives, libertarian conservatives support strict laissez-faire policies such as free trade, opposition to any national bank and opposition to business regulations. They are vehemently opposed to environmental regulations, corporate welfare, subsidies, and other areas of economic intervention. Many of them have views in accord to Ludwig von Mises.[citation needed] However, many of them oppose abortion, as they see it as a positive liberty and violates the non-aggression principle because abortion is aggression towards the fetus.[35]
Fiscal conservatism is the economic philosophy of prudence in government spending and debt.[36] Edmund Burke, in his 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', argued that a government does not have the right to run up large debts and then throw the burden on the taxpayer:
...[I]t is to the property of the citizen, and not to the demands of the creditor of the state, that the first and original faith of civil society is pledged. The claim of the citizen is prior in time, paramount in title, superior in equity. The fortunes of individuals, whether possessed by acquisition or by descent or in virtue of a participation in the goods of some community, were no part of the creditor's security, expressed or implied...[T]he public, whether represented by a monarch or by a senate, can pledge nothing but the public estate; and it can have no public estate except in what it derives from a just and proportioned imposition upon the citizens at large.
Green conservatism is a term used to refer to conservatives who have incorporated green concerns into their ideology.[37] One of the first uses of the term green conservatism was by former United States Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich, in a debate on environmental issues with John Kerry.[38][39] Around this time, the green conservative movement was sometimes referred to as the crunchy con movement, a term popularized by National Review magazine and the writings of Rod Dreher.[40] The group Republicans for Environmental Protection seeks to strengthen the Republican Party's stance on environmental issues, and supports efforts to conserve natural resources and protect human and environmental health.
The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom under David Cameron has embraced a green agenda:[citation needed], including a tax on workplace car parking spaces, a halt to airport growth, a tax on 'gas-guzzling' 4x4s and restrictions on car advertising. The measures were suggested by The Quality of Life Policy Group, which was set up by Cameron to help fight climate change[citation needed].
Cultural conservatives support the preservation of the heritage of one nation, or of a shared culture that is not defined by national boundaries.[41] The shared culture may be as divergent as Western culture or Chinese culture. In the United States, the term cultural conservative may imply a conservative position in the culture war. Cultural conservatives hold fast to traditional ways of thinking even in the face of monumental change. They believe strongly in traditional values and traditional politics, and often have an urgent sense of nationalism.
Social conservatism is distinct from cultural conservatism, although there are some overlaps. Social conservatives believe that the government has a role in encouraging or enforcing what they consider traditional values or behaviors. A social conservative wants to preserve traditional morality and social mores, often through civil law or regulation. Social change is generally regarded as suspect.
A second meaning of the term social conservatism developed in the Nordic countries and continental Europe. There it refers to liberal conservatives supporting modern European welfare states.
Social conservatives (in the first meaning of the word) in many countries generally favor the pro-life position in the abortion controversy and oppose embryonic stem cell research (particularly if publicly funded); oppose both eugenics and human enhancement (transhumanism) while supporting bioconservatism;[42] support a traditional definition of marriage as being one man and one woman; view the nuclear family model as society's foundational unit; oppose expansion of civil marriage and child adoption rights to couples in same-sex relationships; promote public morality and traditional family values; oppose atheism,[43] especially militant atheism, secularism and the separation of church and state;[44][45][46] support the prohibition of drugs, prostitution, premarital sex, non-marital sex and euthanasia; and support the censorship of pornography and what they consider to be obscenity or indecency.
Some conservatives also support harsh, eye for an eye-based punishment such as the death penalty and long prison terms over punishments that focus on rehabilitation.[47] However, a significant minority of conservatives, including Ron Paul, oppose the death penalty, and some conservative Catholics and members of the peace churches [48] oppose the death penalty because of their beliefs in Christian forgiveness and the sanctity of life.
Religious conservatives principally seek to apply the teachings of particular religions to politics, sometimes by merely proclaiming the value of those teachings, at other times by having those teachings influence laws.[49]
Compassionate conservatism is a political philosophy that stresses dealing with social problems such as health care or immigration through private enterprise, charities and religious institutions rather than government. It emphasizes the weakness of human nature and our tendency towards sin and idleness[50] to be overcome through personal responsibility and self-reliance, and optimistic assurance, rather than social action by the poor to assert their rights and fight social injustice.[51]
It is associated with historian and presidential advisor Doug Wead[52] and author and editor Marvin Olasky[53][54] and was popularized by George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign against Al Gore. The idea has also been used in the United Kingdom by British Prime Minister David Cameron.
As of the 2012 presidential campaign at least two observers (journalists Jim Wallis in the Huffington Post, and Amy Sullivan in USA Today) have argued the idea has "virtually disappeared" from America's conservative Republican Party,[55] replaced by competition to "take the hardest line in opposing government-funded programs to help the poor."[56]
Conservative political parties vary widely from country to country in the goals they wish to achieve. Both conservative and liberal parties tend to favor private ownership of property, in opposition to communist, socialist and green parties, which favor communal ownership or laws requiring social responsibility on the part of property owners. Where conservatives and liberals differ is primarily on social issues. Conservatives tend to reject behavior that does not conform to some social norm. For many years, conservative parties fought to stop extension of voting rights to groups such as to non-Christians, non-whites and women. Modern conservative parties often define themselves by their opposition to liberal or labour parties. The United States usage of the term conservative is unique to that country.[57]
According to Alan Ware, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK retained viable conservative parties into the 1980s.[58] Ware said that Australia, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, Spain and the US had no conservative parties, although they had either Christian Democrats or liberals as major right-wing parties. Canada, Ireland, and Portugal had right-wing political parties that defied categorization: the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada; Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Progressive Democrats in Ireland; and the Social Democratic Party of Portugal.[59] Since then, the Swiss People's Party has moved to the extreme right and is no longer considered to be conservative.[60]
Klaus von Beyme, who developed the method of party categorization, found that no modern Eastern European parties could be considered conservative, although the communist and communist-successor parties had strong similarities.[61]
In Italy, which was united by liberals and radicals (risorgimento), liberals not conservatives emerged as the party of the Right.[62] In the Netherlands, conservatives merged into a new Christian democratic party in 1980.[63] In Austria, Germany, Portugal and Spain, conservatism was transformed into and incorporated into fascism or the far right.[64] In 1940, all Japanese parties were merged into a single fascist party. Following the war, Japanese conservatives briefly returned to politics but were largely purged from public office.[65]
Louis Hartz explained the absence of conservatism in Australia or the United States as a result of their settlement as radical or liberal fragments of Great Britain. Although he said English Canada had a negligible conservative influence, subsequent writers claimed that loyalists opposed to the American Revolution brought a Tory ideology into Canada. Hartz explained conservatism in Quebec and Latin America as a result of their settlement as feudal societies.[66] The American conservative writer Russell Kirk provided the opinion that conservatism had been brought to the US and interpreted the American revolution as a "conservative revolution".[67]
Conservative elites have long dominated Latin American nations. Mostly this has been achieved through control of and support for civil institutions, the church and the armed forces, rather than through party politics. Typically the church was exempt from taxes and its employees immune from civil prosecution. Where national conservative parties were weak or non-existent, conservatives were more likely to rely on military dictatorship as a preferred form of government. However in some nations where the elites were able to mobilize popular support for conservative parties, longer periods of political stability were achieved. Chile, Colombia and Venezuela are examples of nations that developed strong conservative parties. Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Peru are examples of nations where this did not occur.[68] The Conservative Party of Venezuela disappeared following the Federal Wars of 1858-1863.[69] Chile's conservative party, the National Party disbanded in 1973 following a military coup and did not re-emerge as a political force following the subsequent return to democracy.[70]
The conservative Union Nationale governed the province of Quebec in periods from 1936 to 1960, in a close alliance with English Canadian business elites and the Catholic Church. This period, known as the Great Darkness ended with the Quiet Revolution and the party went into terminal decline.[71]
Founded in 1945 as the Christian People's Party, the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) dominated politics in post-war Belgium. In 1999, the party's support collapsed and it became the country's fifth largest party.[72]
Brazil's last conservative party, in a democratic regime, was the UDN, but it ceased to exist in 1965 with the rise of Brazil's military government. Today, even with little political representation, individuals such as philosopher Olavo de Carvalho try to rescue the country's conservative values.[73]
Canada's Conservatives had their roots in the Loyalists - Tories - who left America after the American Revolution. They developed in the socio-economic and political cleavages that existed during the first three decades of the 19th century, and had the support of the business, professional and established Church (Anglican) elites in Ontario and to a lesser extent in Quebec. Holding a monopoly over administrative and judicial offices, they were called the "Family Compact" in Ontario and the "Chateau Clique" in Quebec. John A. Macdonald's successful leadership of the movement to confederate the provinces and his subsequent tenure as prime minister for most of the late 19th century rested on his ability to bring together the English-speaking Protestant oligarchy and the ultramontane Catholic hierarchy of Quebec and to keep them united in a conservative coalition.[74]
The Conservatives combined pro-market liberalism and Toryism. They generally supported an activist government and state intervention in the marketplace, and their policies were marked by noblesse oblige, a paternalistic responsibility of the elites for the less well-off.[75] From 1942, the party was known as the Progressive Conservatives, until 2003, when the national party merged with the Canadian Alliance to form the Conservative Party of Canada.[76]
The Colombian Conservative Party, founded in 1849, traces its origins to opponents of General Francisco de Paula Santander's 1833-37 administration. While the term "liberal" had been used to describe all political forces in Colombia, the conservatives began describing themselves as "conservative liberals" and their opponents as "red liberals". From the 1860s until the present, the party has supported strong central government, and supported the Catholic Church, especially its role as protector of the sanctity of the family, and opposed separation of church and state. Its policies include the legal equality of all men, the citizen's right to own property and opposition to dictatorship. It has usually been Colombia's second largest party, with the Colombian Liberal Party being the largest.
Founded in 1915, the Conservative People's Party of Denmark. was the successor of Højre (literally "right"). In the 2005 election it won 18 out of 179 seats in the Folketing and became a junior partner in coalition with the Liberals.[77] The party is preceded by 11 years by the Young Conservatives (KU), today the youth movement of the party. The Party suffered a major defeat in the parliamentary elections of September 2011 in which the party lost more than half of its seat and also lost governmental power.
The traditional conservative party in Finland is the National Coalition Party (in Finnish Kansallinen Kokoomus, Kok). The party was founded in 1918 by monarchists. Although in the past the party was socially conservative, today it has liberalised into a moderate centre-right party, officially supporting same-sex marriage for example. While the party advocates economic liberalism, it is committed to the social market economy. Today, however, the most conservative party concerning social values are the nationalist True Finns and the Christian Democrats. True Finnish party leader Timo Soini is a devout Catholic, and his fellow party members have been criticised for their ultraconservative attitudes towards homosexuality and immigration. Christian Democratic leader Päivi Räsänen is also infamous and criticised for her opposition against the rights of homosexuals. The NCP has 44 out of 200 representatives in the Finnish Parliament, and is therefore the largest party in Finland. Party Leader Jyrki Katainen is the current Prime Minister of Finland, and the NCP forms the government with the Social Democrats, the Green League, the Left Alliance, the Swedish People's Party of Finland and the Christian Democrats, whereas the True Finns is the largest opposition party (third largest overall), and the opposition is formed by the True Finns and the Centre Party.[78]
Following the Second World War, conservatives in France supported Gaullist groups and have been nationalistic, and emphasized tradition, order, and the regeneration of France. Gaullists held divergent views on social issues. The number of Conservative groups, their lack of stability, and their tendency to be identified with local issues defy simple categorization. Conservatism has been the major political force in France since the second world war.[79] Unusually, post-war French conservatism was formed around the personality of a leader, Charles de Gaulle, and did not draw on traditional French conservatism, but on the Bonapartism tradition.[80] Gaullism in France continues under the Union for a Popular Movement.[81] The word "conservative" itself is a term of abuse in France.[82]
The main interwar conservative party was called the People's Party (PP), which supported constitutional monarchy and opposed the republican Liberal Party. It was able to re-group after the Second World War as part of a United Nationalist Front which achieved power campaigning on a simple anticommunist, ultranationalist platform. However, the vote received by the PP declined, leading them to create an expanded party, the Greek Rally, under the leadership of the charismatic General Alexandros Papagos. The conservatives opposed the far right dictatorship of the colonels (1967–1974) and established the New Democratic Party following the fall of the dictatorship. The new party had four objectives: to confront Turkish expansionism in Cyprus, to reestablish and solidify democratic rule, to give the country a strong government, and to make a powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics.[83]
Founded in 1926 as the Conservative Party, Iceland's Independence Party adopted its current name in 1929. From the beginning they have been the largest vote-winning party, averaging around 40%. They combine liberalism and conservatism, supporting nationalization and opposed to class conflict. While mostly in opposition during the 1930s, they embraced economic liberalism, but accepted the welfare state after the war and participated in governments supportive of state intervention and protectionism. Unlike other Scandanivian conservative (and liberal) parties, it has always had a large working-class following.[84]
Luxembourg's major conservative party, the Christian Social People's Party (CSV or PCS) was formed as the Party of the Right in 1914, and adopted its present name in 1945. It was consistently the largest political party in Luxembourg and dominated politics throughout the 20th century.[85]
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is Malaysia's largest political party and largest conservative party. It is a founding member of the National Front coalition, which has played a dominant role in Malaysian politics since independence. UMNO emphasizes as its foundation the struggle to uphold the aspirations of Malay nationalism and the dignity of race, religion and country. The party also aspires to protect the Malay culture as the national culture and to uphold, defend and expand Islam. The other conservative parties in the National Front coalition include the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
The Conservative Party of Norway (Norwegian: Høyre, literally "right") was formed by the old upper class of state officials and wealthy merchants to fight the populist democracy of the Liberal Party, but lost power in 1884 when parliamentarian government was first practised. It formed its first government under parliamentarism in 1889, and continued to alternate in power with the Liberals until the 1930s, when Labour became the dominant political party. It has elements both of paternalism, stressing the responsibilities of the state and of economic liberalism. It first returned to power in the 1960s.[86]
Singapore's only conservative party or party on the right of the political spectrum is the People's Action Party. It is currently in government and has been in government since independence from the British in the 1960s. It has promoted conservative values in the form of 'Asian values' or 'shared values'. The main party on the left of the political spectrum in Singapore is the Workers' Party of Singapore.
Sweden's conservative party, the Moderate Party, was formed in 1904, two years after the founding of the liberal party.[87] The party emphasizes tax reductions, deregulation of private enterprise, and privatization of schools, hospitals and kindergartens.[88]
There are a number of conservative parties in Switzerland's parliament, the Federal Assembly. These include the largest, the Swiss People's Party (SVP),[89] the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP),[90] represented in the Federal Council or cabinet by Doris Leuthard (in 2011), and the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (BDP),[91] which is a spliter of the SVP created after a failed attempt to expel Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf from the SVP.[91]
The Swiss People's Party (SVP or UDC) was formed from the 1971 merger of the Party of Farmers, Traders, and Citizens, formed in 1917 and the smaller Swiss Democratic Party, formed in 1942. The SVP emphasized agricultural policy, and was strong among farmers in German-speaking Protestant areas. As Switzerland considered closer relations with the European Union in the 1990s, the SVP adopted a more militant protectionist and isolationist stance. This stance has allowed it to expand into German-speaking Catholic mountainous areas.[92] The Anti-Defamation League has accused them of manipulating issues such as immigration, Swiss neutrality and welfare benefits, awakening anti-Semitism and racism.[93] The Council of Europe has called the SVP "extreme right", although some scholars dispute this classification. Hans-Georg Betz for example describes it as "populist radical right".[94]
Conservatism in the United Kingdom is related to its counterparts in other Western nations, but has a distinct tradition. Edmund Burke is often considered the father of conservatism in the English-speaking world. Burke was a Whig, while the term Tory is given to the later Conservative Party. One Australian scholar argues, "For Edmund Burke and Australians of a like mind, the essence of conservatism lies not in a body of theory, but in the disposition to maintain those institutions seen as central to the beliefs and practices of society."[95]
The old established form of English and, after the Act of Union, British conservatism, was the Tory Party. It reflected the attitudes of a rural land owning class, and championed the institutions of the monarchy, the Anglican Church, the family, and property as the best defence of the social order. In the early stages of the industrial revolution, it seemed to be totally opposed to a process that seemed to undermine some of these bulwarks. The new industrial elite were seen by many as enemies to the social order. Robert Peel was able to reconcile the new industrial class to the Tory landed class by persuading the latter to accept the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. He created a new political group that sought to preserve the old status quo while accepting the basics of laissez-faire and free trade. The new coalition of traditional landowners and sympathetic industrialists constituted the new Conservative Party.
Benjamin Disraeli gave the new party a political ideology. As a young man, he was influenced by the romantic movement and medievalism, and developed a devastating critique of industrialism. In his novels, he outlined an England divided into two nations, each living in perfect ignorance of each other. He foresaw, like Karl Marx, the phenomenon of an alienated industrial proletariat. His solution involved a return to an idealised view of a corporate or organic society, in which everyone had duties and responsibilities towards other people or groups. This "one nation" conservatism is still a significant tradition in British politics[citation needed]. It has animated a great deal of social reform undertaken by successive Conservative governments[citation needed].
Although nominally a Conservative, Disraeli was sympathetic to some of the demands of the Chartists and argued for an alliance between the landed aristocracy and the working class against the increasing power of the middle class, helping to found the Young England group in 1842 to promote the view that the rich should use their power to protect the poor from exploitation by the middle class[citation needed]. The conversion of the Conservative Party into a modern mass organisation was accelerated by the concept of Tory Democracy attributed to Lord Randolph Churchill, father of Britain's wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill[citation needed].
A Liberal-Conservative coalition during World War I, coupled with the ascent of the Labour Party, hastened the collapse of the Liberals in the 1920s. After World War II, the Conservative Party made concessions to the socialist policies of the Left. This compromise was a pragmatic measure to regain power, but also the result of the early successes of central planning and state ownership forming a cross-party consensus. This was known as Butskellism, after the almost identical Keynesian policies of Rab Butler on behalf of the Conservatives, and Hugh Gaitskell for Labour.
However, in the 1980s, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, and the influence of Keith Joseph, there was a dramatic shift in the ideological direction of British conservatism, with a movement towards free-market economic policies[citation needed]. As one commentator explains, "The privatization of state owned industries, unthinkable before, became commonplace [during Thatcher's government] and has now been imitated all over the world."[96] Some commentators have questioned whether Thatcherism was consistent with the traditional concept of conservatism in the United Kingdom, and saw her views as more consistent with radical classical liberalism. Thatcher was described as "a radical in a conservative party",[96] and her ideology has been seen as confronting "established institutions" and the "accepted beliefs of the elite",[96] both concepts incompatible with the traditional conception of conservatism as signifying support for the established order and existing social convention.
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During the 19th and early 20th centuries, according to political economist Barry Clark, conservatism in the United States existed only in the American South, where "the plantation system and slavery were ideally suited for an ideology that emphasized the importance of hierarchal community." However, after World War I and the Great Depression "skeptics toward reason and science" revitalized conservatism, and in the 1950s a conservative movement arose in the United States, led by William F. Buckley, Jr.. Its first major success was the election of Ronald Reagan, president from 1981 to 1989. Modern American conservatives are a powerful political force, formed out of "their disgust with the counterculture of the 1960s, their dissatisfaction with the conciliatory nature of U.S. foreign policy, and their disillusionment with the welfare state as a solution to poverty and crime."[97] Since 1980, the Republican Party has been the leading conservative party in the United States. Organizations in the US committed to promoting conservative ideology include the American Conservative Union, Eagle Forum, Heritage Foundation, Citizens United, and the Hoover Institution. US-based media outlets that are conservative include Human Events, National Review, The American Conservative, Policy Review, Fox News, and The Weekly Standard.
Following the Second World War, psychologists conducted research into the different motives and tendencies that account for ideological differences between left and right. The early studies focused on conservatives, beginning with Theodor W. Adorno's The Authoritarian Personality (1950). This book has been heavily criticized on theoretical and methodological grounds, but some of its findings have been confirmed by further empirical research.[98]
In 1973, British psychologist Glenn Wilson published an influential book providing evidence that a general factor underlying conservative beliefs is "fear of uncertainty".[99] A meta-analysis of research literature by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway in 2003 found that many factors, such as intolerance of ambiguity and need for cognitive closure, contribute to the degree of one's political conservatism.[98] A study by Kathleen Maclay stated these traits "might be associated with such generally valued characteristics as personal commitment and unwavering loyalty." The research also suggested that while most people are resistant to change, liberals are more tolerant of it.[100]
According to psychologist Robert Altemeyer, individuals who are politically conservative tend to rank high in Right-Wing Authoritarianism on his RWA scale.[101] This finding was echoed by Theodor Adorno. A study done on Israeli and Palestinian students in Israel found that RWA scores of right-wing party supporters were significantly higher than those of left-wing party supporters.[102] However, a 2005 study by H. Michael Crowson and colleagues suggested a moderate gap between RWA and other conservative positions. "The results indicated that conservatism is not synonymous with RWA." [103]
Psychologist Felicia Pratto and her colleagues have found evidence to support the idea that a high Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is strongly correlated with conservative political views, and opposition to social engineering to promote equality, though Pratto's findings have been highly controversial.[104] Pratto and her colleagues found that high SDO scores were highly correlated with measures of prejudice. They were refuted in this claim by David J. Schneider, who wrote that "correlations between prejudice and political conservative are reduced virtually to zero when controls for SDO are instituted" [105] and by Kenneth Minogue who wrote "It is characteristic of the conservative temperament to value established identities, to praise habit and to respect prejudice, not because it is irrational, but because such things anchor the darting impulses of human beings in solidities of custom which we do not often begin to value until we are already losing them. Radicalism often generates youth movements, while conservatism is a condition found among the mature, who have discovered what it is in life they most value." [106]
A 1996 study on the relationship between racism and conservatism found that the correlation was stronger among more educated individuals, though specifically anti-Black racism did not increase. They also found that the correlation between racism and conservatism could be entirely accounted for by their mutual relationship with social dominance orientation. The authors concluded that opposition to affirmative action, especially among more highly educated conservatives, was better explained by social dominance orientation than by principled conservatism.[107]
A 2008 research report found that conservatives are happier than liberals, and that as income inequality increases, this difference in relative happiness increases, because conservatives (more than liberals) possess an ideological buffer against the negative hedonic effects of economic inequality.[108]
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Translations:
Conservatism |
Dansk (Danish)
n. - konservatisme
Nederlands (Dutch)
behoudzucht, conservatisme
Français (French)
n. - (gén, Pol) conservatisme
Deutsch (German)
n. - Konservatismus
Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - συντηρητισμός
Italiano (Italian)
conservatorismo
Português (Portuguese)
n. - conservadorismo (m)
Русский (Russian)
консерватизм
Español (Spanish)
n. - conservadurismo
Svenska (Swedish)
n. - konservatism
中文（简体）(Chinese (Simplified))
保守主义, 守旧性
中文（繁體）(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 保守主義, 守舊性
한국어 (Korean)
n. - 보수주의, 보수당의 주의, 안전제일주의
日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 保守主義, 保守的傾向, 保守党の主義
العربيه (Arabic)
(الاسم) مذهب المحافظين, مقاومه التغيير, المحافظه على الوضع القائم
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 | American Heritage Dictionary. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright © 2007, 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. © 1994-2012 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Barron's Accounting Dictionary. Dictionary of Accounting Terms. Copyright © 2010 by Barron's Educational Series, Inc. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Oxford Dictionary of Politics. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Copyright © 1996, 2003 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Copyright © 1994, 1996, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Gale Encyclopedia of US History. Encyclopedia of American History Copyright © 2006 by The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Columbia Encyclopedia. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. Licensed from Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/cup/. Read more |
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| Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: Politics. The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition Edited by E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil. Copyright © 2002 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin. All rights reserved. Read more |
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