Consolidated Rail Corporation: Information from Answers.com

Type: Public Company
Address: Six Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19103, United States
Telephone: (215) 977-4000
Fax: (215) 977-4582
Employees: 27,787
Sales: $3.37 billion
Stock Index: New York Philadelphia
Incorporated: 1976

Consolidated Rail Corporation--best known as Conrail--was formed by the U.S. government out of six bankrupt railroads serving the northeastern United States. Conrail began operations in 1976. It was returned to the private sector through a public stock offering in 1987, after establishing a record of steady profits.

Between the 1930s and the 1960s, U.S. railroads, once the country's primary source of freight transportation, were undermined by the growth of air and road transportation. Trucking had usurped so much of the freight transportation business that many railroads merged or went under in the 1960s and 1970s. The eastern railroads were hit additionally with the collapse of coal traffic during the 1960s, as emphasis shifted to oil as an energy source. Between 1967 and 1972, six significant northeastern railroads went bankrupt: Central Railroad of New Jersey; Penn Central Transportation Company--created from the 1968 merger of Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central Railroad; Lehigh Valley Railroad Company; Reading Company; Lehigh & Hudson River Railway Company; and Erie Lackawanna Railway Company. The roots of these companies stretched back as far as 1826.

By 1975 railroads had lost so much business to the trucking industry--which could offer door-to-door service and was not subject to the same price restrictions--that railroads handled only 36% of the nation's freight. As a result, bankruptcies and mergers left the country with only six major freight railroads. The government reacted with the 1974 Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which in turn gave birth to the United States Railway Association (USRA). A plan was devised by USRA for the consolidation of the six bankrupt lines into a single system, with the backing of federal funds. The initial investment was $2.1 billion. Conrail officially began operations in 1976, with Edward G. Jordan as chairman and CEO, and Richard C. Spence as president. The company's mandate was to revitalize rail service in the Northeast and Midwest and to operate as a for-profit company. Conrail at its inception had about 17,700 track miles, 100,000 employees, and operated in 16 states and in Washington, D.C., and Canada. It handled both freight and passenger services. The government held 85% of the stock, with employees holding the remainder.

The first years of operation focused on rehabilitation. Deterioration of track and properties was advanced because of deferred maintenance during the years Conrail's bankrupted predecessors struggled. Severe winter storms during 1977 and 1978 increased deterioration while thwarting rehabilitation. In 1978 $1.2 billion more in federal funds was authorized. Nearly all of the money went to upkeep and modernization. In 1979 Stuart M. Reed became president. From its inception through 1980, Conrail had a cumulative net loss of about $1.5 billion. The USRA system plan for the company had predicted it would be making a profit by 1979. In 1981, however, Conrail was still losing money on 20% to 30% of its traffic, and the government continued to support its operations as the industrial economy of the Northeast depended on the line. Auto, steel, and coal industries were especially dependent upon the railroad.

In 1980 the Staggers Rail Act was signed, with huge repercussions for the industry. This act essentially deregulated the railroads, whose pricings had been fixed since the turn of the century when railroads represented virtually the only mode of transcontinental transportation. The Staggers Act made railroads more competitive with trucks by allowing them to reprice services, adjust rail rates, react to market conditions, and provide special contracts. This marked the start of Conrail's recovery.

The Staggers Act permitted Conrail to cancel and reassess joint rates with connecting railroads. It was losing money on many of these arrangements as revenues were divided according to distance not costs. As much of Conrail's lines included old terminals and yard operations--with costly upkeep and overhead--it was losing money on crucial business. The chance to offer contract rates to shippers who could guarantee a certain volume of traffic enabled Conrail to plan ahead, spending the assured revenues on equipment and maintenance. Above all, the Staggers Act allowed railroads to regain business lost to the trucking industry.

In 1981 L. Stanley Crane succeeded Jordan as chairman and CEO. Crane had been with Southern Railway Company for more than four decades when he retired as chairman in 1980, the same time the company joined Norfolk and Western Railway Company to become Norfolk Southern Corporation. Under Crane, Conrail began drastic cost-cutting measures, shaving marginal jobs, lines, and services. Another boost to Conrail's competitiveness came in 1981 with the passage of the Northeast Rail Service Act, which enabled Conrail to shed the commuter services it had been required to operate and that represented a loss to the company of $70 million annually. The main transit agencies served by Conrail--which accounted for 215,000 daily passengers--were the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New Jersey Transit Corporation, and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. Conrail concluded its first year of profitability in 1981, with a net income of $39.2 million. An assist toward profitability was the deferral of wage increases agreed upon by Conrail workers, which saved about $150 million in 1981. By 1984 these deferrals would amount to $300 million.

Conrail again made a modest profit in 1982--$174 million--doubly notable as the recession was rocking Conrail's major customers in Pittsburgh and Detroit. Crane's streamlining continued. The work force, once at 100,000, was cut to 60,000 by 1982, and route miles were reduced from 17,700 to 15,000 as excess track was torn up to save maintenance costs. Moneylosing branch lines were abandoned. Taking advantage of the Staggers Act, Conrail went after piggyback business--carrying trailers on flatbed rail cars. In 1982 Conrail was profitable despite a 20% decline in car loadings.

By 1983 Conrail was the fourth largest freight hauler in the United States, and making money even though 40% of its revenues came from industries hardest hit by the recession--steel, autos, and coal. A severance arrangement financed by the government allowed the work force to be cut further, to 42,000. By year's end, the company reported a $31.3 million profit, and suitors began to gather. Courtships would prove stormy.

By 1985 the government had spent more than $7 billion to restore Conrail's profitability. The sale of Conrail to an undercapitalized or poorly managed company would be catastrophic to the Northeast's economy and unpopular with taxpayers. Among the strong suitors were Norfolk Southern, CSX Corporation (formed by the merger of Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coast Line Railroad), and Alleghany Corporation. Conrail employees submitted a $500 million bid for acquisition. The selling price range was set between $1 billion and $1.5 billion. A deadline for formal purchase offers was set in 1984, and 14 potential buyers submitted. Within a few months, these bidders were narrowed to three. Favored was Norfolk Southern, because of its financial strength and solid railroading background. Conrail finished 1984 with a net income of $500 million. The company's profits were misleading because of wage concessions granted by unions and tax advantages, but its cash balance and sustained profits were reassuring to buyers.

In 1985 Conrail management proposed a plan for public offering of Conrail stock. The company, and others in the industry, feared that sale of Conrail to Norfolk Southern would create a monopoly, as the two railroads served many of the same markets. An Interstate Commerce Commission study confirmed this possibility. The sale would also create the country's largest railroad, and would have threatened CSX. Early in 1985, Conrail reached a new agreement with labor unions and resumed paying industry scale wages, retroactive to July 1984. At year's end, Conrail earnings dipped to about $416 million.

In 1986 Norfolk withdrew its bid, citing changes in tax laws that made the purchase less appealing. In the fall, the Conrail Privatization Act was signed, authorizing a public stock offering to return Conrail to the private sector. To prevent possible mergers and takeovers, restrictions were made: no other major railroad would acquire more than 10% of Conrail for one year, and any railroad would need Interstate Commerce Commission permission for a merger after that; any nonrailroad company was prevented from making more than a 10% purchase for three years. The company concluded its sixth straight year of profitability, with a net income of $431 million.

In 1987 Conrail was returned to the private sector in the largest initial public offering to date in U.S. history, raising $1.6 billion. With the $300 million in funds that Conrail had already returned to the government, the sale generated nearly $1.9 billion. The company faced immediate challenges--an Amtrak-Conrail train collision that killed 16 people and injured more than 170 others added lawsuits to the mounting liabilities incurred by employees exposed to asbestos. Then came the October stock market crash, shaking investors confidence and further wounding the economy. Conrail concluded the year, however, with a more than 7% increase in freight traffic and purchased 30 new high-horsepower locomotives. Helping to boost its traffic despite still sagging auto sales was Conrail's commodity diversity: company revenues toward the end of 1987 were coming from chemicals, 17%; autos, 16%; truck trailers, 17%; and coal, 17%. Also a help was the fact that Conrail's average crew was 25% smaller than other major freight carriers' crews, giving it a competitive advantage.

Early in 1988, Conrail's board of directors elected Richard D. Sanborn as president. He came aboard from CSX Corporation and succeeded Crane upon his retirement as chairman and CEO in early 1989. Following Sanborn's untimely death in February 1989, however, the company again was in search of a new CEO. The board of directors elected James A. Hagen as chairman, president, and CEO in April 1989. Hagan, who had been Conrail's senior vice president of marketing and sales between 1977 and 1985, most recently had been president of CSX Distribution Services, Inc. During its first years as a private company, Conrail had proven itself enough of a money-maker to generate takeover attention, with eyes on the 1989 expiration of takeover protection legislation. The company began instituting takeover defenses, including a poison-pill provision. Revenues for 1988 were about $3.5 billion.

Because of the still declining shipments of autos and steel in 1989, all major railroads suffered a slowdown. By year's end, Conrail reduced its nonunion work force by 12% and took a fourth-quarter pretax charge of about $234 million to cover reductions, consolidation of certain functions, and an increase in casualty reserves. Still seeking to thwart takeover early in 1990, Conrail announced a $1.3 billion plan to buy back more than a third of its outstanding shares. It also established a $300 million employee stock ownership plan. These actions helped to reduce the cash surplus that was tempting takeovers. There also were suits pending concerning safety and environmental issues, including the Amtrak collision case from 1987, which had cost Conrail more than $81 million in claims by late 1989. In addition, there was an ongoing antitrust suit for $10 million brought by the bankrupt Delaware & Hudson Railway.

While industrial freight shipments remained weak in 1990, coal and grain traffic picked up, but these were lower revenue commodities for Conrail and did not make up for the slump. Late in 1990, Conrail settled a trackage rights dispute with Canadian Pacific Ltd. (CP), based in Montreal. CP acquired Delaware & Hudson and thus revived competition against Conrail in the Northeast.

By the close of 1990, Conrail operated about 13,000 miles of track, 2,400 locomotives, and 69,000 freight cars with major ports including Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, Boston, and Cleveland. During that year, revenues declined 1.1% to about $3.37 billion. The revenue-producing commodities were 18% chemicals and related products; 17% intermodal--trailers or containers on flatbed cars; 16% coal; 14% autos; 12% metals and related products; 10% food and grain; 9% forest products. The continuing recession kept high-revenue products such as autos and intermodal in weak demand, accounting for Conrail's lower revenues for the year. There was a 9% decline in traffic volume early in 1991 due to the recession. Conrail was able to institute cost controls, however. As a result, although revenues were down 4.9% in the first nine months of 1990, operating expenses fell 6.6% and operating income rose 7.3% . While the company's future is connected to the economy, Conrail performed well in its first major recession since going public.

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail)
Conrail system map with trackage rights in red.
Reporting mark	CR
Locale	Northeast U.S.
Dates of operation	1976–1999
Track gauge	4 ft 8+¹⁄₂ in (1,435 mm) (standard gauge)
Headquarters	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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History

Pre-history: 1973-1976

In the years leading to 1973, the freight railroad system of the U.S. was collapsing. Even after the government-funded Amtrak took over intercity passenger service in 1971, railroad companies continued to lose money due to extensive government regulations, competition from other transportation modes, and other factors. The Penn Central Railroad, formed in 1968 by the merger of the New York Central Railroad and Pennsylvania Railroad (and supplemented in 1969 by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad), declared bankruptcy in 1970, less than three years into its existence. The PC was a hopelessly entangled mess with almost no planning carried out prior to the merger between the Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central. For instance, each company's corporate cultures could not have been more different, creating much of the problems Penn Central experienced. At its lowest point the PC was losing over $1 million a day and trains were becoming lost all over the railroad.^[1] In 1972, Hurricane Agnes extensively damaged the already run-down Northeast railway network and threatened the solvency of even more railroads, including the somewhat more solvent Erie Lackawanna. In mid-1973, under Judge John P. Fullam, the bankrupt Penn Central threatened to end all operations by the end of the year if they did not receive government aid by October 1. At that time it would liquidate and cease operating completely, immediately threatening freight and passenger traffic in the United States. The Congress quickly came up with a bill to nationalize the bankrupt railroads. The Association of American Railroads, which opposed nationalization, submitted an alternate proposal for a government-funded private company. Fullam kept the Penn Central company operating into 1974, when, on January 2, after threatening a veto, President Nixon signed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 into law. The 3R Act, as it was called, provided interim funding to the bankrupt railroads and defined a new Consolidated Rail Corporation under the AAR's plan.

The 3R Act also formed the United States Railway Association, another government corporation, taking over the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to allowing the bankrupt railroads to abandon unprofitable lines. The USRA was incorporated February 1, 1974, and Edward G. Jordan, an insurance executive from California, was named president on March 18 by Nixon. Arthur D. Lewis of Eastern Air Lines was appointed chairman April 30, and the rest of the board was named May 30 and sworn in July 11.

Under the 3R Act, the USRA was to create a Final System Plan to decide which lines should be included in the new Consolidated Rail Corporation. Unlike most railroad consolidations, only the designated lines were to be taken over. Other lines would be sold to Amtrak, various state governments, transportation agencies, and solvent railroads. The few remaining lines were to remain with the old companies along with all previously abandoned lines, many stations, and all non-rail related properties, thus converting most of the old companies into solvent property holding companies. The plan was unveiled July 26, 1975, consisting of lines from Penn Central and six other companies—the Ann Arbor Railroad (bankrupt 1973), Erie Lackawanna Railway (1972), Lehigh Valley Railroad (1970), Reading Company (1971), Central Railroad of New Jersey (1967) and Lehigh and Hudson River Railway (1972). Controlled railroads and jointly owned railroads such as Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines were also included (see list of railroads transferred to Conrail for a full list). It was approved by Congress on November 9, and on February 5, 1976 President Ford signed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, which included this Final System Plan, into law.

The 1975 Final System Plan left major parts of the Erie Lackawanna Railway and Reading Company out of Conrail.

The Erie Lackawanna had been formed in 1960 as a merger of the Erie Railroad and Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad. It too was bankrupt, but was somewhat stronger financially than the others. It was ruled reorganizable under Chapter 77 on April 30, 1974 (as had the Boston and Maine Railroad), but on January 9, 1975, with no end to its losses in sight, its trustees reconsidered and asked for inclusion. The Final System Plan assigned a major section of the EL, from northern New Jersey west to northeast Ohio, to be sold to the Chessie System, which would help spur competition in Conrail's territory. Chessie however could not reach an agreement with EL labor unions, and in February 1976 announced that it would not be buying the EL section. The USRA hurriedly assigned large amounts of trackage rights to the Delaware and Hudson Railway, allowing it to compete in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC markets.

On the other hand, the State of Michigan decided to keep the full Ann Arbor Railroad, of which Conrail would only run the southernmost portion, operational. Michigan bought it and the whole line was operated by Conrail for several years until it was sold to a short line.

A large system becomes profitable: 1976-1997

Conrail was incorporated in Pennsylvania on October 25, 1974, and operations began April 1, 1976. The theory was that if the service was improved through increased capital investment, the economic basis of the railroad would be improved. During its first seven years, Conrail proved to be highly unprofitable, despite receiving billions of dollars of assistance from Congress. The corporation declared enormous losses on its federal income tax returns from 1976 through 1982, resulting in an accumulated net operating loss of $2.2 billion during that period. Congress once again reacted with support by passing the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (45 U.S. Sec. 1101 et seq.), which amended portions of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act by exempting Conrail from liability for any state taxes (45 U.S.C. 727(c)) and requiring the Secretary of Transportation to make arrangements for the sale of the government's interest in Conrail (45 U.S.C. 761). After NERSA was implemented, Conrail began to improve and reported taxable income between $2 million and $314 million each year from 1983 through 1986.

Although Conrail's government-funded rebuilding of the heavily dilapidated railroad infrastructure and rolling stock it inherited from its six bankrupt predecessors succeeded by the end of the 1970s in improving the physical condition of tracks, locomotives, and freight cars, the fundamental economic regulatory issues remained, and Conrail continued to post losses of as much as $1 million a day. Conrail management, recognizing the need for more regulatory freedoms to address the economic issues, were among the parties lobbying for what became the Staggers Act of 1980, which significantly loosened the Interstate Commerce Commission's rigid economic control of the rail industry. This allowed Conrail and other carriers the opportunity to become profitable and strengthen their finances.

The Staggers Act allowed the setting of rates that would recover capital and operating cost (fully allocated cost recovery) by each and every route mile the railroad operated. There would be no more cross-subsidization of costs between route-miles (i.e., rates on profitable route segments were not set higher to subsidize routes where rates were set at intermodal parity, yet still did recover fully allocated costs). Finally, where current and/or future traffic projections showed that profitable volumes of traffic would not return, the railroads were allowed to abandon those routes, shippers and passengers to other modes of transportation. With the Staggers Act, the railroads, including Conrail, were freed from the requirement to operate services with open ended losses for the public convenience and necessity of those who simply chose rail services as their mode of transportation.

Conrail began turning a profit by 1981, the result of the Staggers Act freedoms and its own managerial improvements under the leadership of L. Stanley Crane, who had been chief executive officer of the Southern Railway. While the Staggers Act helped immensely in allowing all railroads to more easily abandon unprofitable rail lines and set its own freight rate it was under Crane's leadership that Conrail truly became a profitable operation. Soon after Crane took office in 1981 he shed another 4,400 miles off the Conrail system in the following two years, which accounted for only 1% of the railroad's overall traffic and 2% of its profits while saving it millions in maintenance costs.^[1] The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 relieved Conrail of its requirement to provide commuter service on the Northeast Corridor, further improving its finances.

Conrail transfer caboose 18065 brings up the rear of a local freight passing Porter, Indiana, in the early 1990s.

After considerable debate in Congress, the Conrail Privatization Act of 1986 was signed into law by President Reagan on October 21, 1986. The largest initial public offering in US history came on March 26, 1987 when Conrail's stock, worth $1.9 billion, was sold to private investors.

Shift of passenger operations to State or Metropolitan rail authorities

Conrail inherited the commuter rail operations of its predecessor rail lines, and operated them until 1983, when these services were transferred to state or metropolitan transit authorities. Except for MARC, the transit authorities purchased the track and right-of-way on which their commuter operations ran, leaving Conrail freight operations as a tenant.

Metropolitan Boston

MBTA

Lower Hudson Valley of New York State and southwest Connecticut

Metro-North

New Jersey

New Jersey Transit

Metropolitan Philadelphia

SEPTA

Maryland

MARC ^[2]

Breakup and shared assets: 1997-1999

With Conrail's increasing success, two eastern rail competitors of Conrail engaged in a takeover battle to control the railroad and expand their systems. In 1997, however, the two railroads, CSX Transportation and the Norfolk Southern Railway, struck a compromise agreement to jointly acquire Conrail and split most of its assets between them, with Norfolk Southern acquiring a larger portion of the Conrail network via a larger stock buyout. Under the final agreement approved by the Surface Transportation Board, Norfolk Southern acquired 58 percent of Conrail's assets, including roughly 6,000 Conrail route miles, and CSX received 42 percent of Conrail's assets, including about 3,600 route miles.^[3]

The buyout was approved by the Surface Transportation Board (successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission) and took place on August 22, 1998. The lines were transferred to two newly-formed limited liability companies, to be subsidiaries of Conrail but leased to CSX and Norfolk Southern, respectively New York Central Lines (NYC) and Pennsylvania Lines (PRR). The NYC and PRR reporting marks, which had passed to Conrail, were also transferred to the new companies, and NS also acquired the CR reporting mark. Operations under CSX and NS began June 1, 1999.

As the names indicated, CSX acquired the former New York Central Railroad main line from New York City and Boston, Massachusetts to Cleveland, Ohio, and the former Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway (NYC Big Four) line to Indianapolis, Indiana (continuing west to East St. Louis, Illinois on a former Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad (PRR Panhandle Route line), while Norfolk Southern got the former Pennsylvania Railroad main line and Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad from Jersey City, New Jersey to Cleveland, and the rest of the former NYC main line west to Chicago, Illinois. Thus the Conrail "X" was neatly split in two, CSX getting one diagonal from Boston to St. Louis and Norfolk Southern the other from New York to Chicago. The two lines cross at a bridge southeast of downtown Cleveland (41°26′49″N 81°37′37″W / 41.447°N 81.627°W / 41.447; -81.627), where the former Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad crosses over the NYC's former Cleveland Short Line Railway around the south side of Cleveland.

In three major metropolitan areas - North Jersey, South Jersey/Philadelphia, and Detroit - Conrail Shared Assets Operations continues to serve as a terminal operating company owned by both CSX and NS. The Conrail Shared Assets Operations arrangement was a concession made to federal regulators who were concerned about the lack of competition in certain rail markets and logistical problems associated with the breaking up the Conrail operations as they existed in densely populated areas with many local customers. The smaller Conrail operation that exists today serves rail freight customers in these markets on behalf of its two owners. A fourth area, the former Monongahela Railway in southwest Pennsylvania, was originally owned jointly by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Pennsylvania Railroad and Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad. Conrail absorbed the company in 1993, and assigned trackage rights to CSX, the successor to the B&O and P&LE. With the Conrail breakup, those lines are owned by NS, but the CSX trackage rights are still in place.

Locomotives

Though Conrail was divided in 1999 between Norfolk Southern Railway and CSX Transportation, some locomotives still bear its name, albeit with the current railroad's number "patched" over the original Conrail number. Many CR units have similar features such as, "Bright Future" blue paint, flashing ditch lights, and Leslie RS3L horns.

Conrail 6114, a GE Dash 8-40CW, leads a train westbound out of Altoona, Pennsylvania.

Signals

Since Conrail acquired so many separate railways, and the North American railway signalling system is not standardized, operators needed to qualify on as many as seven different signaling systems. The varying systems include, but are not limited to, the Pennsylvania's position light signals, the NYC's searchlight signals and tri-light signals. Most of the existing technologies were defined by NORAC.^[4] Conrail itself even had its own, unique tri-light signal modernization program that was applied to many routes. Today, most Northeastern railroads associated with former Conrail assets are working towards standardization of all systems as traffic-light-style signals. Meanwhile, Amtrak uses a modified version of Pennsylvania's position light signals called the Position Color Lights.

Preservation

The Conrail Historical Society was formed to preserve and restore equipment, items pertaining to, and photographs of the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). The Society currently has over 700 members and they have also preserved an operating class N7E former Erie Lackawanna Railway caboose.

Notes

^ ^a ^b "Conrail, The Consolidated Rail Corporation". American-Rails.com. http://www.american-rails.com/conrail.html. Retrieved 2009-03-19.
^ Maryland Transit Administration
^ answers.com
^ http://www.railroad-signaling.com/aspects.html NORAC signal aspect reference

References

Timothy Jacobs, The History of the Pennsylvania Railroad, ISBN 0-517-63351-5
PRR Chronology
H. Roger Grant, Life and death of Erie Lackawanna, Trains February 1992
Bill Stephens and Craig Sanders, Cleveland: center of controversy, Trains July 1998

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Conrail

Conrail official site
Conrail Historical Society
Decision FD-33388 (Surface Transportation Board final decision about the Conrail split)

Books

Withers, Paul, (1997) Conrail, The Final Years 1992-1997 Withers Publishing. ISBN 978-1881411154

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Consolidated Rail Corporation

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