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Craig v. Boren

 
US Supreme Court: Craig v. Boren

429 U.S. 190 (1976), argued 5 Oct. 1976, decided 20 Dec. 1976 by vote of 7 to 2; Brennan for the Court, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and Stewart (as to result) concurring, Burger and Rehnquist in dissent. The Court announced for the first time that sex‐based classifications were subjected to stricter scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than was provided by the rational basis or “ordinary scrutiny” test. As stated by Justice William J. Brennan, the constitutional standard that would have to be met for a statute classifying by gender is that it “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives” (p. 197). This standard appeared to be somewhat less rigorous than the strict scrutiny test applied to “suspect” classifications such as race. Brennan claimed that (although the Court had never before mentioned it) this was the test that had applied to gender discrimination ever since Reed v. Reed (1971). (The period 1971–1976 coincided with a nearly successful effort at the congressional and state level to add an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution.)

The Oklahoma law at issue in Craig allowed females aged 18–20 to purchase beer of 3.2 % alcohol. Males could not purchase beer until age 21. The law was challenged by two underage men, Mark Walker and Curtis Craig, joined by a female beer vendor, Carolyn Whitener. By the time the case was argued at the Supreme Court, both men had turned 21, so the woman's standing proved decisive (see Standing to Sue).

Oklahoma defended the statute as a prophylactic against drunk driving, offering statistics showing that arrests of males 18–20 outnumbered those of females of similar age by a factor of nine for “drunk” driving (2 percent vs. 18 percent), by a factor of eighteen for “driving under the influence,” and by a factor of ten for public drunkenness.

Brennan ruled for the Court that, while enhancing traffic safety did demonstrate an important government interest, the statistical evidence offered by Oklahoma did not meet the other half of the test: the gender line drawn by the state did not “substantially” further the government's goal. Also, explaining that the Twenty‐first Amendment did not alter otherwise applicable equal protection standards, he rejected the state's argument that the extra legislative power secured by that amendment should cause this statute to be sustained.

Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the result and in all of the opinion except the discussion of the Twenty‐first Amendment. Justice Lewis Powell concurred but stated that he would have preferred a rule that said gender classifications must bear a “fair and substantial relation” to the object of legislation. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred but suggested that rather than three differing degrees of equal protection scrutiny the Court should apply the rule that states must govern impartially. For him the requirement of impartiality entailed measuring the importance of the government interest, the degree to which any classification furthers that interest, and the degree of obnoxiousness of the classification. While this law did further traffic safety somewhat, and while that was an important goal, he felt that the offensiveness of a gender‐based law outweighed these two considerations here.

Justice Potter Stewart argued that the rationality test employed in Reed v. Reed still was the appropriate test for gender discrimination, but that this statute did not satisfy even that minimum standard and thus was unconstitutional.

Justice William Rehnquist dissented, objecting both to the introduction of a new level of scrutiny and to its application to male plaintiffs, since males were not in need of special solicitude from the Court. He argued that rationality was the correct test and that the statistical evidence easily satisfied that standard. Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed general agreement with Rehnquist's dissent but argued that the Court should not have taken the case, because, he said, it should never have extended standing to Whitener, a mere saloon‐keeper.

— Leslie Friedman Goldstein

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US History Encyclopedia: Craig v. Boren
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Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), established the constitutional test for laws that discriminate on account of gender. In 1958, Oklahoma enacted a law allowing women to purchase beer containing 3.2 percent alcohol at age eighteen, while men could not do so until they reached twenty-one years of age. In 1972 Craig, a man under twenty-one years of age, and Whitener, a woman operating a bar, challenged the law in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that it constituted "invidious discrimination against males eighteen to twenty years of age," thus violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld Oklahoma's law, triggering a Supreme Court appeal.

Previously, gender distinctions were judged by a "rational basis test," which asked whether legislative bodies had reason to believe that sex discrimination in certain instances served the public interest. But in Reed v. Reed (1971), the Court broke with a century-long trend in Fourteenth Amendment interpretation, invalidating a Utah law that discriminated on account of sex, because it found that "rational basis" was not enough to sustain the discrimination. The Reed opinion appeared to signal a shift toward the application of the "strict scrutiny" test for racial classifications to gender classifications. Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) revisited the issues presented by Reed v. Reed, but did not clarify whether "strict scrutiny" would apply to gender discriminations. In Craig v. Boren the Court finally established which test would apply in gender classifications.

Oklahoma argued that the statute improved public safety, pointing to statistical evidence showing that men were slightly more likely to commit alcohol-related traffic offenses than women. The District Court, citing Reed v. Reed, had found that Oklahoma's statistical evidence endorsed the gender distinction, supporting the statutory goal of increased traffic safety. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that evidence to be exceptionally thin, and offered "only a weak answer to the equal protection question presented here." Justice William Brennan, writing for the 7 to 2 Court majority, emphasized that evidence used to defend discriminations would have to be compelling. Striking down Oklahoma's statute, Brennan stated that the "relationship between gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed v. Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective." Craig v. Boren established that the Court would apply neither "rational basis" nor "strict scrutiny" tests, relying instead on "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny of gender-based discriminations.

—R. Volney Riser

Wikipedia: Craig v. Boren
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Craig v. Boren

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 5, 1976
Decided December 20, 1976
Full case name Craig et al. v. Boren, Governor of Oklahoma, et al.
Citations 429 U.S. 190 (more)
429 U.S. 190; 97 S. Ct. 451; 50 L. Ed. 2d 397; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 183
Holding
To regulate in a sex-discriminatory fashion, the government must demonstrate that its use of sex-based criteria is substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Brennan, joined by White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens
Concurrence Blackmun
Dissent Burger
Dissent Rehnquist
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), was the first case in which a majority of the United States Supreme Court determined that statutory or administrative sex classifications had to be subjected to an intermediate standard of judicial review. (For more on different Equal Protection review standards, see the appropriate section in the article on the Equal Protection Clause.)

Contents

Facts

Oklahoma passed a statute prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21, but allowed females over the age of 18 to purchase it. The statute was challenged as Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation by Curtis Craig, a male who was over 18 but under 21, and by an Oklahoma vendor of alcohol.

Issue

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age based on their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, the Supreme Court examined for jus tertii (third party rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer.

Result

Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens (Justice Blackmun joined all but one part of the opinion; Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and Stewart wrote concurrences[1]). The Court held that the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had not been changed by the subsequently passed Twenty-first Amendment.

The court instituted a standard dubbed, "Intermediate Scrutiny", whereby the state must prove the existence of specific important governmental objectives, and the law must be substantially related to the achievement of those opinions.

As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to males between 18 and 20. To have standing, one must show a "nexus" of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of the statute. In this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party. The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other vendors have standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function".

Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that a higher standard of scrutiny was appropriate.

Dissent

Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Rehnquist dissented because he felt that the law only needed to pass the “rational basis” analysis. (Previous cases in this area, such as Stanton v. Stanton, had used only the "rational basis" test). Burger dissented because "a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities." He felt that the indirect economic injury to Whitener and other vendors introduced "a new concept of constitutional standing to which I cannot subscribe."

See also

Further reading

  • Gryski, Gerard S.; Main, Eleanor C. (1986). "Social Backgrounds as Predictors of Votes on State Courts of Last Resort: The Case of Sex Discrimination". Western Political Quarterly 39 (3): 528–537. doi:10.2307/448346. 
  • Segal, Jeffrey A.; Reedy, Cheryl D. (1988). "The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General". Western Political Quarterly 41 (3): 553–568. doi:10.2307/448602. 

References

External links

  • Text of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) is available from:  · Enfacto · LII

 
 

 

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US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
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