'It happened on my first visit to Paris. I was walking along one of those little streets in Montmartre, when I suddenly had the feeling that I'd been there before. It was all happening again ... .'
This is a characteristic account of
déjà vu (literally 'already seen') — the experience that one has witnessed some new situation or episode on a previous occasion. Perception of the scene is accompanied by a compelling sense of familiarity. Usually the sensation lasts only for a few seconds, but in some pathological cases it may be much more prolonged or, indeed, continuous. It is often accompanied by a conviction that one knows what is about to happen next — 'When I reached the square, I knew what I was about to see ....'
The
déjà vu experience is often reported by patients suffering from psychiatric disorders. It is known to be associated with temporal lobe lesions, and is one of the 'dreamy state' experiences characteristic of focal
epilepsy. But the phenomenon seems also to be experienced occasionally by the majority of normal people. Most commonly it occurs in youth, or under conditions of fatigue or heightened sensitivity.
Understandably, the sensation of having previously experienced the event in question suggests to the individual that he is recalling a previous occurrence. The present event is taken to be a 'second' occurrence; mystification and interest are thus focused upon the 'first' one. As the crucial aspect of
déjà vu is that the individual knows that he has not in fact previously experienced the event, lay explanations often posit psychic or magical processes. Such 'explanations' usually attribute unusual talents or powers to the individual concerned. Thus, one obvious 'explanation' is that the event has been 'revealed' to the individual prior to its occurrence. In that case he has demonstrated precognition, and is the fortunate possessor of the 'sixth sense' or the power of prophecy. More commonly, lay explanations make the presumption that the event has, in fact, occurred on a previous occasion, and focus on how the individual could have gained his knowledge of that 'first' occurrence. A common explanation is that the individual experienced the 'first' event in a previous life. His
déjà vu sensation may thus be taken as evidence for reincarnation. An associated view is that the 'first' event was witnessed by the individual but
through the eyes of another person. He is therefore taken to possess telepathic gifts. The other witness may be hypothesized to have existed at another period in time. In that case the present individual is presumed to have mediumistic powers. A somewhat more subtle hypothesis is that the 'first' experience took place in a
dream, a proposition that accords well with the dreamlike quality of the
déjà vu experience itself. The individual himself may feel, not that he has previously witnessed the event, but that he has previously
foretold it. But there is never any evidence of his actual foretelling, nor does he recall ever having done so. Thus he may speculate that the events were revealed to him in a dream, which would explain his failure to recall consciously his presentiment in the interim. Technically, this feeling is a
pseudo-presentiment, so termed because the belief is held only at the moment that he witnesses the event. A number of serious writers have maintained this 'dream' hypothesis.
As noted above, the last four explanations presuppose that
déjà vu is attached to a
second experiencing of the situation in question — in other words, that the individual is
remembering. Several psychological and psychiatric authorities have also taken this view, classifying
déjà vu as an example of paramnesia. For them the question becomes one not of how the individual could remember something that he has not experienced before, but of why he should
think he has not experienced it before. The obvious assumption is that the original experience aroused distress in the individual, so that its recall would prove painful to him. The standard psychoanalytic explanation of
déjà vu is that the original experience has been repressed and so, by definition, is no longer accessible to
memory. Any repetition of the experience cannot elicit conscious recall of the original occurrence. But it does constitute a 'reminder' to the ego, and it is this that is reflected in the
déjà vu feeling.
A more prosaic explanation of
déjà vu is that, although the overall situation is novel, a number of its component features have in fact been experienced before. For example, the observer may know for certain that he has never walked along this particular street before — indeed, he may never previously have visited the town or even the country in question. But there are many features which all streets have in common, and it is the combination of these specifics which brings some familiarity to this newly visited street. However, this suggestion applies more directly to what has been termed 'restricted paramnesia'. (An everyday example of 'restricted paramnesia' is the frustrating experience of being unable to identify a person whom one knows but in some other context.) There are pronounced phenomenological differences between the preoccupying puzzlement which accompanies a restricted paramnesia and the
déjà vu experience. In the former, one is well aware of those aspects of the situation which have been experienced previously (such as the other person's facial features, expression, and voice). The perplexity arises from the inability to reconstruct the totality of the previous experience (for example, the circumstances and context of previous encounters). In
déjà vu, the
whole of the new experience seems familiar, and so does the ensuing progression of events. Typically, the paramnesia experience is described in terms such as: 'I knew that I had met him before, but for the life of me I couldn't remember who he was ... .' Whereas
déjà vu is described as: 'I felt that I had lived through it all before, but knew that I hadn't.'
Two other suggestions should be mentioned. The first one, once held by psychologists, stresses the affective component and classifies
déjà vu as a paradoxical emotional experience. The argument would be that the sense of familiarity has reference, not to the characteristics of the situation, but to the observer's feelings. It is postulated that these are a carry-over of the emotional state associated with the preceding situation. The second suggestion is of more recent origin and focuses upon neurological function. Here the argument is that the two hemispheres of the brain may temporarily lose synchronicity. Thus the anomalous feeling of familiarity may be due to the fact that one side of the brain is receiving input a fraction of a second after the other.
A more fruitful psychological approach to the consideration of
déjà vu may be to de-emphasize the recall aspect, with its presumption of a 'previous event', and approach the experience in terms of its other name:
fausse reconnaissance (false recognition). Instead of 'Why is the observer unable to remember the previous situation?' the question now becomes: 'Why does the observer feel that he recognizes the present situation?' This, indeed, was the approach taken by
Pierre Janet, who was one of the first psychologists to identify, describe, and analyse the experience. He considered
déjà vu to be one outcome of the obsessional incapacity for active and adequate response to the pressures of reality. The essence of
déjà vu, he suggested, is not the 'affirmation of the past'; it is the 'negation of the present'. It is not a question of how the observer
remembers a previous event, but how he
perceives the present one.
At first sight, the classification of our topic as an anomaly of recognition rather than one of recall does not seem to offer any easier road to explanation. Certainly, conventional laboratory studies of recognition would seem to offer nothing which might throw light upon the
déjà vu experience. However, consideration of the views of
F. C. Bartlett, as presented in his classic work
Remembering, may yield some clues. Bartlett's central point, which has been re-emphasized by contemporary cognitive theorists, was that long-term memory is a dynamic, constructive process. We do not recall an event in its original form, nor even in a merely attenuated version. We
reconstruct it, drawing upon the
schemata or cognitive structures into which the perceived components of the event were organized. Thus, what is reconstructed during recall or reproduction shows not only omissions and abbreviations but elaborations and distortions.
On each occasion that we recall any given event, further distortions or elaborations are introduced. It could be said that in a series of recollections we are not recalling the original event at all, but our last recollection of it. The longer the series the more the remembered version will differ from the original, because each further recollection will involve distortions of distortions and elaborations of elaborations. If this line of argument (for which there is considerable experimental as well as observational evidence) is applied to the examination of recognition, some interesting implications emerge. Basically, recognition involves the acceptance of a 'good fit' or match of currently perceived material with recalled, imagined material. The better the level of match, the more pronounced will be the accompanying sense of familiarity. In the case of personal experiences, the familiarity includes an added dimension of personal identification. Clearly, the more often an original event has been recalled, the more modifications will have been introduced, and the weaker the subjective fit between our current recollection and any representation of the actual original material. Conversely, the sense of familiarity may now be evoked by the perception of material which differs considerably from the actual original, given that the differences are in line with the distortions and elaborations present in our recollection. If we have good reason to believe that it would be quite impossible for us to have actually experienced this new material previously, then our feeling of familiarity is naturally highly perplexing. It may well be that this perplexity, resulting from the discrepancy between objective knowledge and subjective feeling, constitutes what is termed
déjà vu.
In that case, why is the experience so rare? Perhaps the problem is not why
déjà vu occurs, but why it does not occur more frequently. There are several possible answers. One is that perhaps it does occur commonly, but that we register it only under certain conditions. But at the same time, it is probable that there are relatively few occasions when we can be objectively certain that we have not experienced the criterion situation previously. A first visit to a geographic area is one such example. Other cases where the total situation may be labelled emphatically as a personal 'first time' event are often ones of a heightened emotive nature, where we are likely to be more sensitive to our subjective state and more vulnerable to feelings of anxiety and perplexity. It should be noted that while we may be acutely aware that a given situation is a personal 'first', we have almost certainly experienced it at second hand, through descriptions, literary accounts, or films. Perhaps the obvious examples are marriage ceremonies, job interviews, and funerals. And it is of interest that, after the 'strange town' example, these are the very situations in which people most commonly report experiencing
déjà vu.
Purely psychological explanations of the kind discussed are hardly sufficient when the
déjà vu experience is part of an epileptic aura. In this situation one might presume that the spontaneous electrical discharge in an area of the brain (the temporal lobe) particularly concerned with memory has reactivated a distant memory from the memory store, which is now perceived as something the patient has previously experienced — as, indeed, he probably has.
Penfield's brain-stimulation studies on patients undergoing neurosurgical operations might be considered as supportive of such an explanation of the
déjà vu phenomenon, at least in cases when it is associated with temporal lobe epilepsy.
(Published 1987)— Graham F. Reed