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Defense Intelligence Agency

 
US Military History Companion: Defense Intelligence Agency

Creation of a unified Department of Defense (DoD) in 1947–49 was not accompanied by the unification of defense intelligence activities. Each of the military services maintained its own intelligence organization; indeed, maintaining these distinct capabilities had been a major demand of the military during deliberations over the creation of the CIA. But there were also a number of intelligence requirements that were either interservice or departmentwide. Thus, additional intelligence organizations designed existed to meet these broader needs.

In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara decided to rationalize much of the DoD's structure, and to improve resource management for broader defense intelligence efforts. The result was the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Each service continued to argue, however, that it had unique intelligence needs that could not be met by a “joint” agency, and so the separate service units survived as well.

DIA is headed by a three‐star military officer, a position filled by rotation among the services. DIA has been through several major reorganizations in the past few years, although its major functions remain the same: the collection and analysis of intelligence specifically related to military requirements. Collection is carried out overtly by defense attachés and covertly by the relatively new Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service (DHS). The functions of attachés remain known to host governments; DHS collectors operate under cover. DIA produces independent analyses and contributes to communitywide intelligence estimates. It is one of three “all‐source” intelligence analysis centers (along with CIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research).

The DIA has sometimes found itself torn between its military customers (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their organization) and civilian customers in the DoD. The Joint Chiefs may seek analysis to support specific or preferred positions; the civilians may prove skeptical of military‐produced analysis, which often tends toward more pessimistic assumptions about conflict and combat.

Competition with the military service intelligence units is less of a problem. But DIA has been among the intelligence agencies most severely hit by the end of the Cold War, which led to a 25 percent reduction in its personnel.

[See also Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence, Military and Political.]

Bibliography

  • Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, 1984; 2nd ed. 1992.
  • Patrick Mescall, The Birth of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in Rhodri Jeffrey‐Jones and Andrew Lownie, eds., North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays, 1991
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US Military Dictionary: Defense Intelligence Agency
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DIA

Established in October 1961 by President John F. Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, on the basis of the report by the Joint Study Group, which sought more effective ways of organizing U.S. intelligence activities. After World War II, each of the three military departments collected, produced, and dispersed intelligence, a system characterized by needlessly duplicated effort, and ineffective and expensive as well. Since its establishment, the DIA has filled a critical need for a central intelligence organization for the military and other policymakers.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

Intelligence Encyclopedia: DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency)
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The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) coordinates intelligence activities within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Established in 1961, DIA has faced a number of territorial challenges both from the intelligence components of the three major armed services, as well as from other intelligence agencies. DIA, which has some 7,000 civilian and military employees worldwide, is headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Its director is a three-star military officer who serves as principal military intelligence advisor to the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Background

Despite the congressional passage of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, which created unified military commands, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force each guarded their intelligence organizations. As a result, DOD leadership did not receive consistent, reliable intelligence, a shortcoming that contributed to the failed April 1961 invasion of Cuba. Even before that, President John F. Kennedy complained in his 1961 State of the Union speech about "a growing gap between decision and execution, between planning and reality." In February, 1961, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara informed JCS of his decision to create a Defense Intelligence Agency, and instructed the Joint Chiefs to develop a plan for the new organization, which began operation on October 1, 1961.

The intention behind DIA was that it should serve as a tight union, rather than a loose confederation, of defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities, so as not to increase the bureaucratic layering within an already thickly populated defense intelligence community. Its director would report to the secretary of defense through JCS. Upon establishment of DIA, the services transferred various intelligence functions to it gradually, so as to maintain the pace of ongoing activities. The job of DIA would be to collect, process, evaluate, analyze, integrate, produce, and disseminate military intelligence for DOD.

As DIA has admitted in its own official history, its attempts to establish itself as the central military intelligence organization within DOD met with continuing resistance from the military services during the 1960s. First, the services retained their own military intelligence organizations, and their leadership was often wary of sharing intelligence with a relative newcomer. The Vietnam War, in which DIA was tasked with helping to account for missing or captured military personnel, particularly tested the abilities of the fledgling agency.

By the mid-1970s, DIA had gained considerable funding, but its budget of more than $200 million annually made it a target for congressional inquiries, particularly by the Pike Committee, the House equivalent of the more well-known Church Committee in the Senate. Within the Intelligence Community, Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) criticized DIA's inability to effectively coordinate military intelligence activities on the part of the various services.

Executive Order 12036, signed by President James E. Carter on January 24, 1978, restructured the Intelligence Community and brought DIA's responsibilities into focus. The agency was subsequently reorganized into five directorates, concerned with production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 (joint intelligence) support. During the 1980s, a DIA white paper series on Soviet military capabilities gained wide respect in the intelligence community.

Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990, DIA established a 24-hour intelligence management center focusing on intelligence relating to the crisis. Some 2,000 DIA personnel participated in Operation Desert Storm, primarily through the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), which DIA established at the Pentagon to integrate intelligence from the war front. On the ground in Kuwait and Iraq, DIA personnel worked closely with military combat units.

In 1992, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, both controlled by the Army for decades, became part of DIA. The following year saw a thoroughgoing reorganization of DIA as part of the general military downsizing that followed the end of the Cold War. In October 1995, DIA established the Defense HUMINT [Human Intelligence] Service, or DHS.

Structure of Dia

Though DIA was conceived as a military organization, the majority of its personnel today are civilians. The director, however, is always a three-star officer—a lieutenant general or vice admiral. (The only exceptions were General Donald V. Bennett, director from 1969 to 1972, a four-star general, and Dennis M. Nagy, a civilian who served as acting director during the fall of 1991.) In addition to the Command Element, which includes leadership and support staff, DIA consists of three major sections: Analysis, Intelligence Operations, and Support Services.

Within the Analysis section are the directorates for Analysis and Production; Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2); and Policy Support. Analysis and Production manages key components of the intelligence cycle for DOD, its leadership, and its services. The directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2) supports the chairman of JCS and other uniformed leaders by providing a national-level focal point for crisis intelligence support. Within it is the Defense Intelligence Network, which operates a closed circuit DOD news network modeled on commercial news networks such as CNN, as well as INTELINK, a classified Internet. Policy Support works with the Office of the Secretary of the Defense, as well as the National Security Council and State Department.

Intelligence Operations includes the directorate for Intelligence Operations and the Central MASINT Organization. These are concerned, respectively, with human intelligence and measurement and signatures intelligence. Within the directorate for Intelligence Operations is DHS, the Defense HUMINT Service.

Under Support Services are the directorates for Administration and Information Systems and Services. Among the administration sections is the Counterintelligence and Security Activity, which works to counter foreign intelligence threats, conducts security and suitability interviews, and assists the Federal Bureau of Investigation and military investigative organizations in criminal and counterintelligence investigations. Information Systems and Services supports a number of activities, including the operation of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, a high-bandwidth system that makes possible fullmotion video teleconferencing and data exchange among major intelligence nodes.

In addition to these main sections, DIA also includes the Program Management directorate, under which is the Military Intelligence Board, the DIA director's advisory committee. Also outside the main sections of DIA is the Joint Military Intelligence College, which is accredited to award bachelor's and master's degrees in intelligence and strategic intelligence.

Further Reading

Books

Disposition of Production Records of the Defense Intelligence Agency: A NARA Evaluation. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1996.

Intelligence Agencies: Personnel Practices at CIA, NSA, and DIA Compared with Those of Other Agencies. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1996.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. The U.S. Intelligence Community, fourth edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

Scanlon, Charles Francis. In Defense of the Nation, DIA at Forty Years. Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2002.

Electronic

Defense Intelligence Agency. <http://www.dia.mil/> (April 14, 2003).

Defense Intelligence Agency. Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/> (April 14, 2003).

Wikipedia: Defense Intelligence Agency
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Defense Intelligence Agency
US-DefenseIntelligenceAgency-Seal.svg
Seal of the DIA
Agency overview
Formed 1 October 1961
Employees Approx. 16,500 (35% military, and 65% civilian)
Annual budget Classified
Agency executive Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA, Director
Website
www.dia.mil

The Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, is a major producer and manager of military intelligence for the United States Department of Defense, employing over 16,500 military and civilian employees worldwide. The Defense Intelligence Community is headed by the DIA, through its Director (who chairs the Military Intelligence Board), and coordinates the activities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force intelligence components. The DIA and DIC provide military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners within the Department of Defense and the United States Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition. DIA, designated in 1986 as a Defense Department combat support agency, was established in 1961 as a result of a decision by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, under President John F. Kennedy. The Department of Defense created DIA with the publication of Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, effective 1 October 1961. DIA was preceded by the Counter Intelligence Corps.

Contents

History

After World War II until the creation of DIA, the three Military Departments collected, produced and distributed their intelligence for individual use. This turned out to be duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each department provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense or to other governmental agencies.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 wanted to correct these deficiencies by assigning responsibility for Unified and Specified Command intelligence support. However, the intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, the coordination was poor and the first results were short of national reliability and focus. As a result of this poor organization, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the Joint Study Group in 1960 to find better ways for organizing the nation's military intelligence activities.

Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of his decision to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency in February 1961. He ordered them to develop a concept plan that would integrate all the military intelligence of the DoD. During the spring and summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (soon to become DIA's first director) took the lead in planning and organizing this new agency. The JCS published DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, and DIA began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space on 1 October 1961.

DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. The new Agency's mission was the continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Other objectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

Following DIA's establishment, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of defense intelligence. A year after its formation, in October 1962, the Agency faced its first major intelligence test during the superpower confrontation that developed after Soviet missiles were discovered at bases in Cuba by U.S. Air Force spy planes.

In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School (now the National Defense Intelligence College), and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" Buildings at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963. Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attaché System - the last function the Services transferred to DIA.

During these early years of DIA's existence, Agency attempts to establish itself as DoD's central military intelligence organization met with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the war increased defense intelligence's involvement in efforts to account for American service members missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

During the 1960s, DIA analysts focused on: China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its Cultural Revolution; increasing unrest among African nations; fighting in Cyprus and Kashmir; and the missile gap between the US and the Soviets. In the late 1960s, crises that tested intelligence responsiveness included: the Tet Offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria; North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo; and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The early 1970s were transitional years as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating its functions and establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. Challenges facing DIA at this time included: the rise of Ostpolitik in Germany; the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast; and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970s, as decision makers increasingly recognized the value of its products. Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Richard Nixon's visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and the prisoners of war being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved: détente; the development of arms control agreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; and global energy concerns.

Intense Congressional review during 1975-76 created turbulence within the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many Intelligence Community functions. At the same time, with American involvement in Vietnam ending, defense intelligence faced a significant decline in resources. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified Commands, and also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). Faced with similar resource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. Despite these and other Community-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the loss of resources during the 1970s limited the Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

As resources declined, intelligence requirements expanded. By the late 1970s, Agency analysts were focused on Lebanon, China, South Africa, terrorism, and Southeast Asia POW issues. In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA's relationship with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Secretary assigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resource area to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisory responsibility regarding policy matters. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the time centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijacking, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Middle East tensions.

Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American embassy in Teheran in 1979. Also, of serious concern were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, border clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA's national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support.

DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both field commanders and national-level decision makers. DIA's publication in 1981 of the first in a series of whitepapers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled Soviet Military Power met with wide acclaim. Ten such booklets were published subsequently over roughly the next decade. World crises continued to flare and included the downing of two Libyan Su-22s by American F-14s over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian air raids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

Other analysis at this time was focused on the war over the Falkland Islands, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. Other DIA analytical efforts during the mid-1980s centered on the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency's first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the previous year during a series of crises—the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro, unrest in the Philippines, and counter-terrorist operations against Libya.

Also at this time, the Agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union, counter-narcotics, war fighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. DoD moved decisively to improve its automated data bases and apply additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

Designated a combat support agency under the Goldwater-Nicholas Defense Reorganization Act, DIA moved quickly to increase cooperation with the Unified & Specified Commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine. Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran–Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation Earnest Will while closely monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS Stark, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The "Toyota War" between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA's heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Subsequently, the Agency provided threat data on "hot spots" throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing the impact of changes in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decision makers with intelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, events surrounding the downing of several Libyan jets, the civil war in Liberia, and the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Weapons acquisition issues, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism, likewise, remained high priority issues.

With the end of the Cold War, defense intelligence began a period of reevaluation following the fall of Communism in many of the East European countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoing economic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production, DoD-wide, as resource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agency objectives and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the concept of functional management to better address unified & specified command intelligence issues.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation Desert Storm began, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligence support effort. Most of them associated in some way with the national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in The Pentagon to integrate the intelligence being produced throughout the Community. DIA sent more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations to provide intelligence support. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern times.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the Army for over 20 and 50 years respectively, became part of DIA in January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, DIA has been active in nuclear proliferation intelligence collection and analysis with particular interests in North Korea and Iran as well as counter-terrorism. DIA was also involved with the intelligence build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was a subject in the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq. The Defense Intelligence Agency has conflicted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collection and analysis on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and has often represented the Pentagon in the CIA-DoD intelligence rivalry due to DIA's alleged clandestine HUMINT collection and often overlapping analysis products. Operational military intelligence has also been a focus, particularly in Iraq with insurgency threats and asymmetric warfare. The DIA is responsible for assessing the current and projected national security threats to the United States as well as presenting these assessments to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The DIA still actively maintains its responsibility for conventional strategic and operational military intelligence.

Overview

DIA's Director is a three-star military officer who serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence. The Director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community. The exact numbers and specific budget information are not publicly released due to security considerations. DIA has major operational activities at The Pentagon, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.38°50′53″N 77°00′43″W / 38.848°N 77.012°W / 38.848; -77.012, the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, Alabama. DIA is a member of the United States Intelligence Community, reporting to the Director of National Intelligence.

DIA possesses a diverse workforce skilled in the areas of military history and doctrine, economics, physics, chemistry, world history, political science, bio-sciences, computer sciences, and many other fields of expertise.

The Agency responds to the needs of a variety of customers from the President of the United States to the soldier in the field. Its work encompasses all aspects of military intelligence requirements – from highly complex missile trajectory data to biographical information on foreign military leaders.

In August 2008, the agency announced that it would subject each of its 5,700 prospective and current employees to a polygraph interrogation at least once annually.[1]

Mission

DIA's mission is to provide timely and objective military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners. It is considered to be a member of the Intelligence Community. The director of DIA is the main adviser to the United States Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters related to military intelligence. Under the support of the Military Intelligence Board, DIA unifies the Defense Intelligence Community on major issues such as the number of deployed forces, assessments, policy, and resources. To help weapon systems planners and the Defense community, DIA plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.

Vision

Integration of highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading edge technology to discover information and acquire knowledge that provides warning, identifies opportunities, and delivers overwhelming advantage to the nation's warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.

DIA seal

The dark blue background of the seal signifies the unknown, or the threats and challenges of the world around us. The flaming gold torch symbolizes the Intelligence function, lighting the way to a known world symbolized by the blue-green planet. The eternal search for knowledge and truth is the worldwide mission of DIA. The two red ellipses symbolize the technical aspects of intelligence today and in the future. The 13 stars and the wreath identify DIA as a Department of Defense organization.

Organization

DIA is led by a Director, typically a three-star military officer. The current director is Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA, who assumed command in March 2009. Letitia A. Long was appointed deputy director in May 2006, and Phillip R. Roberts has served as chief of staff since March 2007.

Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, USA; 17th Director of DIA

DIA is organized into these primary operational directorates:

Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH): This directorate manages DIA's and the DoD's human source intelligence collection, including the Defense Attache System, and is the primary interface between the Department of Defense and the National Clandestine Service. DH conducts worldwide strategic HUMINT collection operations in support of DoD, national intelligence requirements, and military operations. It deploys teams of linguists, field analysts, case officers, interrogation experts, technical specialists, and special forces. DH also absorbed the personnel and capabilities of the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2008.

Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection (DT): Collects Measurement and Signature Intelligence which is technical intelligence that – when collected, processed, and analyzed by dedicated MASINT systems – results in intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. This often includes radar intelligence, acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological intelligence. DIA is the central agency for MASINT collection within the US Intelligence Community.

Directorate for Analysis (DI): Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities, transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), terrorism, and missile systems and contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the President's Daily Brief. The Directorate of Analysis also manages the National Center for Medical Intelligence, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, and the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agency's facilities as well as in the field.

Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff (J2): Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence for defense policy and war planning.

Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DJ): Fuses tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence assets and serves as the center for coordination of these assets in response to combatant command requirements. The DIOCC is closely integrated with the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to provide a unified Department of Defense intelligence command center to combine operations with intelligence and advise the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, warfighters, and the DNI's National Intelligence Coordination Center.

DIA also runs the National Defense Intelligence College.

See also

References

  1. ^ Hess, Pamela, "Pentagon's Intelligence Arm Steps Up Lie-Detector Efforts", Arizona Daily Star, August 24, 2008.

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US Military History Companion. The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Copyright © 2000 by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
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Intelligence Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security. Copyright © 2004 by The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
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