Dictionary:
de·ter·min·ism (dĭ-tûr'mə-nĭz'əm)  |
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.
determinist de·ter'min·ist n.| 5min Related Video: determinism |
| Sci-Tech Encyclopedia: Determinism |
The principle that nature follows exact laws, so that what will happen in the future is a necessary consequence of the state of the world at any given moment in the past. This view, if fully adopted, implies that events which seem to occur by chance would be fully understood if more was known about them, and that apparently free thoughts and choices are explainable and in principle predictable in terms of neuroscience. In a looser sense, determinism refers to claims that mental freedom is much more restricted than people are inclined to suppose.
The question of determinism in physical science cannot be considered apart from the philosophical problem; this gives it added importance and forces its consideration in a very critical spirit.
The idea that the world is composed of atoms moving under the influence of certain forces according to certain laws can be traced back to the Greek philosopher Leucippus. Deterministic philosophy was prominent in the work of the seventeenth-century thinker René Descartes, and became widely known through his influence. Isaac Newton carried out a large part of the cartesian program. His theory explained so many natural processes that it began to appear that the universe since the time of Creation might actually have run its course in a deterministic fashion like a machine, without divine intervention. A century after Newton, Pierre Simon de Laplace argued that an Omniscient Calculator, provided with exact knowledge of the state of the universe at present, would be able to predict the entire future. See also Classical mechanics; Newton's laws of motion.
The quantum mechanics of the 1920s introduced the paradox of particles which are, at the same time, waves. A wave of length λ was supposed to accompany, or describe, a particle of momentum p = h/λ, where h is Planck's constant. The probability of finding a free particle is expressed by a (complex) wave packet (see illustration), and the particle has appreciable probability of being found only where the wave function is large; that is, within a region of size roughly Δx on each side of x0 in the illustration. A theorem of Fourier analysis shows that Δp, the range of momenta present in the wave packet, is related to Δx as shown below. This means that the more precisely the specification of a 
particle's position x is attempted by means of a localized wave function, the less precisely can its momentum be specified. W. Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, or indeterminacy, states that it is impossible to measure, and therefore to know, x and p any more accurately than is allowed by this relation, and there are also other pairs of dynamical variables similarly related.
A wave packet—of wavelength approximately λ, and produced perhaps by opening and closing a shutter—traveling through space.
There remains the question as to whether Heisenberg's principle is merely an unfortunate limitation on an experimenter's ability to know or whether it goes deeper. The general opinion of physicists is that of N. Bohr: the principle expresses a limitation of the precision with which concepts such as position and momentum can be applied at all. Therefore Laplace's Omniscient Calculator cannot predict the future. See also
Perceptive mathematicians have warned that determinism is not as obvious a consequence of newtonian physics as it might appear. A series of mathematical results have been proven whose general effect is that for the vast majority of dynamical systems any error in the initial conditions, however small, will be amplified, in general exponentially, and so quickly that the predicted result will soon bear no relation to reality. Thus unless it is assumed that initial conditions are known with perfect accuracy, and perfectly accurate computation takes place thereafter, the Omniscient Calculator will wind up getting everything wrong. See also Chaos.
Very few people now think that all events in the natural world are exactly determined. Experiments suggest that some human and animal behavior can reliably be predicted and controlled, but nobody knows the limits within which this can be done.
| Geography Dictionary: determinism |
The view that human actions are stimulated and governed by some outside agency like the environment or the economy. Individuals have no choice in regulating their actions, which may be predicted from the external stimuli which triggered them. This view is currently rejected.
| Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: determinism |
For more information on determinism, visit Britannica.com.
| Philosophy Dictionary: determinism |
The doctrine that every event has a cause. The usual explanation of this is that for every event, there is some antecedent state, related in such a way that it would break a law of nature for this antecedent state to exist yet the event not to happen. This is a purely metaphysical claim, and carries no implications for whether we can in principle predict the event (see chaos). The main interest in determinism has been in assessing its implications for free will. However, quantum physics is essentially indeterministic, yet the view that our actions are subject to quantum indeterminacies hardly encourages a sense of our own responsibility for them. See also dilemma of determinism, libertarianism (metaphysical).
| Sports Science and Medicine: determinism |
1. The assumption that nothing occurs without it having a cause, implying that if the cause of a phenomenon can be identified, the occurrence of the phenomenon can be predicted.
2. In psychology, the view that every aspect of behaviour or experience is related to an antecedent event, external or internal to the individual.
| Columbia Encyclopedia: determinism |
| Psychoanalysis: Determinism |
The most general meaning of "determinism," one applicable in most contexts, is the condition of being determined. If we understand determinateness to be a qualification of an object, determinism sees this determinateness initially as identification of the object (by several processes) and then as a causal response to a request for an explanation of why. All scientific or theoretical research thus necessarily presupposes determinism, but not in the sense of merely naming or the other operations of contemporary language, since the conditions for the initial application of language are not determinant. The meaning customarily given to determinism is determination, through the principle of causality, of the objective conditions for a phenomenon to occur.
Initially, the concept of determinism (Determinismus) arose within German theological and moral thinking, where it served narrow requirements related to predestination and was used to provide dogmatic answers; it did not have an objective theoretical meaning as such. Then in nineteenth-century scientific positivism, the "condition of determination" became associated with an empirical or descriptive principle of causality based on the primacy of observation, and not on explanation in the strict sense. Subsequently, for experimental science, determinism came to be considered a condition for the conduct of science itself, that is, as the epistemological principle of scientific knowledge. In this way determinism became normative. For example, physiological determinism claims to decide between the normal and the pathological in medicine, as shown by Georges Canguilhem.
Determinism, without being explicitly referred to, has been the ideal of mechanics since the seventeenth century. Projected onto objects made to satisfy the demand for causality, determinism ended up requiring that all phenomena satisfy the principle of ontological objectivity assumed in nature. Quantum physics, however, led to a retrenchment of this principle of establishing the conditions of determination, at least on the microphysical scale. Chaos theory has accentuated this point of view. In the sphere of the psyche, when Sigmund Freud attempted to explain dreams by psychoanalysis, he assumed a notion of psychic determinism in his theory of intentionality. He thus shifted the doctrine of causality in the direction of a theory of intentionality that assumed the existence of a subjective causality beyond or alongside objective causality, as shown by Pierre-Henri Castel in his introduction to Freud's Interpretation of Dreams.
Determinism essentially informs all theoretical or scientific research. So how can we explain the fact that modern philosophical thought, at least since Kant and Fichte, is so strongly opposed to it? Natural determinism, after serving as the principle of Spinoza's immanent metaphysics, has come to dominate science. This domination reveals that the term has undergone both a confinement and an unwarranted extension in twentieth-century thinking. The confinement of the term to natural science constrains philosophers of freedom from examining the conditions that determine what they say. In the nonclassical sciences, confinement of the term to well-behaved natural sciences subjects intellectuals to indeterminacy complexes that seriously inhibit their theoretical inventiveness and subjects them to denigration. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, is denigrated by positivist psychology and the various forms of psychological, organicist, and physicalist reductionism. As a result, Freudian psychoanalysis continues to search for an epistemological legitimacy based on theoretical models of the natural sciences, as was shown by Paul-Laurent Assoun. In physics, Max Planck and Werner Heisenberg created a quantum physics that was indeterminate from the point of view of classical determinism (as formulated by Pierre Simon Laplace). Because they were under the ideological spell of the old determinism, they could not completely accept their own discoveries as good science. There were two reasons for this situation: first, the concept of determinism arose not in the minimalist causal sense given above but in a theological sense, and second, ever since classical mechanics, the degree of determination that scientific objectivism has achieved has delimited the meaning and norm of determinism. Because they exclude identity and assume the differential nature of the symbolic, the status of the psyche and, even more so, the structuralist approach to the subject as taken by Jacques Lacan show that objective legality and causality could not serve as paradigms for everything we talk about. This is especially so for the unconscious, which, although "structured like a language," is not structured as a determining cause.
A robust determinism must renounce naturalist metaphysics, which has continued to control its principles. A new philosophy of "determined" freedom can be developed without indeterminism. Freud's determined freedom led Jean-Paul Sartre, probably wrongly, to reject the Freudian unconscious and to confront a "natural determinism". All of Freud's efforts, contrary to Jung's, clearly attempted to establish a paradoxical materialism that went beyond philosophical idealism and the old materialisms, dialectic or otherwise.
Bibliography
Assoun, Paul-Laurent. (1981). Introduction à l'épistémologie freudienne. Paris: Payot.
Castel, Pierre-Henri. (1998). Introductionà "L'interprétation du rêve" de Freud. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Canguilhem, Georges. (1989). The normal and the pathological (Carolyn R. Fawcett, Trans.). New York: Zone Books.
Kojève, Alexandre. (1990). L'idée du déterminisme dans la physique classique et dans la physique moderne. Paris: Hachette. (Original work published 1932.)
Koyré, Alexandre. (1957). From the closed world to the infinite universe. New York: Harper.
Lacan, Jacques. (1966).Écrits. Paris: Seuil.
—DOMINIQUE AUFFRET
| History 1450-1789: Determinism |
Determinism is a doctrine about causes and effects, some version of which has been in contention at almost every period in Western philosophy. In logic, a thing is said to be "determined" or "determinate" (from Latin determinatus) in its properties if, for each generic property, it has a fully specified property of that sort. A cat cannot simply be feline; it must be Siamese, slender, long-legged, raucous, and so forth. Nor can it be simply colored; it must be black, or white, or ginger, or teal. Most philosophers have held that actual concrete individuals are completely determined.
An efficient cause is said to be determined in its effects by prior causes if its action, and therefore its effects, are entirely determined by those causes. The most important case for early modern philosophers was the human will. The will in choosing can be inclined toward this or that choice by passion, sentiment, or reason: on that, almost all early modern philosophers agreed. According to some it is always determined by the totality of causes acting upon it. Others held that no combination of prior causes ever suffices: however "inclined" the will may be toward one alternative, it is never necessary that it should act thus, even given all the causes acting upon it.
Determinism, then, is the conjunction of two claims: that given the totality of causes that have combined to produce a certain effect, that effect cannot but occur (causes "necessitate" their effects), and that the action of a cause is fully determined by the prior causes that have set it in motion. The action of one billiard ball on another when colliding with it is not merely to make it move somehow, but to make it move in a precise direction with a precise speed (René Descartes [1596–1650] called the direction of a motion its "determination"). The word determinism was seldom used by early modern philosophers. David Hume (1711–1776) referred to the "doctrine of necessity" in his discussion of free will; Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694), objecting to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646–1716) version of determinism, said that it imposed a "more than fatal necessity" on human action. We may distinguish in early modern thought a theological and a physical determinism.
Theological Determinism
According to theological deteminism, everything that occurs in the world has been entirely determined by the creative act of God, the "first cause." Being omniscient, God knows timelessly all there is to know about his creation. Since (in the predominant view) God not only creates the world but continues to cooperate with every "second" cause, God knows timelessly not only what he does but also what every created thing will do. In particular the acts of the human will are, if not determined by God (here opinions differed), known to him eternally insofar as they are determined by causes acting upon the will. Since causes (including God) necessitate their effects, even what we regard as "free" choices are extrinsically determined.
Theological determinism was by no means a new doctrine. Medieval philosophers had dealt with it at length. During the Reformation it received new impetus from debates on predestination, debates renewed in the seventeenth century by the Jansenist controversy. Among early modern philosophers, some tried to limit divine knowledge, holding that before the fact God does not know what a free will chooses (Luis de Molina [1535–1600]). Others, including Descartes, denied that the determination implied by divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with freedom (Sixth Response). Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) and Leibniz, on the other hand, held that although the will does not have the "freedom of election," which consists in being able to choose otherwise than it actually chooses, it does have the "freedom of autonomy," which consists in an agent's acts being determined by that agent's own nature rather than by extrinsic causes.
Leibniz, whose God is the traditional omniscient creator of the world, agreed that all acts, including acts of will, are determined (Leibniz uses the term "certain"). But he denied that those acts are "necessary": God could have created a different possible world, and his will in creating the actual world was only inclined, not necessitated, by the aim that it should be the best of all possible worlds. Moreover, the human mind, like every individual substance, is utterly autonomous in its acts, since no substance ever genuinely affects another.
Spinoza, who identified God with the entirety of the world, held that all things occur of necessity. In particular the will has no freedom of election: what I do I must do. The human mind may, however, aspire to freedom of autonomy by virtue of acting according to reason, which is to say, out of what belongs most properly to its nature.
Physical Determinism
Although some ancient philosophers had entertained notions of physical determinism, the predominantly Aristotelian philosophy of the sixteenth century did not seriously raise the question. Natural causes—the active powers of nature—act, in the usual phrase, "always or for the most part": generally speaking, it was thought that there was a certain indeterminacy in their action; indeed, for some philosophers that indeterminacy provided an argument on behalf of divine concurrence or cooperation with natural causes, determining the precise nature of their effects.
With Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Descartes, natural philosophy began to take as fundamental the notion of a "law of nature." A law of nature admits no exceptions; causes acting according to laws of nature not only necessitate but wholly determine their effects. Physical determinism received its definitive statement in the Théorie analytique des probabilités (Analytical theory of probabilities) of Pierre-Simon de Laplace (1749–1827):
An intelligence which, for a given instant, knew all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings that compose it, and if it were, moreover, vast enough to submit all these data to Analysis, would embrace in one formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the smallest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes. (pp. vi–ix)
A world in which all causal interactions are governed by immutable, universal laws is a world from which, it would seem, not only freedom of election but even freedom of autonomy is excluded. If physics is in principle sufficient to explain the motions and qualities of material things, and if all my acts have—eventually as one traces back the chain of causes leading up to them—causes extrinsic to me, then the will is not only determined in its acts but determined extrinsically.
Freedom of election is an artifact of our ignorance of the springs of human action. Spinoza and Hume agreed in this diagnosis. But Spinoza, as we have seen, held that we can aspire, as reasonless beings cannot, to freedom of autonomy insofar as knowledge of causes and effects and of our own nature renders our will independent of the usual causes acting on it—the passions, for example. Hume, writing after the enormous success of Newtonian physics, deterministic through and through, offered a different sort of freedom or "liberty," which he regarded as sufficient to the purposes of moral judgment—in particular, the attribution of responsibility for our actions. An agent is "at liberty" if not physically or mentally constrained: not, that is, in chains or drunk or hypnotized. The prior determination of the will by whatever unknown, and perhaps unknowable, causes typically act on it does not constitute constraint.
Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) view of physical nature, or the "world of phenomena," much resembled that of Laplace. Like Hume, he did not seek theological backing for the necessity pertaining to the laws of nature; unlike Hume (but in certain respects in agreement with Hume's analysis of causal reasoning), Kant regarded the universality and necessity of the laws of nature as a prerequisite for understanding natural phenomena. Merely probable laws are not laws at all. The human being is, with respect to its existence in the natural world, subject to the same lawful necessity that governs all things. It is therefore determined in its motions. Whether that entails the determination of its volitions is another matter. A rational will is a will governed not by the laws of nature but by the moral law, a law which the will freely legislates for itself in accordance with reason. The result is that in considering ourselves as capable of moral action, and therefore as having freedom of autonomy (because the moral law, if it governs our will, does so according to our nature as rational agents), we must somehow think of ourselves as if we were not also things in the natural world (pp. 124–125). Kant admitted that it is not easy to see how the two "standpoints" can be maintained simultaneously. What keeps the standpoint of freedom from collapsing into the natural standpoint is the distinction between "subjectivity," the self experienced as part of nature and governed by its laws, and moral "objectivity," the self considered according to its own nature, capable of choosing on the basis of reasons, independently of the natural causes that would influence it.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by H. J. Paton. New York, 1964. Translation of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785).
Laplace, Pierre Simon. Théorie analytique des probabilités. 3rd ed. Paris, 1820.
Molina, Luis de. Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione, et Reprobatione Concordia. Lisbon, 1588.
Secondary Sources
Clatterbaugh, Kenneth C. The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637–1739. New York, 1999.
Nadler, Steven M., ed. Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony. University Park, Pa., 1993.
—DENNIS DES CHENE
| Veterinary Dictionary: determinism |
The theory that all phenomena are the result of antecedent conditions and that nothing occurs by chance.
| Wikipedia: Determinism |
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Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition and behavior, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences.[1] With numerous historical debates, many varieties and philosophical positions on the subject of determinism exist from traditions throughout the world.
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It is a popular belief that determinism necessarily entails that humanity or individual humans have no influence on the future and its events (a position known as fatalism); however, some determinists believe that the level to which human beings have influence over their future is itself merely dependent on present and past. Causal determinism is associated with, and relies upon, the ideas of materialism and causality. Some of the main philosophers who have dealt with this issue are Steven M. Cahn, Marcus Aurelius, Omar Khayyám, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, Baron d'Holbach (Paul Heinrich Dietrich), Pierre-Simon Laplace, Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and, more recently, John Searle, Ted Honderich, and Daniel Dennett.
Mecca Chiesa notes that the probabilistic or selectionistic determinism of B.F. Skinner comprised a wholly separate conception of determinism that was not mechanistic at all.[2] A mechanistic determinism would assume that every event has an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, but a selectionistic or probabilistic model does not.[3][4]
The exact meaning of the term determinism has historically been subject to rigorous scrutiny and several interpretations. Some people, called Incompatibilists, view determinism and free will as mutually exclusive. The belief that free will is an illusion is known as Hard Determinism. Others, labeled Compatibilists, (or Soft Determinists) believe that the two ideas can be coherently reconciled. Incompatibilists who accept free will but reject determinism are called Philosophical Libertarians — not to be confused with Political Libertarians. Some feel it refers to the metaphysical truth of independent agency, whereas others simply define it as the feeling of agency that humans experience when they act. Many will agree that determinism is the theory that human choices and actions can be determined from external causes; but free will is the theory that human choices and actions are determined by internal causes: that an individual is the prime mover of his life.
Ted Honderich, in his book How Free Are You? - The Determinism Problem gives the following summary of the theory of determinism:
In its central part, determinism is the theory that our choices and decisions and what gives rise to them are effects. What the theory comes to therefore depends on what effects are taken to be... [I]t is effects that seem fundamental to the subject of determinism and how it affects our lives.[5]
Causal (or nomological) determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity might be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.[6] Simon-Pierre Laplace's determinist "dogma" (as described by Stephen Hawking) is generally referred to as "scientific determinism" and predicated on the supposition that all events have a cause and effect and the precise combination of events at a particular time engender a particular outcome.[7] This causal determinism has a direct relationship with predictability. Perfect predictability implies strict determinism, but lack of predictability does not necessarily imply lack of determinism. Limitations on predictability could alternatively be caused by factors such as a lack of information or excessive complexity. An example of this could be found by looking at a bomb dropping from the air. Through mathematics, we can predict the time the bomb will take to reach the ground, and we also know what will happen once the bomb explodes. Any small errors in prediction might arise from our not measuring some factors, such as puffs of wind or variations in air temperature along the bomb's path.
Logical determinism is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present. This is referred to as the problem of future contingents.
Additionally, there is environmental determinism, also known as climatic or geographical determinism which holds the view that the physical environment, rather than social conditions, determines culture. Those who believe this view say that humans are strictly defined by stimulus-response (environment-behavior) and cannot deviate. Key proponents of this notion have included Ellen Churchill Semple, Ellsworth Huntington, Thomas Griffith Taylor and possibly Jared Diamond, although his status as an environmental determinist is debated.[8]
Biological determinism is the idea that all behavior, belief, and desire are fixed by our genetic endowment. There are other theses on determinism, including cultural determinism and the narrower concept of psychological determinism. Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, e.g. bio-environmental determinism, are even more common. Addiction Specialist Dr. Drew Pinski relates addiction to biological determinism:[cite this quote]
"Absolutely. It's a complex disorder, but it clearly has a genetic basis. In fact, in the definition of the disease, we consider genetics absolutely a crucial piece of the definition. So the definition as stated in a consensus conference that was published in the early '90s, it's a genetic disorder with a biological basis. The hallmark is the progressive use in the face of adverse consequence, and then finally denial."
Theological determinism is the thesis that there is a God who determines all that humans will do, either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of omniscience[9] or by decreeing their actions in advance.[10] The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free, if there is a being who has determined them for us ahead of time.
Often determinism is connected with ethics as an excuse for unethical actions. Hard determinists assert morality as being caused through hereditary and environmental means. Opposition to determinism promotes that without belief in uncaused free will, humans will not have reason to behave ethically. Determinism, however, does not negate emotions and reason of a person, it simply proposes the source of what causes us to fall back on moral behavior. Anyone susceptible to immoral actions from the idea of determinism was susceptible before and does not hold strong moral judgment prior to the idea.
Determinism implies the moral differences between two people are caused by hereditary predispositions and environmental effects and events. This does not mean determinists are against punishment of people who commit crimes because the cause of a person's morality (depending on the branch of determinism) is not necessarily themselves.
The idea that the entire universe is a deterministic system has been articulated in both Eastern and non-Eastern religion, philosophy, and literature.
A shifting flow of probabilities for futures lies at the heart of theories associated with the Yi Jing (or I Ching, the Book of Changes). Probabilities take the center of the stage away from things and people. A kind of "divine" volition sets the fundamental rules for the working out of probabilities in the universe, and human volitions are always a factor in the ways that humans can deal with the real world situations one encounters. If one's situation in life is surfing on a tsunami, one still has some range of choices even in that situation. One person might give up, and another person might choose to struggle and perhaps to survive. The Yi Jing mentality is much closer to the mentality of quantum physics than to that of classical physics, and also finds parallelism in voluntarist or Existentialist ideas of taking one's life as one's project.
This theory has also seen its use in popular culture in Japan. In an anime titled xxxHolic the term Hitsuzen is used to describe the Determinism theory although it has a more magical feel to its explanation.[2] [3]
The followers of the philosopher Mozi made some early discoveries in optics and other areas of physics, ideas that were consonant with deterministic ideas[citation needed].
In the philosophical schools of India, the concept of precise and continual effect of laws of Karma on the existence of all sentient beings is analogues to western deterministic concept. Karma is the concept of "action" or "deed" in Indian religions. It is understood as that, which causes the entire cycle of cause and effect (i.e., the cycle called saṃsāra) originating in ancient India and treated in Hindu, Jain, Sikh and Buddhist philosophies. Karma is considered predetermined and deterministic in the universe, with the exception of a human, who through free will can (somewhat) influence the future. See Karma in Hinduism.
In the West, the Ancient Greek atomists Leucippus and Democritus were the first to anticipate determinism when they theorized that all processes in the world were due to the mechanical interplay of atoms, but this theory did not gain much support at the time. Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws. The "billiard ball" hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (Laplace's demon). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.
Whether or not it is all-encompassing in so doing, Newtonian mechanics deals only with caused events, e.g.: If an object begins in a known position and is hit dead on by an object with some known velocity, then it will be pushed straight toward another predictable point. If it goes somewhere else, the Newtonians argue, one must question one's measurements of the original position of the object, the exact direction of the striking object, gravitational or other fields that were inadvertently ignored, etc. Then, they maintain, repeated experiments and improvements in accuracy will always bring one's observations closer to the theoretically predicted results. When dealing with situations on an ordinary human scale, Newtonian physics has been so enormously successful that it has no competition. But it fails spectacularly as velocities become some substantial fraction of the speed of light and when interactions at the atomic scale are studied. Before the discovery of quantum effects and other challenges to Newtonian physics, "uncertainty" was always a term that applied to the accuracy of human knowledge about causes and effects, and not to the causes and effects themselves.
Newtonian mechanics as well as any following physical theories are results of observations, and experiments and so they describe "how it all works" within a tolerance. However, old western scientists believed if there are any logical connections found between an observed cause and effect, there must be also some absolute natural laws behind. Belief in perfect natural laws driving everything, instead of just describing what we should expect, led to searching for a set of universal simple laws that rule the world. This movement significantly encouraged deterministic views in western philosophy.[11]
Some determinists argue that materialism does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the minds or souls of conscious beings.
A number of positions can be delineated:
Since the early twentieth century when astronomer Edwin Hubble first hypothesized that redshift shows the universe is expanding, prevailing scientific opinion has been that the current state of the universe is the result of a process described by the Big Bang. Many theists and deists claim that it therefore has a finite age, pointing out that something cannot come from nothing. The big bang does not describe from where the compressed universe came; instead it leaves the question open. Different astrophysicists hold different views about precisely how the universe originated (Cosmogony). The philosophical argument here would be that the big bang triggered every single action, and possibly mental thought, through the system of cause and effect.
Some proponents of emergentist or generative philosophy, cognitive sciences and evolutionary psychology, argue that free will does not exist.[14][15] They suggest instead that an illusion of free will is experienced due to the generation of infinite behaviour from the interaction of finite-deterministic set of rules and parameters. Thus the unpredictability of the emerging behaviour from deterministic processes leads to a perception of free will, even though free will as an ontological entity does not exist.[14][15]
As an illustration, the strategy board-games chess and Go have rigorous rules in which no information (such as cards' face-values) is hidden from either player and no random events (such as dice-rolling) happen within the game. Yet, chess and especially Go with its extremely simple deterministic rules, can still have an extremely large number of unpredictable moves. By this analogy, it is suggested, the experience of free will emerges from the interaction of finite rules and deterministic parameters that generate infinite and unpredictable behaviour. Yet, if all these events were accounted for, and there were a known way to evaluate these events, the seemingly unpredictable behaviour would become predictable.[14][15]
Many mathematical models are deterministic. This is true of most models involving differential equations (notably, those measuring rate of change over time). Mathematical models that are not deterministic because they involve randomness are called stochastic. Because of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, some deterministic models may appear to behave non-deterministically; in such cases, a deterministic interpretation of the model may not be useful due to numerical instability and a finite amount of precision in measurement. Such considerations can motivate the consideration of a stochastic model when the underlying system is accurately modeled in the abstract by deterministic equations.[16] A truly non-deterministic event is independent of the time and observer, thus it is called intrinsic random event.
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Compatibilism is the acceptance of freedom as voluntariness and Determinism. The negation of determinism is sometimes called indeterminism.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, quantum mechanics has revealed previously concealed aspects of events. Newtonian physics, taken in isolation rather than as an approximation to quantum mechanics, depicts a universe in which objects move in perfectly determinative ways. At human scale levels of interaction, Newtonian mechanics makes predictions that are agreed with, within the accuracy of measurement. Poorly designed and fabricated guns and ammunition scatter their shots rather widely around the center of a target, and better guns produce tighter patterns. Absolute knowledge of the forces accelerating a bullet should produce absolutely reliable predictions of its path, or so was thought. However, knowledge is never absolute in practice and the equations of Newtonian mechanics can exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions, meaning small errors in knowledge of initial conditions can result in arbitrarily large deviations from predicted behavior.
At atomic scales the paths of objects can only be predicted in a probabilistic way. The paths may not be exactly specified in a full quantum description of the particles; "path" is a classical concept which quantum particles do not exactly possess. The probability arises from the measurement of the perceived path of the particle. In some cases, a quantum particle may trace an exact path, and the probability of finding the particles in that path is one. The quantum development is at least as predictable as the classical motion, but it describes wave functions that cannot be easily expressed in ordinary language. In double-slit experiments, photons are fired singly through a double-slit apparatus at a distant screen and do not arrive at a single point, nor do the photons arrive in a scattered pattern analogous to bullets fired by a fixed gun at a distant target. Instead, the light arrives in varying concentrations at widely separated points, and the distribution of its collisions with the target can be calculated reliably. In that sense the behavior of light in this apparatus is deterministic, but there is no way to predict where in the resulting interference pattern an individual photon will make its contribution (see Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle).
Some have argued that, in addition to the conditions humans can observe and the laws we can deduce, there are hidden factors or "hidden variables" that determine absolutely in which order photons reach the detector screen. They argue that the course of the universe is absolutely determined, but that humans are screened from knowledge of the determinative factors. So, they say, it only appears that things proceed in a merely probabilistically-determinative way. In actuality, they proceed in an absolutely deterministic way. Although matters are still subject to some measure of dispute, quantum mechanics makes statistical predictions which would be violated if some local hidden variables existed. There have been a number of experiments to verify those predictions, and so far they do not appear to be violated, though many physicists believe better experiments are needed to conclusively settle the question. (See Bell test experiments.) It is possible, however, to augment quantum mechanics with non-local hidden variables to achieve a deterministic theory that is in agreement with experiment. An example is the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics.
On the macro scale it can matter very much whether a bullet arrives at a certain point at a certain time, as snipers are well aware; there are analogous quantum events that have macro- as well as quantum-level consequences. It is easy to contrive situations in which the arrival of an electron at a screen at a certain point and time would trigger one event and its arrival at another point would trigger an entirely different event. (See Schrödinger's cat.)
Even before the laws of quantum mechanics were fully developed, the phenomenon of radioactivity posed a challenge to determinism. A gram of uranium-238, a commonly occurring radioactive substance, contains some 2.5 x 1021 atoms. By all tests known to science these atoms are identical and indistinguishable. Yet about 12600 times a second one of the atoms in that gram will decay, giving off an alpha particle. This decay does not depend on external stimulus and no extant theory of physics predicts when any given atom will decay, with realistically obtainable knowledge. The uranium found on earth is thought to have been synthesized during a supernova explosion that occurred roughly 5 billion years ago. For determinism to hold, every uranium atom must contain some internal "clock" that specifies the exact time it will decay.[citation needed] And somehow the laws of physics must specify exactly how those clocks were set as each uranium atom was formed during the supernova collapse.
Exposure to alpha radiation can cause cancer. For this to happen, at some point a specific alpha particle must alter some chemical reaction in a cell in a way that results in a mutation. Since molecules are in constant thermal motion, the exact timing of the radioactive decay that produced the fatal alpha particle matters. If probabilistically determined events do have an impact on the macro events—such as when a person who could have been historically important dies in youth of a cancer caused by a random mutation—then the course of history is not determined from the dawn of time.
The time dependent Schrödinger equation gives the first time derivative of the quantum state. That is, it explicitly and uniquely predicts the development of the wave function with time.
So quantum mechanics is deterministic, provided that one accepts the wave function itself as reality (rather than as probability of classical coordinates). Since we have no practical way of knowing the exact magnitudes, and especially the phases, in a full quantum mechanical description of the causes of an observable event, this turns out to be philosophically similar to the "hidden variable" doctrine.
According to some, quantum mechanics is more strongly ordered than Classical Mechanics, because while Classical Mechanics is chaotic, quantum mechanics is not. For example, the classical problem of three bodies under a force such as gravity is not integrable, while the quantum mechanical three body problem is tractable and integrable, using the Faddeev Equations. That is, the quantum mechanical problem can always be solved to a given accuracy with a large enough computer of predetermined precision, while the classical problem may require arbitrarily high precision, depending on the details of the motion. This does not mean that quantum mechanics describes the world as more deterministic, unless one already considers the wave function to be the true reality. Even so, this does not get rid of the probabilities, because we can't do anything without using classical descriptions, but it assigns the probabilities to the classical approximation, rather than to the quantum reality.
Asserting that quantum mechanics is deterministic by treating the wave function itself as reality implies a single wave function for the entire universe, starting at the origin of the universe. Such a "wave function of everything" would carry the probabilities of not just the world we know, but every other possible world that could have evolved. For example, large voids in the distributions of galaxies are believed by many cosmologists to have originated in quantum fluctuations during the big bang. (See cosmic inflation and primordial fluctuations.) If so, the "wave function of everything" would carry the possibility that the region where our Milky Way galaxy is located could have been a void and the Earth never existed at all. (See large-scale structure of the cosmos.)
Intrinsic to the debate concerning determinism is the issue of first cause. Deism, a philosophy articulated in the seventeenth century, holds that the universe has been deterministic since creation, but ascribes the creation to a metaphysical God or first cause outside of the chain of determinism. God may have begun the process, Deism argues, but God has not influenced its evolution. This perspective illustrates a puzzle underlying any conception of determinism:
Assume: All events have causes, and their causes are all prior events. There is no cycle of events such that an event (possibly indirectly) causes itself.
The picture this gives us is that Event AN is preceded by AN-1, which is preceded by AN-2, and so forth.
Under these assumptions, two possibilities seem clear, and both of them question the validity of the original assumptions:
Under this analysis the original assumption must have something wrong with it. It can be fixed by admitting one exception, a creation event (either the creation of the original event or events, or the creation of the infinite series of events) that is itself not a caused event in the sense of the word "caused" used in the formulation of the original assumption. Some agency, which many systems of thought call God, creates space, time, and the entities found in the universe by means of some process that is analogous to causation but is not causation as we know it. This solution to the original difficulty has led people to question whether there is any reason for there only being one divine quasi-causal act, whether there have not been a number of events that have occurred outside the ordinary sequence of events, events that may be called miracles, or accidents. Another possibility is that the "last event" loops back to the "first event" causing an infinite loop. If you were to call the Big Bang the first event, you would see the end of the Universe as the "last event". In theory, the end of the Universe would be the cause of the beginning of the Universe. You would be left with an infinite loop of time with no real beginning or end. This theory eliminates the need for a first cause, but does not explain why there should be a loop in time. A further problem is that an infinite series of events before any particular event would make it impossible for the event to occur. If there are an infinite number of yesterdays, how do you get to today?
Immanuel Kant carried forth this idea of Leibniz in his idea of transcendental relations, and as a result, this had profound effects on later philosophical attempts to sort these issues out. His most influential immediate successor, a strong critic whose ideas were yet strongly influenced by Kant, was Edmund Husserl, the developer of the school of philosophy called phenomenology. But the central concern of that school was to elucidate not physics but the grounding of information that physicists and others regard as empirical. In an indirect way, this train of investigation appears to have contributed much to the philosophy of science called logical positivism and particularly to the thought of members of the Vienna Circle, all of which have had much to say, at least indirectly, about ideas of determinism.
decision rules and emergent social norms. Psychological Review, 110, 3–28
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| Translations: Determinism |
Dansk (Danish)
n. - determinisme
Nederlands (Dutch)
determinisme (ontkenning van wilsvrijheid)
Français (French)
n. - déterminisme
Deutsch (German)
n. - Determinismus, (Lehre von der Unfreiheit des menschl. Willens)
Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - (φιλοσ.) αιτιοκρατία, ντετερμινισμός
Italiano (Italian)
determinismo
Português (Portuguese)
n. - determinismo (m)
Español (Spanish)
n. - determinismo
Svenska (Swedish)
n. - filos. determinism
中文（简体）(Chinese (Simplified))
决定论
中文（繁體）(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 決定論
العربيه (Arabic)
(الاسم) مذهب الحتميه, مذهب يقول بأن كينونه أو أفعال المر هي ثمرة عوامل لا يستطيع اختيارها
עברית (Hebrew)
n. - דטרמיניזם, תיאוריה לפיה כל פעולות האדם נשלטות ע"י סיבות שאינן תלויות ברצון
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