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Engel v. Vitale

 
US Supreme Court: Engel v. Vitale
Engel v. Vitale

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370 U.S. 421 (1962), argued 3 Apr. 1962, decided 25 June 1962 by vote of 7 to 1; black for the Court, Douglas concurring, Stewart in dissent, White not participating. The Supreme Court did not work from a blank slate when it first faced the constitutionality of governmentally sponsored prayers in public schools. In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947), *Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), and Zorach v. Clauson (1952), it had held the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to require a “wall of separation” between church and state. The height of this “wall,” however, was unclear. Everson and Zorach allowed public accommodation of religious practices, but McCollum struck them down. Additionally, during this period the Court declined to hear Doremus v. Board of Education (1952)—a case squarely raising the constitutionality of Bible reading in public schools. Nine years later, in Engel v. Vitale (1962), it took up a similar question.

Not only was the Court's slate cluttered with legal precedents, but it also contained the badge of modern constitutional litigation: substantial interest group presence. Pushing the strong separationist line it had drawn since Everson, the American Civil Liberties Union joined the parents of ten public school students in a suit claiming that a state‐authored prayer—“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country”—was an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Supporting the ACLU position were amicus curiae briefs filed by the American Ethical Union, the American Jewish Committee (joined by the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith), and the Synagogue Council of America (joined by the National Community Relations Advisory Council). (See Amicus Brief.)

Essentially, the separationist argument boiled down to this: any state support given to religion, either direct or indirect, violates the Constitution. In support of this contention, these litigants offered legal precedents and a history of the religion clauses that drew heavily from the writings of Thomas Jefferson (the “wall” metaphor was initially his) and James Madison. Particular emphasis was placed on the latter's “Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.”

Although they had the numerical edge, separationist groups were not the only organized litigators involved in Engel. Sharing oral argument with counsel for the school board was Porter R. Chandler, an attorney frequently called “the Cardinal's lawyer” because of his close association with the Archdiocese of New York. Chandler appended himself to the case by intervening on behalf of parents and children in the school district. Appearing as amicus curiae in support of the prayer were the Board of Regents of the State of New York and twenty state attorneys general. Essentially, they contended that the prayer, because it created no Establishment Clause problems, facilitated free exercise values, was not coercive, and involved no expenditure of public monies.

The majority opinion of Justice Hugo Black sided with separationist interests. He held that use of public schools to encourage prayer was “a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause” (p. 424). Drawing solely on British and American history to support this judgment, Black cited no precedent to reach this conclusion. Seemingly as an afterthought, he commented that the Constitution did not require that all religious values be purged from public life, but merely that schools could not sponsor them.

Justice Potter Stewart tendered the sole dissent, charging the majority with misconstruing the meaning of the First Amendment's religious clauses. His reading of them led him to two conclusions: government cannot coerce one's religious beliefs because (1) the Free Exercise Clause was preeminent and (2) the Establishment Clause simply forbids governmental establishment of an official church. Though unpersuasive to others on the Court at this time, the second line of argument was to be given new life by Justice William Rehnquist in his Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) dissent.

See also Religion.

— Joseph F. Kobylka

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US Government Guide: Engel v. Vitale
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370 U.S. 421 (1962)
Vote: 7–1
For the Court: Black
Concurring: Douglas
Dissenting: Stewart
Not participating: White

The Board of Regents of the state of New York has the authority to supervise the state's educational system. In 1961, this state education board composed a short prayer: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.” The Board of Regents recommended daily recitation in schools of this nondenominational prayer, on a voluntary basis.

Although the Regents prayer was only a recommendation, the New Hyde Park Board of Education required that this prayer be said aloud at the beginning of each school day by each class of students in the district and in the presence of a teacher. The parents of 10 students objected to this requirement as a violation of the principle of separation of church and state in the 1st Amendment to the Constitution. They took legal action to compel the local board of education to discontinue the use in public schools of an official prayer that was contrary to their beliefs and practices.

The Issue

Did the New York Board of Regents and the New Hyde Park Board of Education violate the 1st Amendment ban on laws “respecting an establishment of religion”?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court decided to strike down the Regents prayer. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, said that the primary concern in this case was the creation of the prayer and the subsequent distribution of it throughout the state by an official agency of the state government. These actions violated the establishment clause of the 1st Amendment, which was applicable to the state of New York through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Black concluded, “Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary [in school districts other than New Hyde Park] can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause [which] is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.”

Dissent

Justice Potter Stewart dissented on the grounds that the Regents prayer was nondenominational and voluntary. Justice Stewart wrote: “With all due respect, I think the Court has misapplied a great constitutional principle. I cannot see how an ‘official religion’ is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of the Nation.”

Significance

This case, in combination with the decision in Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), established a strong position in favor of a strict separation of church and state. However, opponents have continued to challenge this view. In his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), Justice William Rehnquist rejected the idea of strict separation of church and state. Rather, he argued, the establishment clause of the 1st Amendment was meant only to prevent the government from favoring one religion over another.

See also Abington School District v. Schempp; Establishment clause; Religious issues under the Constitution; Wallace v. Jaffree

Law Encyclopedia: Engel v. Vitale
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This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

In 1962, the Supreme Court struck down a state-sponsored prayer in New York public schools, in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601, the first in a line of decisions banning school prayer. In finding a twenty-two-word voluntary prayer unconstitutional, the Court opened a Pandora's box. For the next three decades, public anger brought many calls for a constitutional amendment to restore what Engel took away. On the other hand, the ruling was a landmark victory for church-state separationists who marked it as the beginning of a new era in First Amendment doctrine.

The origins of the case lay in a controversial education project in the early 1950s, started by the New York Board of Regents, a bipartisan citizen commission appointed by the New York State Legislature to oversee state schools. The regents set out to recommend a plan for "moral education," the most controversial part of which included prayer. Religious leaders naturally differed over the wording of a proposed prayer intended to be recited by students each morning, but in 1951, a compromise resulted in what they hoped would be an inoffensive solution. Included as part of the regents' Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools, the prayer went "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we Beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."

Going out of their way to avoid trouble, the regents made the prayer entirely optional. Both local school boards and parents could decide if it would be used. Nevertheless, its authors had not written it only to try their hand at prayer making. "We believe," they wrote, "that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program." But fearing religious and legal controversy, New York school districts shunned the prayer. They had good reason: not only was the state quite ethnically and religiously diverse, but also religious instruction in public schools had been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1948 (McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 549). Most school districts followed the lead of New York City and ignored the prayer. Only about 10 percent of them were using it by the late 1950s.

In 1958, the prayer provoked a lawsuit (Engel). Five parents of students in the small suburb of New Hyde Park, Long Island, brought suit to stop its use in their schools. Two parents were Jewish, the third was Unitarian, the fourth was a member of the Ethical Culture Society, and the fifth was a self-professed atheist. They believed that the school system was coercing their children into saying the regents' prayer, even though individually, their children could be excused from participating. The difficulty of granting children the permission to step out of the room during recitation of the prayer had, they argued, made the prayer effectively compulsory. Furthermore, voluntary or not, they said, the prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"). The parents received substantial help in their suit from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which had been advocating strict separation of church and state for many years.

At first, the lawsuit failed. The plaintiffs asked the New York State Supreme Court— acting as a trial court — to stop use of the prayer. It refused. Justice Bernard S. Meyer found the prayer clearly religious, but not a violation of the First Amendment. Instead, he ordered school districts to set up safeguards against "embarrassments and pressures" upon children who did not wish to participate. The New York Appellate Division upheld the decision. So did the state's Court of Appeals, by a vote of 5-2. It said the nation's founders had designed the Establishment Clause to prohibit adopting an official religion or favoring a particular religion. "They could not have meant to prohibit mere professions of belief in God," the court held, "for if that were so, they themselves in many ways were violating the rule when and after they adopted it."

After agreeing to review the case, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on April 3, 1962. Attorney William J. Butler made the following case for the plaintiffs: all state support to religion violates the First Amendment, and the prayer constituted the "teaching of religion in a public institution" and should therefore be banned. Several powerful groups joined the plaintiffs by filing friend-of-the-court briefs. These included the ACLU; the American Jewish Committee, joined by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; the Synagogue Council of America, joined by the National Community Relations Advisory Council; and the American Ethical Union. These organizations took different positions. The American Ethical Union saw the prayer as "governmental preference for theism in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." The Synagogue Council argued that any school prayer was unconstitutional— even if voluntary — because it constituted "state aid to religion."

The school board defended the prayer on several grounds. It cited the second part of the First Amendment's religious guarantees, the Free Exercise Clause ("or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"). The prayer was an example of free exercise, Attorney Bertram B. Daiker argued, that fell far short of establishing a religion because it was optional, not compulsory. Daiker also found authority in the nation's traditions, calling the prayer "fully in accord with the tradition and heritage that has been handed down to us." Like the plaintiffs, the school board had powerful friends in court. Briefs supporting the prayer came from nineteen state attorneys general who also saw religious and national tradition under attack. The attorneys general said the nation's founders "would be profoundly shocked" by the lawsuit.

On June 25, 1962, the groundbreaking decision was delivered. By a 7-1 majority, the Supreme Court found the prayer unconstitutional (the ninth justice, Byron R. White, did not participate). Justice Hugo L. Black's majority opinion called the prayer "wholly inconsistent" with the Establishment Clause. A considerable series of precedents existed from 1940 on for the ruling, but Black did not cite it. Instead, he recalled the bitter history of church-state conflict in England and colonial America, noting that by the time the Constitution was written, "there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of church and state." The First Amendment was added to prevent that union, which "tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Black scorned the school board's claim that the regents' prayer was harmless. Neither its brevity nor its voluntary nature nor its nondenominational status could protect it from the Constitution. "[O]ne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way [lies] in the government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services," wrote Black.

Critics would immediately blast the Engel decision. In a move that seemed to anticipate this response, Black wrote,

It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong… . It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.

The Court's message to government was simple: stay out of the prayer business, and leave it to religious leaders.

In a sole dissent, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the majority had overstated the meaning of the Establishment Clause: it prevented only the creation of official religions. "I cannot see how an ‘official religion' is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it," he wrote, and his view was prophetic. For the next thirty years, advocates of school prayer could not see how, either. By 1985, when the school prayer ban reached a new level in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued similarly in his dissent to the majority ruling banning a so-called moment of silence in the classroom.

Engel was only the first ban against prayer in public schools; a year later, the Court returned to the issue in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, with even more far-reaching results. The immediate effect was the end of the regents' prayer. In a much broader sense, by sounding the death knell for a traditional practice, Engel created an uproar of protest that continues today.

See: Abington School District v. Schempp; Schools and School Districts.

Wikipedia: Engel v. Vitale
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Engel v. Vitale
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 3, 1962
Decided June 25, 1962
Full case name Steven I. Engel, et al. v. William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.'
Citations 370 U.S. 421 (more)
82 S. Ct. 1261; 8 L. Ed. 2d 601; 1962 U.S. LEXIS 847; 20 Ohio Op. 2d 328; 86 A.L.R.2d 1285
Prior history 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd, 176 N.E.2d 579 (N.Y. 1961)
Subsequent history 186 N.E.2d 124 (N.Y. 1962)
Holding
Government-directed prayer in public schools, even if it is denominationally neutral and non-mandatory, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Black, joined by Warren, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan
Dissent Stewart
Frankfurter and White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that determined that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose an official school prayer and require its recitation in public schools.

Contents

Background of the case

The case was brought by the families of public school students in New Hyde Park, New York who complained the prayer to "Almighty God" contradicted their religious beliefs. They were supported by groups opposed to the school prayer including rabbinical organizations, Ethical Culture, and Judaic organizations. The prayer in question was:

Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country. Amen.

The plaintiffs argued that opening the school day with such a prayer (even if students are not required to recite it) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth), which says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The governments of twenty-two states[1] signed on to an amicus curiae brief urging affirmance of the New York Court of Appeals decision that upheld the constitutionality of the prayer. The American Ethical Union, the American Jewish Committee, and the Synagogue Council of America each submitted briefs urging the Court to instead reverse and rule that the prayer was unconstitutional.

The Court's decision

The court decided that government-directed prayer in public schools was an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause. This was decided in a vote of 6-1, because before the decision could be announced, Justice Felix Frankfurter suffered a cerebral stroke that forced him to retire, and Justice Byron White took no part in the case.[2]

Black's majority opinion

Justice Hugo Black argued the importance of separation between church and state by giving a lengthy history of the issue, beginning with the sixteenth century in England. He then claimed the prayer is a religious activity by the very nature of it being a prayer. The majority further ruled that prescribing such a religious activity for school children violates the Establishment Clause. The program, created by government officials to promote a religious belief, is therefore impermissible.

In response to the defendant's claims that: (a) people respect any specific established religion; and (b) the prayer is voluntary, Black's opinions held that neither of these claims frees it from contradicting the Establishment Clause. The opinion held that the fact that it promotes a religion is sufficient to conclude it is in violation, even if that promotion is not coercive. Furthermore, the opinion held that the fact that the prayer is vaguely worded enough not to promote any particular religion is not a sufficient defense, as it still promotes a family of religions (those that recognize "Almighty God"), which is also a violation of the Establishment Clause.

Stewart's dissent

In his dissent, Potter Stewart argued that the majority's background narratives regarding England, the Book of Common Prayer, and the separation of church and state were irrelevant, as England had then and has now an established religion. Stewart believed that the real issue was on prohibiting those who want to begin a school day with prayer from doing so. Moreover, he argued that phrases like, "the wall of separation," are nowhere in the Constitution and Black used them uncritically. Stewart then listed the religious references in the three branches of the federal government and on American coins, in the National Anthem, in the Pledge of Allegiance, and in one of the court's recent decisions, Zorach v. Clauson. He argued that neither these examples, nor the voluntary prayer in New York established a religion.

Subsequent history

Engel became the basis for several subsequent decisions limiting government-directed prayer in school. In Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), the Supreme Court ruled Alabama's law permitting one minute for prayer or meditation was unconstitutional. In Lee v. Weisman (1992), the court prohibited clergy-led prayer at high school graduation ceremonies. Lee v. Weisman, in turn, was a basis for Santa Fe ISD v. Doe (2000), in which the Court extended the ban to school sanctioning of student-led prayer at high school football games.

See also

References

  1. ^ The amicus curiae was joined by the attorneys general of Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia.
  2. ^ http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=370&invol=421

External links

  • Text of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) is available from:  · Enfacto · Findlaw

 
 

 

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US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
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Law Encyclopedia. West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Copyright © 1998 by The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
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